





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































	 1286II	 1291II	 1296I	 1302II	 1308I	 1313II	 1320II	 Total	 Avg.	
Curfew	 36	 72	 43	 44	 10	 35	 7	 247	 35	
Arms	 52	 60	 104	 78	 43	 103	 97	 537	 77	
Gambling	 71	 79	 28	 -	 39	 34	 25	 276	 46	




































































































	 1286II	 1291II	 1296I	 1302II	 1308I	 1313II	 1320II	 Avg.	
Convicted	 64	 58–70	 49–60	 39–50	 60–75	 35–75	 71–83	 54–68	
Acquitted	 36	 21–25	 33–40	 32–41	 20–25	 11–25	 14–17	 24–30	
Cleric	 0	 4–5	 0	 7–9	 0	 0	 0	 1.5–2	
Unknown	 0	 17	 19	 23	 20	 54	 14	 21	
	
Table	3	–	Bologna:	Arms-bearing	Case	Outcomes	by	Percentage	
	 1286II	 1291II	 1296I	 1302II	 1308I	 1313II	 1320II	 Avg.	
Convicted	 56	 43–59	 62–66	 55–69	 58–86	 27–74	 88	 56–71	
Acquitted	 25	 30–41	 27–29	 23–29	 9–14	 9–24	 11	 19–25	








Banned	 0	 0	 3	 0	 0	 0	 0	 <	1	
Unknown	 0	 27	 7	 21	 33	 63	 0	 22	
	
Table	4	–	Bologna:	Gambling	Case	Outcomes	by	Percentage	
	 1286II	 1291II	 1296I	 1308I	 1313II	 1320II	 Avg.	
Convicted	 54–55	 24–37	 39–42	 10–50	 32–52	 88–92	 41–55	
Marochus	 7	 37–57	 7–8	 0	 6–10	 0	 10–14	
Acquitted	 34–35	 3–4	 46–50	 10–50	 21–33	 4	 20–29	
Cleric	 1	 1-2	 0	 0	 3–5	 4	 2	
Banned	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 <	1	



























	 1286II	 1296I	 1320II	
Curfew	 46	(7)	 245	(20)	 25	
Arms	 305	(40)	 1410	(230)	 1155	




























	 1286II	 1291II	 1296I	 1302II	 1308I	 1313II	 1320II	 Avg.	
Curfew	 23	 34	 25	 36	 11	 20	 5	 22	
Arms	 33	 28	 59	 64	 47	 60	 75	 52	















































































Curfew	 37	 44	 31	 0	 6	
Arms	 22	 230	 19	 0	 3	
Gambling	 23	 1075	 11	 7	 5	












































Convicted	 Acquitted	 Banned	 Unknown	 Total	Fines	in	
Lire	
Curfew	 24	 13	 8	 0	 3	 17	
Arms	 23		 9	 12	 1		 1		 43	

























































Curfew	 81	 31	 59	 7	 2	
Arms	 47	 40	 47	 13	 0	
Gambling	 0	 -	 -	 -	 -	











Curfew	 99	 -	 -	 100	 -	
Arms	 35	 34	 31	 31	 3	
Gambling	 3	 -	 -	 67	 33	







	 1260	 1262	 1263	 1267	 1269	 1270	 1274	 Total	 Avg.	
Curfew	 25	 365	 90	 71	 41	 34	 0	 626	 89	
Arms	 15	 44	 3	 76	 127	 61	 18	 344	 49	
Gambling	 0	 13	 0	 0	 0	 0	 6	 19	 3	
Total	 40	 422	 93	 147	 168	 95	 24	 989	 141	
	
Table	12	–	Perugia:	Persons	Convicted	by	Percentage	of	Total	Convictions	
	 1260	 1262	 1263	 1267	 1269	 1270	 1274	 Avg.	
Curfew	 5	 38	 18	 17	 6	 7	 0	 15	
Arms	 3	 5	 1	 19	 18	 12	 3	 8	
Gambling	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	




















































































Curfew	 19	 46.5	 11	 58	
Arms	 22	 455	 20	 91	
Gambling	 50	 696	 16	 32	









Curfew	 113	 132.75	 64	 57	
Arms	 20	 650	 16	 80	
Gambling	 8	 136	 4	 50	









Curfew	 131	 161.5	 57	 44	
Arms	 24	 655	 16	 67	
Gambling	 23	 402	 14	 61	









Curfew	 263	 340.75	 132	 51	
Arms	 66	 1760	 52	 79	
Gambling	 81	 1234	 34	 42	
























































Curfew	 52	 53	 29	 56	
Arms	 51	 104	 29	 57	
Gambling	 10	 60	 6	 60	
Total/Avg.	 113	 217	 64	 57	
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communes,	even	if	their	archives	shed	less	light	on	it.	Furthermore,	the	judicial	records	
suggest	a	police	apparatus	that	was	not	merely	active	but	effective.	In	a	medieval	town,	it	
took	only	a	few	dozen	men	patrolling	regularly	for	the	government	to	project	a	credible	
threat	of	detecting	and	punishing	offenders.	The	data	above	undermine	the	
historiographical	consensus	that	medieval	courts	lacked	police	power,	which	is	based	in	
large	part	on	the	high	contumacy	rates	in	trials	for	crimes	against	persons	and	property	
(e.g.,	theft,	assault,	and	homicide).	When	the	scope	of	analysis	is	expanded	to	include	trials	
initiated	by	the	familia	for	lesser	statutory	offenses,	contumacy	becomes	rare	and	the	
courts	appear	more	effective	at	delivering	punitive	justice.	
Indeed,	the	data	discussed	above	cover	just	three	offenses,	a	fraction	of	the	
communes’	broader	efforts	to	police	their	territories.	Geltner	has	found	that	Bologna’s	dirt	
notary	adjudicated,	on	average,	nearly	50	charges	per	month	in	the	fourteenth	century,	
most	of	them	discovered	by	his	own	patrols	and	inspections.197	Similarly,	Vallerani	found	
that	“administrative	crimes”	denounced	by	the	city’s	various	police	forces—not	only	the	
three	above,	but	also	neglect	of	guard	duty,	illegal	exports,	and	agricultural	damages	(danni	
dati),	among	others—accounted	for	60	to	70	percent	of	all	guilty	verdicts	in	Perugia’s	
courts	in	the	1260s	and	1270s.198		
There	is	also	good	reason	to	believe	that	the	judicial	sources	underrepresent	the	
disciplinary	actions	of	the	podestà’s	(or	capitano’s)	familia.	For	example,	in	Bologna	the	
familia	likely	delivered	summary	justice	to	public	gamblers	more	often	than	the	registers	
let	on.	A	list	of	some	141	marochi	arrested	by	the	familia	in	or	near	public	gambling	spots	
during	the	second	semester	of	1293	shows	that	all	but	two	of	them	were	flogged,	many	the	
same	day	as	their	arrest.	Vallerani	has	interpreted	this	list	as	evidence	of	an	exceptional	
disciplinary	operation	ordered	by	one	podestà.199	However,	the	exceptional	part	may	not	
be	the	operation,	but	the	fact	that	a	notary	bothered	to	record	it.	Other	evidence	is	
suggestive:	one	day	in	August	1292,	for	example,	14	marochi	were	arrested	near	the	two	
baratarie	and	flogged	the	same	day.200	With	no	fines	to	collect	or	risk	of	contumacy,	the	
court	had	little	incentive	to	document	these	summary	cases.	Likewise,	notaries	may	not	
have	bothered	to	record	cases	that	were	quickly	dismissed	on	the	basis	of	privilege	(see	
Chapters	2	and	6).	For	example,	defense	testimony	survives	for	an	October	1320	curfew	
case	that	is	not	listed	in	the	book	of	discoveries,	which	has	the	appearance	of	being	
otherwise	thorough.	The	defense	hinged	entirely	on	the	defendant’s	legal	privilege	rather	
than	the	facts	of	the	case.201	If	the	notaries	did	not	bother	to	record	such	discoveries,	this	
would	explain	the	extraordinarily	high	conviction	rates	seen	in	the	second	half	of	1320	
semester	(about	90	percent	in	arms	and	gambling	cases	and	80	percent	in	curfew).	It	
would	also	mean	that	a	potentially	large	number	of	inventiones	have	not	survived.	Even	if	
all	the	familia’s	discoveries	were	recorded,	this	would	still	only	represent	a	fraction	of	the	
individuals	they	stopped	each	semester.	The	countless	individuals	they	stopped	and	found	
to	be	in	compliance	with	the	law	have	left	no	trace	in	the	historical	record,	except	in	a	few	
																																																								
197	Geltner,	“Public	Health,”	113–14.	
198	Vallerani,	Il	sistema	giudiziario,	169.	NB:	this	percentage	is	in	terms	of	judicial	acts,	not	persons	convicted.	
199	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293II	(53	fols.),	48r–52v.	Vallerani,	“Giochi	di	posizione,”	27.	
200	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(54	fols.),	32v.	
201	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(30	fols.),	11r–v.	
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cases	of	incidental	testimony.202	All	told,	the	records	left	by	third-party	policing	show	that	
public	justice	in	the	communes	was	more	coercive	than	the	historiography	suggests.	
Conclusion:	Policing	and	Hegemonic	Justice	
The	communes’	judicial	records	show	that	their	police	forces	were	effective	in	their	
basic	task	of	law	enforcement.	In	larger	cities	like	Bologna,	they	compelled	hundreds	of	
people	to	appear	in	court	for	minor	offenses	each	year,	greatly	increasing	the	number	of	
inquisitions	conducted	by	the	criminal	court.	They	arrested	offenders	or	made	them	give	
surety	to	appear	in	court	at	a	later	date,	virtually	eliminating	the	problem	of	contumacy	
that	usually	plagued	the	court.	This	in	turn	allowed	judges	to	proactively	hand	down	
sentences	rather	than	reactively	issue	bans.	Moreover,	a	guilty	verdict	was	far	more	likely	
than	in	most	criminal	cases,	because	the	statutes	presumed	individuals	accused	by	the	
familia	guilty	until	proven	innocent.	The	conviction	rate	was	therefore	significantly	higher	
in	criminal	trials	initiated	by	the	familia.	In	brief,	the	evidence	presented	in	this	chapter	
shows	that	communal	governments	wielded	significant	police	power	that	is	unaccounted	
for	in	most	histories	of	medieval	states	and	public	justice.	
Put	another	way,	the	coercive	law	enforcement	described	in	this	chapter	involved	
little	negotiation.	The	familia’s	patrols	compelled	locals	to	stand	trial,	and	judges	applied	
the	statutory	penalties	often	enough	to	make	the	threat	of	punishment	credible.	Third-
party	policing	was	therefore	an	important	part	of	the	shift	from	negotiated	to	hegemonic	
justice	discussed	in	the	introduction.	This	observation	does	not	discount	the	value	of	
dispute	resolution	as	an	interpretive	framework	for	the	study	of	medieval	justice,	nor	does	
it	necessarily	indicate	that	police	power	was	the	most	salient	aspect	of	public	justice	in	the	
Italian	communes.	Indeed,	hegemonic	and	negotiated	forms	of	justice	complemented	each	
other,	and	each	played	important	roles	in	maintaining	the	social	order.	It	suggests,	
however,	that	recent	historiography,	with	its	near-exclusive	focus	on	negotiated	justice,	
does	not	paint	a	balanced	portrait	of	justice	in	the	medieval	communes.	
	 The	impact	of	the	communes’	police	forces	went	well	beyond	the	relatively	small	
number	of	residents	they	charged	and	convicted	each	year.	As	North,	Wallis,	and	Weingast	
point	out,	violence	consists	not	just	of	physical	actions,	but	of	coercive	threats	of	physical	
action.203	The	familia,	as	executors	of	state-sanctioned	violence,	presented	a	coercive	threat	
to	citizens	that	was	just	as	important	as	the	actions	they	took.	Their	wide-ranging	and	
frequent	patrols	made	the	possibility	of	law	enforcement	omnipresent;	even	if	the	
podestà’s	men	were	not	in	sight,	they	could	arrive	at	any	moment.	Furthermore,	as	the	next	
chapter	will	make	clear,	virtually	no	one	was	spared	this	coercion,	because	the	familia	
enforced	the	law	across	social	strata.	Thus,	their	patrols	created	a	diffuse	threat	of	state	
coercion	not	unlike	the	classic	example	of	Bentham’s	panopticon.	This,	rather	than	the	
number	of	people	the	familia	arrested	per	se,	marked	the	real	significance	of	the	institution.		
	 	
																																																								
202	For	examples,	see	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(46	fols.),	17v;	Corone	8,	1296I	(42	fols.),	17r.	
203	North,	Wallis,	and	Weingast,	Violence	and	Social	Orders,	13.	
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Chapter	2:	Police	Discretion	and	Personal	Autonomy	
In	January	1287,	two	berrovarii	testified	in	court	against	Ugolino	Zovenzoni,	whom	
they	had	charged	with	carrying	a	prohibited	knife.	The	Zovenzoni	banking	family,	whose	
members	frequently	held	public	office,	was	among	the	city’s	most	prominent,	but	this	did	
not	seem	to	faze	the	podestà’s	familiares.	The	judge	began	by	asking	the	berrovarii	a	simple	
factual	question:	had	they	discovered	a	knife	on	the	defendant	while	patrolling	a	few	days	
earlier?	The	officers	proceeded	to	tell	their	side	of	the	story	with	the	defendant	present	
before	them.	When	they	encountered	Ugolino	on	patrol,	they	called	after	him	to	stop	and	
submit	to	a	pat-down.	Ugolino,	however,	“pretended	not	to	hear”	and	entered	the	shop	of	a	
certain	barber	instead,	“not	permitting	himself	to	be	searched.”	Not	to	be	deterred,	the	
berrovarii	followed	Ugolino	inside	and	checked	him	for	weapons	there.	Although	they	did	
not	find	any	on	his	person,	they	did	find	a	knife	in	a	pail	inside	the	shop.	They	therefore	
arrested	Ugolino	on	the	basis	of	presumption	and	led	him	before	the	podestà’s	knight.	
Questioning	Ugolino	in	turn,	the	judge	asked	him	if	the	knife	found	by	the	berrovarii	was	in	
fact	his.	Ugolino	admitted	the	knife	belonged	to	him,	but	claimed	he	had	placed	it	in	the	
barber’s	shop	for	safekeeping	before	the	familia	searched	him.	Ugolino	also	denied	under	
further	questioning	that	the	familia	had	been	following	him	when	he	entered	the	shop,	as	
well	as	the	allegation	that	he	had	fled	and	refused	to	be	searched.	The	podestà’s	judge	
apparently	found	Ugolino’s	testimony	unconvincing,	however.	Notwithstanding	his	
membership	in	an	elite	family,	he	was	convicted	of	bearing	illicit	arms	and	sentenced	to	pay	
the	statutory	fine	of	10	lire.1	
The	last	chapter	illustrated	the	coercive	capacity	of	the	familia	with	regards	to	its	
proactive	patrols	and	ability	to	compel	suspects	to	answer	charges	in	court.	This	chapter	
explains	how	the	familia	projected	a	credible	threat	of	punishment	throughout	the	
commune,	including	for	political	elites	like	the	Zovenzoni.	In	Bologna,	lawmakers	did	not	
explicitly	accord	the	berrovarii	legal	discretion	(arbitrium)	in	enforcing	the	laws,	as	they	
did	the	podestà	and	his	judges.2	But	like	all	patrol	officers,	the	berrovarii	used	discretion	in	
deciding	how	the	commune’s	statutes—many	of	which	created	considerable	legal	
ambiguities—should	apply	to	the	realities	they	encountered	in	the	street.	In	other	words,	
the	berrovarii	acted	to	some	extent	as	judges	of	first	instance.	Kenneth	Culp	Davis’	
observation	about	Chicago’s	police	in	1975	is	just	as	apt	for	the	podestà’s	familia	in	the	
thirteenth	century:	“The	police	make	policy	about	what	law	to	enforce,	how	much	to	
enforce	it,	against	whom,	and	on	what	occasions.”3	As	the	evidence	below	will	bear	out,	the	
berrovarii	exercised	police	discretion	in	a	surprisingly	impersonal	and	sometimes	
aggressive	manner.	
To	get	at	the	question	of	how	the	familia	enforced	the	statutes,	this	chapter	
discusses	the	issues	of	identification	and	interpretation	they	routinely	confronted	on	
patrol.	It	starts	by	asking	whom	the	familia	enforced	the	law	against,	a	question	that	in	turn	
																																																								
1	ASB,	Corone	1,	1287I	(34	fols.),	2r–v:	“Et	dum	volebant	eum	cercare	de	armis,	vocaverunt	ipsum	Ugolinum	
dicendo,	‘Vade	plane	quia	volumus	te	cercare	si	habes	arma.’	Et	ipse	Ugolinus	finsit	non	audire,	et	de	minori	
post	ivit	et	intravit	stationem	infrascripti	barberii	non	permitendo	se	rimari.”	On	the	Zovenzoni,	see	Blanshei,	
Politics	and	Justice,	100,	130,	542,	557.	
2	On	the	concept	of	arbitrium,	see	Vallerani,	“L’arbitrio”;	Meccarelli,	Arbitrium.	
3	Davis,	Police	Discretion,	1.	
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has	two	components.	First,	how	did	the	familia	deal	with	questions	of	social	identity	and	
political	status?	The	statutes	and	custom	granted	exceptions	for	people	based	on	their	
occupation,	activity,	or	political	status.	Watchmen,	travelers,	and	select	public	
officeholders,	for	example,	enjoyed	certain	immunities	from	the	arms-bearing	laws.	In	
many	encounters,	the	berrovarii	therefore	had	to	decide	whether	an	apparent	violator	of	
statute	enjoyed	an	exemption	or	not.4	Second,	assuming	the	familia	made	a	proper	
identification,	did	they	enforce	the	law	against	everyone	they	were	supposed	to	enforce	it	
against?	It	is	entirely	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	commune’s	political	elites	would	pass	
certain	laws	with	a	wink	to	the	podestà	that	they	were	meant	for	“other”	city	residents.	
Nevertheless,	Ugolino	Zovenzoni’s	case	above	is	illustrative:	his	family	name	neither	
deterred	the	berrovarii	from	pursuing	him	on	suspicion	of	carrying	an	illegal	weapon	nor	
spared	him	conviction	in	court.	Indeed,	the	trial	records	show	the	familia	regularly	arrested	
and	denounced	members	of	the	commune’s	elite	families—the	same	citizens	who	
employed	them	and	authored	the	statutes	they	enforced.		
The	chapter	then	treats	the	deceptively	simple	questions	of	fact	the	familia	had	to	
interpret,	such	as	whether	a	knife	was	of	the	type	prohibited	by	statute.	It	goes	on	to	show	
how	certain	legal	presumptions	built	into	statute	allowed	the	familia	to	make	arrests	in	
many	cases	on	the	basis	of	suspicion.	These	presumptions	stacked	the	deck	against	the	
locals	the	familia	policed,	including	the	popolano	elites	whom	they	ultimately	served.	The	
chapter	then	treats	questions	of	jurisdiction—i.e.,	of	where	the	law	was	to	be	enforced—
implicit	in	statute,	and	suggests	that	the	familia	often	pushed	the	boundaries	of	their	
authority.	Lastly,	the	chapter	takes	on	questions	of	intent,	asking	to	what	extent	the	familia	
took	the	apparent	good	(or	bad)	intentions	of	a	suspect	into	account	when	deciding	to	
register	a	charge.	Again,	the	evidence	suggests	that	the	familia	erred	on	the	side	of	
aggressive	enforcement.	Although	the	trial	records	tend	to	suppress	crucial	details	about	
the	circumstances	of	arrests,	a	number	of	cases	suggest	that	the	familia	took	advantage	of	
ambiguities	in	the	statutes	to	bring	charges	on	tenuous	grounds.	To	be	sure,	defendants	
often	exploited	those	same	ambiguities	in	their	legal	defenses,	and	foreign	judges	(to	say	
nothing	of	local	jurists)	did	not	always	agree	with	their	berrovarii.	The	point	remains,	
however,	that	the	berrovarii	were	empowered	to	arrest	individuals	at	the	slightest	hint	of	a	
legal	infraction,	and	there	was	little	to	stop	them	from	exploiting	this.	Even	the	sindacato,	
an	audit	procedure	that	podestà	underwent	at	the	end	of	their	terms	at	some	risk	to	their	
professional	reputations,	seems	not	to	have	checked	the	berrovarii’s	behavior.5	In	general,	
the	system	encouraged	familiares	to	make	arrests	and	allow	a	judge	to	decide	the	truth	of	
the	matter	later	in	court.	
To	be	clear,	this	chapter	does	not	argue	that	the	familia	habitually	abused	its	power,	
harassing	and	arresting	people	in	arbitrary	fashion—although	that	is	entirely	possible.	Nor	
does	it	claim	that	the	familia	always	enforced	the	law	as	strictly	as	possible.	For	obvious	
reasons,	instances	where	the	familia	showed	leniency—e.g.,	when	they	had	“probable	
cause”	but	chose	not	to	make	the	arrest—leave	no	historical	record.	But	it	does	argue	that	
the	familia	used	their	legal	discretion	to	police	aggressively.	Furthermore,	they	enforced	
the	law	with	a	remarkable	degree	of	impersonality,	in	the	sense	of	treating	all	violations	in	
																																																								
4	On	legal	privilege	in	Bologna,	see	Vallerani,	Medieval	Public	Justice,	275–76;	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	
377–408.	Chapter	6	will	deal	with	the	subject	more	extensively.	
5	Geltner,	“Fighting	Corruption”;	Sabapathy,	“A	Medieval	Officer.”	
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the	same	manner.6	Granted,	there	were	no	truly	impersonal	institutions	in	thirteenth-
century	Italy,	and	no	concept	of	equality	before	the	law.	Medieval	legal	codes	enshrined	
social	inequalities	by	prescribing	different	rules,	punishments,	and	procedures	for	different	
classes	of	person,	and	the	statutes	of	the	Italian	communes	were	no	exception.	However,	
the	statutes	generally	forbade	anyone—regardless	of	social	identity—from	going	about	the	
city	at	night	without	a	light,	playing	dice	outside	of	the	public	gambling	spots,	or	carrying	a	
knife	through	the	city	streets.	And	the	familia	enforced	the	law	impersonally	enough	to	
make	the	threat	of	punishment	for	certain	offenses	credible	for	all.	
The	familia’s	impersonal	and	sometimes	aggressive	use	of	their	discretion	was	
perhaps	the	most	consequential	feature	of	third-party	policing	in	the	communes.	When	
berrovarii	decided	to	denounce	an	individual	for	violating	a	statute,	it	was	a	coercive	act	in	
its	own	right,	regardless	of	whether	the	judge	subsequently	found	him	guilty.	Indeed,	as	
Chapter	6	will	bear	out,	the	mere	threat	of	denunciation	could	have	a	coercive	effect	on	city	
residents.	The	familia’s	patrols	made	legal	harassment	a	part	of	daily	life	and	placed	
punitive	judgments	in	the	hands	of	public	officials,	effectively	making	city	residents	more	
subject	to	government	authority.	Third-party	policing	thus	infringed	significantly	on	the	
personal	autonomy	of	citizens,	including	elites,	and	diminished	their	ability	to	negotiate	
justice	on	their	own	terms.	The	apparent	paradox	is	that	this	change	seems	to	have	
occurred	at	a	moment	when	elite	citizens	enjoyed	real	autonomy	in	deciding	how	to	govern	
themselves.	
Social	Identity	
In	the	first	place,	berrovarii	generally	had	to	ascertain	who	was	committing	a	
particular	deed	in	order	to	determine	its	legality.	Communal	statutes	included	numerous	
exceptions	that	allowed	individuals	to	engage	in	proscribed	behaviors	on	the	basis	of	their	
occupation	or	intent.	Perugia’s	1279	statute	on	arms-bearing,	for	example,	made	explicit	
exceptions	for	travelers,	night	watchmen,	the	guards	of	the	commune’s	grain	stores	
(custodes	grascie),	officials	carrying	out	orders	from	the	podestà	or	capitano,	or	anyone	
delivering	outlaws	into	the	commune’s	custody.7	In	1293,	Bologna’s	lawmakers	enshrined	
in	statute	the	exception,	long	recognized	by	custom,	that	allowed	travelers	to	carry	certain	
weapons.	The	law	provided	that	anyone	coming	and	going	from	the	city	could	carry	a	
sword,	dagger,	or	knife	if	he	wore	a	cap	(capellus)	and,	if	mounted,	spurs—two	visible	
markers	that	would	make	travelers	more	readily	identifiable.	Any	traveler	also	had	to	carry	
his	weapon	“publicly	and	visibly,”	in	hand,	with	the	hilt	lashed	to	the	sheath	such	that	it	
could	not	be	drawn,	all	the	way	from	his	home	to	the	gates	of	the	city,	and	vice	versa	upon	
return.	The	guards	of	the	city	gates	were	responsible	for	educating	all	foreigners	entering	
the	city	about	these	rules,	as	were	innkeepers.8	Thus,	whenever	the	familia	suspected	
someone	of	bearing	arms	illicitly,	they	had	to	determine	if	the	suspect	was	traveling,	and	if	
so,	if	he	was	bearing	his	arms	in	the	manner	stipulated	by	law.		
																																																								
6	On	the	concept	of	impersonality,	see	Wallis,	“Institutions,	Organizations,	Impersonality,	and	Interests.”	
7	Statuto	1279,	1:333.	
8	Statuti	1288,	1:227,	568–69.	Perugia’s	statutes	held	innkeepers	monetarily	responsible	for	educating	foreign	
guests	about	the	city’s	arms-bearing	regulations;	see	Statuto	1279,	1:333.	Such	requirements	of	gate-	and	
innkeepers	were	common	across	northern	Italy;	see	Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms,”	87–89.	The	traveling	cap	
seems	to	have	been	a	customary	marker	across	communal	Italy;	see	Cavallar,	107–8.		
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The	familia	viewed	armed	men	who	claimed	to	be	traveling	with	a	certain	
skepticism.	Multiple	cases	survive	from	multiple	communes	wherein	the	familia	apparently	
denounced	an	individual	for	openly	carrying	a	weapon	that	was	lashed	shut,	either	while	
traveling	or	attempting	to	peddle	the	weapon	on	the	street.9	Indeed,	Perugia’s	1279	statute	
seemed	to	assume	the	familia	would	arrest	individuals	wearing	traveling	caps,	even	though	
the	cap	was	supposed	to	signal	the	armed	traveler’s	exempt	status	under	law.10	Certainly,	
the	familia	had	little	to	lose	by	denouncing	a	man	with	a	knife	in	hand,	even	if	he	was	
carrying	it	in	accordance	with	the	statutes.	Similar	are	cases	where	the	familia	did	not	show	
leniency	to	armed	men	who	claimed	they	were	about	to	start	travel	or	had	just	returned	
from	a	trip.	For	example,	in	September	1287,	the	familia	reported	finding	Giovanni	Aliseri	
on	his	doorstep	with	a	knife,	and	that	he	“was	saying	he	had	just	then	come	from	abroad	
and	was	not	yet	able	to	put	down	the	knife.”11	They	registered	the	charge	against	him	
nonetheless,	forcing	Giovanni	to	appear	in	court.		
The	familia	also	had	to	ascertain	whether	a	traveler	was	a	citizen	or	contadino,	
because	at	times	different	rules	applied	to	each.	For	example,	in	1293	Bologna’s	lawmakers	
prohibited	contadini	from	carrying	any	“offensive	arms,”	citing	a	wave	of	violent	crime	by	
“rustics.”12	But	here	too,	there	is	good	evidence	the	berrovarii	preferred	not	to	take	armed	
men	at	their	word.	For	example,	in	November	1320,	two	berrovarii	denounced	Lenzo	
Buttrigari	for	carrying	a	sword	on	a	public	road	in	the	contado.	Presumably,	the	familia	did	
not	know	Lenzo	was	a	citizen	of	Bologna,	which	meant	that	his	carrying	a	sword	outside	
the	city	walls	was	no	crime	at	all.	The	court	explicitly	dismissed	the	case	on	the	grounds	
that	he	was	a	citizen,	but	only	after	Lenzo	had	been	made	to	appear	in	court,	give	surety,	
and	prove	his	citizenship,	which	he	did	by	producing	two	notarized	letters	showing	that	he	
was	registered	in	the	commune’s	tax	rolls.13	If	the	familia	did	know	he	was	a	citizen	when	
they	arrested	him,	then	their	actions	could	only	be	described	as	unlawful.	In	all,	the	
berrovarii	seem	to	have	been	reluctant	to	accept	excuses	on	the	scene,	preferring	to	let	a	
judge	make	a	determination	later	in	court.	
The	trial	records	suggest	a	pattern	of	aggressive	enforcement	by	the	familia	with	
regards	to	other	customary	exceptions	to	the	statutes.	For	example,	they	sometimes	
detained	bakers	for	violating	curfew,	even	though	ancient	custom	allowed	bakers,	by	
necessity	of	their	occupation,	to	be	out	in	the	streets	in	the	early	hours	of	the	morning.14	Or	
																																																								
9	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	8r,	25r–v,	29r–30v;	1290I	(24	fols.),	6r;	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	5v;	
Corone	9,	1298	(28	fols.),	16r;	Corone	16,	1308I	(64	fols.),	33r,	51r;	Corone	18,	1310II	(96	fols.),	48r,	50v,	82r;	
Corone	19,	1312I	(48	fols.),	39r;	1312I	(40	fols.),	32r;	Corone	21,	1315I	(102	fols.),	3r.	For	examples	from	
Perugia	and	Orvieto,	see	ASP,	Capitano	4,	reg.	5	(1277),	11v–12r,	45r–46r;	6	(1277),	95r–96r,	97r–100r;	7b,	
reg.	7	(1283),	38r.	ASO,	Podestà	1,	reg.	17	(1287),	3r.	On	statutory	protections	for	individuals	attempting	to	
buy,	sell,	or	repair	weapons,	see	Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms,”	109–10.	
10	The	statute	did	not	allow	judges	to	admit	traveling	defenses	in	arms-bearing	cases	unless	the	defendant	
had	been	wearing	a	cap	at	the	time	of	discovery;	see	Statuto	1279,	1:332.	
11	ASB,	Corone	2,	1287II,	25r:	“Qui	dicebat	se	tantum	tunc	venisse	de	foris	nec	adhuc	deponi	potuisse	
cultellum.”	For	similar	cases,	see	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(50	fols.),	42r–43r;	Corone	7,	1295I	(30	fols.),	22v;	
Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	8r–9r.	Corone	14,	1303II,	14v–15r.	
12	Statuti	1288,	1:569.	On	jurists’	concerns	about	violent	rustici,	see	Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms,”	64–67.	
13	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(56	fols.),	19v–20r:	“Non	fuit	processus	quia	civis.”	For	a	similar	case,	see	ASB,	
Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	11r,	15v–16r.	
14	For	curfew	cases	involving	bakers,	see	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	19r,	41r–42r;	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	
8,	7v.	
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the	familia	might	mistake	the	tools	carried	by	butchers,	tailors,	millers,	and	other	artisans	
for	illegal	weapons,	forcing	them	to	stand	trial.15	In	part,	these	cases	rested	on	a	question	of	
fact,	namely	whether	the	instrument	carried	was	one	of	the	weapons	prohibited	by	statute.	
But	they	also	rested	on	a	question	of	customary	right,	since	the	tools	carried	by	certain	
tradesmen	could	also	be	used	as	deadly	weapons.	In	one	such	case,	from	July	1292,	some	
berrovarii	reported	finding	“a	small,	sharp	knife	of	the	sort	for	skinning	animals”	on	the	
ground,	and	Andriolo	Albizi	near	it.	Andriolo	said	he	had	been	carrying	the	knife	because	
he	was	a	butcher,	but	threw	it	away	when	he	saw	the	berrovarii	patrolling	“because	of	the	
fear	he	had	of	the	familia.”	The	judge	acquitted	Andriolo	explicitly	because	he	was	a	
butcher	and	his	knife	was	not	malicious—in	other	words,	because	the	facts	of	the	case	were	
just	as	the	familia	had	reported.16	Indeed,	Andriolo’s	testimony	is	noteworthy	for	its	
suggestion	that	the	familia’s	patrols	inspired	even	law-abiding	citizens	to	hide	legitimate	
trade	tools	to	avoid	the	possibility	of	arrest.	Anyone	carrying	any	sort	of	blade	through	the	
city,	in	any	manner,	risked	being	stopped	by	the	familia.	
	 Lending	further	weight	to	this	point,	the	familia	seems	to	have	impeded	the	
commune’s	own	watchmen,	guards,	and	other	officials	from	carrying	out	their	respective	
offices	on	multiple	occasions.	For	their	part,	Bologna’s	watchmen	were	supposed	to	carry	
proof	of	office	in	the	form	of	a	notarized	license	(carticella)	while	on	duty.17	But	this	system	
was	hardly	a	foolproof	means	of	keeping	watchmen	on	the	right	side	of	the	law.	For	
example,	in	November	1293,	the	familia	arrested	Giovanni	Zaccarelli	for	breaking	curfew	
unarmed,	forcing	him	to	spend	four	days	in	prison	until	he	could	give	surety.	The	notary	
Berardino	Bambaglioli	eventually	certified	that	Giovanni	was	listed	among	the	watchmen	
for	the	quarter	of	Porta	Ravegnana,	thereby	securing	his	acquittal.18	In	April	of	that	same	
year,	the	familia	charged	another	resident	of	Bologna	with	carrying	a	knife,	sword,	and	
shield	around	the	time	of	the	first	curfew	bell,	even	though	he	protested	that	he	was	
patrolling	with	other	watchmen.	It	later	emerged	(the	record	does	not	indicate	how)	that	
he	was	filling	in	for	his	brother,	who	was	a	watchman,	and	had	been	in	the	company	of	
other	watchmen	when	the	familia	stopped	him.	The	court	acquitted	him	accordingly.19	The	
same	pattern	is	evident	in	Perugia,	where	in	July	1283	the	capitano	del	popolo	restituted	
confiscated	arms	to	several	watchmen	whom	his	familia	had	wrongfully	charged.20	In	other	
cases,	the	familia	seems	to	have	arrested	armed	men	in	the	course	of	military	service	for	
																																																								
15	For	a	miller	carrying	a	sickle,	see	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(118	fols.),	28r.	For	a	tailor	carrying	a	bodkin,	see	
ASB,	Corone	5,	1293II	(48	fols.),	5r;	1293II	(53	fols.),	4v.	For	a	tailor	carrying	scissors,	see	ASB,	Corone	6,	
1294I	(118	fols.),	22r;	1294I	(84	fols.),	17v.	For	a	skinner	carrying	a	knife,	see	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	
1v;	1296I	(42	fols.),	25r–v.	For	two	men	who	fleshed	hides	for	the	cobblers’	guild	carrying	knives,	see	ASP,	
Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	4r.	
16	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(54	fols.),	17v:	“Invenerunt	quendam	cultellum	parvum	acutum	ad	modum	
excorticandi	bestias	iacentem	in	terra.	[...]	Et	propter	timorem	quod	habuit	de	dicta	familia,	ipse	proiecit	
dictum	cultellum.”		
17	This	is	evident	from	a	case	of	substitution	on	the	night	watch	from	1289.	Witnesses	reported	hearing	the	
absent	watchman	ask	the	defendant	to	stand	in	for	him	for	that	night,	and	then	hand	him	his	carticella.	See	
ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	33v.	
18	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293II	(48	fols.),	18r–18v.	For	similar	cases,	see	ASP,	Capitano	7b,	reg.	7,	28v;	ASB,	Corone	1,	
1286II,	21v.	
19	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	23r.	For	a	similar	case,	see	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	49r.	
20	ASP,	Capitano	7b,	reg.	7,	41r.	
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Bologna	or	an	allied	commune.21	Other	officeholders	who	faced	charges	from	the	familia,	
apparently	as	a	result	of	fulfilling	their	duties,	included	a	gatekeeper	on	his	way	to	open	the	
gate	of	Via	San	Donato	early	one	morning	before	the	first	bell,	two	contadini	headed	to	
guard	duty	at	the	castle	of	Crespellano,	a	guard	hired	by	the	butchers’	guild	to	stand	watch	
over	their	shops,	and	a	jailer	pursuing	an	escaped	prisoner	in	the	commune’s	piazza.22	In	all	
these	cases,	the	familia	seems	not	have	heeded	the	social	identity	of	the	individual	in	
question,	compelling	them	to	prove	before	a	judge	that	they	were	discharging	their	official	
duties	at	the	time	the	familia	discovered	them.	
One	case	is	especially	illustrative	of	the	familia’s	apparent	penchant	for	strict	
enforcement.	In	October	1290,	the	familia	found	Antonio	the	ragman	(strazarolus)	with	a	
knife	in	the	middle	of	the	crossroads	of	Porta	Ravegnana.	Antonio	argued	in	his	defense	
that	he	was	a	warden	(saltarius)	and	had	license	to	bear	arms	when	coming	and	going	from	
duty.	At	that	moment,	moreover,	he	had	just	returned	from	the	vineyard	of	a	certain	
Giovanni,	where	some	trees	and	vines	had	been	damaged.	Before	going	home	from	duty,	he	
had	stopped	at	the	bench	of	the	notary	Bonaventura	to	file	a	report.	According	to	his	
defense,	he	was	still	speaking	with	Bonaventura’s	son	Conradino,	who	was	in	the	middle	of	
writing	up	the	report,	when	the	familia	found	him	with	the	knife.	Two	fellow	wardens	who	
had	accompanied	Antonio	to	the	damaged	vineyard	testified	as	witnesses.	As	they	told	it,	
they	went	straight	from	the	vineyard	to	the	notary’s	bench	to	have	a	denunciation	(or	
accusation)	written	up	so	they	could	deliver	it	to	the	commune’s	officials.	Furthermore,	
Antonio,	like	all	wardens,	had	a	written	license	for	bearing	arms.	The	notary’s	son	
Conradino	also	confirmed	that	Antonio	had	been	carrying	out	his	office	as	warden,	and	that	
the	familia	came	just	as	he	was	speaking	with	Antonio.23	Unsurprisingly,	the	court	
acquitted	him.	In	fairness	to	the	berrovarii,	Antonio	may	well	have	forgotten	his	license,	
which	would	explain	why	they	apparently	did	not	book	his	fellow	wardens.	But	surely	
those	wardens	and	the	notary	would	have	vouched	for	Antonio	when	they	encountered	the	
familia.	The	case	suggests	once	again	that	the	familia	took	the	narrowest	possible	view	of	
the	law:	they	had	found	Antonio	in	the	crossroads	with	a	knife,	and	they	would	report	him	
regardless	of	whom	he	was	with	or	what	he	was	doing.	In	at	least	two	other	cases,	the	
defendant	was	acquitted	after	proving	in	court	that	he	was	a	warden.24		
Lastly,	the	familia’s	relative	disregard	for	status	of	any	kind	is	evident	in	their	
prosecution	of	legal	minors.	Under	Bolognese	law,	15	was	the	age	of	majority,	but	younger	
adolescents	and	even	children	are	not	uncommon	in	the	trial	records.25	To	give	but	three	
examples,	in	March	1295	the	familia	reported	finding	a	boy	roughly	eight	years	of	age	
carrying	a	knife	“against	the	form	of	the	statutes.”	Although	the	podestà	ultimately	
acquitted	him,	he	initiated	proceedings	against	the	boy	“according	to	the	form	of	the	
																																																								
21	ASB,	Corone	1,	1264,	4v;	1286II,	20v;	Corone	6,	1294I	(40	fols.),	17v,	19v.	
22	In	order	of	mention:	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	6r,	37v;	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	40v–42r,	56r;	
Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	9r–v,	17v	and	1302II	(152	fols.),	14v–15r;	Corone	5,	1293II	(48	fols.),	20v	and	
1293II	(53	fols.),	25r–v.	For	similar	cases,	see	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294II	(58	fols.),	14v	and	1294II	(42	fols.),	17v–
18r;	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	58r.	
23	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	40r–v,	45r–47r.	
24	ASB,	Corone	2,	1287II,	20r;	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	28v;	1291II	(37	fols.),	6r.	
25	A	1311	statute	explicitly	refers	to	crimes	committed	“per	maiorem	vel	maiores	annorum	quindecim”;	ASB,	
Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	1v–2r.	
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statutes.”26	In	August	1297,	an	11-year-old	girl	named	Meldina—with	her	father	present	
and	consenting—confessed	in	court	that	the	familia	had	found	her	carrying	two	bunches	of	
grapes	back	to	the	city	that	day.	The	judge	ultimately	acquitted	Meldina	and	her	father,	but	
only	after	giving	them	five	days	to	make	a	legal	defense	and	accepting	surety	from	her	
father.27	And	one	evening	in	November	1316,	the	familia	apparently	stopped	and	frisked	
two	young	boys	(pueri)	near	the	apothecary	where	they	worked,	even	though	they	were	
carrying	a	light.28	In	some	cases,	the	podestà’s	familia	may	have	been	acting	at	the	behest	of	
a	paterfamilias	to	discipline	a	wayward	child.29	In	others,	the	familia	might	simply	have	
mistaken	a	legal	minor	for	a	legal	adult,	or	a	legal	adult	might	have	lied	about	his	age	to	
avoid	prosecution.	Yet	the	overall	pattern	suggests	that	the	familia	showed	little	regard	for	
the	age	of	suspects	in	their	quest	to	detect	violations	of	the	statute,	just	as	they	showed	
little	regard	for	other	forms	of	social	status.30	All	told,	the	familia	frequently	ignored	social	
identity	on	patrol.	Anyone	who	appeared	to	be	violating	a	statute,	regardless	of	who	they	
were,	was	worth	bringing	before	a	judge.	
Political	Status	
	 Of	course,	the	question	of	whom	the	familia	enforced	the	law	against	also	has	a	
political	dimension.	As	discussed	in	the	Introduction,	foreign	police	forces	were	supposed	
to	enforce	the	law	impersonally—meaning	against	everyone	equally—insofar	as	the	
statutes	allowed	it.	It	is	a	valid	question,	however,	whether	the	familia	actually	denounced	
and	punished	members	of	the	political	elite.	The	social	order	in	medieval	Italy	was	deeply	
inegalitarian	and	predicated	on	exclusion,	and	municipal	statutes	enshrined	different	rules	
and	penalties	for	persons	of	different	status.	Bologna’s	early	statutes,	for	instance,	
distinguished	between	two	basic	categories	of	people,	milites	and	pedites,	and	scaled	
penalties	for	each	group	according	to	income.	To	take	one	example,	the	law	regulating	
arms-bearing	prescribed	penalties	as	follows:	20	lire	for	a	miles	worth	more	than	100	lire;	
15	lire	for	a	miles	worth	50	to	100	lire;	10	lire	for	a	pedes	worth	100	lire;	7	lire	for	a	pedes	
worth	50-100	lire;	and	7	lire	for	anyone	worth	less	than	50	lire.31	By	the	1270s	and	
especially	by	the	1280s,	Bologna’s	laws	prescribed	special	obligations	and	penalties	for	
“magnates,”	a	juridical	category	whose	membership,	with	few	exceptions,	comprised	the	
ancient	noble	families	previously	labeled	milites.	More	broadly,	the	popular	regime	
“governed	by	list,”	keeping	ever-changing	rosters—some	positive	(taxpayers,	guild	
members,	militia	members),	some	negative	(outlaws,	magnates,	political	exiles)—that	
determined	who	could	and	could	not	participate	in	various	aspects	of	political	life.32		
Legal	privileges,	which	exempted	individuals	from	certain	statutes	and	procedural	
norms,	also	played	an	important	role	in	Bolognese	politics	in	the	late	thirteenth	and	early	
																																																								
26	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(30	fols.),	21r–v.	
27	ASB,	Vigne	1,	1297,	1v.	
28	The	berrovarii	alleged	that	the	two	boys	(whom	they	did	not	identify	as	such)	had	fled;	see	ASB,	Corone	23,	
1316II	(99	fols.),	41r.	Defense	witnesses,	however,	said	the	familia	had	searched	them	and	led	them	before	
the	miles,	but	found	them	unarmed;	see	Corone	23,	1316II	(36	fols.),	15r–17v.	
29	On	the	corrective	(pro	amendare)	imprisonment	of	slaves	and	children,	see	Geltner,	The	Medieval	Prison,	
50–51.	
30	For	further	examples,	see	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	11	(January	1286),	3r;	Corone	8,	1296I	(42	fols.),	20v–
21r;	Corone	9,	1298–1299	(48	fols.),	29v;	Corone	29,	1324I,	55r–v.	
31	Statuti	1245,	1:268–72.	
32	Milani,	“Il	governo	delle	liste”;	Milani,	L’esclusione.	
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fourteenth	centuries.33	Sarah	Blanshei	has	detailed	the	evolution	of	legal	privilege	in	
Bologna,	but	it	is	worth	sketching	the	broad	outlines	here	to	illustrate	how	communal	
politics	affected	law	enforcement.34	The	earliest	privileges,	dating	from	the	1250s,	were	
designed	to	protect	select	public	officials	from	retaliation	for	harsh	or	unpopular	measures	
they	imposed	in	the	course	of	their	official	duties.	Accusations	by	privileged	officeholders	
enjoyed	the	status	of	proof,	and	the	podestà	was	required	to	punish	those	they	accused	
swiftly	and	severely,	which	effectively	deprived	their	would-be	enemies	of	due	process.	In	
1274,	the	commune	extended	such	privileges	to	university	students	on	a	permanent	basis.	
But	it	was	the	Sacred	and	Most	Sacred	Ordinances	of	1282-1284	that	made	privilege	a	
more	permanent	feature	of	the	political	elite.	These	ordinances	extended	privileges	like	
those	previously	reserved	for	select	officials	to	all	members	of	the	guilds	and	popular	
militias	to	protect	them	from	attacks	by	magnates	or	anyone	outside	the	popular	societies.	
They	also	granted	extraordinary	immunities	to	the	authors	of	the	Sacred	Ordinances	and	
their	male	kin,	including	the	right	to	bear	arms	without	a	license.	These	privileges	endured	
with	some	modifications	until	the	first	decade	of	the	fourteenth	century,	when	major	
political	conspiracies	in	1303	and	1306	splintered	the	popolo	coalition.35	The	government	
that	emerged	was	dominated	by	hardline	Guelfs	and	the	Scacchese	faction	of	the	wealthy	
banker	Romeo	Pepoli.36	This	regime	deployed	legal	privilege	as	a	political	weapon,	using	it	
to	protect	its	own	partisans	and	cripple	the	opposition,	namely	the	Lambertazzi	party	
(Bologna’s	Ghibelline	party)	and	Maltraversa	faction	(rivals	to	the	Scacchesi).	By	1310,	
Romeo	Pepoli	controlled	Bolognese	politics	under	a	“proto-signoria,”	and	some	5,500	
members	of	the	popular	societies	could	purchase	extraordinary	privileges	for	a	mere	12	
denari.	These	privileges	granted	their	holders	immunity	from	public	prosecution	for	all	but	
major	crimes,	such	as	homicide	and	robbery,	and	new	protections	against	Lambertazzi,	in	
addition	to	the	older	ones	against	magnates	and	persons	outside	the	popular	societies.	In	
effect,	this	meant	half	the	politically	active	adult	male	population—the	half	aligned	with	the	
Scacchesi—could	carry	weapons,	gamble,	and	even	assault	their	enemies	with	impunity.	
Bologna’s	government	periodically	revoked	the	privilege	of	bearing	arms,	occasionally	
granted	its	foreign	magistrates	the	authority	to	disregard	privilege	in	special	cases,	and	in	
1318	reduced	the	ranks	of	the	privileged	to	4,000.	But	by	and	large,	these	egregiously	
partisan	privileges	stood	until	1321,	when	the	Pepoli	were	overthrown	and	banned,	and	
the	new	regime	reduced	the	number	of	individuals	who	enjoyed	such	extraordinary	
immunities	to	just	99.		
During	the	peak	of	privilege	in	Bologna	(roughly	1310	to	1321),	the	question	of	
whether	the	familia	enforced	the	statutes	against	political	elites	was	essentially	moot.	
Granted,	privileges	were	constantly	being	repealed	and	re-extended,	but	generally	
speaking,	the	only	elites	they	could	enforce	the	law	against	were	those	who	had	fallen	out	
of	political	favor	(see	Chapter	6).	However,	privilege	seems	to	have	played	an	outsized	role	
in	Bologna	compared	to	other	communes,	and	the	familia	had	been	patrolling	Bologna’s	
streets	since	at	least	the	1240s.	The	question	therefore	stands	whether	third-party	police	
																																																								
33	On	the	concept	of	privilegium	in	medieval	jurisprudence,	see	Vallerani,	“Paradigmi	dell’eccezione,”	188–92;	
Gouron,	“La	notion	de	privilège”;	Cortese,	La	norma	giuridica,	2:44–46;	Piano	Mortari,	“Ius	singulare.”	
34	The	following	discussion	is	drawn	from	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	377–408.	
35	See	Milani,	“From	One	Conflict	to	Another,”	esp.	242–51.	
36	On	the	Pepoli,	see	Giansante,	L’usuraio	onorato,	193–219;	“Romeo	Pepoli”;	Patrimonio	familiare.	Romeo’s	
son	Taddeo	became	Bologna’s	first	officially	recognized	signore	in	1337.	
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forces,	as	one	of	the	communes’	enduring	institutions,	were	ever	capable	of	policing	the	
political	elites	who	hired	them.	Again,	it	would	hardly	be	surprising	if	the	familia	turned	a	
blind	eye	to	offenses	by	elites	and	instead	targeted	the	politically	and	socially	marginalized,	
since	they	ultimately	served	the	local	governing	elite.	
The	trial	records	frequently	disguise	the	social	identities	of	persons	accused	by	the	
familia,	if	for	no	other	reason	than	notaries	frequently	omitted	their	family	names	and	
occupations.37	Nevertheless,	there	is	enough	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	podestà’s	familia	
was	not	merely	a	tool	of	political	repression	for	the	governing	elite.	In	the	first	place,	they	
do	not	seem	to	have	targeted	magnates	any	more	than	other	elites.	For	example,	among	the	
more	than	200	individuals	denounced	by	the	familia	in	the	second	semester	of	1291,	only	
one	is	identified	as	a	noble.	Second,	familiares	do	not	seem	to	have	given	popolani	a	free	
pass.	The	raid	on	a	gambling	house	described	at	the	start	of	this	book	netted	three	notaries	
who	were	later	convicted,	and	these	were	hardly	the	only	notaries	to	be	forced	into	court	
by	the	familia.38	Members	of	the	popolo’s	preeminent	families—the	Gozzadini,	Sabadini,	
Zovenzoni,	and	Bentivoglio,	to	name	a	few	of	the	most	famous—also	appear	throughout	the	
Crowns	and	Arms	registers.		
This	is	not	to	say	that	the	familia	was	blind	to	social	status.	As	today,	patrolling	
officers	could	not	have	helped	but	notice	obvious	signs	of	social	status,	such	as	how	an	
individual	dressed,	where	he	lived,	and	what	kind	of	company	he	kept.	This	is	all	but	
explicit	in	a	1291	curfew	case	where	the	familia	charged	Bigolo	and	Bonacossa	Gozzadini.	
The	notary	recorded	the	gratuitous	detail	that	Bonacossa	was	found	holding	a	
sparrowhawk,	as	if	to	suggest	that	he	might	be	a	noble,	since	falconry	was	an	elite	
pastime.39	Nor	is	it	to	say	that	the	familia	never	let	suspects	go	with	a	warning	or	turned	a	
blind	eye	altogether.	Such	instances	tend	to	leave	no	trace	in	the	historical	record	outside	
of	incidental	testimony	by	witnesses	or	investigations	of	corruption.	Indeed,	it	is	
reasonable	to	assume	that	the	familia	let	urban	elites	off	with	a	warning	more	often	than	
others.	But	the	regular	appearance	of	politically	prominent	families	in	the	trial	records	
shows	that	the	familia	enforced	the	law	impersonally	enough	to	make	the	threat	of	
punishment	credible	for	all,	including	their	employers.	
Perhaps	the	best	illustration	of	the	familia’s	unbiased	law	enforcement	is	their	
consistent	prosecution	of	the	Pepoli	family,	both	before	and	after	Romeo	came	to	exercise	
extraordinary	personal	authority	over	Bologna.	The	familia	charged	Zoene	di	Ugolino	
Pepoli,	himself	an	important	political	figure,	with	illicit	arms-bearing	in	July	1285	and	again	
in	April	1287,	and	the	court	convicted	him	in	at	least	the	latter	case.40	The	familia	charged	
Balduino	di	Filippo	Pepoli	with	gambling	in	January	1287,	and	he	was	convicted	of	fleeing	
the	familia	and	violating	curfew	one	month	later	in	February	1287.41	Cingo(lo)	di	Ugolino	
Pepoli	was	convicted	for	carrying	a	knife	in	January	1293,	as	was	Romeo	Pepoli	himself	in	
																																																								
37	For	example,	a	certain	Bertuccio	di	Bonaiolo	was	one	of	eight	men	charged	with	violating	curfew	one	
evening	in	1294.	Only	from	his	defense—a	claim	to	legal	privilege—do	we	know	that	this	Bertuccio	was	
Albertuccio	Maranesi,	from	a	preeminent	family	in	the	popolo	coalition;	see	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294II	(28	fols.),	
7r.	His	defensio	is	on	a	loose	slip	wedged	into	the	register.	
38	For	other	notaries	convicted	on	arms-bearing	and	curfew	charges,	see	ASB,	Corone	2,	1288II,	21v;	Corone	
5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	10r,	42r.	
39	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	42v.	
40	ASB,	Corone	1,	1285II	(70	fols.),	11r;	1287I	(16	fols.),	11v.	
41	ASB,	Corone	1,	1287I	(34	fols.),	5r,	20r.	
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September	1294.42	Romeo’s	cousin	Filippo	had	multiple	run-ins	with	the	law:	he	was	
convicted	four	times	on	weapons	charges,	namely	in	April	1298,	July	1299,	November	
1299,	and	December	1300.43	In	January	1315,	the	familia	charged	Romeo’s	son	Tarlatto	
with	carrying	a	knife	in	the	piazza,	and	in	November	1320,	Cingolo’s	son	Borniolo	was	
convicted	for	carrying	a	knife.44	To	be	sure,	it	cannot	be	assumed	that	all	of	Romeo’s	
relatives	enjoyed	elite	political	status,	and	the	Pepoli’s	political	fortunes	varied	
considerably	over	this	35-year	period.	Nonetheless,	the	fact	remains	that	the	Pepoli	were	
an	elite	popolano	banking	family,	and	the	familia	clearly	did	not	let	the	Pepoli’s	prominence	
dissuade	them	from	prosecution.		
One	of	Filippo	Pepoli’s	run-ins	with	the	law	is	worth	detailing	for	what	it	reveals	
about	the	effects	of	third-party	policing	on	local	elites.	In	December	1300,	two	berrovarii	
denounced	Filippo	for	carrying	a	prohibited	weapon.	According	to	their	report,	when	they	
encountered	Filippo	in	the	crossroads	of	Porta	Ravegnana	and	tried	to	search	him	for	
weapons,	he	fled	into	a	tailor’s	shop.	They	may	not	have	realized	at	the	moment	that	
Filippo	belonged	to	one	of	the	commune’s	elite	banking	families,	or	they	may	have	
recognized	him	as	a	Pepoli	and	decided	to	search	him	anyway.	Whatever	the	case,	the	
podestà’s	knight	Guido	had	to	intervene	to	coax	Filippo	back	outside.	In	the	familia’s	telling,	
Guido	came	to	the	door	of	the	tailor’s	shop	and	ordered	Filippo	to	come	out.	He	cooperated,	
exiting	the	shop	and	surrendering	his	knife	to	one	of	the	berrovarii.	Filippo,	however,	told	a	
different	story	in	his	deposition.	Filippo	claimed	that	he	had	never	fled	before	the	familia	
and	the	familia	had	not	found	the	knife	on	him,	strictly	speaking.	Rather,	he	had	entered	the	
tailor’s	shop	to	have	some	wool	garments	made	when	the	familia	just	happened	to	pass	
through	the	neighborhood.	When	the	podestà’s	knight	came	to	the	shop’s	door	and	told	
him	to	come	outside,	Filippo	replied	that	he	did	not	want	to.	The	knight	Guido	then	asked	
him	if	he	had	any	weapons	that	he	wished	to	hand	over.	Filippo	answered	that	he	did	not,	
because	the	familia	had	not	found	any	on	him.	At	this	point,	Guido	decided	to	take	a	
different	tack.	“You	may	exit	safely	since	I	believe	you,”	he	said.	“Whatever	arms	you	have	
and	however	they	might	be	found	on	you,	you’ll	bear	no	penalty.”	Filippo	then	came	outside	
“under	the	hope	of	this	guarantee”	and	handed	over	his	knife	to	one	of	the	berrovarii.45	But	
the	knight’s	guarantee—if	indeed	it	was	offered—proved	no	guarantee	at	all.	The	podestà’s	
judge	was	unmoved	by	Filippo’s	story	and	had	him	sentenced	to	the	statutory	penalty	of	10	
lire	for	carrying	a	prohibited	knife.	
	 Filippo’s	encounter	with	Guido	strongly	suggests	that	the	familia	showed	little	
deference	to	local	elites.	Not	only	did	the	berrovarii	try	to	stop	this	member	of	the	Pepoli	
clan	in	the	street,	they	did	not	allow	his	attempt	at	evasion	to	go	unchallenged.	Indeed,	the	
podestà’s	knight	seems	to	have	duped	Filippo	into	giving	himself	up	for	conviction,	
knowing	full	well	who	he	was	at	the	time.	Even	if	he	were	eventually	able	to	secure	his	
acquittal	through	political	connections	and/or	an	appeal,	this	did	not	change	the	
fundamental	coerciveness	of	the	familia’s	actions.	The	familia’s	denunciation	forced	Filippo	
to	stand	trial	and	established	a	presumption	of	guilt	against	him.	Filippo’s	attempt	to	argue	
																																																								
42	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	4r;	Corone	6,	1294II	(58	fols.),	23r.	
43	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298	(28	fols.),	5v;	Corone	10,	1299	(40	fols.),	8r;	1299–1300	(18	fols.),	5v;	Corone	11,	
1300–1301	(40	fols.),	8r.	
44	ASB,	Corone	21,	1315I	(102	fols.),	22v;	Corone	28,	1320II	(56	fols.),	21r.	
45	ASB,	Corone	11,	1300–1301	(40	fols.),	8r–v:	“Dictus	miles	tunc	dixit,	‘Exeas	secure	quia	te	fido,	et	pro	armis	
que	habeas	et	modo	tibi	invenirentur	nullam	penam	portabis.’	Et	tunc	ipse	sub	spe	dicte	fidantie	exivit	extra.”		
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that	the	familia	had	not,	technically	speaking,	discovered	a	knife	on	him	fell	flat	in	court	and	
failed	to	override	the	legal	facts	established	in	the	familia’s	report.	Thus,	while	the	familia	
served	at	the	pleasure	of	elites	like	the	Pepoli,	those	same	elites	were	subject	to	the	
familia’s	police	power.		
	 The	familia’s	police	activity	also	affected	elites	indirectly	by	implicating	their	social	
networks.	Whenever	someone	of	good	repute	was	stopped	by	the	familia,	his	friends,	
family,	or	neighbors	had	to	give	surety	for	him	to	restore	him	to	his	previously	liberty.	This	
was	a	matter	of	course,	as	indicated	by	one	witness	in	a	1316	curfew	case	who	spoke	of	
exiting	his	home	to	give	surety	for	the	defendants	“as	neighbors	and	friends	do.”46	If	the	
familia	would	not	accept	surety	for	a	detainee,	then	those	same	friends	and	neighbors	
might	have	to	follow	him	to	the	palace	to	give	surety	there.47	Furthermore,	the	defendant’s	
social	network	might	have	to	come	to	court	to	vouch	for	his	defense.	This	is	well-illustrated	
in	the	1292	curfew	case	of	Corrodo,	the	servant	of	Antonio,	notary	to	the	Archbishop	of	
Ravenna.	Antonio	submitted	a	legal	defense	and	produced	some	six	witnesses	to	testify	in	
support	of	it,	all	to	save	poor	Corrodo—or	more	likely	himself,	since	he	would	have	paid	his	
servant’s	penalty—from	a	5-lire	fine.48	No	charge	was	too	trivial	to	merit	the	attention	of	an	
elite	patron,	as	when	Candaleone	Gozzadini	gave	surety	for	Pietro	of	Medicina	after	he	was	
caught	urinating	on	the	jail	tower	in	1256.49	
Indeed,	because	the	familia’s	police	actions	affected	social	networks,	they	could	
inconvenience	political	elites	without	targeting	them	directly.	Again,	the	Pepoli	family	
serves	to	illustrate	the	point.	In	September	1286,	the	familia	discovered	gamblers	in	a	
tavern	owned	by	Romeo	Pepoli.50	In	April	1308,	Filippo	Pepoli	came	to	court	to	vouch	for	
his	servant	Dino,	who	had	been	charged	with	carrying	a	knife.51	In	July	1315,	Tarlatto	
Pepoli’s	servant	Mengolino	answered	an	arms-bearing	charge.52	In	January	1318,	the	
familia	again	discovered	gamblers	in	a	tavern	owned	by	Romeo	(it	is	unclear	if	it	was	the	
same	one)	and	charged	the	taverner,	a	servant	of	Romeo,	with	hosting	them.53	And	in	
August	1320,	Romeo	came	to	court	to	give	surety	for	his	friend	Pietro	di	Jacopo	
Buonacatti—himself	of	an	important	notarial	family—after	the	familia	found	Pietro	under	
Romeo’s	portico	with	a	knife.54	In	some	cases,	the	familia	may	well	have	known	whose	
servant	or	tavern	they	were	dealing	with.	But	frequently	they	could	not	have	predicted	who	
would	be	implicated	or	inconvenienced	by	their	police	actions.	Inevitably,	third-party	
policing	involved	a	certain	amount	of	collateral	damage	for	the	elites	who	instituted	it.	
Factual	Matters	
At	its	most	basic	level,	the	familia’s	legal	discretion	resided	in	their	having	to	
determine—as	all	police	do—which	of	the	realities	they	observed	in	the	street	constituted	
																																																								
46	ASB,	Corone	23,	1316II	(36	fols.),	17v:	“Voluit	exire	extra	domum	suam	ad	faciendum	eis	securitatem	ut	
faciunt	vicini	et	amici.”		
47	See	for	example	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	42v;	Corone	5,	1293II	(53	fols.),	14r–15r.	
48	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(50	fols.),	43v–44r.	For	cases	where	elites	paid	the	fines	of	servants,	see	ASB,	
Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	20r;	ASO,	Podestà	1,	reg.	6,	4r.	
49	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	22v.	
50	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	21r.	
51	ASB,	Corone	16,	1308I	(64	fols.),	27v.	Dino	is	identified	as	both	a	famulus	and	familiaris.	
52	ASB,	Corone	22,	1315II	(38	fols.),	10r–11r.	
53	ASB,	Corone	25,	1318I	(82	fols.),	19r.	
54	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(100	fols.),	42r–v.	
	 70	
a	violation	of	statute.	In	arms-bearing	cases,	the	familia	first	had	to	determine	if	the	
weapon	was	indeed	of	a	prohibited	type.	When	it	came	to	conspicuous	weapons	like	lances	
and	pole	arms,	there	was	little	for	the	berrovarii	to	determine;	they	were	all	illegal	inside	
the	city.	For	humbler	objects	like	wooden	maces,	clubs,	and	stones,	Perugia’s	statutes	left	it	
to	the	podestà	and	capitano	to	determine	whether	it	was	wielded	with	malicious	intent	(in	
fraudem)	based	on	the	person’s	social	identity	(both	his	habitus	and	condicio)	and	the	
nature	of	the	object	itself.55	Blade	weapons	could	also	create	legal	ambiguity,	as	it	was	not	
always	easy	to	distinguish	a	cultellus	de	ferire,	the	kind	of	knife	a	soldier	carried	as	a	
sidearm	into	battle,	from	a	knife	used	as	a	trade	tool	or	for	eating.56	To	make	the	statutes	
on	arms-bearing	clearer	to	residents,	many	of	whom	could	not	read	Latin,	Bologna’s	
government	had	pictures	of	illegal	weapons	painted	on	the	walls	of	the	palace	and	the	
Asinelli	tower.57	But	even	then,	the	familia	still	had	to	decide	if	the	weapons	they	found	in	
the	streets	conformed	to	these	ideal	types.	The	1295	defense	of	one	contadino	from	
Montelungo,	for	example,	hinged	entirely	on	his	claim	that	his	confiscated	weapon	was	a	
long	sword	(spata),	not	a	dagger	(sponto).58	
Familiares	indicated	their	belief	that	a	knife	was	illegal	by	reporting	it	as	vetitus,	
malitiosus,	fraudulosus,	or	suspectus.59	The	court,	in	turn,	took	these	descriptors	seriously.	
In	a	1308	case,	the	notary	first	described	a	small	blade	(stochettum)	as	“very	sharp”	
(acutissimum)	but	then	crossed	this	out	and	labeled	it	simply	“sharp”	(acutum)	instead.60	
Judges	did	not	always	agree	with	the	berrovarii	about	the	legality	of	a	given	weapon.	For	
example,	in	1291	the	familia	arrested	a	butcher	named	Pace	for	carrying	a	large	pointed	
knife,	which	they	deemed	“against	the	form	of	the	statutes.”	The	charge	was	dropped,	
however,	after	the	judge	determined	that	the	knife	in	question	“was	not	beyond	the	
suitable	form.”61	And	in	1293,	the	familia	reported	finding	one	individual	carrying	a	
wooden	club	and	wearing	three	pieces	of	armor.	He	was	acquitted,	however,	after	he	
produced	a	license	for	the	armor	and	the	podestà	and	his	judges	deemed	that	the	club,	
upon	closer	examination,	was	“neither	malicious	nor	suspect.”62	Yet	regardless	of	the	
judge’s	eventual	ruling,	it	was	the	job	of	the	berrovarii	to	bring	in	all	arms-bearing	suspects	
and	let	the	court	decide	their	guilt.	
																																																								
55	Statuto	1279,	1:333.	
56	For	the	legal	questions	surrounding	the	definition	of	arms	and,	in	particular,	different	kinds	of	knives,	see	
Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms,”	73–86,	94–102.	
57	These	paintings	are	mentioned	incidentally	in	defense	testimony	in	a	1294	weapons	case;	ASB,	Corone	6,	
1294I	(84	fols.),	20r.	A	1293	law	that	banned	armor-piercing	daggers	also	stipulated	that	they	be	painted	on	
the	palace	walls	and	Asinelli	tower,	presumably	where	other	prohibited	weapons	were	depicted;	Statuti	1288,	
1:568.	The	commune	used	the	same	strategy	to	educate	the	public	about	standard	measures,	publishing	a	
table	of	them	in	1286	on	the	church	of	Santa	Maria	dei	Rustigani,	located	on	the	south	side	of	the	central	
piazza;	see	Bergonzoni,	“Note	sulle	unità	di	misura	bolognesi,”	168.	
58	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	70r.	Long	swords	were	generally	licit	in	the	contado,	and	the	early	statutes	
did	not	prohibit	them	at	all;	see	Statuti	1245,	1:270–71.	
59	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294II	(28	fols.),	5v:	“Vetitus.”	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(58	fols.),	43r:	“Malitiosus.”	ASB,	
Corone	5,	1293II	(48	fols.),	2v	and	ASO,	Podestà	2,	reg.	3,	3r:	“Fraudulosus.”	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	
3v:	“Suspectus.”		
60	ASB,	Corone	16,	1308I	(64	fols.),	19r.	
61	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	15r:	“Canzellatus	quia	dictus	cultelus	non	erat	ultra	formam	congruam.”		
62	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	18r:	“Dictus	bastone	fuit	examinatus	per	dominum	potestatem	et	suos	
iudices	quod	non	erat	malitiosus	nec	suspectus,	ideo	fuit	relaxatus.”		
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Likewise,	when	they	encountered	men	at	play,	the	berrovarii	had	to	determine	if	
they	were	witnessing	an	illegal	game	or	one	permitted	by	statute.	The	popular	ludus	ad	
zardum,	where	players	won	if	they	rolled	the	number	they	called	out	first,	was	widely	
prohibited	outside	of	the	public	gambling	spots.63	Bologna’s	1288	statutes	seem	to	prohibit	
dice	games	altogether,	but	certain	games	involving	dice	were	apparently	licit.	The	law	
permitted	the	ludus	tabullarum,	which	seems	to	have	involved	a	board	and	game	pieces	as	
well	as	dice.	In	one	1318	case,	witnesses	referred	to	the	same	game,	which	they	were	
arguing	was	licit,	by	three	different	names:	tabule,	alee,	and	minoreti.64	In	a	1299	gambling	
inquisition,	two	neighborhood	witnesses	testified	that	the	defendants	were	playing	
rappellum	ad	vinum	cum	taxillis,	most	likely	a	drinking	game,	as	if	it	were	legal.65	If	anything	
seems	clear,	it	is	that	the	rules	and	names	of	games	were	fluid	and	likely	varied	from	city	to	
city,	which	only	complicated	the	job	of	the	berrovarii	tasked	with	enforcing	local	gaming	
laws.66	To	overcome	this	challenge,	the	familia	took	pains	to	observe	what	appeared	to	be	
illegal	dice	games	before	moving	against	them.	For	example,	in	1299,	two	berrovarii	gave	
damning	testimony	against	a	certain	Francesco	and	a	student	named	Giovanni,	found	
gambling	under	a	portico.	They	had	observed	Francesco	roll	the	dice	until	he	lost	his	turn,	
at	which	point	a	spectator	said	to	him,	“You	owe	him	14.”	Then	Giovanni	put	down	another	
bet	saying,	“I	want	to	wager	all	the	money	I’ve	got.”	At	this	point	one	of	the	berrovarii	
intervened,	ordering	them	to	freeze	and	not	touch	the	money	or	dice	until	the	knight	
arrived.67	Fortunately	for	the	berrovarii,	legal	presumptions	against	gamblers	(see	below)	
allowed	them	to	make	accusations	with	little	fear	of	repercussions.	
Agricultural	crimes	could	also	hinge	on	basic	questions	of	fact.	In	July	1289,	the	
familia	arrested	the	servant	(famulus)	of	Giacomo	da	Ignano	for	carrying	a	basket	of	unripe	
grapes.	He	made	the	defense	that	he	was	carrying	the	bitter	grapes	to	the	city	for	his	
master	to	eat,	with	his	permission	and	by	his	order.	Giacomo	and	two	other	witnesses	
confirmed	this,	and	so	the	court	acquitted	his	servant	“since	it	was	evident	these	grapes	
were	for	eating	and	not	from	a	vineyard.”68	Much	as	the	familia	made	it	risky	to	carry	any	
type	of	blade	weapon	through	the	city,	even	for	legitimate	purposes,	they	apparently	made	
it	risky	for	anyone	to	carry	grapes	in	the	countryside.	
The	language	of	curfew	laws	was	especially	imprecise	and	gave	the	familia	
significant	leeway	in	determining	who	had	violated	this	statute.	At	a	glance,	Bologna’s	
curfew	law	seems	straightforward:	no	one	was	to	go	through	the	city	after	the	third	
																																																								
63	Sella,	“Nomi	latini	di	giuochi,”	214.	
64	ASB,	Corone	26,	1318II	(78	fols.),	37v–38r.	
65	ASB,	Corone	10,	1299–1300	(41	fols.),	6r.	
66	Perugia’s	statutes,	by	contrast,	expressly	prohibited	anyone	from	playing	any	dice	game	or	game	involving	
wagers	in	any	house,	tavern,	or	inn;	see	Statuto	1279,	1:328.	A	modern	compendium	of	medieval	gaming	laws	
contains	some	3,200	statutes;	see	Rizzi,	ed.,	Statuta	de	ludo.	For	our	limited	understanding	of	the	various	
types	of	games	named	in	the	sources,	see	Vallerani,	“Giochi	di	posizione,”	23.	
67	ASB,	Corone	10,	1299	(34	fols.),	12v:	“Et	tunc	unus	qui	nominatur	Mercatus	dixit	ipse,	‘Habet	tibi	quatuor	
decim.’	Et	viderunt	quod	dictus	Johanes	tunc	proiecit	super	illas	tabulas	ubi	ludebant	illos	denarios	quos	
habebat	in	manu	dicendo,	‘Vollo	temptare	quot	denarios	habeo.’”	For	similar	examples,	see	Corone	1,	1286II,	
32r;	Corone	6,	1294I	(40	fols.),	8v.	
68	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	8r,	28r:	“Non	condempnetur	quia	apparuit	ipsos	uvas	esse	per	gulas	et	non	
de	vinea.	Absolutus.”		
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sounding	of	the	bell	without	a	light.69	The	first	curfew	bell	marked	the	beginning	of	
nightfall,	and	residents	had	until	the	third	and	final	bell	to	either	close	up	their	houses	or	
light	a	lamp	of	some	sort.70	Nighttime	lasted	until	the	sounding	of	the	morning	bell,	which	
left	individuals	free	to	go	about	the	streets	unmolested.	However,	timekeeping	in	the	
premodern	city	was	an	inexact	science.	The	cathedral	bell,	which	marked	time	in	Bologna,	
could	be	difficult	to	hear	or	its	ring	confused	with	other	bells’	in	the	city.	People	could	also	
lose	count	of	how	many	times	it	had	rung,	leading	to	disagreements	over	when	night	had	
fallen.	Curfew	defendants	often	claimed,	therefore,	that	the	berrovarii	had	detained	them	
before	nightfall	or	after	daybreak,	and	judges	sometimes	sided	with	them	against	the	
berrovarii.	In	a	1279	case	from	Perugia,	the	capitano’s	familia	seems	to	have	arrested	one	
individual	at	the	exact	moment	the	third	bell	was	ringing.	He	argued	that,	when	the	familia	
found	him,	the	final	curfew	bell	had	not	finished	ringing	but	lasted	a	long	time	thereafter.	
Two	witnesses	confirmed	this,	and	the	court	acquitted	him.71	
The	pattern	of	contention	over	the	timing	of	curfew	arrests	is	likely	attributable	to	
the	familia’s	tendency	to	patrol	on	the	cusp	of	nightfall.	These	evening	patrols	served	the	
disciplinary	function	of	putting	the	city	to	bed,	so	to	speak.	This	is	more	or	less	explicit	in	a	
September	1294	case	in	which	six	alleged	curfew	breakers	argued	jointly	that	they	had	not	
heard	the	third	bell	when	the	familia	booked	them.	According	to	their	witness	Tommasio,	
he	had	been	standing	unshod	near	his	front	door	with	his	neighbors	“as	men	stand	in	
summertime	because	of	the	heat”	when	some	berrovarii	came	upon	them.	The	officers	let	
them	off	with	the	warning:	“Go	inside	now,	since	it	is	time.”	Tommasio	went	inside,	but	
evidently	some	of	his	neighbors	did	not.	Soon	afterward,	the	podestà’s	notary	arrived	on	
the	scene	and	booked	them,	causing	a	disturbance	(rumor)	in	the	neighborhood.	Tommasio	
and	another	witness	testified	that	the	curfew	bell	was	broken	at	the	time	and	could	not	be	
heard	clearly	over	the	noise	of	the	millhouses	in	their	neighborhood.	Despite	this	favorable	
testimony	from	Tommasio	and	other	witnesses,	the	judge	convicted	these	six	men	of	
violating	curfew.72	A	similar	incident	occurred	earlier	that	year	in	March,	when	the	familia	
seems	to	have	booked	three	popolani	just	before	the	third	sounding	of	the	bell—even	after	
letting	some	of	their	neighbors	go.	Again,	the	judge	acquitted	them	of	the	curfew	charges	
accordingly.73	The	trial	records	may	conceal	legitimate	reasons	the	familia	had	for	singling	
these	individuals	out	among	their	neighbors.	Nonetheless,	these	incidents	indicate	the	
familia’s	willingness	to	use	their	discretion	for	disciplinary	purposes,	even	if	one	of	their	
own	judges	overturned	them	later.	
More	subjective	than	the	question	of	when	curfew	fell,	however,	was	the	question	of	
whether	someone	was	with	or	without	a	light.	The	language	of	the	statute	itself	created	this	
																																																								
69	Statuti	1288,	1:229.	Lawmakers	sometimes	enacted	strict	curfews	prohibiting	nocturnal	travel	even	with	a	
light,	but	such	measures	were	temporary.	
70	A	crime	was	considered	nocturnal	if	it	occurred	after	the	first	bell,	not	the	third;	see	Statuti	1288,	1:175.		
71	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	1r.	For	similar	cases,	see	ASP,	Capitano	7b,	reg.	7,	32r–v;	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(54	
fols.),	30v.	
72	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294II	(28	fols.),	7r,	27v:	“Et	ego	fui	de	illis	[…]	qui	dimittebamur	per	familiam,	quia	
inveniebant	nos	ita	descalzati	ad	ostia	nostra	et	sub	porticibus	propter	calorem,	sicut	stant	homines	in	estivo	
tempore.	Et	dicebant	tantum	barruarii	quod	precedebant	vobis	domino,	‘Intrante	amodo	in	domum	quia	est	
tempus.’	Et	ita	ibant	viam.”		
73	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(118	fols.),	54v;	1294I	(84	fols.),	34r–35r.	The	three	popolani	were	the	notary	Giberto	
di	Guidolino,	Allegrezzia	Musoni,	and	Ugolino	Sabadini.	Despite	his	acquittal	on	curfew	charges,	Ugolino	was	
convicted	for	carrying	a	sword	at	the	same	time.	
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ambiguity,	since	it	did	not	require	every	individual	to	carry	his	own	lamp.	Exactly	how	
close	to	a	given	light	source	did	someone	have	to	be	for	the	familia	or	watchmen	to	
consider	him	cum	lumine?	Many	alleged	curfew	breakers	claimed	they	had	in	fact	been	cum	
lumine—a	light	held	by	someone	else—when	the	familia	discovered	them.	A	good	example	
is	the	case	of	a	certain	Zambonino,	whom	the	familia	allegedly	found	without	a	light	in	the	
marketplace	near	the	piazza	in	August	1302.	Zambonino	claimed	in	his	defense	that	some	
watchmen	had	taken	away	his	lamp	right	before	the	familia	came	upon	him,	but	he	was	still	
“in	the	presence	of	the	said	light”	when	arrested.74	Three	watchmen	corroborated	this	
story.	They	all	testified	that	they	had	taken	Zambonino’s	lamp	with	his	consent	as	they	
responded	to	a	disturbance	nearby	in	the	house	of	Lambertino	Ramponi,	a	famous	jurist	
and	magnate.	Nevertheless,	as	the	watchman	Giacomo	put	it:	“Zambonino	was	in	the	
presence	of	and	with	the	said	light	when	he	was	found	by	the	podestà’s	familia,	even	
though	he	did	not	have	the	light	in	hand.”75	The	question	of	light	possession	could	also	arise	
when	the	alleged	offender	was	discovered	near	his	home,	where	the	light	from	his	portico	
or	his	neighbor’s	reached	the	street.	For	example,	in	July	1310	the	familia	charged	a	certain	
Rizzardo	and	Tommaso	for	being	out	at	night	without	a	light.	They	argued	jointly	that,	
when	the	familia	found	them,	they	were	fetching	drinking	water	from	the	well	next	to	
Rizzardo’s	house.	Rizzardo’s	sister	Damiana	was	waiting	at	the	door	with	a	few	other	
neighbors	and	holding	a	candle	that	cast	light	all	the	way	to	the	well,	such	that	Rizzardo	
and	Tommaso	believed	they	were	cum	lumine	and	not	breaking	the	law.76	Three	neighbors	
who	were	present	confirmed	this	story.	According	to	one	of	them,	Rizzardo	had	instructed	
Damiana	before	he	and	Tommaso	went	out:	“Take	a	light	and	light	it	for	us,	so	that	if	the	
familia	of	the	podestà	comes,	they	won’t	be	able	to	impede	us	or	say	anything.”77	What	
motivated	the	familia	to	level	charges	in	a	case	like	this	is	impossible	to	say.	But	if	anything	
is	clear,	it	is	that	the	ambiguous	language	of	the	curfew	law	made	it	a	flexible	tool	of	
enforcement	for	the	familia.	Anyone	who	was	out	at	night	and	not	himself	carrying	a	light	
could	be	booked	and	made	to	answer	in	a	court	of	law.	
Legal	Presumptions	
As	the	above	examples	show,	the	berrovarii	exercised	judicial	discretion	simply	by	
applying	the	language	of	the	statutes	to	everyday	life.	But	the	statutes	created	even	more	
room	for	interpretation	by	allowing	for	convictions	on	the	basis	of	presumption.78	
Communal	statutes	identified	certain	indicators	and	created	certain	legal	fictions	that	could	
serve	as	proof	of	guilt	even	when	the	familia	did	not	catch	the	suspect	in	flagrante	delicto.	
Thus,	in	the	words	of	a	1301	entry	from	the	crowns	notary,	he	searched	the	city	and	its	
churches	for	sumptuary	violations	“through	fama,	appearance,	proofs,	circumstantial	
																																																								
74	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(152	fols.),	57v:	“Item	quod	dictus	Zamboninus	erat	in	presentia	dicti	luminis.”	For	
the	relatio,	see	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	44v–45r.	
75	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(152	fols.),	58r–58v:	“Respondit	quod	ipse	Zamboninus	erat	in	presentia	dicti	
luminis	et	cum	dicta	lumine	quando	fuit	inventus	per	familiam	domini	potestatis,	sed	tamen	lumen	non	
habebat	in	manu.”		
76	ASB,	Corone	18,	1310II	(96	fols.),	7v–8v,	11v.	For	a	similar	case,	see	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	27v.	
77	ASB,	Corone	18,	1310II	(96	fols.),	12r:	“Et	audivit	et	vidit	quando	dictus	Ricçardus	dixit	predicte	Damiane	
sue	sorore,	‘Accipe	unum	lumen	et	collumina	nobis,	ut	si	veniret	familia	potestatis	non	possit	nos	impedire	
neque	dicere	aliquid.’”		
78	Helmholz	and	Sellar,	eds.,	The	Law	of	Presumptions;	Reggi,	“Presunzione”;	Ramponi,	La	teoria	generale.	
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evidence,	and	presumptions.”79	Ultimately	it	was	up	to	the	judge	whether	to	convict	on	the	
basis	of	presumption,	but	the	familia	was	always	justified	in	reporting	an	offense	on	this	
basis.	In	effect,	the	berrovarii’s	job	was	to	bring	anyone	who	seemed	to	be	breaking	the	law	
into	court	and	allow	a	judge	to	decide	his	or	her	guilt.	Hence	in	a	1279	register	from	
Perugia,	denunciations	for	arms-bearing	end	with	the	formula	“which	seems	to	be	against	
the	form	of	the	statute.”80	By	design,	then,	the	familia	had	little	incentive	to	police	leniently.	
Presumption	played	an	especially	important	role	in	gambling	cases.	Strictly	
speaking,	the	crime	lay	not	in	the	dice	game	but	in	the	winning	and	losing	of	money	over	it,	
yet	this	was	difficult	for	berrovarii	to	observe	directly.	Moreover,	when	the	familia	
interrupted	a	dice	game,	it	could	be	difficult	to	determine	who	was	playing	and	who	was	
merely	spectating.	Siena’s	statutes	circumvented	this	by	prescribing	a	lesser	penalty	for	
anyone	spectating	at	an	illicit	dice	game.81	Bologna’s	statutes,	however,	made	no	such	
distinction	and	allowed	judges	to	convict	anyone	present	at	a	dice	game	on	the	basis	of	
presumption.82	The	statutes	did	not	elaborate	on	what	created	presumption	for	gambling	
offenses,	but	in	practice	the	familia	could	arrest	anyone	standing	around	a	gaming	table,	
overheard	placing	bets,	or	found	with	dice	or	money	before	them.	Perugia’s	1279	statutes	
stated	that	gambling	should	be	“understood	to	have	taken	place	if	things	apt	for	gambling	
are	found.”83	
For	the	berrovarii,	presumption	functioned	much	like	“probable	cause”	today.	To	
make	a	legitimate	arrest,	the	familia	did	not	have	to	catch	suspects	in	the	act,	but	only	in	a	
situation	that	created	adequate	suspicion.	Four	cases	from	1256	show	the	judge	explicitly	
invoking	presumption	to	convict	men	suspected	of	gambling	in	taverns	at	night.	In	one	of	
these	cases,	the	familia	found	three	men	seated	at	a	table	with	dice	before	them	and	sent	
them	fleeing.	The	podestà,	“holding	the	presumption	that	they	were	gambling	and	from	the	
discretion	granted	to	him	by	statute,”	sentenced	each	of	them	to	a	50-lire	fine.84	In	another	
case,	the	familia	spied	on	three	men	in	a	tavern	through	a	keyhole	in	the	door	and	saw	
them	rolling	(or	appearing	to	roll)	dice	on	a	table.	Again,	the	judge	“presumed”	they	were	
gambling	and	sentenced	them	each	to	a	50-lire	fine.85	The	berrovarii	themselves	implicitly	
appealed	to	presumption	when	they	reported	violations	using	tentative	language—for	
instance,	that	the	suspects	“seem	to	have	been”	gambling.86	To	take	an	example	from	
																																																								
79	ASB,	Corone	12,	1301II,	1r:	“Inquirendo	per	famam,	aspectum,	probationes,	indictia,	presuntiones,	et	
quolibet	alio	modo.”		
80	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	13r:	“Quid	videtur	esse	contra	formam	statuti.”		
81	Costituto,	2:246.	
82	This	is	explicit	in	Bologna’s	earliest	extant	gambling	statute	from	1252;	see	Statuti	1245,	1:304.	The	
principle	held	in	the	1288	compilation;	see	Statuti	1288,	1:224.	
83	Statuto	1279,	1:328:	“Et	intelligatur	ludus	fieri,	si	inueniantur	res	parate	ad	ludendum	secundum	formam	
statuti.”		
84	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	26r:	“Ideo	potestas	habita	presumptione	quod	luderent,	et	ex	arbitrio	ei	dato	ex	
statutis	condenpnat	quemlibet	eorum	secundum	formam	statutorum	in	libris	quinquaginta.”	The	second	case	
(on	26v)	is	nearly	identical.	
85	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	41r:	“Unde	cum	potestas	presumat	eos	luxisse,	ideo	ex	arbitrio	ei	dato	ex	
statutis	condenpnat.”	In	the	fourth	case	(on	40v),	the	familia	eavesdropped	at	the	tavern	door.	
86	For	examples,	see	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	30v;	Corone	2,	1287II,	28v;	Corone	5,	1293II	(48	fols.),	9v;	Corone	
9,	1298	(28	fols.),	22v.	
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Orvieto,	the	judge	convicted	four	men	in	1277	“as	if”	(tamquam)	they	were	found	gambling	
after	the	familia	reported	them	as	“suspected	of	gambling”	(suspectus	de	ludo).87		
Although	judges	did	not	always	convict	on	the	basis	of	presumption,	the	familia’s	
charge	could	serve	a	disciplinary	function	in	itself,	since	it	often	meant	at	least	a	brief	stint	
in	jail.	For	instance,	in	1298	the	familia	denounced	four	men	for	playing	dice	in	a	tavern,	
including	the	taverner.	In	court,	the	discovering	officer	admitted	that,	although	he	had	seen	
one	of	the	suspects	with	dice	in	hand,	he	had	not	seen	money	or	wine	(a	common	currency	
of	wager)	before	them.	The	podestà	thus	had	them	released	“since	they	were	not	playing,”	
but	only	after—or	perhaps	because—they	had	spent	time	in	jail.88	Similarly,	in	March	1287	
a	domicellus	of	the	podestà	named	Bastardino	denounced	three	men	for	illicit	gambling.	He	
had	seen	one	of	them	shaking	his	hand	“as	men	who	roll	dice	when	they	gamble	do,”	and	
found	a	die	on	the	ground	nearby,	but	no	money	on	the	table.	All	three	men	denied	the	
charge	when	they	appeared	in	court,	but	they	had	difficulty	giving	surety	and	thus	had	to	
spend	significant	time	in	jail—more	than	three	weeks	in	one	case,	and	possibly	more	in	
another.89	Regardless	of	the	outcome,	the	familia’s	denunciation	itself	constituted	a	penalty	
of	sorts,	and	the	presumptions	included	in	statute	only	enabled	the	familia	to	make	more	
denunciations.	
Something	like	presumption	also	applied	against	tavern	owners.	According	to	
Bologna’s	statutes,	if	the	familia	found	gamblers	inside	a	building	or	on	its	premises,	the	
proprietor	was	automatically	implicated	as	a	host	of	illegal	gaming.	Likewise,	if	anyone	fled	
during	a	gambling	raid	and	the	property	owner	was	present,	he	was	liable	for	the	fugitive’s	
penalty	unless	he	gave	the	fugitive’s	name.90	If	the	taverner	was	present	at	the	scene,	the	
presumption	of	guilt	could	be	hard	to	overcome.	In	each	of	the	four	cases	from	1256	
mentioned	above,	the	taverners	were	indeed	present	and	the	judge	sentenced	them	to	the	
same	penalty	as	the	gamblers.	In	a	1286	case,	the	court	summoned	the	taverner	Pietro	and	
his	wife	Gualandina	after	four	men	were	arrested	for	gambling	on	their	premises	and	a	fifth	
escaped.	Though	they	pleaded	ignorance,	the	court	sentenced	Pietro	to	a	25-lire	fine,	
perhaps	in	a	show	of	clemency	since	the	statutory	penalty	was	100	lire.91	As	their	plea	
suggests,	these	cases	likely	hinged	on	whether	the	gamblers	had	been	playing	with	the	
proprietor’s	knowledge	and	consent.	Orvieto’s	court	also	condemned	taverners	after	men	
were	found	gambling	in	their	establishments.92	
Proprietors	were	also	disadvantaged	by	the	legal	fiction	regarding	gambling	
paraphernalia.	According	to	statute,	anyone	reputed	as	a	host	who	was	found	to	have	
gaming	tables	on	his	property	was	to	be	condemned	as	if	gamblers	had	been	discovered	
there.93	For	example,	in	a	1289	inquisition	Bologna’s	court	questioned	some	30	witnesses	
																																																								
87	ASO,	Podestà	1,	reg.	6,	31r.	See	43r	for	a	similar	sentence.	
88	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298	(28	fols.),	9v:	“Relaxati	de	mandato	domini	potestatis	quia	non	ludebant.”		
89	ASB,	Corone	1,	1287	(32	fols.),	29v–30r:	“Et	unus	illorum,	qui	stabant	in	pedibus,	tenebat	pugnum	seu	
manum	clausam	quemadmodum	tenent	homines	quando	tra[h]unt	tasillos	pro	ludendo.	Et	stabat	chinatus	
super	disco	et	torlabat	manum	contra	socium	suum,	qui	erat	in	pedibus,	sicut	faciunt	homines	qui	tra[h]unt	
tasillos	quando	ludent.”	After	appearing	in	court	on	9	March,	one	defendant	was	not	released	from	jail	until	
19	March	and	a	second	not	until	1	April.	A	third	is	noted	to	have	been	jailed	but	not	released.		
90	Statuti	1288,	1:224.	
91	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	10r–v.	
92	ASO,	Podestà	2,	reg.	9,	22v,	45v.	
93	Statuti	1288,	1:224.	Perugia’s	statutes	likewise	presumed	that	illegal	gaming	was	taking	place	wherever	
gambling	paraphernalia	was	discovered;	see	Statuto	1279,	1:328.	
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about	two	taverners	after	the	familia	discovered	gaming	tables	in	their	establishment.94	
That	case	ended	in	their	acquittal,	but	others	were	not	so	lucky.	In	two	similar	cases	from	
1299,	the	familia	discovered	gaming	tables	in	two	different	taverns.	In	these	inquests,	the	
witness	testimony	proved	more	damning,	and	the	court	sentenced	each	of	the	two	
taverners	to	pay	the	statutory	fine	of	100	lire.95	By	including	such	presumptions	against	
gamblers	and	their	facilitators	in	the	statutes,	Bologna’s	lawmakers	empowered	the	familia	
to	police	gaming	aggressively.	
The	statutes	also	created	two	legal	fictions	that	were	common	in	arms-bearing	
cases.	First,	the	law	regarded	anyone	who	fled	from	the	familia	or	otherwise	refused	a	
search	as	guilty	of	carrying	a	knife	illicitly.96	This	was	consistent	with	the	law’s	stance	
toward	contumacy	more	generally;	anyone	accused	of	a	crime	who	refused	to	appear	in	
court	was	considered	guilty.97	Ironically,	this	meant	it	actually	behooved	anyone	carrying	a	
prohibited	weapon	to	flee,	since	then	at	least	they	might	escape.	Unsurprisingly,	then,	many	
arms-bearing	suspects	attempted	to	flee	before	the	familia.	In	the	first	semester	of	1308,	
for	example,	15	of	the	43	arms-bearing	cases	(i.e.,	more	than	a	third)	explicitly	involved	
flight;	in	the	second	semester	of	1320,	15	of	the	97	arms-bearing	cases	did.	As	the	next	
chapter	will	discuss,	familiares	were	not	shy	about	giving	chase	and	worked	hard	to	make	
fugitives	pay	the	statutory	penalty.		
	 Second,	the	law	presumed	that	anyone	found	“next	to”	an	abandoned	weapon	was	
the	owner	of	that	weapon,	unless	he	revealed	whose	it	really	was.98	In	Bologna	this	legal	
fiction	dates	back	to	at	least	1256,	when	a	cobbler	was	convicted	for	a	falzonus	found	at	his	
feet	one	night.99	This	principle	was	meant	to	ensure	that	individuals	who	tried	to	discard	
their	weapons	at	the	sight	of	the	familia	would	not	escape	conviction.	Indeed,	the	familia	
often	reported	witnessing	such	attempts	at	evasion.100	But	it	also	applied	to	groups.	When	
multiple	individuals	were	found	in	the	vicinity	of	an	abandoned	weapon,	the	law	presumed	
the	nearest	person	to	be	the	guilty	party.	This	legal	fiction	aimed	to	compel	the	weapon’s	
true	owner	to	come	forward	lest	his	friends	and	associates	suffer	the	penalty,	and	seems	to	
have	worked	as	intended	on	occasion.101	In	other	cases,	however,	a	code	of	silence	
prevailed,	and	judges	then	had	to	determine	the	defendant’s	relative	proximity	to	an	
abandoned	weapon.	In	a	typical	case	from	Perugia	in	1279,	the	judge	asked	the	defendant	
whose	knife	it	was,	if	anyone	was	nearer	it	than	he,	and	how	far	he	was	from	it.102	The	
statutes	left	no	room	for	claims	of	ignorance	in	abandoned	weapon	cases.	This	presumption	
gave	the	familia	grounds,	once	again,	to	charge	more	individuals	and	thereby	discipline	
them,	regardless	of	how	the	judge	ultimately	ruled.103	
																																																								
94	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(58	fols.),	53r–55v.	
95	ASB,	Corone	10,	1299–1300	(41	fols.),	8v–11r,	18v–23r.	
96	Statuti	1288,	1:226–27.	Statuto	1279,	1:333.	For	other	cities,	see	Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms,”	118–19.	
97	Carraway,	“Contumacy,”	103.	
98	Statuti	1288,	1:227.	
99	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	5v.	
100	For	examples,	see	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	6v,	36v;	Corone	10,	1299	(34	fols.),	4r;	Corone	13,	1302II	
(102	fols.),	22v.	ASO,	Podestà	1,	reg.	6,	37r;	2,	reg.	9,	45r.	ASP,	Capitano	2,	reg.	1,	3r;	7b,	reg.	7,	19v.	
101	See	for	example	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(100	fols.),	56v.	
102	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	23v.	
103	For	further	examples,	see	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	81r;	Corone	28,	1320II	(100	fols.),	28r,	60v–
61r.	
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Several	cases	also	exist	in	which	the	familia	apparently	fabricated	details	that	went	
beyond	presumption,	suggesting	they	wanted	to	secure	convictions	rather	than	merely	
level	charges.	For	instance,	in	August	1298	the	familia	reported	finding	Carlo	di	Bonacossa	
Baciacomari	carrying	a	knife	through	the	city	at	night.	Carlo	also	happened	to	be	a	magnate,	
as	he	confessed	at	his	arraignment,	though	his	family	included	a	popolano	branch	as	well.	
Testimony	from	the	two	discovering	officers	is	squeezed	into	the	margin	next	to	the	case	
entry,	suggesting	they	were	questioned	later	about	the	incident.	When	pressed,	they	
admitted	that	they	had	found	the	knife	on	the	ground	and	“did	not	know	for	certain	whose	
knife	it	was,	except	that	one	of	the	men,	namely	the	said	Carlo	or	Bartolomeo,	threw	the	
said	knife	on	the	ground.”	In	another	marginal	note,	this	previously	unmentioned	
Bartolomeo	di	Fra	Giacomo	then	confessed	that	the	knife	was	his	and	that	he	discarded	it	
when	he	saw	the	familia.	His	name	thus	appears	below	Carlo’s	as	the	individual	found	with	
a	knife	at	night;	where	it	once	said	Carlo	was	given	three	days	to	make	his	defense,	his	
name	was	crossed	out	and	Bartolomeo’s	written	instead.104	Why	the	familia	first	charged	
Carlo	and	not	Bartolomeo	is	unclear,	but	the	salient	point	is	that	they	first	claimed	they	had	
found	Carlo	with	the	knife	in	hand,	and	only	reluctantly	admitted	they	had	found	it	on	the	
ground.		
	
[Image	1:	The	record	of	Carlo	Baciacomari’s	trial	in	the	Crowns	and	Arms	series.]	
	
Similarly,	in	1302	the	familia	charged	Ugolino	di	Bittino	da	Sala,	another	magnate,	
with	carrying	a	knife.	The	notary	initially	recorded	that	they	found	Ugolino	“going	through	
the	city”	with	a	knife.	The	notary	crossed	this	out,	however,	and	wrote	instead	that	the	
familia	found	a	knife	on	the	ground	under	a	portico	near	Ugolino,	and	one	of	the	berrovarii	
“believed”	the	knife	belonged	to	him.105	This	likely	represents	another	change	in	the	
berrovarii’s	story	under	questioning,	as	in	the	case	above,	rather	than	scribal	error.	Once	
again,	it	seems	the	berrovarii	had	embellished	their	story	to	secure	a	conviction.	These	
cases	highlight	once	more	the	extent	to	which	guilt	or	innocence	could	hinge	on	the	word	of	
the	berrovarii.	Although	they	ultimately	shared	exonerating	information,	the	berrovarii	
were	not	forthcoming	initially—apparently	because	they	preferred	to	see	their	charges	
result	in	convictions.	
Police	Jurisdiction	
For	the	familia,	identifying	illicit	activity	was	not	only	a	question	of	what	they	saw	
taking	place	but	also	where	they	saw	it.	This	is	abundantly	clear	in	the	activity	of	the	dirt	
notary,	who	generally	enforced	the	city’s	zoning	laws.106	But	the	familia	was	also	concerned	
with	questions	of	space	on	its	patrols	for	curfew,	gambling,	and	arms-bearing	offenses.	
Perugia’s	statutes,	for	example,	scaled	the	penalties	for	carrying	assault	weapons	according	
																																																								
104	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298	(28	fols.),	19r:	“Predicti	Roffinus	et	Petrinus	dixerunt	quod	invenerunt	ipsum	
cutellum	in	terram	et	nesciunt	pro	firmo	cuius	sit	ille	cutellus,	nisi	quod	unus	ex	eis	dictum	cutellum	proiecit	
in	terram,	videlicet	dictus	Carlus	vel	Bertholomeus.”		
105	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	83v:	“Qui	beroarii	[...]	retulerunt	[...]	se	invenisse	[crossed	out:	
Ugolinum	Bitini	de	Salla	capelle	sancti	Felicis	sive	sancti	Nicolay	ire	per]	sub	quendam	porticum	in	terra	
proiectum	prope	Ugolinum	Bitini	de	Salla	capelle	sancti	Felicis	sive	sancti	Nicolay.	Et	predictus	Janotus	de	
Valdetario	[beroerius]	dixit	dictum	cutellum	fuisse	predicti	Ugolini	ut	credebat.”		
106	Geltner,	“Finding	Matter	Out	of	Place.”	
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to	where	the	offense	took	place,	with	the	steepest	fines	for	violations	in	the	civic	center	(the	
central	piazza	and	palaces	of	the	commune	and	capitano)	and	the	lightest	penalties	for	
violations	in	the	contado	or	distretto.107	In	gambling	cases,	it	could	be	important	to	delimit	
property	boundaries	and	note	precisely	where	players	were	found	since,	as	noted	above,	
the	statutes	held	proprietors	responsible	for	gamblers	found	on	their	premises.108	
Bologna’s	statutes	did	not	set	any	spatial	boundaries	for	licit	or	illicit	arms-bearing,	
but	trial	records	show	that,	in	practice,	the	arms-bearing	laws	applied	only	in	public	spaces,	
not	on	private	property.109	This	is	explicit	in	a	case	from	July	1289,	when	two	berrovarii	
reported	that	a	city	resident	named	Zino	da	Collo	was	carrying	a	dagger	and	wearing	an	
iron	helmet	“through	the	city	of	Bologna.”	According	to	the	trial	record,	Zino	confessed	he	
was	found	carrying	the	arms	“through	the	city	of	Bologna,”	but	noted	he	was	in	a	building	
(domus),	not	outside.	The	judge	then	questioned	the	berrovarii	more	closely,	as	recorded	in	
the	margins	of	the	case.	When	pressed,	the	berrovarii	admitted	they	had	entered	the	
building	after	Zino	and	found	the	arms	there.	They	could	not	say	they	had	discovered	the	
arms	outside	the	building,	nor	did	they	indicate	that	Zino	had	failed	to	heed	their	orders	to	
stop.	The	notary	amended	the	trial	record	accordingly	to	read	that	the	berrovarii	had	found	
Zino	“whom	they	believe	to	have	been	bearing”	arms.	In	the	end,	the	podestà	dropped	the	
charges	against	Zino	altogether,	for	the	explicit	reason	that	his	weapons	were	found	inside	
a	house	and	not	outside.110	A	similar	sequence	played	out	in	April	1290,	when	two	
berrovarii	reported	that	Simone	of	Vicenza,	then	resident	of	Bologna,	was	carrying	a	knife	
and	iron	mace	“through	the	city	of	Bologna”	without	a	cap.	Simone	confessed	he	had	been	
found	with	the	weapons,	but	in	the	garden	behind	the	house	where	he	lived.	This	claim	
became	the	sole	article	of	his	formal	defense,	which	two	witnesses	upheld.	Tellingly,	the	
judge	asked	the	witnesses:	“When	he	exited	the	house	with	the	weapons,	did	Simone	enter	
a	public	street	with	those	weapons?”	They	replied	he	had	not.111	Three	days	after	this	
defense	testimony—11	after	the	original	denunciation—the	judge	asked	the	berrovarii	
where	they	had	found	Simone	with	the	weapons.	They	replied,	rather	grudgingly	it	seems,	
that	they	had	found	him	bearing	arms	“through	the	city,	through	the	garden.”112	The	judge	
acquitted	Simone.	In	both	of	these	cases,	the	outcome	hinged	solely	on	the	question	of	
public	versus	private	space.	In	the	first,	the	judge	wanted	to	know	whether	the	berrovarii	
had	found	Zino	outside	the	house	with	the	weapons;	in	the	second,	whether	Simone	had	
ever	entered	into	the	public	street	with	his	weapons.	The	interaction	between	the	judges	
and	berrovarii	in	these	cases	also	illustrates	the	different	incentives	they	had	when	it	came	
to	enforcing	the	law,	even	though	both	were	familiares	of	the	podestà.	
																																																								
107	Statuto	1279,	1:332.	
108	For	an	example,	see	ASB,	Corone	1,	1285II	(7	fols.),	1r–v.	
109	Statutes	of	other	communes	made	such	jurisdictional	limits	explicit;	see	Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms,”	119–
20.	
110	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	13v:	“Qui	berruarii	retulerunt	mihi	notario	se	invenisse	Zinum	de	Collo	
capelle	sancti	Petri	Marzolini	[inserted	later:	quem	credunt]	portasse	hodie	secum	per	civitatem	Bononie	
unum	spontonem	et	unam	planulam	contra	formam	statutorum	comunis	Bononie.”		
111	ASB,	Corone	2,	1290I	(24	fols.),	20r:	“Interrogatus	si	dictus	Simone	quando	exivit	de	dicta	domo	cum	dictis	
armis	intravit	cum	ipsis	armis	in	viam	publicam,	respondit	non.”	
112	ASB,	Corone	2,	1290I	(24	fols.),	9r:	“Dixerunt	se	invenisse	dictum	Simonem	portantem	dicta	arma	per	
dictam	civitatem	per	quendam	ortum.”		
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The	familia,	then,	was	not	supposed	to	arrest	anyone	for	carrying	a	weapon	unless	
he	set	foot	in	a	public	space.	The	principle	seems	to	have	held	in	Perugia	as	well,	where	a	
1273	conviction	spells	out,	for	example,	that	the	imputed	was	carrying	two	blade	weapons	
“outside	his	home	against	the	form	of	the	statutes.”113	Because	of	this,	notaries	typically	
recorded	where	discoveries	of	prohibited	arms	took	place,	even	if	no	more	specifically	than	
a	public	street	or	piazza.	A	record	from	4	September	1288,	for	example,	notes	the	familia’s	
discovery	of	six	illegally	armed	men:	one	in	the	piazza	of	San	Domenico,	one	in	Via	
Barberia,	another	in	Via	Santo	Stefano,	two	in	Strada	Maggiore,	and	the	sixth	in	the	vicinity	
of	Strada	Maggiore.114	However,	the	familia	was	justified	in	pursuing	armed	suspects	into	
buildings	if	they	were	spotted	in	the	street	first.	In	a	1292	case,	for	example,	the	familia	
reported	following	the	suspect	into	a	shop	after	seeing	him	place	his	hand	under	his	tunic,	
as	if	he	had	a	knife.115	
There	is	evidence,	however,	that	the	berrovarii	frequently	overstepped	the	
boundaries	of	their	jurisdiction,	as	they	seem	to	have	in	Zino’s	and	Simone’s	cases	above.	A	
pattern	of	encroachment	is	evident	in	a	series	of	cases	from	autumn	1320.	On	22	October,	
two	berrovarii	reported	that	Petrizolo	d’Argelata	had	a	knife	“upon	the	entrance	and	almost	
inside	the	entrance”	of	his	home,	a	dubious	charge	at	best.	Petrizolo	produced	two	
eyewitnesses	who	testified	that	the	knife	was	in	fact	found	inside	the	entrance,	not	“almost”	
inside.	Apparently	unsure	whether	to	proceed	with	the	case,	the	presiding	judge	sought	the	
opinion	of	two	outside	jurists.	By	their	advice	he	dropped	the	charges,	since	“it	was	proved	
that	the	knife	was	found	inside	the	entrance	of	his	house.”116	One	day	later	(23	October),	
two	other	berrovarii	charged	Francesco	Buonacatti	with	carrying	a	knife	“upon	the	
entrance”	(super	hostio)	of	his	house.	Four	days	later,	he	introduced	a	defense	arguing	that	
he	was	actually	inside	his	house	when	the	knife	was	found	on	him;	the	familia	had	entered	
and	taken	his	knife	away	there.	He	produced	two	eyewitnesses	to	confirm	this	and	was	
acquitted.	Again	the	record	states	that	the	charge	was	dropped	“since	the	weapon	was	
found	on	him	inside	the	entrance	of	his	house.”117	Finally,	on	5	November,	two	berrovarii	
denounced	Desolo	di	Virgilio	Spersonaldi	for	having	a	sword	or	dagger	“inside	the	
entrance”	(intra	hostium)	of	the	house	of	Madaluccia	Magnani.	Here,	the	officers	did	not	
even	make	the	“almost”	distinction,	which	makes	the	charge	somewhat	baffling,	especially	
after	the	precedent	of	the	previous	two	cases.	Nevertheless,	like	everyone	charged	by	the	
familia,	Desolo	had	to	appear	in	court,	give	surety,	and	make	a	defense.	Predictably,	he	
argued	that	he	had	been	inside	Madaluccia’s	house	when	found	with	the	sword,	and	added	
that	he	had	it	lashed	to	its	sheath.	His	two	eyewitnesses	confirmed	this,	and	the	charge	was	
dropped	accordingly.118	The	records	do	not	reveal	what	motivated	the	familia’s	charges	in	
																																																								
113	ASP,	Capitano	1,	reg.	4,	15v:	“Extra	domum	suam	contra	formam	statutorum	populi.”	Other	entries	note	
the	accused	to	have	been	discovered	in	a	public	street;	see	Capitano	1,	reg.	2,	38v–41v.	
114	ASB,	Corone	2,	1288II,	13r–v.	
115	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(54	fols.),	26r.	
116	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(56	fols.),	10r:	“[Inventus]	portare	et	super	se	habere	unum	cultellum	de	ferro	
feritorium	et	malitiosum	super	hostium	et	quasi	intra	hostium	domus	dicti	Petrizoli	posite	in	burgho	Gallerie	
cappelle	predicte.	[…]	Non	fuit	processum	ad	condempnationem	dicti	Petrizoli	de	consilio	domini	Francisci	et	
domini	Guidi,	quia	probatum	fuit	dictum	cultellum	fore	sibi	inventum	intra	hostium	domus	sue.”		
117	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(56	fols.),	10v:	“Non	procedatur	quia	declaratum	fuit	per	dominum	potestatem	
procedendum	non	esse,	quia	inventa	fuerunt	sibi	dicta	arma	intra	hostium	domus	sue	ut	probatum	est	in	libro	
testium.”	The	intentio	is	on	1320II	(30	fols.),	12r–v.	
118	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(56	fols.),	19r;	1320II	(30	fols.),	13r–14v.	
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these	cases,	but	the	pattern	of	encroachment—against	members	of	elite	popolani	families,	
no	less—seems	clear.119	
	 Furthermore,	some	cases	appear	to	show	the	familia	intentionally	circumventing	
the	limits	of	their	jurisdiction.	In	February	1296,	the	familia	reported	that	Giacomuccio	
Aldrovandini	was	carrying	a	knife	in	his	home	village	of	Ceretolo.	The	report	gives	no	more	
detail	than	this,	and	Giacomuccio,	appearing	in	court	two	days	later,	confessed	it	was	true.	
No	formal	defense	survives,	but	for	some	unexplained	reason,	the	judge	interrogated	a	
domicellus	of	the	podestà	about	the	incident.	The	domicellus	testified	that	he	had	first	seen	
Giacomuccio	standing	under	his	portico	when	a	scutifer	in	their	patrol	party	called	
Giacomuccio	over	to	help	adjust	his	stirrup.	Giacomuccio	entered	the	public	road,	
presumably	to	offer	the	help	requested.	However,	according	to	the	domicellus,	the	scutifer	
“only	called	him	over	since	they	saw	him	under	the	portico	with	a	knife,	and	they	wanted	to	
take	the	knife	from	him.”120	The	judge	sentenced	Giacomuccio	to	pay	a	20-lire	fine	all	the	
same.	Giacomuccio	perhaps	should	have	known	better	than	to	approach	the	familia	armed,	
even	in	the	contado.	Nonetheless,	it	is	remarkable	that	a	domicellus	of	the	podestà	would	
publicly	admit	that	his	comrades	had	baited	the	suspect	in	order	to	convict	him.	In	fact,	the	
familia	had	extra	incentive	at	this	time	to	secure	convictions,	thanks	to	a	1295	provision	
that	promised	20	soldi	to	the	discovering	officer—or	ten	times	his	daily	salary—for	any	
weapons	conviction.121	The	familia	were	surely	aware	that	arresting	Giacomuccio	under	his	
portico	would	have	left	him	an	avenue	of	defense,	so	they	lured	him	out	into	a	public	space	
where	the	charge	would	be	more	difficult	to	beat.	Likewise,	in	a	1314	case,	two	witnesses	
claimed	that	the	familia	had	ordered	the	defendant,	a	spicer	named	Tura	Banchelli,	to	exit	
his	home	only	to	arrest	him	for	carrying	a	knife.	A	third	witness	even	claimed	that	a	
familiaris	had	“grabbed	Tura	by	his	robe	and	pulled	him	out	of	his	house,”	and	then	found	
the	knife	on	him.122	It	is	unclear	how	credible	the	judge	found	this	story,	since	the	verdict	
does	not	survive.	But	based	on	the	examples	above,	it	is	plausible	that	the	familia	would	
have	resorted	to	force	in	order	to	arrest	Tura	on	public	soil.		
Ultimately,	the	familia’s	aggressive	style	of	policing	could	resemble	the	“personal”	
domination	of	feudal	lordship	more	than	the	“impersonal”	enforcement	of	a	rational-
bureaucratic	government.	A	case	in	point	comes	from	March-April	1295,	when	Bologna’s	
cavalcatores	charged	Giacomo	Lanfranchetti	of	Zola	Predosa	with	carrying	a	sword,	knife,	
and	shield	in	the	contado.	In	his	defense,	Giacomo	contended	that	the	cavalrymen	had	
discovered	him	eating	lunch	at	a	table	with	several	others	in	the	courtyard	of	a	domus	
(perhaps	a	tavern)	in	Zola	Predosa	belonging	to	Michele	Toschi.	This	courtyard,	moreover,	
was	closed	off	by	a	hedge	and	a	ditch	and	had	a	gate	as	well.123	The	property	owner,	
Michele	Toschi,	told	the	following	story	in	his	testimony:	Giacomo	and	several	others	had	
																																																								
119	The	Buonacatti	were	a	prominent	notarial	family,	and	the	Spersonaldi	among	the	merchant-banking	elite;	
see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	126.	One	of	Desolo’s	witnesses	was	a	Bentivoglio,	the	other	a	Borghesini.	
120	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	52v–53r:	“Et	quidam	scutifer	dicti	domini	potestatis	vocavit	eum	
Jacobucium	[…]	solomodo	quia	viderunt	ipsum	sub	dicto	porticu	habere	dictum	cutellum,	quia	volebant	ei	
aufere	dictum	cutellum.”		
121	Statuti	1288,	1:586.	
122	ASB,	Corone	20,	1314I	(40	fols.),	31v–32r:	“Et	unus	ex	dictis	familiaribus	cepit	dictum	Turam	per	
guarnachiam	et	extrassit	ex	domo	sua,	et	inventus	fuit	tunc	sibi	cultellus	per	dictam	familiam.”	For	a	similar	
case,	see	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	6r–6v.	
123	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	14r.	
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been	lunching	under	his	portico	in	the	courtyard	when	a	horseman	armed	with	a	battle	ax	
rode	into	the	courtyard	and	said,	“Give	me	your	weapons.”	Giacomo	handed	over	his	sword,	
knife,	and	shield	but	protested	that	the	cavalryman	“was	acting	wrongfully	since	he	could	
not	de	jure	take	those	arms	from	him	in	that	courtyard	under	that	portico.”124	Two	other	
eyewitnesses	corroborated	this	story.	As	one	Omodeo	recalled,	Giacomo	had	rebuked	the	
cavalryman	that	“de	jure	he	was	not	supposed	to	take	those	arms	from	him	since	he	was	in	
a	courtyard	which	is	closed	off	with	hedges	and	a	gate	under	a	portico.”125	The	verdict	does	
not	survive,	but	the	defense	reinforces	the	notion	that	property	boundaries	could	mark	the	
difference	between	lawful	and	unlawful	enforcement.	In	effect,	Giacomo’s	defense	argued,	
the	cavalryman	had	every	right	to	confiscate	his	weapons	outside	the	confines	of	the	
courtyard,	but	inside	them	the	same	actions	were	an	abuse	of	office.	For	Giacomo	and	his	
companions,	the	cavalryman	had	acted	rapaciously	and	with	impunity,	much	like	a	contado	
lord.	The	key	difference—and	source	of	his	impunity—was	that	he	enjoyed	the	veneer	of	
legitimacy	that	came	with	public	office.	
Mitigating	Factors	
Lastly,	the	podestà’s	familia	had	to	navigate	questions	of	criminal	intent	that,	like	
questions	of	jurisdiction,	the	statutes	did	not	always	address.	This	is	especially	evident	in	
their	enforcement	of	the	curfew	law,	which	was	not	meant	to	penalize	everyone	found	out	
of	doors	at	night.	Indeed,	some	communes’	statutes	explicitly	granted	exceptions	to	the	
curfew	law	based	on	social	identity	and	intent.	Perugia’s,	for	example,	exempted	bakers,	
who	went	about	their	work	in	the	early	hours	of	the	morning,	and	men	of	good	repute	
discovered	within	three	houses	of	their	own	from	any	curfew	penalty.	The	statute	also	
granted	discretion	to	the	court	in	cases	of	necessity,	such	as	fetching	a	priest	for	a	sick	
person,	or	simply	coming	home	from	someone	else’s	house.	In	such	cases,	the	capitano	was	
to	decide	whether	a	penalty	was	merited	based	on	the	defendant’s	physical	appearance	and	
the	nature	of	his	business.126	Siena’s	statutes	made	it	a	lesser	offense	to	leave	one’s	door	
open	after	curfew,	with	a	fine	of	just	10	soldi.127	Bologna’s	1288	curfew	law	was	silent	on	
such	matters,	but	judges	routinely	took	such	mitigating	factors	under	consideration	in	
court.128	Judges	could	use	their	discretion	to	acquit	defendants	who	were	not	truly	“going	
through	the	city,”	as	the	statutes	said,	but	merely	idling	in	their	neighborhoods	in	the	
evening.	This	is	explicit	in	a	1293	case,	where	the	notary	first	registered	the	discovery	of	
Nerio	Galluzzi	“going	through	the	city	of	Bologna	after	the	third	sounding	of	the	bell	
without	a	light.”	He	later	amended	this	to	say	the	familia	had	found	him	“standing	in	the	
city	of	Bologna	after	the	third	sounding	of	the	bell,	namely	next	to	his	doorway	which	was	
																																																								
124	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	14v:	“Unus	cavalcator	comunis	Bononie	cum	una	manereta	in	manu	
concursit	[sic]	in	dictam	curtille	et	sub	porticu	sub	[quo]	erant	predicti	qui	comedebant,	et	dixit	eis,	‘Detis	
michi	arma.’	Et	ipse	Jacobus	dedit	spatam	unam	et	unum	tabulatium	et	unum	cutellum	de	ferire,	dicendo	ille	
Jacobus	illi	equitatori	quod	malle	faciebat,	quia	non	poterat	de	jure	ei	accipere	ea	arma	quia	erat	in	dictum	
curtille	sub	dicta	porticu.”		
125	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	14v:	“Dicebat	ille	Jacobus	quod	ille	cavalcator	de	iure	non	debebat	ei	
accipere	dicta	arma,	quia	erat	in	una	curtille	quod	cluditur	cum	cedis	et	porta	sub	una	porticu.”		
126	Statuto	1279,	1:337.	
127	For	examples	of	convictions,	see	ASS,	Malefizi	11,	2v,	4v.	
128	A	1265	ordinance	required	residents	to	close	their	doors	after	the	third	bell,	but	only	in	taverns,	cellars,	
and	“houses	of	suspicion”;	see	Statuti	1245,	3:557.	
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slightly	open	and	there	was	light	kindled	near	him.”	The	judge	went	on	to	acquit	Nerio.129	
Many	curfew	defendants	tried	to	prove	their	benign	intent	(i.e.,	that	they	were	not	thieves	
in	the	night)	by	protesting	that	the	familia	or	watchmen	had	discovered	them	on	their	own	
doorsteps,	unshod	or	in	a	state	of	undress.	
For	their	part,	however,	Bologna’s	berrovarii	frequently	leveled	curfew	charges	
against	individuals	found	in	close	proximity	to	their	homes.	For	example,	19	of	the	36	
individuals	charged	with	violating	curfew	in	the	second	semester	of	1286	are	explicitly	
noted—either	through	their	acquittal	or	the	familia’s	own	report—to	have	been	under	
their	porticoes,	in	front	of	their	doors,	or	otherwise	near	their	homes.	This	strict	legalism—
Bologna’s	statutes	said	nothing	about	proximity	to	home,	after	all—contrasts	sharply	with	
judges’	consideration	of	extra-statutory	factors.	For	example,	in	a	series	of	cases	from	3	
August	1288,	the	judge	sentenced	the	defendants	according	to	how	far	each	was	discovered	
from	his	home.	Piero	Oseletti,	Allegretto	di	ser	Mercato,	and	Pietro	di	ser	Tederigo	Ferri,	
were	all	charged	with	nothing	worse	than	having	their	doors	open	after	the	third	bell,	and	
were	acquitted.	Ugolino	Garisendi	was	found	under	the	portico	of	his	house	without	a	light,	
“but	the	servant	who	was	with	him	had	a	light,”	and	so	he	too	was	acquitted.	Lambertino	
Oseletti	was	found	under	the	portico	of	his	house	without	a	light—slightly	further	afield	
than	his	kinsman	Piero—and	fined	20	soldi,	a	fraction	of	the	full	penalty.	Piero	Rayneri,	on	
the	other	hand,	was	found	“without	a	light	going	through	the	city	of	Bologna	more	than	five	
houses	distant	from	his	house	of	habitation,”	and	sentenced	to	the	statutory	fine	of	100	
soldi.	Allegretto’s	servant	was	also	found	without	a	light	more	than	five	houses	from	his	
place	of	habitation	but	only	fined	20	soldi,	likely	on	account	of	his	low	social	status.130	But	
with	regards	to	the	other	defendants,	the	judge	cared	less	about	their	social	status	than	the	
flagrancy	with	which	they	had	violated	the	law.131	Proximity	to	home	was	a	recurring	
theme	in	curfew	cases	in	Bologna	and	in	other	communes	as	well.132	In	a	1295	curfew	case	
from	Orvieto,	the	accused	confessed	that	he	had	been	found	without	a	light	“more	than	six	
houses	from	his	own,”	and	was	convicted	accordingly.133	And	in	a	1279	case	from	Perugia,	
three	watchmen	admitted	to	the	court	a	day	after	the	defendant	was	arraigned	that	they	
had	discovered	him	next	door	to	his	home.134		
Wherever	the	law	was	silent	on	such	matters,	the	familia	could	denounce	apparent	
curfew	breakers	and	allow	a	judge	to	decide	whether	they	deserved	punishment.	Bologna’s	
berrovarii	did	not	receive	a	cut	of	curfew	fines,	but	neither	did	they	suffer	a	penalty	for	
failing	to	prove	a	charge,	as	in	accusatio	procedure.	In	practice,	this	meant	the	familia	(and	
																																																								
129	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	40r:	“Mellinus,	Cinccus	berovarii	et	familia	dicti	domini	potestatis	[...]	
retulerunt	se	invenisse	dicta	die	de	sero	Nerium	Jacobi	Galluzzi	cappelle	Sancti	Andree	de	Piatisiis	[crossed	
out:	eundo	per]	stando	in	civitatem	Bononie	post	tertium	sonum	campane	[crossed	out:	sine	lumine],	[added	
later:]	videlicet	iusta	hostium	suum,	quod	erat	parum	apertum,	et	lumen	erat	prope	eum	accensum.”		
130	ASB,	Corone	2,	1288II,	3r–v:	“Ugholinus	de	Gharsendis	fuit	inventus	sine	lumine	post	tertium	sonum	
campane	que	pulsatur	de	sero	sub	porticu	domus	sue,	tamen	famulus	qui	erat	cum	eo	habebat	lumen.	[…]	
Pieris	condam	Raynerii	de	cappella	sancte	Marie	de	Porta	Ravenatis	fuit	inventus	sine	lumine	ire	per	
civitatem	Bononie	plus	alonge	a	domo	habitationis	sue	quam	quinque	domus.”		
131	The	Oseletti	and	Garisendi	were	old	noble	families,	and	Alegretto’s	and	Pietro’s	fathers	enjoyed	the	
honorific	title	of	“ser.”	
132	For	other	examples,	see	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	24v–25r,	28r,	30r,	33r;	Corone	25,	1318I	(82	fols.),	10v,	
12v.	
133	ASO,	Podestà	2,	reg.	8,	57r:	“Lunge	a	domo	sua	per	sex	domos	et	ultra.”		
134	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	12v.	A	similar	case	is	on	26v.	
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watchmen,	too)	could	make	arrests	in	dubious	circumstances,	such	as	when	local	residents	
tried	to	give	surety	for	someone	already	in	custody.	This	was	precisely	the	defense	of	four	
curfew	suspects	in	a	1317	case,	for	example.	According	to	one	of	their	witnesses,	a	certain	
Giacomo,	he	had	nearly	come	outside	himself	to	give	surety	for	their	neighbor,	Freddo,	who	
had	been	detained	for	violating	curfew.	But	when	he	saw	the	notary	booking	everyone	who	
came	outside,	he	thought	better	of	it.	According	to	Giacomo,	everyone	in	that	neighborhood	
spoke	ill	(malum)	of	the	familia’s	actions.135	A	resident	of	Perugia	made	a	similar	argument	
in	1283.	He	admitted	that	the	familia	had	found	him	after	dark	without	a	light	and	wearing	
three	pieces	of	armor.	But	he	also	pleaded	that	he	had	entered	the	street	in	front	of	his	
neighbors’	houses—within	three	doors	of	his	own—to	guaranty	for	Pellolo	di	Ranalduccio,	
whom	the	familia	had	detained	there.	He	also	had	a	license	for	the	armor.136	Indeed,	this	
probably	happened	more	often	than	the	sources	let	on.	In	a	1313	case,	one	of	the	witnesses	
testified	he	had	stepped	outside	when	he	heard	the	familia	arresting	his	neighbors—almost	
surely	to	guaranty	for	them—but	the	familia	said	to	him,	“Go	inside	and	shut	the	door	if	you	
do	not	wish	to	be	a	hindrance.”137	The	only	difference	between	a	curfew	breaker	and	
someone	giving	surety	was	intent.	In	the	cases	above,	the	familia	decided	to	make	would-be	
guarantors	for	their	neighbors	prove	their	lawful	intent	in	court.	
Similarly,	the	familia	sometimes	charged	individuals	whose	light	had	clearly	gone	
out	moments	earlier.	One	night	in	1310,	for	instance,	two	berrovarii	reported	finding	
Giacomo,	the	servant	(familiaris)	of	a	certain	Bartolino,	without	a	light,	but	added	that	“he	
had	a	candle	in	his	hand,	extinguished	and	smoking,	which	seemed	to	have	been	lit	shortly	
before	they	found	him.”	The	judge	eventually	ordered	Giacomo’s	release	“since	he	made	his	
excuse”—almost	certainly	the	one	the	familia	had	reported.138	And	one	night	in	1320,	two	
berrovarii	reported	that	Benvegnudo,	a	farrier’s	son,	was	out	at	night	in	the	central	
marketplace	with	a	burnt-out	candle,	in	the	company	of	two	merchants	on	horseback.	
Benvegnudo	could	not	give	surety	and	was	jailed	accordingly.	He	was	eventually	released	
because,	as	the	margin	notes,	“the	podestà	did	not	wish	Benvegnudo	to	be	condemned	
since	he	had	a	burnt-out	candle	in	hand	and	was	with	the	merchants,”	who	were	probably	
carrying	lights.139	Again,	the	details	of	the	familia’s	accusation	provided	grounds	for	
acquittal.	The	familia’s	tendency	for	strict	enforcement	could	make	it	hazardous	even	for	
neighbors	to	visit	each	other	across	the	street.	In	October	1293,	for	instance,	the	neighbors	
of	a	certain	Giovanni	testified	in	his	defense	that	the	familia	had	arrested	him	immediately	
after	the	wind	blew	out	his	candle	as	he	tried	to	return	home	from	dinner	at	his	neighbor’s	
house	across	the	street.	The	judge	acquitted	Giovanni	accordingly.140	Granted,	the	
																																																								
135	ASB,	Corone	24,	1317I	(46	fols.),	13r–v.	
136	ASP,	Capitano	7b,	reg.	7,	48r.	
137	ASB,	Corone	19,	1313I	(67	fols.),	14v–15r:	“Et	tunc	familia	dixit	isti,	‘Intrate	domum	et	firmate	hostium	si	
non	vultis	impedimentum.’”	See	also	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	68r.	
138	ASB,	Corone	18,	1310II	(96	fols.),	7v:	“Dixerunt	tamen	dicti	berroarii	quod	infrascriptus	Jacomus	familiaris	
Bartolini	habebat	candelam	in	manu	extinctam	et	fumantem,	que	paulo	ante	quam	ipsum	invenirent	
hostendebatur	ipsam	fuisse	accensam.”	For	another	case	where	the	defendant,	an	11-year-old	boy,	reportedly	
had	a	still-smoking	candle,	see	ASB,	Corone	11,	1300	(82	fols.),	11r,	13r–14r.	
139	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(56	fols.),	21v:	“Noluit	potestas	quod	condepnaretur	dictus	Benvegnudus,	quia	
habebat	candelam	extintam	in	manu	et	erat	cum	dictis	mercatoribus.”		
140	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293II	(48	fols.),	15v;	1293II	(53	fols.),	19v–20r.	
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berrovarii	were	not	wrong	that	someone	holding	a	burnt-out	candle	was	not,	strictly	
speaking,	cum	lumine.	But	they	also	had	the	de	facto	discretion	to	let	such	individuals	go.	
Lastly,	the	curfew	law	allowed	the	familia	to	arrest	individuals	when	they	stepped	
outside	at	night	to	relieve	themselves.	In	a	December	1290	case,	the	butcher	Tranchedino	
pleaded—after	spending	the	night	in	jail—that	he	had	exited	his	house	to	urinate	when	the	
familia	arrested	him,	and	went	on	to	win	his	acquittal.141	Similar	is	the	case	of	the	merchant	
Paoletto	of	Spoleto,	charged	with	violating	curfew	in	Perugia	in	January	1279.	He	argued	in	
his	defense	that	he	was	staying	as	a	guest	in	a	certain	house	(perhaps	an	inn)	and	was	
attempting	to	urinate	in	the	street	in	front	of	that	house	when	the	familia	found	him.142	In	
yet	another	case	from	Bologna,	from	1294,	Albergato	of	Tossignano	claimed	in	his	defense	
that	three	watchmen	had	arrested	him	after	the	wind	blew	out	his	candle	as	he	was	
urinating	near	the	door	of	the	inn	where	he	was	staying.143	Although	the	verdict	is	not	
given,	his	story—corroborated	by	two	fellow	lodgers—illustrates	how	potentially	
repressive	the	curfew	laws	could	be,	or	at	the	very	least,	construed	to	be.	
Conclusion:	The	Paradox	of	Impersonality	
This	chapter	has	deliberately	focused	on	the	berrovarii’s	interpretation	of	the	
statutes	rather	than	judges’	and	jurists’,	if	one	can	equate	the	two.	As	we	have	seen,	judges	
sometimes	overruled	their	berrovarii,	and	it	should	be	noted	too	that	local	jurists	and	
doctors	of	law—many	of	them	ensconced	at	Bologna’s	university—had	a	significant	
capacity	to	influence	trial	outcomes	through	their	legal	opinions	(consilia).144	Indeed,	the	
leading	jurists	of	the	day	took	up	many	of	the	same	problems	of	statutory	interpretation	
that	the	berrovarii	confronted	on	patrol	in	their	academic	writings,	in	particular	through	
dialectical	questions	(quaestiones	disputatae).	Tommaso	da	Piperata,	for	example,	asked	
who	(if	anyone)	was	to	be	penalized	when	the	berrovarii	discovered	a	weapon	at	the	feet	of	
a	group	of	men,	and	Dino	del	Mugello	asked	whether	an	assailant	who	wounded	his	victim	
with	a	prohibited	knife	was	also	to	be	charged	for	the	knife.145	Their	answers	to	such	
practical	questions	of	law—and	how	those	answers	influenced	trial	outcomes—are	in	need	
of	greater	study.		
Yet	the	opinions	of	professional	jurists	and	even	trial	outcomes	were	in	large	part	
beside	the	point	when	it	came	to	the	familia’s	patrols.	If	the	examples	above	are	any	
indication,	the	berrovarii	had	a	penchant	for	strictly	interpreting	the	statutes,	to	the	point	
even	of	denouncing	acts	that	the	statutes	explicitly	allowed.	Likewise,	familiares	frequently	
ignored	indicators	of	law-abiding	intent	and	other	mitigating	factors	that	typically	led	
judges	to	acquit	defendants.	Perhaps	most	surprisingly,	they	showed	little	regard	for	the	
social	identity	or	political	status	of	the	individuals	they	policed,	legal	privileges	and	
statutory	exceptions	notwithstanding.	In	sum,	the	familia	exercised	police	discretion	in	a	
way	that	made	government	coercion	a	routine	feature	of	urban	life	and	effectively	
																																																								
141	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	83r,	84r–85v.	
142	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	1v.		
143	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	31r.	For	the	relatio,	see	1294I	(118	fols.),	42v–43r.	
144	Vallerani,	“Criminal	Court	Procedure,”	46–49.	On	consilia	see	Menzinger,	“Consilium	sapientum”;	Vallerani,	
“The	Generation	of	Moderni”;	Ascheri	et	al.,	eds.,	Legal	Consulting.	
145	For	these	and	other	specific	examples,	see	Bellomo,	ed.,	Quaestiones	in	iure	civili	disputatae.	More	generally	
see	Vallerani,	“Il	diritto	in	questione”;	Bellomo,	I	fatti	e	il	diritto;	Fransen,	“Les	questions	disputées.”	
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diminished	the	personal	autonomy	of	the	communes’	citizens,	including	elites.	
Paradoxically,	it	turned	self-governing	citizens	into	something	closer	to	subjects.	
The	qualitative	nature	of	the	familia’s	policing	made	their	patrols	coercive	acts	in	
their	own	right,	regardless	of	how	many	alleged	offenders	they	discovered.	Their	daily	
patrols	projected	the	threat	of	the	government’s	legitimate	violence	and	made	official	
interventions	a	routine	part	of	life	in	the	commune.	Whatever	legal	protections	existed,	in	
practice	there	were	few	checks	against	the	familia’s	expansive	powers	of	search	and	
seizure.	With	their	word	alone,	the	podestà’s	men	could	compel	locals	to	answer	charges	in	
court,	where	the	deck	was	stacked	against	them	by	statutory	presumptions,	not	least	the	
presumption	of	guilt.	While	there	is	still	ample	potential	today	for	police	to	abuse	their	
powers	and	harass	citizens,	the	power	disparity	was	all	the	more	acute	in	medieval	Italy,	
where	there	were	no	legal	standards	like	“reasonable	suspicion”	and	no	bill	of	rights	to	
protect	citizens	from	unreasonable	searches	and	seizures.		
Crucially,	communal	governments	did	not	always	possess	this	kind	of	police	power.	
As	noted	in	the	last	chapter,	in	the	twelfth	century	and	likely	at	the	start	of	the	thirteenth,	
most	communes	did	not	have	blanket	prohibitions	against	carrying	knives	in	the	street	or	
playing	dice	games	outside	of	publicly	designated	areas,	let	alone	third-party	enforcers	to	
give	such	laws	teeth.	The	amplification	of	government	police	power	was	a	deliberate	policy	
decision	made	by	self-governing	elites,	and	hardly	an	inevitable	one.	Of	course,	citizens	
could	still	choose	to	disobey	the	law,	but	they	had	granted	the	podestà	the	authority	to	
discipline	and	punish	them	for	that	disobedience.	The	next	three	chapters	will	explore	
what	motivated	citizen-legislators	to	limit	their	personal	autonomy	in	this	way.		 	
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Chapter	3:	The	Logic	of	Third-Party	Policing	
The	last	two	chapters	have	illustrated	the	coercive	capacity	of	the	podestà’s	familia,	
both	in	terms	of	compelling	individuals	into	court	and	projecting	the	threat	of	prosecution	
for	all	citizens.	The	familia	made	government	police	power	pervasive	in	daily	life	and,	to	an	
important	extent,	turned	self-governing	citizens	into	subjects	of	the	commune.	The	birth	of	
third-party	policing	thus	raises	a	fundamental	question:	why	did	citizen-legislators	in	cities	
like	Bologna	impose	this	kind	of	law	enforcement	upon	themselves?	After	all,	it	is	
reasonable	to	assume	that	political	elites	would	seek	to	maximize	their	personal	autonomy,	
not	constrain	it.	Bologna’s	lawmakers	expressly	stated	their	rationale	in	a	1260	statute,	the	
earliest	surviving	law	from	that	commune	to	deal	expressly	with	the	podestà’s	berrovarii:	
	
Likewise	we	establish	and	ordain,	for	the	advantage	and	good	state	of	the	commune	of	
Bologna,	and	for	this	purpose,	that	criminals	might	be	captured	and	led	into	the	custody	of	
the	commune	of	Bologna,	that	the	coming	podestà	within	15	days	of	the	start	of	his	rule	
should	summon	20	good,	lawful,	and	trustworthy	foreign	men,	who	ought	to	keep	watch	
through	the	city	and	boroughs	day	and	night,	and	search	for	men	bearing	prohibited	arms,	
and	pursue	and	capture	outlawed	criminals	of	the	commune	of	Bologna,	and	do	everything	
else	according	to	the	direction	of	the	podestà	and	council	of	Bologna.1	
	
Although	the	lawmakers’	own	words	are	not	sufficient	to	explain	the	growth	of	police	
power	in	this	context,	they	are	a	logical	and	revealing	place	to	start.	This	chapter	unpacks	
the	language	of	the	statute	above	to	help	explain	the	shift	toward	impersonal	rules	and	
hegemonic	justice.	
The	chapter	opens	by	discussing	how	the	familia	served	the	commune’s	interest	in	
bringing	criminals,	outlaws,	and	political	rebels	into	official	custody.	Bologna’s	elites	
employed	the	podestà	in	part	to	capture	wanted	men,	and	he	regularly	sent	his	knights	and	
berrovarii—sometimes	accompanied	by	armed	citizens—on	manhunts	in	the	contado.	
These	expeditions	show	once	again	that	criminal	justice	in	the	communes	was	more	
coercive	than	some	historians	imagine.	Although	it	was	difficult	to	bring	outlaws	into	
custody,	that	does	not	mean	that	citizen-legislators	preferred	for	them	to	remain	
contumacious.	Importantly,	however,	there	was	nothing	inevitable	about	lawmakers’	
decision	to	hire	foreign	mercenaries	to	capture	wanted	men.	As	discussed	below,	the	
communes	had	other	mechanisms	of	enforcement	available	to	them;	it	was	not	obvious	
they	had	to	employ	a	third	party	in	this	capacity.	
In	light	of	this,	the	chapter	then	explores	why	citizen-legislators	chose	to	establish	a	
dedicated	police	force	composed	of	foreigners.	The	language	of	the	resolution	above	
provides	two	important	clues.	First,	lawmakers	ordered	the	berrovarii	to	patrol	the	city	day	
and	night	and	to	search	for	illegal	weapons,	among	other	violations	of	statute,	so	as	to	
																																																								
1	Statuti	1245,	3:392:	“Item	statuimus	et	ordinamus	pro	utilitate	et	bono	statu	comunis	Bononie	et	ad	hoc,	ut	
malefactores	possint	capi	et	in	fortiam	comunis	Bononie	deduci,	quod	potestas	ventura,	jnfra	xv.	dies	ab	
ingressu	sui	regiminis,	faciat	venire	xx.	bonos	et	legales	homines	forenses	et	dignos	fide,	qui	debeant	
custodire	die	noctuque	per	civitatem	et	burgos,	et	inquirere	portantes	arma	vetita,	et	malefactores	bannitos	
comunis	Bononie	prosequi	et	capere,	et	alia	omnia	facere	secundum	dispositionem	potestatis	et	conscilij	
Bononie.”		
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better	prevent	crimes	and	uncover	threats.	The	night	watch	and	other	local	guards	were	
limited	in	when	and	where	they	could	enforce	the	laws,	and	the	employment	of	a	dedicated,	
around-the-clock	police	force	overcame	gaps	in	enforcement.	Furthermore,	lawmakers	
ordered	the	familia	to	search	the	city	proactively	for	violators	of	statute	to	gain	better	
knowledge	of	threats	in	the	community.	In	this	respect,	lawmakers	extended	the	logic	of	
judicial	inquisition,	which	became	an	increasingly	prominent	feature	of	public	justice	over	
the	course	of	the	thirteenth	century.	Police	patrols	effectively	amplified	the	inquisitorial	
power	of	the	criminal	court	by	serving	as	“eyes	on	the	street.”2	Like	judicial	inquests,	police	
patrols	sought	to	identify	and	classify	threats,	not	only	to	prosecute	crimes	already	
committed	but	also	to	prevent	future	crimes.	This	preventive	logic	will	be	the	subject	of	the	
next	two	chapters,	but	for	now	it	can	be	said	that	citizen-legislators	were	no	longer	content	
to	react	to	crimes	and	punish	them	after	the	fact.	
Second,	lawmakers	stipulated	that	the	berrovarii	had	to	be	trustworthy	foreigners—
like	their	captain,	the	podestà—to	mitigate	the	role	of	personal	relations	in	law	
enforcement.	The	simple	fact	that	local	residents	knew	each	other	and	had	relationships	of	
enmity	and	amity	made	it	impossible	for	them	to	police	their	communities	impartially	and	
difficult	for	public	officials	to	rely	on	locals	for	information	about	crime.3	In	brief,	friends	
tended	not	to	denounce	each	other	for	legal	infractions,	and	enemies	often	made	spurious	
accusations	against	each	other.	This	was	especially	true	of	statutory	offenses,	such	as	the	
bearing	of	prohibited	arms,	that	caused	no	obvious	harm	to	persons	or	property.	Citizen-
legislators	evidently	perceived	this	state	of	affairs	as	problematic	and	developed	third-
party	policing	as	a	logical	extension	of	the	podestarial	model,	designed	to	make	public	
justice	less	subject	to	local	prejudices.		
There	is	still	an	underlying	question,	however,	of	why	the	communes’	political	elites	
believed	it	was	in	their	interest—or	in	the	words	of	the	1260	resolution,	“for	the	advantage	
and	good	state	of	the	commune”—to	augment	the	podestarial	and	inquisitorial	models	of	
law	enforcement.	Hence,	this	chapter	concludes	by	discussing	how	more	impersonal	
institutions—that	is,	rules	and	enforcement	mechanisms	that	applied	to	everyone	
regardless	of	social	status—could	offer	advantages	in	the	context	of	intra-elite	competition.	
For	popular	regimes	like	Bologna’s,	the	popolo’s	formal	entry	into	the	constitutional	order	
in	many	towns	meant	the	expansion	of	the	governing	elite	to	include	numerous	“lesser”	
families.	Individually,	these	families	could	not	easily	assert	their	political	interests	in	the	
face	of	the	customary	privileges	and	military	might	of	the	great	noble	houses	and	their	
consorterie.	However,	through	public	laws	and	collective	organizations	such	as	guilds,	
militias,	and	the	foreign	magistracies	of	the	podestà	and	capitano	del	popolo,	the	popolo	
could	effectively	coerce	even	the	most	powerful	families	and	level	the	political	playing	field,	
so	to	speak.	Thus,	the	popolo	used	written	law	and	third-party	enforcement	to	regulate	and	
prevent	the	use	of	violence	and	maintain	cohesion	within	their	coalition.	In	signorie,	too,	
municipal	statutes	and	public	organizations	could	be	powerful	tools	for	the	ruling	family	to	
keep	rival	factions	and	coalitions	in	check.	Thus,	even	as	factional	conflict	continued	
unabated,	the	social	order	in	northern	Italy	became	less	dependent	on	personality	and	
																																																								
2	For	the	concept	of	“eyes	on	the	street,”	see	Jacobs,	The	Death	and	Life	of	Great	American	Cities.	
3	On	the	importance	of	relationships	of	amity	and	enmity,	see	Zorzi,	“Amici	e	nemici”;	Gentile,	“Amicizia	e	
fazione”;	Smail,	“Hatred”;	Garnier,	Amicus	amicis,	inimicus	inimicis;	Miglio	et	al.,	eds.,	Amicus	(inimicus)	hostis.	
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more	reliant	on	written	law.	The	institutional	change	was	far	from	neat,	but	one	of	its	chief	
manifestations	was	the	investment	of	greater	police	power	in	the	organs	of	government.	
The	concluding	discussion	also	highlights	the	underlying	drivers	and	enabling	
factors	for	this	institutional	evolution,	namely	the	pressures	of	urbanization	and	
contemporaneous	revolutions	in	written	recordkeeping	and	legal	science.	Generally	
speaking,	cities	generate	more	sophisticated	apparatuses	of	surveillance	and	control	
because	their	populations	and	economies	are	more	complex	and	challenging	for	rulers	to	
govern.	For	this	reason,	Foucault	asserted	that	“to	police	and	to	urbanize	is	the	same	
thing.”4	The	towns	of	medieval	Italy	were	no	exception,	and	their	massive	demographic	and	
economic	growth	in	the	thirteenth	century	spurred	the	growth	of	police	power	as	
municipal	regimes	strove	to	promote	prosperity	and	order.	At	the	same	time,	the	rise	of	a	
new	commercial	and	administrative	elite,	along	with	a	politically	influential	cadre	of	
professional	jurists,	introduced	new	technologies	of	power	into	government.	Merchants,	
bankers,	notaries,	and	lawyers	all	relied	on	written	records,	classification	schemes,	and	
rule	enforcement	in	their	professions,	and	they	brought	these	tools	with	them	as	they	
entered	politics.	The	rise	of	the	new	elite	thus	fostered	the	growth	of	rational-legal	
authority—including	the	apparatus	of	third-party	policing—in	the	communes’	
institutions.5	Beyond	communal	Italy	as	well,	rulers	enthusiastically	adopted	the	
administrative	elite’s	technologies	of	power	to	make	complex	communities	more	“legible”	
and	therefore	easier	to	manage	and	control.	Spurred	by	these	societal	trends,	the	elites	of	
Italy’s	communes	adopted	third-party	policing	not	out	of	a	moral	preference	for	more	
impersonal	institutions,	but	out	of	the	logic	of	political	competition	in	a	limited	access	
order.	
“To	[…]	Pursue	and	Capture	Outlawed	Criminals”	
The	most	basic	reason	Bologna’s	lawmakers	gave	for	employing	a	foreign	police	
force	was	to	“pursue	and	capture	outlawed	criminals	of	the	commune.”	In	general,	the	
judicial	records	amply	attest	the	commune’s	desire	to	have	criminals	in	its	fortia	or,	less	
commonly,	its	virtus.6	Although	fortia	and	virtus	clearly	meant	“custody”	in	these	contexts,	
it	is	significant	that	these	words	also	meant	“strength.”	The	commune’s	elites	did	not	
merely	want	suspects	in	their	custody;	they	wanted	them	in	their	power	or	grip.	Such	
language	appears	consistently	in	statutes	and	council	resolutions	with	regards	to	the	
podestà’s	berrovarii.	As	part	of	his	oath,	for	example,	Bologna’s	podestà	swore	to	offer	his	
berrovarii	and	officials	“to	capture	outlaws	and	condemned	criminals”	as	often	as	anyone	
asked	him	to.7	In	1295,	Bologna’s	lawmakers	doubled	the	number	of	berrovarii	from	20	to	
40,	in	part,	“so	that	the	podestà	of	Bologna	may	be	able	to	better	pursue	criminals.”8	And	in	
1311,	when	they	again	increased	the	number	of	berrovarii	from	20	to	30,	it	was	“so	that	[...]	
malefactors	may	be	captured	better	and	more	quickly.”9	This	line	of	thinking	was	common	
across	northern	Italy.	Perugia’s	statutes,	for	example,	called	for	the	podestà	and	capitano	to	
																																																								
4	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population,	336–37.	
5	On	the	concept	of	legibility,	see	Scott,	Seeing	Like	a	State.	
6	For	this	usage	of	virtus,	see	Statuti	1245,	1:301;	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	4v.	
7	Statuti	1288,	1:12–13:	“Ad	capiendum	banitos	et	malefactores	condempnatos	quociens	fuero	requisitus.”		
8	Statuti	1288,	1:581:	“Ad	hoc	ut	potestas	Bononie	melius	possit	[…]	persequi	mallefactores.”		
9	ASB,	Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	1v:	“Ut	malleficia	cessent	et	malefactores	melius	et	citius	capiantur.”		
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secretly	elect	berrovarii,	at	public	expense,	to	capture	outlaws	(exbanniti)	as	often	as	
seemed	necessary	to	them.10	
Such	language	may	seem	definitional	of	policing	and	therefore	unremarkable,	but	it	
bears	emphasis	for	two	reasons.	First,	historians	have	recently	argued	that	medieval	courts	
did	not	necessarily	view	contumacy	as	a	problem,	since	it	could	allow	disputing	parties	the	
opportunity	to	make	peace	out	of	court,	spare	judges	the	burden	of	deciding	punishments	
in	politically	sensitive	cases,	or	constitute	a	punishment	for	the	accused	in	and	of	itself.	
Daniel	Smail	has	even	called	high	contumacy	rates	“key	to	the	proper	working	of	the	
system”	in	late	medieval	Marseille.11	While	contumacy	certainly	had	its	social	uses,	it	is	
important	to	recognize	that	communal	governments	expended	considerable	resources	
attempting	to	bring	outlaws	into	custody,	as	the	evidence	below	will	illustrate.	At	the	same	
time	the	courts	encouraged	and	welcomed	peace	accords,	they	also	pursued	outlaws	who	
had	yet	to	make	peace	with	their	victims	because	ongoing	disputes	represented	a	threat	to	
public	order.12	The	communes’	governing	elite	hired	mercenaries	expressly	to	capture	
criminals	because	they	viewed	contumacy	as	a	problem	to	be	mitigated.	
Second,	it	was	hardly	inevitable	that	communal	elites	would	turn	to	foreign	
mercenaries	for	purposes	of	law	enforcement.	In	medieval	Italy,	it	was	risky	to	invite	
armed	foreigners	into	a	city;	more	typically,	they	were	to	be	kept	out.13	Moreover,	
apprehending	criminals	had	traditionally	been	the	responsibility	of	the	community	and	
local	officials,	not	a	specialized	group	of	outsiders.	If	governments	wished	to	improve	the	
coercive	capacity	of	their	courts,	they	could	have	augmented	any	number	of	community-
based	institutions	and	organizations	for	detecting	and	apprehending	criminals	rather	than	
create	a	new	one.	There	is	no	space	to	detail	these	here,	but	generally	they	included	the	
night	watch	and	other	specialized	corps	of	guards;	civic	militias;	parish	and	village	officials;	
and	neighborhoods	and	villages	themselves,	who,	like	their	official	representatives,	could	
be	legally	obligated	to	raise	the	hue	and	cry.14	Communes	also	offered	monetary	rewards	to	
encourage	locals	(both	officials	and	private	citizens)	to	deliver	malefactors	into	custody.15	
All	of	these	community-based	institutions	remained	in	effect	well	after	the	podestà’s	
familia	began	patrolling	the	streets	on	a	regular	basis.	Citizen-legislators	clearly	did	not	
intend	for	the	familia	to	replace	them.	However,	lawmakers	evidently	believed	existing	
																																																								
10	Statuto	1279,	1:278.	
11	Quotation	from	Smail,	The	Consumption	of	Justice,	173.	See	also	Kumhera,	The	Benefits	of	Peace,	93–96;	
Carraway,	“Contumacy.”	
12	Blanshei,	“Bolognese	Criminal	Justice,”	70.	
13	Hannelore	Zug	Tucci	discusses	the	burdens	of	provisioning	and	housing	foreign	soldiers	as	prisoners	of	war	
in	Prigionia	di	guerra,	107–34,	153–88.	
14	In	general,	see	Zorzi,	“Contrôle	social.”	For	Bologna’s	civic	militias,	see	Fasoli,	“Le	compagnie.”	On	the	hue	
and	cry	in	late	medieval	Italy,	see	Manikowska,	“‘Accorr’uomo.’”	For	the	duty	of	massarii	to	deliver	wanted	
men	into	custody,	see	Statuti	1245,	1:234–35;	ASB,	Sindacato	1,	1284II	(46	fols.),	1r.	For	penalties	against	
communities	who	failed	to	raise	the	hue	and	cry,	see	Statuti	1245,	3:561–63;	Statuti	1288,	1:175,	578–79;	
ASB,	Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	2r–v.	For	sentences	against	communities,	see	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	45r,	
49r–v,	55r–56r;	ASS,	Malefizi	6,	20r–21r.	On	such	penalties	in	general,	see	Lepsius,	“Public	Responsibility.”	
15	For	the	evolution	of	the	reward	scale	in	Bologna,	see	Statuti	1245,	1:260;	Statuti	1288,	1:580–81;	ASB,	
Cartacea	216,	reg.	5,	117v–118r;	Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	2v.	For	an	ad	hoc	bounty	issued	in	the	wake	of	a	
high-profile	assault,	see	ASB,	Sindacato	8,	1291I	(44	fols.),	29r.	For	bounties	in	Siena,	see	Pazzaglini,	The	
Criminal	Ban,	55–57.	Siena	and	Bologna	both	generally	exempted	berrovarii	and	foreign	officials	from	
receiving	such	bounties.	For	records	of	bounty	payments	in	Bologna,	see	ASB,	Cartacea	216,	reg.	5,	117v,	
148v,	157r;	Tesoreria	3,	27v,	44r;	Corone	13,	1302II	(152	fols.),	116r,	122v,	129v.	
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institutions	were	inadequate,	or	else	they	would	not	have	hired	armed	foreigners	to	catch	
criminals.	Though	novel,	their	decision	to	apply	military	force	to	the	problem	is	easy	to	
comprehend	when	one	considers	the	dangers	communal	officials	faced	in	trying	to	
apprehend	wanted	men.	A	vivid	example	comes	from	1254,	when	Bologna’s	podestà	
dispatched	two	criers	to	Crevalcore,	a	fortified	settlement	at	the	northwestern	edge	of	
Bolognese	territory.	Their	mission	was	to	arrest	the	outlaw	Girardino	di	Pietro	Pippini,	
who	belonged	to	one	of	the	commune’s	elite	families.	The	criers	returned	empty-handed,	
however,	to	denounce	the	men	of	Crevalcore	for	rescuing	Girardino	from	their	clutches	and	
assaulting	them	with	prohibited	weapons.	According	to	the	crier	Alberto,	the	Crevalcoresi	
“took	[Girardino]	from	his	hands	and	fortia	by	force	and	in	a	bad	way,	such	that	he	could	
not	lead	him	into	the	fortia	of	the	podestà,”	even	though	he	repeatedly	ordered	them	on	
behalf	of	the	podestà	to	allow	him	to	arrest	Girardino.	The	criers’	report	implicated	some	
29	individuals,	including	the	massarius	of	Crevalcore.16	Such	active	resistance,	whether	
from	powerful	families	or	rebellious	communities	in	the	contado,	posed	a	real	danger	to	the	
commune’s	officials	and,	more	abstractly,	to	its	writ	of	law.		
Lawmakers	hired	soldiers	to	undertake	the	risks	of	arresting	criminals,	as	a	1250	
statute	makes	explicit.	According	to	this	law,	the	podestà	was	to	deploy	his	knights	or	use	
any	other	means	at	his	disposal	to	capture	any	outlaw	“who,	because	of	his	strength	(fortia)	
and	power	(potentia),	cannot	be	captured	by	the	criers	of	the	commune	of	Bologna,	or	
whom	they	do	not	dare	to	capture.”17	It	is	not	hard	to	find	examples	of	such	individuals	in	
the	records,	as	in	a	1277	case	from	Perugia,	where	three	men	from	a	village	in	the	
countryside—probably	local	officials,	but	not	explicitly	identified	as	such—faced	charges	
for	failing	to	keep	a	detainee	named	Tornabene	in	their	custody.	In	their	defense	they	
argued	that	Tornabene	had	escaped	from	their	hands	by	force,	even	though	they	raised	the	
hue	and	cry	and	gave	chase,	because	he	was	“strong,	robust,	and	stronger	than	they.”18	
Indeed,	the	communes’	judicial	records	are	peppered	with	cases	in	which	captives	
managed	to	escape	official	custody.	Early	convictions	of	curfew	violators	in	absentia,	from	
the	1240s	and	1250s,	likewise	indicate	that	the	night	watch	had	greater	difficulty	
compelling	offenders	to	appear	in	court	and	pay	fines.19	It	was	virtually	unheard	of	in	the	
later	Crowns	and	Arms	registers	for	a	curfew	defendant	to	refuse	summonses	or	otherwise	
fail	to	appear	in	court.	Of	course,	the	berrovarii	were	not	immune	from	having	suspects	
escape	their	official	custody.20	But	the	point	remains	that	governing	elites	hired	them	to	
improve	the	coercive	capacity	of	their	courts,	despite	the	multitude	of	community-based	
institutions	already	in	existence.	In	other	words,	they	saw	a	need	to	employ	specialists	in	
coercion	to	mitigate	the	problem	of	contumacy.		
																																																								
16	ASB,	Inquisitiones	1,	reg.	4,	2r–3v:	“Et	eum	sibi	acceperunt	de	suis	manibus	et	fortia	per	vim	et	malo	modo	
ita	quod	eum	ducere	nequivit	in	fortiam	potestatis.’”	On	the	Pippini	family,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	
131,	233–34,	262,	288.	
17	Statuti	1245,	1:339–44:	“Et	si	esset	aliquis	qui	propter	fortiam	suam	et	potentiam	capi	non	possit	a	nunciis	
comunis	bononie,	vel	qui	non	auderent	capere,	teneatur	potestas	mittere	de	militibus	suis	et	facere	modis	
omnibus	ita	quod	capiatur	et	detineatur	in	civitate	vel	in	aliqua	terra	districtus	bononie.”		
18	ASP,	Capitano	4,	reg.	6,	42r:	“Item	quod	idem	Tornabene	est	fortis	rubestus	et	eis	fortior	et	quolibet	eorum.”		
19	For	examples	from	1237	and	1249,	respectively,	see	ASB,	Accusationes	1a,	reg.	6,	loose	fragment;	reg.	11,	
1r.	
20	For	examples	of	men	who	escaped	the	familia’s	custody,	see	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293II	(48	fols.),	9v;	Corone	18,	
1310II	(96	fols.),	45v,	47r;	ASO,	Podestà	2,	reg.	3,	8v;	reg.	8,	31r,	57r;	reg.	9,	36v.	
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Beyond	the	stated	rationale,	archival	evidence	shows	that	the	podestà’s	knights	led	
their	berrovarii	on	outlaw-hunting	expeditions	in	the	contado	with	some	regularity.	
Records	of	payment	from	the	second	half	of	1302	show	that	the	podestà	compensated	
heralds	and	criers	for	accompanying	his	officers	on	such	expeditions.	The	podestà’s	knight	
led	such	expeditions	on	multiple	occasions,	and	the	judge	of	the	criminal	court	even	led	one	
to	Castel	de’	Britti.21	In	January	1300,	Bologna’s	podestà	ordered	his	knight	Guido	to	raze	
the	properties	of	the	Counts	of	Panico,	a	family	of	feudal	lords	in	the	Appenines,	since	they	
had	recently	murdered	one	of	the	commune’s	notaries.22	And	in	1296,	the	podestà’s	knight	
led	his	berrovarii	and	some	cavalcatores	on	an	expedition	to	capture	the	outlaw	Ghilino	da	
Tignano.23	Likewise,	Siena’s	statutes	required	the	podestà	to	send	an	outlaw-hunting	
expedition	into	the	contado	at	least	once	a	month,	and	Peter	Raymond	Pazzaglini	has	
documented	a	report,	in	the	form	of	a	letter	from	one	of	the	podestà’s	knights,	about	one	
such	failed	expedition	in	September	1279.	In	August	1285,	Siena’s	council	appropriated	
300	lire	for	the	podestà	to	spend	on	capturing	outlaws,	robbers,	and	men	of	ill	repute,	in	
part	to	defray	the	costs	of	such	expeditions.24	Furthermore,	by	1279	Perugia	had	
established	a	special	force	to	capture	outlaws	in	the	contado,	much	like	Bologna	did	in	
1287.	On	four	different	occasions	between	December	1303	and	February	1304,	familiares	
of	Perugia’s	capitano	and	podestà	delivered	captured	outlaws	under	bans	of	100-125	lire	to	
the	court.25	Together,	such	records	convey	the	impression	that	communal	officials	
committed	significant	time	and	resources	to	capturing	wanted	men.	
The	case	of	Bartolomeo	of	Castel	del	Vescovo,	captured	by	Bologna	in	April	1315,	
leaves	little	doubt	that	the	pursuit	of	outlaws	was	a	high	priority	for	communal	authorities.	
Bartolomeo	had	been	banned	in	late	1306	for	assault,	robbery,	and	“other	excesses.”	Now	
that	he	was	finally	in	custody,	the	judge	questioned	him	closely	about	his	whereabouts	
during	those	eight	and	a	half	years.	Bartolomeo	revealed	that	he	had	lived	in	the	same	
home	in	Castel	del	Vescovo,	a	hilltop	fortress	owned	by	the	bishops	of	Bologna	(today	Sasso	
Marconi),	for	roughly	eighteen	years,	and	had	been	living	there	when	he	was	placed	under	
ban.	He	stayed	there	for	another	year	after	his	ban	and	then	returned	to	his	home	village	of	
terra	Battiticcio,	living	in	a	house	behind	his	father’s	for	three	years.	Bartolomeo	then	
moved	in	with	his	father,	who	died	about	three	years	prior	to	his	capture,	and	remained	
there	until	the	podestà’s	knight	and	familia	captured	him	in	his	home.	Reading	between	the	
lines,	Bartolomeo	may	have	avoided	capture	after	his	initial	ban	by	living	on	episcopal	
property,	formally	outside	the	commune’s	jurisdiction.	The	ecclesiastical	authorities	either	
did	not	know	or	did	not	wish	to	hand	him	over	to	the	commune.	Furthermore,	Bologna’s	
authorities	seem	not	to	have	known	his	place	of	origin—the	trial	record	lists	him	as	being	
from	Castel	del	Vescovo	rather	than	terra	Battiticcio—so	they	could	not	look	for	him	there.	
Yet	somehow,	more	than	eight	years	after	banning	him,	the	Bolognese	commune	received	
intelligence	on	his	location—or	at	least	the	presence	of	some	outlaw(s)	in	terra	
																																																								
21	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(152	fols.),	81v,	90v,	92r–v,	95v,	97r.	The	judge’s	expedition	to	Castel	de’	Britti	is	on	
92v.	
22	ASB,	Corone	11,	1301I,	8r.	
23	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(42	fols.),	23r.	
24	Pazzaglini,	The	Criminal	Ban,	55,	172–73,	176–77.	The	podestà	may	have	used	some	of	these	funds	to	pay	
bounties	and	bribe	informants,	but	Pazzaglini	also	documented	payments	to	communal	officials,	such	as	
nuntii,	who	participated	in	these	expeditions.	
25	ASP,	Capitano	31,	reg.	5,	6r–9r.	
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Battiticcio—and	sent	a	raiding	party	to	capture	him.26	His	case	is	a	testament	to	the	
effectiveness	of	the	commune’s	recordkeeping,	in	particular	the	criminal	court’s.	There	
were	at	least	fourteen	different	podestà	between	the	time	Bartolomeo	was	banned	and	the	
time	he	was	captured,	yet	the	court	never	lost	track	of	his	case	and	proved	eager	to	
prosecute	him	when	it	had	the	opportunity.	
The	communes’	preoccupation	with	apprehending	criminals	also	animated	patrols	
for	illegal	weapons,	gamblers,	and	even	curfew	breakers.	Military	expeditions	to	capture	
outlaws	may	seem	far	removed	from	patrols	for	illegal	weapons,	but	in	fact	they	were	two	
sides	of	the	same	coin.	A	1295	report	from	Filippino	Confalonieri,	then	“Captain	of	the	
Mountains”	for	Bologna,	vividly	illustrates	how	the	two	phenomena	were	interrelated	in	
practice.	His	report	survives	as	a	transcription	of	a	letter	presented	by	two	of	his	men—
along	with	several	captives	and	confiscated	arms—to	the	podestà’s	court	on	1	March	of	
that	year.	Therein,	Filippino	related	what	happened	when	he	and	his	men	rode	to	the	
market	at	Savigno	the	previous	Sunday	(27	February)	to	search	for	illegal	weapons	and	
outlaws:	
	
When	I	went	into	the	market,	I	saw	very	many	men	coming	to	the	market	from	the	hills	of	
the	mountains,	who	were	abandoning	their	weapons	and	fleeing	because	of	them.	My	
comrades	all	scaled	the	hills,	pursuing	them	manfully	every	which	way.	Of	these	fugitives	
they	captured	Alberto	Mellotis	of	Prunarolo	and	Pighino	di	Ugolino	of	Medelana,	who	are	
said	to	be	outlaws—Alberto	with	a	lance	and	knife	and	Pighino,	who	had	abandoned	his	
dagger	and	knife	in	the	woods,	with	an	iron	helmet,	shield,	and	iron	gorget.	We	would	have	
captured	a	much	greater	number	of	those	fleeing	if	the	paths	had	been	straight,	but	they	
escaped	completely	because	of	the	severe	rises	and	falls	of	the	mountains.	I	have	sent	the	
arms	found	in	the	woods	and	mountains	by	me	and	my	comrades	through	this	carrier.	We	
might	have	had	many	more	of	these	arms	if	not	for	the	fact	that	my	comrades	and	I	had	a	
greater	desire	to	pursue	and	capture	men.	I,	with	my	armed	comrades,	pursued	them	
through	the	woods	and	mountains	for	so	long	that	people	had	left	the	market	and	it	was	
almost	evening.27		
	
Filippino	likely	embellished	some	details,	but	his	envoys	presented	an	impressive	haul	of	
contraband	that	included	six	swords,	five	knives,	six	lances,	four	iron	helmets,	and	six	
shields—27	items	in	total—which	the	court	consigned	for	resale.28	Similar	evidence	
suggests	this	was	not	an	isolated	incident.	Not	long	after	Filippino	raided	the	market	at	
																																																								
26	ASB,	Corone	21,	1315I	(102	fols.),	100v–101r.	The	interrogation	makes	clear	that	Bartolomeo	was	captured	
as	an	outlaw	(tamquam	banitus),	rather	than	arrested	for	some	other	offense	and	discovered	to	be	under	ban.	
27	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(30	fols.),	18v–19v:	“Et	cum	ivissem	in	dictum	merchatum,	vidi	quamplures	venientes	
ad	merchatum	a	colibus	montanearum	qui	prohicebant	arma	et	fugebant	pro	armis.	Omnes	mei	socii	colles	
monteanarum	ascenderunt,	undique	eos	viriliter	prosequendo,	ex	quibus	ceperunt	Albertum	Mellotis	de	
Promurollo	et	Piginum	Ugolini	de	Medellana,	qui	dicuntur	esse	baniti,	videlicet	dictum	Albertum	cum	lanzea	
et	cultello,	et	dictum	Piginum	cum	cervellera	et	tevlatio	et	colari	ferreo,	qui	prohicerat	spontonem	et	cutellum	
in	nemore.	Et	ex	ipsis	fugentibus	in	quantitate	maxima	cepissemus	si	vie	plane	fuissent,	qui	fugendo	penitus	
evaserunt	propter	mallos	excessus	et	decessus	montanarum.	Et	arma	per	me	ac	dictos	socios	inventa	per	
nemus	et	montaneas	vobis	per	latorem	presentum	destinavi.	Et	quamplura	dictorum	armorum	habuissemus,	
nissi	quod	mei	et	sociorum	meorum	maior	voluntas	aderat	in	hominibus	persequendis	et	capiendis.	Tantum	
eos	persecutus	fui	cum	dictis	armatis	sociis	per	nemus	et	montaneas	quod	gentes	de	merchato	recesserant	et	
aderat	[sic]	quaxi	erat	sero.”		
28	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	20r.	
	 96	
Savigno	above,	his	men	made	another	arrest	for	weapon	possession	at	a	market	at	
Monteveglio,	and	in	February	1296	the	podestà’s	officers	made	arrests	at	another	country	
market,	where	they	went	“in	order	to	find	men	carrying	weapons	and	capture	outlaws	of	
the	commune.”29	Again,	Bologna’s	police	forces	were	not	the	only	ones	who	targeted	such	
markets	on	patrol.	The	1277	case	of	an	escaped	detainee	from	Perugia	noted	that	the	
capitano’s	notary	had	arrested	him	at	a	country	market.30	As	seen	in	the	previous	chapter,	
the	practice	of	policing	in	the	contado	bore	a	strong	resemblance	to	predatory	lordship;	the	
primary	difference	was	that	the	commune’s	mercenaries	had	written	law	on	their	side.	But	
it	is	important	to	remember	that	the	commune’s	lawmakers	hired	these	mercenaries	
precisely	in	order	to	extend	the	writ	of	their	statutes	by	force.	
Indeed,	the	familia	brought	the	same	aggressive	approach	to	law	enforcement	into	
the	city,	pursuing	armed	men,	curfew	breakers,	and	gamblers	with	enthusiasm.	The	
Crowns	and	Arms	registers	describe	berrovarii	chasing	after	fleeing	dice	players	with	some	
regularity.31	As	noted	in	the	last	chapter,	many	arms	suspects	also	tried	to	flee	the	familia	
rather	than	submit	to	a	search,	since	the	statutes	made	the	gambit	worthwhile	for	guilty	
parties.	Those	who	did	flee,	however,	could	expect	a	foot	race.	For	example,	in	1294	two	
berrovarii	reportedly	chased	Giacomo	of	Pieve	di	Cento	from	near	the	church	of	Santa	
Maria	Nuova	to	“outside	the	city,	borghi	and	suburbs	of	Bologna	as	far	as	beyond	the	Reno”	
before	they	“finally”	caught	him,	still	carrying	his	weapons.32	The	berrovarii	also	chased	
arms-bearing	suspects	into	buildings.	In	three	separate	instances	in	1308,	the	familia	
reportedly	chased	individuals	into	houses	and	found	them	hiding,	one	of	them	behind	a	bed	
with	his	knife	still	at	his	feet.33	Once	again,	evidence	from	other	communes	mirrors	that	
from	Bologna.	A	1306	conviction	from	Siena	describes	in	detail	how	the	familia	pursued	an	
arms	suspect	into	his	shop	near	the	main	piazza,	where	he	locked	himself	in	and	refused	to	
open	the	door	for	the	podestà’s	men.34		
The	familia	even	chased	curfew	breakers	with	zeal.	One	evening	in	Bologna	in	1294,	
the	familia	reportedly	pursued	a	certain	Gerardo	over	a	long	distance	after	they	found	him	
without	a	light.	Gerardo	confessed	as	much,	stating	that	“he	did	not	want	to	fall	under	the	
penalty	of	the	commune	of	Bologna.”35	In	a	1313	curfew	case,	a	defense	witness	testified	
that	his	two	neighbors,	Bonincontro	and	Tommasino,	had	just	exited	Bonincontro’s	house	
after	dinner	when	the	familia	“came	running	toward”	them.	The	two	men	quickly	went	
inside.	The	defense	witness	then	heard	the	familia	at	Bonincontro’s	door	saying,	“Open	up!	
Where	are	those	guys	who	just	fled	into	this	house?”	The	defendants	complied	and	opened	
																																																								
29	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(42	fols.),	1r:	“Per	dominum	Martinum	militem	domini	potestatis	et	eius	familiam,	qui	
iverunt	per	comitatum	Bononie	causa	inveniendi	portantes	arma	et	causa	capiendi	bannitos	comunis	
Bononie.”	See	also	15v–16r,	18r–19v.	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(30	fols.),	23r.	
30	ASP,	Capitano	4,	reg.	6,	42r.	
31	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	8v,	44v;	1287I	(34	fols.),	23v–24r;	Corone	16,	1308I	(45	fols.),	1bis	r–v,	12r.	
32	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(118	fols.),	41r–v:	“Et	qui	Jacobus	similliter	affugit	ante	ipsos	baroarios	extra	
civitatem	et	burgos	et	suburbia	Bononie	usque	ultra	Renum,	et	tandem	predicti	baroarii	et	allia	famillia	
domini	potestatis	eum	ceperunt	cum	dictis	armis.”	Giacomo	had	to	pay	a	30-lire	fine	for	his	sword,	knife,	and	
two	pieces	of	armor.	For	a	long	chase	through	the	Porta	Saragozza,	see	Corone	28,	1320II	(100	fols.),	71r–v.	
33	ASB,	Corone	16,	1308I	(64	fols.),	20r,	24v,	30r.	For	similar	cases,	see	Corone	8,	1297I	(46	fols.),	14r–14v;	
28,	1320II	(100	fols.),	27v.	
34	ASS,	Malefizi	11,	89v.	For	another	sentence	where	the	suspect	fled	into	his	home,	see	118r.	
35	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(40	fols.),	7v:	“Qui	confessus	fuit	quod	affugit	coram	dicte	familie	quia	nolebat	cadere	
in	penam	comunis	Bononie.”	
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the	door,	only	to	be	arrested	by	the	familia.	Two	other	witnesses	corroborated	this	story.36	
Although	the	defendants	in	this	case	seem	to	have	been	guilty	of	violating	curfew,	it	is	
striking	that	the	familia	would	give	chase	and	make	them	present	themselves	for	arrest,	
rather	than	simply	allowing	these	town	residents	to	comply	with	the	law	by	going	inside.	In	
sum,	the	evidence	suggests	that,	when	Bologna’s	lawmakers	enjoined	the	berrovarii	to	
capture	criminals,	they	meant	all	violators	of	statute,	not	merely	outlaws	and	felons.	They	
instituted	third-party	policing	to	enhance	the	coercive	capacity	of	their	courts,	whether	
they	were	trying	to	exact	justice	from	an	infamous	highway	robber	or	an	ordinary	curfew	
breaker.	
“To	[…]	Search	for	Men	Bearing	Prohibited	Arms”	
Another	key	reason	Bologna’s	lawmakers	gave	for	employing	berrovarii	was	to	
“search	for	men	bearing	prohibited	arms.”	The	verb	they	chose	to	describe	this	duty	of	the	
berrovarii,	inquirere,	indicates	the	close	link	between	the	growth	of	policing	and	the	growth	
of	inquisition	in	the	thirteenth	century.	The	rise	of	inquisition	was	once	a	staple	narrative	
of	medieval	historiography,	but	it	has	recently	fallen	out	of	favor	as	scholars	have	
deconstructed	the	assumed	dichotomy	between	“strong”	public	justice	(embodied	by	
inquisitorial	procedure)	and	“weak”	private	justice	(embodied	by	accusatorial	
procedure).37	On	the	whole,	this	deconstruction	has	been	a	necessary	and	helpful	
corrective	to	historical	understanding,	but	it	has	not	reckoned	with	the	police	activity	of	the	
foreign	magistrates’	familie,	which	the	sources	present	unequivocally	as	a	form	of	
inquisition.	Besides	the	1260	ordinance	above,	the	earliest	mentions	of	the	familia’s	patrols	
(from	1256)	use	the	verb	inquirere	to	describe	their	activity.38	A	patrol	record	from	1289	
speaks	of	the	familia	“searching	and	conducting	investigation”	for	gamblers	and	other	
lawbreakers.39	And	when	lawmakers,	doubled	the	size	of	the	police	force	in	1295,	it	was	so	
the	podestà	could	“more	diligently	search	for—and	have	searched—men	bearing	arms.”40	
Indeed,	the	judicial	registers	abound	with	“searching”	verbs	to	describe	the	familia’s	patrol	
activity.	Rimari,	investigare,	scrutari,	perscrutari,	cercare,	and	tentare	are	all	used	in	
Bologna	and	other	communes	alike.41	The	same	language	applied	to	the	patrols	of	the	dirt	
notary	and	the	sumptuary	inspections	of	the	crowns	notary.42	In	effect,	the	familia’s	patrols	
																																																								
36	ASB,	Corone	19,	1313I	(67	fols.),	14r–15v:	“Audivit	dictum	Bonincontrum	esse	extra	cum	dicto	Thomaxino	
quando	cenati	fuerunt.	Et	tunc	eis	extra	domum	existentibus,	familia	venit	currendo	versus	domus	istius	
Bonincontri.	Et	tunc	[...]	audivit	familiam	domini	potestatis	ad	hostium	domus	dicti	Bonincontri	dicentem,	
‘Aperiatis	nobis.	Ubi	sunt	isti	qui	hic	aufugerunt	in	domum	predictam?’”		
37	Much	of	the	literature	on	negotiated	justice	cited	in	the	Introduction	and	Chapter	5	is	relevant,	but	Massimo	
Vallerani’s	work	is	perhaps	most	salient.	For	a	classical	narrative,	see	Pertile,	Storia	del	diritto	italiano.	
38	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	26r.	See	also	40v,	41r.	
39	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(58	fols.),	2v:	“Inquirendo	et	inquisitionem	faciendo	pro	ludentibus	ad	ludum	
tasillorum	et	alia	facientibus	contra	formam	statutorum	comunis	Bononie.”		
40	Statuti	1288,	1:581:	“Item	ad	hoc	ut	potestas	Bononie	melius	possit	per	civitatem	Bononie,	burgos,	et	
suburbia	vel	alibi	ubi	extiterit	oportunum	persequi	mallefactores	et	diligencius	inquirere	et	inquiri	facere	de	
portantibus	arma.”		
41	ASB,	Corone	16,	1308I	(45	fols.),	17r:	“Perscrutare.”	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293II	(48	fols.),	6v:	“Cercare.”	ASB,	
Corone	16,	1308I	(64	fols.),	30r:	“Tentare.”	A	1303	patrol	order	from	the	podestà	to	his	judges	and	knights	
uses	rimari,	investigare,	and	scrutari	synonymously	with	inquirere;	see	ASB,	Corone	13,	1303I	(44	fols.),	1r–v.	
For	examples	from	other	communes	see	ASS,	Malefizi	11,	137v;	ASP,	Capitano	2,	reg.	1,	46v;	ASO,	Podestà	1,	
reg.	6,	43v.	
42	ASB,	Fango	1,	1285	(54	fols.),	11r;	Corone	12,	1301II,	1r.	
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were	roving	inquisitions.	The	podestà’s	knight	or	judge,	supported	by	a	notary,	played	the	
role	of	inquisitor	in	the	street,	weighing	evidence	and	interrogating	suspects	to	determine	
if	they	should	be	put	on	trial.		
Implicit	in	all	this	“searching”	language	was	a	desire	for	more	perfect	knowledge	of	
crimes	committed	in	the	commune’s	jurisdiction.	In	principle,	the	familia	searched	for	
everyone	and	everything	that	the	commune	banned.	At	the	start	of	1303,	for	example,	the	
podestà	ordered	his	retinue	to	search	for	illegal	weapons,	gamblers,	pimps,	prostitutes,	and	
everything	else	that	statute	required	them	to	police.43	A	register	from	the	first	semester	of	
1296	speaks	of	the	familia	“searching	for	things	forbidden	by	the	commune”	and	
“investigating	for	gamblers,	weapons,	and	other	forbidden	things.”44	In	another	iteration	
from	1320,	they	were	to	search	for	“each	and	every	person”	bearing	illicit	arms,	playing	
dice,	breaking	curfew,	or	“doing	other	things”	contrary	to	statute.45	Indeed,	the	familia’s	
patrols	could	focus	on	“prohibited	persons”	(persone	prohibite)	as	much	as	prohibited	
things	or	behaviors,	an	important	point	that	will	be	the	theme	of	the	next	chapter.46	Again,	
the	language	was	much	the	same	in	other	communes.	In	Orvieto,	the	familia	searched	“for	
those	doing	anything	whatsoever	against	the	form	of	the	statutes.”47	
The	communes’	lawmakers	and	magistrates	justified	this	searching—and	many	
other	aspects	of	criminal	law	besides—in	terms	of	the	need	to	punish	crime.48	The	maxim	
“It	is	in	the	interest	of	the	republic	that	no	crimes	remain	unpunished”	(rei	publicae	
interest,	ne	crimina	remaneant	impunita,	or	ne	crimina	for	short)	is	a	commonplace	in	the	
judicial	sources.	Borrowed	from	a	1203	decretal	of	Innocent	III,	this	dictum	expressed	the	
age-old	theory	that	exemplary	punishment	deterred	crime,	while	a	failure	to	punish	
encouraged	criminal	audacity.	Nonetheless,	it	soon	became,	in	Trevor	Dean’s	words,	“the	
great	mobilising	rationale”	of	far-reaching	changes	in	criminal	law	in	thirteenth-century	
Europe.49	Canon	and	civil	lawyers	adopted	ne	crimina	to	justify	removing	procedural	
impediments	to	the	prosecution	of	crime.	Over	the	course	of	the	thirteenth	century,	jurists	
used	it	to	erode	defendants’	and	witnesses’	rights,	expand	inquisitorial	procedure	and	the	
use	of	torture,	and	allow	circumstantial	evidence,	among	other	procedural	innovations.50	
																																																								
43	ASB,	Corone	13,	1303I	(44	fols.),	1r–v.	See	also	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	55r;	1293II	(48	fols.),	44r;	Corone	
10,	1299	(8	fols.),	1r;	Corone	11,	1300	(82	fols.),	1v.	
44	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	1r:	“Circando	de	vetita	comunis	bononie.”	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	
6r:	“Inquirendo	de	lusoribus	et	armis	et	aliis	vetitis”;	6r.	See	also	53v,	59r.	For	the	dirt	notary’s	searching	for	
“prohibited	things”	(de	vetitis),	see	ASB,	Fango	7,	1296I	(98	fols.),	65r.	Note:	folio	65	is	marked	“xvii.”	
45	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(56	fols.),	2r:	“De	omnibus	et	singulis	portantibus	arma,	ludentibus	ad	ludum	
taxillorum	sive	ad	alium	ludum,	vel	euntibus	post	tertium	sonum	campane	que	pulsatur	de	sero	pro	guardia	
civitatis	Bononie,	vel	alia	facientibus	contra	formam	statutorum	comunis	et	populi	Bononie.”	For	similar	
language,	see	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(118	fols.),	44r.	
46	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	1r:	“Aliis	personis	prohybitis.”	See	also	ASB,	Corone	11,	1300	(82	fols.),	
1v;	Corone	13,	1303I	(44	fols.),	1r–v.	
47	ASO,	Podestà	2,	reg.	10,	12r:	“Pro	portantibus	arma	et	quocumque	modo	facientibus	contra	formam	
statutorum.”	See	also	12v.	
48	Statuti	1288,	1:578–79;	ASB,	Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	1v.	
49	Dean,	Crime	and	Justice,	87.	
50	Fraher,	“IV	Lateran’s	Revolution”;	“Preventing	Crime”;	“The	Theoretical	Justification.”	For	the	origins	of	the	
maxim	before	Innocent	III,	see	Jerouschek,	“‘Ne	crimina’”;	Landau,	“‘Ne	crimina	maneant	impunita.’”	Thank	
you	to	Anders	Winroth	for	this	last	reference.	
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Thus,	ne	crimina	epitomized	and	helped	popularize	a	philosophy	of	hegemonic	justice	that	
favored	retribution	over	negotiation.51		
As	the	next	chapter	will	further	demonstrate,	the	growth	of	police	power	was	part	of	
this	broader	quest	for	deterrence	through	punishment.	When	Bologna	increased	the	size	of	
the	police	force	in	July	1311,	it	was	in	part	“so	that	crimes	might	cease.”52	The	language	of	
the	Crowns	and	Arms	registers	betrays	a	similar	concern	with	unpunished	crime.	For	
example,	in	1293	the	podestà	ordered	his	familia	to	scour	the	city	for	all	sorts	of	criminals	
“so	that	they	might	capture,	round	up,	and	bring	before	his	court	all	those	who	ought	to	be	
punished	by	the	owed	penalty.”53	There	is	an	implicit	concern	here	that	as-yet-
undiscovered	criminals	were	not	paying	the	public	debt	they	owed	for	their	crimes.	
Similarly,	the	titles	of	several	registers	declare	that	records	of	“each	and	every	man	and	
person	found	and	to	be	found”	in	violation	of	the	curfew	and	weapons	laws	are	contained	
in	their	pages.54	Again,	the	court	assumed	it	was	unaware	of	all	the	crimes	committed	in	its	
jurisdiction.	This	would	be	unremarkable	its	own	right,	but	the	governing	elites’	attempt	to	
remedy	this	through	policing	drove,	in	part,	a	shift	from	reactive	to	proactive	law	
enforcement	in	the	thirteenth	century.	
Indeed,	the	familia’s	basic	function,	besides	apprehending	criminals,	was	to	detect	
crimes	that	would	otherwise	go	unpunished.	As	discussed	below,	the	familia	differed	
fundamentally	from	the	night	watch	and	other	community-based	institutions	in	the	
broader	scope	of	their	patrol	activity.	Lawmakers	asked	them	“to	keep	watch	[...]	day	and	
night”	and	search	for	all	manner	of	prohibited	persons	and	things,	which	meant	they	could	
show	up	anywhere	at	any	time	and	arrest	anyone	who	appeared	to	be	breaking	the	law.	
The	familia	also	pursued	evidence	aggressively	when	they	made	discoveries	in	order	to	
secure	convictions.	In	October	1295,	for	instance,	the	familia	was	patrolling	outside	the	city	
near	San	Giovanni	in	Persiceto	when	they	saw	someone	toss	a	knife	into	a	nearby	stream.	A	
famulus	of	the	podestà	went	into	the	water	to	retrieve	it,	which	later	induced	the	suspect	to	
confess	in	court	that	he	had	thrown	his	knife	in	the	water	“out	of	fear”	of	the	familia.55		
The	familia’s	investigative	function	is	also	abundantly	clear	in	the	raids	they	
executed	on	gambling	houses,	like	the	one	from	1286	described	at	the	start	of	this	book.	
The	familia	probably	executed	planned	raids	more	than	the	trial	records	let	on.	For	
example,	in	a	March	1300	case,	two	berrovarii	and	a	domicellus	related	how	they	and	other	
familiares	entered	a	house	“violently”	(violenter)	and	arrested	some	13	individuals,	
confiscating	their	gambling	paraphernalia	as	well.56	It	is	hard	to	imagine	that	the	raid	
would	have	been	so	successful	without	some	degree	of	planning,	but	the	trial	record	makes	
no	indication	of	it.	Yet	other	cases	suggest	the	familia	undertook	raids	with	minimal	
planning	after	being	tipped	off	on	patrol.	In	an	example	from	1308,	two	berrovarii	reported	
having	to	send	for	axes	to	open	the	door	of	a	house	“in	which	it	was	being	said	publicly	that	
there	were	gamblers	and	they	were	playing	an	illegal	game.”	By	the	time	they	broke	in,	
																																																								
51	See	especially	Sbriccoli:	“‘Vidi	communiter	observari’”;	“Legislation”;	“Tormentum.”	
52	ASB,	Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	1v,	23	July	1311:	“Ut	malleficia	cessent.”		
53	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	55r:	“Ut	eos	omnes	capiant	et	conquirant	et	coram	eius	curia	conducant	
pena	debita	puniendos.”		
54	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(11	fols.),	1r:	“De	omnibus	et	syngulis	hominibus	et	personis	inventis	et	inveniendis.”	
For	near	identical	language,	see	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	1r;	Corone	6,	1294I	(118	fols.),	1r.	
55	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295II	(32	fols.),	16v–17r.	For	a	similar	case,	see	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294II	(58	fols.),	12r.	
56	ASB,	Corone	10,	1299–1300	(41	fols.),	37v–38r.		
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everyone	had	escaped	through	windows	and	other	exits,	with	the	exception	of	one	hapless	
individual	who	was	still	“throwing	himself”	through	a	window	and	then	resisted	arrest.57	
All	told,	these	raids	attest	the	familia	as	an	investigative	body—an	extension	of	the	criminal	
court—that	did	not	simply	witness	crime	by	chance	but	sought	to	uncover	it	proactively.	
The	crowns	notaries’	written	records	were	also	crucial	as	an	investigative	tool,	
insofar	as	they	could	be	used	to	legally	coerce	suspected	offenders.58	Like	police	today,	the	
familia	could	use	anything	a	suspect	said	at	the	moment	of	his	detention	against	him	later	
in	court.	For	example,	in	August	1291,	when	Salvuccio	Beccadelli	denied	before	the	judge	
that	he	had	been	caught	gambling,	the	judge	asked	him	if	he	had	not	confessed	his	guilt	to	
the	knight	at	the	place	of	the	inventio.	Salvuccio	admitted	that	he	had	and	proceeded	to	give	
the	names	of	two	other	men	present	at	the	dice	game.	Similarly,	in	a	case	from	July	1320,	
the	notary	made	a	special	note:	before	the	defendant	denied	knowing	whom	the	knife	
belonged	to,	he	had	confessed	to	the	notary	himself	(presumably	at	the	scene	of	the	
discovery)	that	the	knife	was	his.59	The	coercive	power	of	written	records	is	also	well-
illustrated	by	a	case	from	September	1289,	in	which	a	captain	of	the	night	watch	accused	
Biagio	Magnavacca	of	physically	and	verbally	assaulting	him	when	he	tried	to	arrest	him	
for	breaking	curfew.	At	his	arraignment,	Biagio	denied	the	charge	in	its	entirety.	But	a	week	
later,	when	the	court	presented	Biagio	with	a	written	copy	of	the	witness	testimony	against	
him,	Biagio	changed	his	mind	and	confessed	that	everything	in	the	inquisition	was	true.60	
Indeed,	it	was	a	common	tactic	of	the	criminal	court	to	hear	witness	testimony	in	secret	
and	then	deliver	it	to	the	defendant.61	By	using	the	written	word	coercively,	these	trials	
followed	the	same	procedural	logic	as	judicial	torture,	which	likewise	sought	to	use	the	
accused’s	own	words	against	him	(see	Chapter	4).	Thus,	the	familia	not	only	served	as	the	
authorities’	“eyes	on	the	street”	but	also	extended	the	reach	of	the	judicial	apparatus	itself,	
including	its	powers	of	investigation	and	prosecution.	The	governing	elite	gained	both	
better	knowledge	of	crimes	and	more	convictions	according	to	statute.		
“Trustworthy	Foreign	Men”	
Many	of	the	same	community-based	institutions	used	to	apprehend	criminals	could	
also	be	used	to	detect	crime.	Lawmakers	could	employ	watchmen	and	guards	elected	from	
among	the	city	residents	to	observe	and	report	crime	directly;	question	local	officials	about	
goings-on	in	their	parishes	and	villages;	and	employ	secret	informants	to	denounce	specific	
crimes.	All	of	these	institutions	remained	alive	and	well	into	the	fourteenth	century,	long	
after	the	advent	of	third-party	policing.	Furthermore,	all	of	them	relied	on	(or	at	least	were	
subject	to	the	influence	of)	locals’	personal	knowledge	of	their	communities	and	
relationships	of	amity	and	enmity	with	their	neighbors.	In	this	context,	it	is	significant	that	
lawmakers	stipulated	the	berrovarii	had	to	be	“good,	lawful,	and	trustworthy	foreign	men,”	
like	the	podestà	himself.	However	“normal”	it	was	in	communal	society	for	law	
enforcement	to	depend	on	local	relationships,	elites	evidently	wanted	enforcers	who	would	
not	know	their	subjects	and	therefore	prosecute	them	impartially.	In	this	sense,	the	growth	
																																																								
57	ASB,	Corone	16,	1308I	(64	fols.),	10v–11r:	“In	qua	domo	publice	dicebatur	quod	erant	lusores	et	ludebant	
ad	ludum	prohibitum.”	
58	The	coercive	“technology	of	documentation”	is	a	major	theme	in	Given,	Inquisition,	25–51.	
59	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	37r;	Corone	28,	1320II	(100	fols.),	23v.	
60	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(58	fols.),	24v–25r,	27r–v.	
61	For	another	example,	see	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	50r.	
	 101	
of	government	policing	was	a	logical	extension	of	the	podestariat.	Put	another	way,	if	the	
Italian	city-republics	were	“face-to-face”	communities	where	the	leading	citizens	all	knew	
each	other,	they	employed	the	familia	to	circumvent	that	reality.62	
Again,	third-party	policing	did	not	supplant	or	replace	community-based	
institutions,	and	the	authorities	continued	to	rely	on	locals’	knowledge	for	law	
enforcement.	The	institution	of	the	night	watch,	for	example,	explicitly	hinged	on	the	
watchmen’s	personal	knowledge	of	their	neighborhoods.	The	1250	statute	enjoined	
watchmen	not	to	denounce	anyone	they	found	at	night	whom	they	knew	and	believed	to	be	
“without	suspicion	or	malice.”63	The	1288	statute	elaborated	on	this	principle,	enjoining	
them	to	capture	if	they	could	anyone	whom	they	did	not	know,	and	denounce	the	next	
morning	those	whom	they	knew	but	thought	suspect.64	In	other	words,	watchmen	were	
supposed	to	use	their	intimate	knowledge	of	their	neighborhoods	and	neighbors	to	keep	
them	safe.	Similarly,	communes	leaned	on	parish	officials,	called	ministrales	in	Bologna,	to	
denounce	crimes	in	their	neighborhoods.	The	statutes	required	ministrales	to	denounce	
local	crime,	and	also	required	the	podestà’s	notaries	to	question	ministrales	regularly,	
usually	on	a	monthly	basis,	in	general	inquests.65	In	principle,	Bologna’s	ministrales	
constituted	a	sizable	force	of	publicly	designated	accusers,	numbering	close	to	300	by	the	
start	of	the	fourteenth	century.66	Records	of	these	general	inquests	suggest	the	podestà’s	
notaries	expended	considerable	energy	conducting	them	(see	below).		
The	communes	also	made	use	of	secret	informants	in	a	variety	of	contexts.	Carol	
Lansing	has	shown	how	Orvieto	used	secret	informants	to	some	effect	in	prosecuting	
violations	of	the	funeral	and	mourning	laws;	Orvieto	even	designated	“secret	guards”	
(custodes	celati	or	secreti)	to	denounce	stray	animals.67	Alternatively,	communes	might	
offer	rewards	for	denunciations.	Bologna,	for	example,	offered	the	denouncer	half	the	sum	
of	the	resulting	conviction	in	cases	of	divination,	throwing	stones	at	houses	at	night,	and	
not	using	the	city	gates	to	exit	the	city.68	Such	denunciations	could	pay	off	handsomely.	The	
individual	who	denounced	the	gambling	house	raided	at	the	start	of	this	book	came	back	to	
the	podestà	two	months	later	to	collect	his	reward,	which	amounted	to	some	125	lire,	or	
half	the	sum	of	ten	gambling	convictions.69	Many	communes	encouraged	denunciations	like	
these	by	setting	up	slotted	lockboxes	that	allowed	anyone	to	pass	a	note	to	the	authorities	
in	secret—and,	in	Bologna’s	case,	anonymously.70	Lastly,	the	court	could	open	an	
																																																								
62	For	Italian	cities	as	“face-to-face”	communities,	see	Muir,	“The	Idea	of	Community”;	Weissman,	“The	
Importance	of	Being	Ambiguous.”	For	the	sociological	theory	behind	this	concept,	see	Goffman,	Interaction	
Ritual.	
63	Statuti	1245,	3:106–07:	“Sine	suspicione	et	malicia.”		
64	Statuti	1288,	1:96.	
65	For	example,	ministrales	had	to	report	armed	assaults	and	homicides	within	three	days;	see	Statuti	1288,	
1:175.	The	earlier	statutes	(1245–1267),	with	the	exception	of	the	emergency	ordinances	of	1261	and	1265,	
do	not	mention	this	obligation	for	ministrales,	but	the	sources	show	them	fulfilling	it	as	early	as	1254.		
66	The	statutes	did	not	specify	the	number	of	ministrales	to	be	designated	for	each	parish,	but	four	or	five	
seems	to	have	been	standard.	The	registers	from	1301II	and	1315II	contain	the	names	of	274	and	292	
ministrales,	respectively.	See	ASB,	Corone	12,	1301II,	1v–7r;	Corone	22,	1315II	(38	fols.),	1bisv–8r.		
67	Lansing,	Passion	and	Order.	For	custodes	secreti	denouncing	stray	pigs,	see	ASO,	Podestà	2,	reg.	8,	16v.	
68	Statuti	1288,	1:208,	211,	235.	
69	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	12r.	
70	On	anonymous	denunciations	in	Bologna,	see	Blanshei	Politics	and	Justice,	46,	192,	350–51.	Florence	also	
allowed	anonymous	denunciations;	see	Terry-Fritsch,	“Networks	of	Urban	Secrecy”;	Rocke,	Forbidden	
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investigation	on	the	basis	of	public	rumor	(fama)	alone,	obviating	the	need	for	any	
individual	to	denounce	the	crime.	
However,	insofar	as	all	these	mechanisms	relied	on	locals’	reporting,	they	were	all	
vulnerable	to	the	same	weaknesses,	namely	that	friends	would	not	denounce	each	other	to	
the	authorities	and	enemies	would	denounce	each	other	spuriously.	Generally	speaking,	
neighbors	only	denounced	each	other	to	the	authorities	when	their	dispute	could	not	be	
resolved	by	other	means	or	when	they	were	enemies—or	both.	This	was	in	keeping	with	
the	general	trend	in	late	medieval	societies	whereby	individuals	tended	to	use	public	
courts	to	pursue	feuds.71	Accusers	did	not	necessarily	expect	the	court	to	deliver	a	
definitive	verdict	in	their	favor,	but	found	public	legal	proceedings	a	useful	mechanism	to	
steer	the	dispute	toward	a	more	favorable	settlement.	Even	within	this	norm,	however,	the	
initiation	of	a	public	accusation	or	lawsuit	could	be	cause	for	enmity	in	and	of	itself.	
Medieval	jurists	even	had	a	term	for	this	hatred	(odium	litis).72	Thus,	if	enmity	did	not	
already	define	the	relationship	between	two	neighbors,	a	denunciation	to	the	podestà	was	
a	reliable	way	to	ensure	it	would.		
Because	of	this	reality,	general	inquests	were	of	limited	value	in	generating	
denunciations.	Andrea	Zorzi	has	found	that	Florence’s	parish-based	system	worked	as	
intended	when	it	came	to	the	denunciation	of	violent	crime,	but	in	Bologna	this	did	not	hold	
for	other	types	of	crime.73	In	the	vast	majority	of	inquests,	ministrales	swore	to	the	notary	
that	they	knew	nothing	about	the	contents	of	the	inquisition.	For	example,	in	the	first	half	
of	1320,	the	notary	conducted	a	23-article	general	inquest	every	month,	and	every	
ministralis	professed	to	know	nothing.74	In	Perugia,	too,	records	from	1279	show	that	one	
of	the	capitano’s	judges	held	a	wide-ranging	general	inquest	each	month	whereby	he	
sought	to	identify	sodomites,	heretics,	Jews,	“sons	who	beat	their	father	and	mother,”	
taverners	and	innkeepers	who	held	dice	games,	anyone	who	aided	outlaws	of	the	
commune,	blasphemers,	and	violators	of	commercial	and	public	health	regulations.	Every	
month,	representatives	from	Perugia’s	parishes	claimed	not	to	know	anyone	fitting	those	
descriptions.75	As	Carol	Lansing	has	pointed	out,	the	only	delinquents	whom	ministrales	
seemed	willing	to	denounce	with	any	regularity	were	low-status	individuals	such	as	
prostitutes	and	their	procurers,	whose	presence	“dishonored”	their	neighborhoods	and	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Friendships,	49,	54–55.	In	contrast,	Venice’s	Maggior	Consiglio	prescribed	in	1275	that	all	anonymous	
denunciations	would	be	burned	without	exception,	though	this	policy	was	softened	starting	in	the	late	
fourteenth	century;	see	Preto,	I	servizi	segreti,	168–69.	
71	Zorzi	calls	this	the	“publicization”	of	vendetta	in	“The	Judicial	System,”	53.	For	a	broader	historiographical	
discussion,	see	Smail,	The	Consumption	of	Justice,	9–13.	Vallerani	emphasizes	the	economic	(rather	than	
emotional)	bases	of	conflicts	pursued	through	accusatio	procedure	in	“Criminal	Court	Procedure,”	38–39.	
72	Vallerani,	“Criminal	Court	Procedure,”	38.	
73	Zorzi	found	that	Florence’s	cappellani	accounted	for	a	large	percentage	of	assault	and	murder	
denunciations	before	the	Black	Death;	see	“Contrôle	social,”	1171–1174.	For	a	local	brawl	denounced	by	
Bologna’s	ministrale	in	June	1254,	see	ASB,	Inquisitiones	1,	reg.	4,	2r.	
74	ASB,	Corone	27,	1320I	(48	fols.),	25r–33v;	1320I	(46	fols.),	26r–30v,	32r–35v.	Monthly	inquisitions	into	
gambling	from	August	to	December	1294	likewise	produced	no	denunciations;	see	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294II	(46	
fols.),	9r,	11v,	14r,	16v,	19r	
75	ASP,	Capitano	5a,	reg.	3,	9r,	17r,	25r,	73r,	124r,	145r–v,	153r,	177r–v,	193r–v,	233r–v,	249r–v,	305r–v:	
“Illos	filios	qui	verberant	patrem	et	matrem.”		
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whose	enmity	would	cost	them	little.76	Although	they	may	not	capture	denunciations	of	
assaults	and	murders,	the	records	of	general	inquisitions	suggest	a	code	of	silence	among	
neighbors.77	The	podestà	was	known	to	prosecute	ministrales	found	to	be	negligent	in	their	
duties	(see	above),	but	this	threat	was	not	enough	to	overrule	the	logic	of	enmity	and	amity	
that	underpinned	neighborly	relations.	General	inquests	functioned	more	as	a	ritual	
reminder	of	the	commune’s	statutes	and	the	ideal	of	urban	order	those	statutes	codified,	
rather	than	an	effective	mechanism	for	uncovering	crime.	
Conversely,	the	potential	for	spurious	denunciations	is	apparent	in	cases	where	
watchmen	seem	to	have	abused	their	office	in	pursuit	of	personal	or	neighborhood	
agendas.	For	example,	in	July	1285	a	captain	of	the	night	watch	delivered	a	certain	
Bongiovanni	into	official	custody,	denouncing	him	as	a	thief,	infamous	person,	son	of	a	
Lambertazzi,	and	“bad	man”	who	had	boasted	of	killing	many	men.	Despite	this,	the	judge	
allowed	Bongiovanni	to	produce	witnesses	in	his	defense.	When	the	judge	asked	one	
witness	“if	the	man	who	detained	[Bongiovanni]	was	his	friend,”	he	responded,	“On	the	
contrary,	he	is	an	enemy	as	much	as	one	can	be,	and	wishes	him	the	greatest	malice.”78	
When	the	judge	asked	another	witness	if	Bongiovanni	had	any	enemies,	he	reported	that	
Bongiovanni	had	come	to	blows	with	the	man	who	detained	him	about	three	months	
earlier	and	been	threatened	by	him	many	times.79	Whatever	the	reason	for	their	brawl,	
such	an	incident	was	virtually	guaranteed	to	engender	a	relationship	of	enmity	in	
communal	society.	Other	watchmen	could	be	subtler,	denouncing	their	personal	enemies	
only	for	violating	curfew.	In	1264,	two	watchmen,	Mercadino	and	Pietrobello,	denounced	
one	Brugnolo	for	carrying	a	knife	and	javelin	(spitum)	around	daybreak.	According	to	
Brugnolo’s	travel	companion,	Baruffaldo,	Mercadino	had	greeted	them	with	a	mocking	
reference	to	Brugnolo’s	political	support	for	Venedico,	anzianus	of	the	popolo,	whom	
Mercadino	hated.	Mercadino	therefore	confiscated	their	weapons	out	of	hatred	“and	for	no	
other	reason.”80	It	is	impossible	to	know	the	truth	of	the	matter	in	such	cases,	but	they	
illustrate	the	inherent	flaw	in	asking	community	members	to	police	each	other.	The	
watchmen	could	use	their	deep	personal	knowledge	of	their	neighbors	to	identify	
suspicious	individuals,	but	they	could	use	that	same	personal	knowledge	to	abuse	their	
office.	Although	judges	and	lawmakers	had	methods	to	guard	against	dubious	information,	
ultimately	any	trial	that	hinged	on	information	from	local	residents—whether	it	came	from	
fama,	a	secret	denunciation,	or	a	local	official—could	be	undermined	by	personal	enmities.		
																																																								
76	Lansing,	Passion	and	Order,	36.	For	prostitutes	“dishonoring”	(dehonestare)	the	parish	of	Sant’Arcangelo,	
see	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	16v.	For	other	denunciations	of	prostitutes	and	their	procurers,	see	ASB,	
Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	16v;	Inquisitiones	1,	reg.	16,	1r–4r;	Inquisitiones	18,	reg.	1,	13r;	Corone	4,	1292II	(11	
fols.),	2r;	Corone	13,	1302II,	86r–v;	Corone	17,	1309II,	54v;	Corone	18,	1310II	(22	fols.),	4r–5r,	7v,	9v–10r,	
17r;	1310II	(96	fols.),	69v–70r;	Corone	26,	1319II	(42	fols.),	5r–v,	8r–v.		
77	For	exceptions,	see	ASB,	Inquisitiones	18,	reg.	1,	13r–v;	Corone	26,	1319II	(42	fols.),	8r–v;	Corone	12,	
1301II,	8r;	Corone	28,	1320II	(22	fols.),	5r.	
78	ASB,	Corone	1,	1285II	(70	fols.),	10r:	“Interrogatus	si	ille	qui	detinuit	est	suus	amicus,	respondit	quod	non	
immo	inimicus	quantum	posset	et	vult	sibi	maximam	maliciam.”		
79	ASB,	Corone	1,	1285II	(70	fols.),	10v.	For	a	similar	case,	see	Corone	6,	1294II	(58	fols.),	26v;	1294II	(42	
fols.),	24v–25r.	
80	ASB,	Corone	1,	1264,	5v:	“Et	quando	idem	Mercadinus	invenit	eos	dixit	versus	Brugnolum,	‘Es	tu	
Brugnolus?	Tu	mihi	carus	bene	amore	talis	hominis	de	mondo.’	Et	hoc	dixit	causa	quia	odit	Veneticum	
ancianum	populi	de	cuius	parte	est	Brugnolus.	Et	odio	fecit	et	abstulit	ei	arma	et	non	alia	de	causa.”		
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This	was	all	the	more	true	when	it	came	to	statutes	that	criminalized	common	
behaviors	and	whose	violation	left	no	obvious	victim	but	the	commune	itself.	Locals	had	
little	incentive	to	denounce	their	neighbors	for	breaking	these	rules	unless	they	were	
already	enemies.	Indeed,	the	earliest	evidence	for	the	enforcement	of	arms-bearing	and	
gambling	laws—a	set	of	criminal	bans	resulting	from	private	accusations	in	the	1230s—
suggests	that,	in	the	absence	of	third-party	enforcers,	accusations	only	served	to	further	
personal	vendettas.	In	some	of	these	cases,	the	purported	victims	of	violent	crimes	appear	
to	have	tacked	on	arms-bearing	or	gambling	to	more	serious	charges.	For	example,	in	1234,	
one	Ubaldino	accused	one	Damiano	of	attempting	to	murder	him	with	a	sword,	knife,	and	
armor	at	another	man’s	request.	He	added	that	Damiano	had	carried	the	sword	and	knife	
illegally	100	times	since	the	new	year.81	Other	examples	suggest	political	motives.	In	April	
1235,	Matteo	of	Orvieto	accused	a	member	of	the	Lambertazzi	house	of	gambling	at	least	
eight	times,	blaspheming	God	and	Mary	at	least	20	times,	and	carrying	a	knife	through	the	
city	at	least	six	times	since	the	previous	Christmas.	This	accusation	came	just	months	after	
Alberto	Lambertazzi	caused	a	tumult	in	the	city	by	killing	the	son	of	a	tailor,	and	just	two	
months	before	the	podestà	would	place	Alberto	under	perpetual	ban	for	the	same	
murder.82	I	have	found	just	one	example,	from	June	1235,	of	an	arms-bearing	accusation	
accompanied	by	no	other	charge.	In	that	case,	the	notary	Antonio	(no	surname	is	given)	
accused	Bonaventura	Liazzari,	from	a	family	of	urban	magnates,	of	carrying	a	knife	through	
the	city	ten	times	since	the	new	year.83	Perhaps	Antonio	was	looking	out	for	the	public	
interest,	but	the	accusation	more	likely	was	born	of	factional	conflict.	Together	these	cases	
suggest	that	community	members	tended	to	denounce	each	other	for	arms-bearing	and	
gambling	offenses	only	if	they	were	already	personal	or	political	enemies.		
The	governing	elite’s	decision	to	have	foreign	soldiers	patrol	their	streets	to	enforce	
these	laws	strongly	suggests	they	were	not	happy	with	this	state	of	affairs,	however	
“normal”	it	was	for	relationships	of	amity	and	enmity	to	drive	litigation	in	communal	
society.	Instead	of	expanding	the	police	capabilities	of	the	night	watch	or	civic	militias,	they	
invested	police	power	in	a	group	of	armed	outsiders	who	could	enforce	the	law	
impersonally.	The	contrast	in	enforcement	is	clear	in	the	way	the	familia	enforced	the	
curfew	law.	Instead	of	denouncing	suspicious	persons	only,	like	the	night	watch,	familiares	
were	to	denounce	anyone	they	found	in	violation	of	curfew	since	they	could	not	know	(in	
theory)	who	belonged	in	a	given	neighborhood	and	who	did	not.	This	is	not	to	say	that	
familiares	never	acted	out	of	self-interest	or	abused	their	office,	but	in	principle	at	least,	
they	had	neutral	relationships	with	the	people	they	policed	and	were	less	prone	to	such	
abuses.	In	effect,	the	same	governing	elites	who	pursued	their	enmities	through	public	
courts	attempted	to	curb	the	excesses	of	this	“culture	of	hatred”	by	making	criminal	justice	
more	impersonal.84	
Furthermore,	by	effectively	removing	the	need	for	local	cooperation	in	criminal	
prosecutions,	the	familia’s	patrols	made	the	criminal	court	self-sufficient	in	detecting	and	
																																																								
81	ASB,	Accusationes	1a,	reg.	4,	36v.	Similar	examples	are	on	34r–v,	35r,	40r.		
82	ASB,	Accusationes	1a,	1235,	3r.	Alberto’s	June	1235	sentence	is	on	6r.	For	more	on	the	homicide,	see	
Blanshei,	“Criminal	Law,”	8–9;	Vanghi,	“Il	libro	di	banditi.”	For	an	arms-bearing	accusation	with	even	more	
explicit	political	overtones,	see	ASB,	Accusationes	1a,	1235,	3r.	
83	ASB,	Accusationes	1a,	1235,	6v.	On	the	Liazzari	family	as	magnates,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	101,	
142.	
84	For	the	“culture	of	hatred,”	see	Maire	Vigueur,	Cavaliers	et	citoyens,	307–35;	Blanshei,	“Homicide.”	
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punishing	crime.	In	conveying	the	relatio,	the	familia	played	the	role	not	only	of	third-party	
accuser,	but	also	of	eyewitness	for	the	prosecution.	Indeed,	familiares	seem	to	have	been	
quite	conscious	of	their	role	as	official	witnesses.	In	a	1287	gambling	relatio,	for	example,	
one	berrovarius	noted	that	his	partner	had	found	a	die	on	the	ground	“with	him	present	
and	seeing	as	a	witness.”85	In	the	first	semester	of	1296,	the	dirt	notary	prefaced	a	series	of	
inventiones	by	noting	he	had	discovered	them	“in	[the]	presence”	of	two	berrovarii	and	one	
crier.	These	officers,	moreover,	“swore,	solemnly	asserting	to	tell	the	truth,	and	by	their	
oath	said	they	had	seen”	him,	the	dirt	notary,	find	the	things	written	below.86	As	we	have	
seen	time	and	again,	the	eyewitness	testimony	of	familiares	carried	the	weight	of	proof	and	
was	difficult	for	defendants	to	overcome.	When	foreign	officials	served	as	accusers,	
witnesses,	and	judges	all	at	once,	the	trial	tended	to	move	swiftly	toward	a	guilty	verdict.	
That	self-governing	elites	would	cut	themselves	out	of	the	legal	process	to	such	an	extent	
and	encourage	judges	to	apply	statutory	punishments,	often	at	their	own	expense,	is	the	
fundamental	paradox	in	need	of	explanation.	
“The	Good	State	of	the	Commune”	
At	this	point,	it	should	be	clear	that	the	communes’	elites	sought	to	improve	their	
methods	for	surveying	and	controlling	the	populations	under	their	rule.	They	wanted	their	
courts	to	be	able	to	detect	more	crime,	physically	coerce	more	outlaws	and	offenders,	and	
successfully	prosecute	them	according	to	statute.	The	question	remains	why,	in	the	words	
of	Bologna’s	lawmakers,	elites	deemed	it	“for	the	advantage	and	good	state	of	the	
commune”	to	subject	themselves	to	such	proactive,	third-party	policing.	
By	appealing	to	the	“good	state”	of	the	commune,	Bologna’s	lawmakers	were	
situating	themselves	squarely	within	the	reigning	political	discourse	of	the	day.	Political	
thinkers	across	Latin	Christendom	generally	subscribed	to	the	ideal	of	the	common	good	
(bonum	commune	or	utilitas	publica)	as	the	fundamental	purpose	of	government.	Although	
interpretations	varied,	this	classical	republican	concept	was	generally	understood	to	entail	
not	only	the	peace	and	order	of	the	polity	but	also	the	virtue	and	prosperity	of	its	citizens.87	
The	Italian	communes	in	particular	saw	a	thirteenth-century	revival	of	republican	political	
thought	with	authors	such	as	Giovanni	da	Viterbo,	Brunetto	Latini,	and	Remigio	de’	
Girolami	penning	influential	treatises	and	manuals	on	the	good	governance	of	cities.88	
Artists	also	contributed	to	this	discourse	by	depicting	good	governance	and	related	themes	
in	public	places,	often	in	the	chambers	of	government	officials	and	magistrates.	Ambrogio	
Lorenzetti’s	Allegory	of	Good	and	Bad	Government	in	Siena’s	Palazzo	Pubblico	is	the	best-
known	example,	but	communal	regimes	across	northern	Italy	commissioned	public	art	for	
																																																								
85	ASB,	Corone	1,	1287I	(34	fols.),	23v–24r:	“Se	teste	presente	et	vidente.”		
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87	Il	bene	comune;	Lecuppre-Desjardin	and	van	Bruaene,	eds.,	De	bono	communi;	Kempshall,	The	Common	
Good.	
88	Napolitano,	“From	Royal	Court	to	City	Hall”;	Mineo,	“Cose	in	comune”;	Cox,	“Ciceronian	Rhetoric”;	Artifoni,	
“Retorica	e	organizzazione”;	Viroli,	From	Politics	to	Reason	of	State,	11–70;	Skinner,	The	Foundations,	1:3–66.	
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similar	political	ends.89	There	is	no	space	here	to	discuss	these	rich	topics	in	depth,	but	it	
suffices	to	say	that	the	good	state	of	the	commune	was	the	rhetorical	touchstone	for	the	
legitimacy	of	any	policy—or	indeed	any	regime—in	thirteenth-century	Italy.	
The	popolo	regimes	that	rose	to	power	in	Bologna,	Perugia,	and	many	other	
communes	in	the	thirteenth	century	were	especially	adept	at	deploying	republican	ideals	to	
legitimate	their	policies,	as	in	the	1260	ordinance	above,	and	to	vilify	their	enemies.90	
Indeed,	such	regimes	typically	styled	themselves	as	the	defenders	of	the	common	good	
against	a	violent	and	rapacious	nobility.	For	example,	when	Bologna	banished	Alberto	
Lambertazzi	for	the	murder	of	a	tailor’s	son	in	1235,	the	sentence	decreed	it	was	“for	the	
public	utility	of	the	whole	city,”	since	Alberto	was	a	belligerent	man	(homo	rixosus)	and	it	
was	“feared	that,	through	him	and	his	deeds,	scandal	might	arise	in	the	city	and	the	city	
might	have	a	bad	state.”91	Over	the	ensuing	decades,	Bologna’s	popolo	regime	would	use	
republican	rhetoric	to	justify	a	host	of	institutional	innovations	and	expedient	measures	in	
government.	Employing	foreign	soldiers	as	a	police	force	was	one	of	many	policy	decisions	
that	the	popolo	legitimized	by	appealing	to	the	good	of	the	republic.	
The	question	of	why	third-party	policing	emerged	in	communal	Italy	hinges	at	least	
in	part,	then,	on	the	relationship	between	the	popolo’s	rhetoric	and	its	policies,	which	
historians	have	debated	for	more	than	a	century.	One	influential	school	of	thought	views	
the	popolo-magnate	conflict	through	the	lens	of	class	struggle,	as	an	archetypal	case	of	a	
new	bourgeoisie	rising	up	to	challenge	the	landed	aristocracy.92	Another	school	of	thought	
holds	that	the	popolo-magnate	conflict	was	merely	the	continuation	of	factional	warfare	
under	a	new	guise.	In	this	view,	the	popolo	used	republican	ideals	and	institutions	to	
legitimate	their	governments	but	ruled	through	violent	domination,	much	like	the	
traditional	nobility.93		
These	competing	interpretations	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	however,	and	each	gets	
at	important	aspects	of	the	historical	reality.	On	the	one	hand,	recent	scholarship	has	made	
clear	that	there	was	indeed	a	class	element	to	the	conflict.	For	example,	in	Florence	and	
Bologna,	the	popolo’s	chief	antagonists,	called	milites	in	the	first	half	of	the	thirteenth	
century	and	magnates	in	the	second	half,	comprised	the	same	noble	families,	with	only	a	
handful	of	newcomers	over	the	decades.	In	other	words,	miles	or	magnate	was	not	simply	a	
label	for	a	member	of	the	opposing	faction;	it	signified	membership	in	a	largely	static	(and	
ancient)	group	of	urban	aristocrats.94	On	the	other	hand,	popolani	could	be	just	as	violent	
as	magnates,	and	their	coalitions	tended	to	evolve	into	oligarchic	or	signorial	regimes	
																																																								
89	The	literature	on	Lorenzetti	is	vast,	but	an	excellent	starting	point	is	Boucheron,	The	Power	of	Images.	For	
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94	Diacciati,	Popolani	e	magnati;	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice;	Milani,	“Da	milites	a	magnati.”	
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rather	like	the	ones	they	originally	opposed.95	Indeed,	popular	regimes	were	still	
fundamentally	exclusive,	like	the	regimes	of	the	nobility	whose	power	they	co-opted	or	
usurped.	In	Bologna,	for	example,	membership	in	a	guild	or	popular	militia	was	the	sole	
determinant	of	popolano	status,	and	therefore	of	one’s	political	rights.	Bologna’s	popolo	
limited	membership	in	the	popular	societies	on	multiple	fronts.	They	recognized	the	guilds	
of	select	trades	only,	and	banned	certain	individuals	and	categories	of	people	from	
membership	in	the	guilds	and	popular	militias.	The	popolo	excluded	people	below	them:	
marginal	figures	like	gamblers,	immigrants,	and	tax-paying	peasants	in	the	contado	
(fumantes),	as	well	as	menial	workers	like	wine-porters.	They	also	excluded	people	above	
them:	nobles,	magnates,	knights,	and	anyone	who	pledged	fealty	to	such	individuals	instead	
of	the	commune.	After	a	1274	civil	war,	exclusion	also	operated	on	a	horizontal	axis,	as	the	
victorious	Geremei	faction	of	the	popolo	sent	their	rivals,	the	Lambertazzi—approximately	
4,000	citizens	from	a	city	of	50,000—into	mass	exile.	To	borrow	Giuliano	Milani’s	phrase,	
Bologna’s	popolo	governed	“by	lists,”	controlling	the	political,	social,	and	legal	status	of	
citizens	and	subjects—from	magnates	to	exiles	to	fumantes—by	placing	their	names	in	
specific	rolls.96	Thus,	under	popular	rule,	the	social	order	continued	to	be	defined	by	elites’	
ability	to	exclude	rivals	and	non-elites	from	political	and	economic	privileges.	By	extension,	
the	bonum	commune	was	hardly	common	to	everyone;	it	remained	the	province	of	a	
coalition	of	governing	elites.	
Yet,	even	as	government	under	the	popolo	remained	firmly	grounded	in	the	logic	of	
a	limited	access	order,	it	is	undeniable	that	these	regimes	ushered	in	sweeping	institutional	
changes	that	can	be	described	as	more	impersonal	in	nature.	They	expanded	political	
participation	in	civic	councils,	multiplied	public	offices,	and	subjected	aristocrats	to	tax	
assessments	for	the	first	time.	They	also	enacted	judicial	reforms	such	as	the	expanded	use	
of	judicial	inquisition	and	harsher	criminal	penalties—not	always	enforced,	but	written	
into	statute	nonetheless.97	Massimo	Giansante	has	therefore	argued	that	the	popolo-
magnate	conflict	is	best	understood	as	a	clash	of	institutional	norms	rather	than	a	clash	of	
opposing	classes	or	factions.98		
Insofar	as	the	popolo	championed	impersonal	institutions	over	the	personal	exercise	
of	power,	this	must	be	explained	by	the	political	advantage	it	afforded	them	in	the	context	
of	a	limited	access	order.	New	written	laws	and	public	offices	were	critical	tools	in	the	
popolo’s	basic	project	of	gaining	access	to	and	later	consolidating	power	within	the	
governing	elite.99	Although	popolo	regimes	tended	to	become	more	exclusive	over	the	
decades,	the	popolo	coalition	originally	sought	to	secure	a	role	in	government	for	
commercial	and	professional	elites.	In	this	they	were	largely	successful.	In	the	early	to	mid-
thirteenth	century,	bankers,	merchants,	and	tradesmen	in	many	communes	gained	political	
																																																								
95	On	popolano	violence,	see	Zorzi,	“Politica	e	giustizia”;	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	399.	
96	Giansante,	“Ancora	magnati	e	popolani”;	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	15–41;	Milani,	“Il	governo	delle	liste.”	
97	Poloni,	“Il	comune	di	popolo”;	Artifoni,	“I	governi	di	‘popolo.’”	For	the	case	of	Bologna	see	Blanshei,	Politics	
and	Justice,	69–133;	Smurra,	Città,	cittadini	e	imposta	diretta;	Tamba,	“Il	Consiglio	del	popolo”;	Tamba,	
“Consigli	elettorali”;	Bocchi,	“Le	imposte	dirette.”	
98	Giansante,	“Ancora	magnati	e	popolani,”	556.	John	Najemy	has	argued	similarly	that	the	republican	ideals	
espoused	by	the	popolo	represented	the	values	of	a	new	professional	class	who	sought	to	overcome	the	
traditional	logic	of	faction.	See	“The	Dialogue	of	Power”;	“Brunetto	Latini’s	‘Politica.’”	
99	On	the	instrumental	use	of	law	to	achieve	political	hegemony,	see	Gamberini,	The	Clash	of	Legitimacies,	68–
83.	
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representation	in	governments	formerly	dominated	by	a	handful	of	noble	families.	In	the	
context	of	this	project,	third-party	policing	allowed	the	popolo	to	exercise	power	in	a	way	
that	mitigated	the	risk	of	violent	conflict.	By	entrusting	law	enforcement	and,	to	a	lesser	
extent,	the	right	to	violence	to	public	organizations	such	as	the	podestà’s	familia,	the	popolo	
coalition	could	indirectly	coerce	the	lords	and	“great	houses”	of	the	city,	who	might	
otherwise	hold	a	significant	military	advantage	over	them	in	a	direct	conflict.	They	could	
also	deter	members	of	their	own	party	from	resorting	to	violent	self-help	of	the	sort	they	
typically	blamed	on	magnates,	encouraging	them	instead	to	work	through	public	collectives	
(see	Chapter	5).		
In	the	same	vein,	popolo	regimes	used	written	laws	to	level	the	playing	field	against	
the	urban	aristocracy.	Granted,	some	of	the	popolo’s	new	rules	were	far	from	impersonal,	
like	the	anti-magnate	legislation	of	Bologna	(1282)	and	Florence	(1293).	These	laws	made	
legal	inferiors	of	certain	families	to	repress	an	aristocratic	way	of	life	marked	above	all	by	
recourse	to	violent	self-help,	which	the	popolo	deemed	antithetical	to	the	commune.	In	
effect,	anti-magnate	legislation	sought	to	command	respect	for	civic	institutions	through	
legal	rather	than	military	coercion.	Yet	many	of	the	rules	that	the	familia	enforced,	such	as	
who	could	carry	weapons	in	the	city	and	under	what	circumstances,	applied	more	or	less	
equally	to	everyone—especially	in	the	middle	decades	of	the	thirteenth	century,	before	
legal	immunities	became	widespread	(see	Chapters	2	and	6).	Statutes	promoting	peace	and	
order,	public	health,	commercial	standards,	and	the	free	circulation	of	goods	undoubtedly	
benefited	the	bankers,	merchants,	and	artisans	who	comprised	the	popolo’s	base,	but	they	
also	constituted	a	credible	effort	to	create	genuine	public	goods.	Thus,	the	popolo	used	
written	rules,	backed	by	a	credible	threat	of	enforcement	by	neutral	public	officials,	not	just	
to	repress	political	opponents	but	also	to	promote	the	security	and	prosperity	of	their	cities	
and	thereby	legitimate	their	rule.	The	cost	of	this	was	that	the	popolo’s	elites	too	were	
sometimes	subjected	to	punishment	and	more	mundane	forms	of	coercion	at	the	hands	of	
neutral	public	officials,	but	this	was	evidently	a	tolerable	price	to	pay,	especially	as	those	
same	elites	developed	strategies	to	shield	themselves	from	it.	
Popolo	regimes	were	not	the	only	ones	to	calculate	that	more	impersonal	
institutions	offered	them	some	political	advantage.	Urban	statutes	and	enforcement	
mechanisms	developed	in	a	broadly	similar	fashion	across	northern	Italy,	even	in	towns	
that	never	experienced	popular	government.	By	the	1280s,	signorial	rule	had	become	the	
norm	across	the	towns	of	the	Po	Valley.	In	Ferrara,	for	example,	the	Salinguerra	and	Estensi	
families	dominated	the	podestariat	from	1195,	and	from	1240	the	Estensi	enjoyed	de	facto	
lordship	over	the	city,	which	would	become	de	jure	before	the	end	of	the	century.	The	
endurance	of	popular	institutions	at	Bologna	well	into	the	fourteenth	century—even	
through	Romeo	Pepoli’s	political	ascendancy	in	the	1310s—was	exceptional.100	Yet	
Ferrara’s	rulers,	like	Bologna’s,	banned	weapons	within	their	town	walls	(among	other	
police	measures)	and	employed	foreign	police	forces	to	enforce	the	writ	of	law.101	In	a	
signorial	context,	a	ruler	might	find	impersonal	institutions	advantageous	considering	that,	
though	he	was	the	most	powerful	individual	in	the	commune,	he	was	not	more	powerful	
																																																								
100	Waley	and	Dean,	The	Italian	City-Republics,	171–72,	177,	182.	
101	Ferrara’s	1287	statutes	explicitly	refer	to	the	podestà’s	familia	searching	the	city	for	prohibited	arms	and	
other	crimes;	see	Montorsi,	ed.,	Statuta	Ferrariae,	45.	For	the	statutes	concerning	the	bearing	of	arms,	curfew,	
and	gambling,	see	258–59,	272–74.	
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than	a	coalition	of	his	peers.	By	governing	indirectly	through	ostensibly	neutral	laws	and	
officials,	the	lord	of	a	city	could	conserve	personal	resources	and	avoid	antagonizing	other	
powerful	families.	Indeed,	the	distinction	between	signoria	and	city-republic	was	not	
always	clear,	as	many	signori	secured	their	grip	on	power	gradually	through	legitimately	
held	public	office.	
That	said,	it	was	not	merely	the	cold	calculation	of	political	advantage	that	led	urban	
governments	to	see	the	public	utility	of	third-party	policing.	On	a	more	basic	level,	
increased	policing	was	driven	at	least	in	part	by	the	pressures	of	urbanization.	As	noted	
above,	Foucault	viewed	police	as	a	distinctly	urban	mode	of	governance	for	the	simple	
reason	that	dense	population	and	market	centers	invite	greater	regulation	by	local	
authorities.	In	this	paradigm,	urban	communities,	with	all	their	complexities	and	potential	
for	conflict,	must	be	managed	at	the	population	level	if	they	are	to	thrive	and	not	merely	
survive.	Hence	police,	beyond	its	negative	function	of	suppressing	threats	to	elite	interests,	
also	has	the	positive	function	of	promoting	the	health,	productivity,	and	general	well-being	
of	the	community—the	“coexistence	and	communication	of	men,”	in	Foucault’s	phrase	of	
choice.102	The	urgency	of	this	task	only	increases	as	the	size	of	the	population	and	economy	
increases,	and	in	this	basic	way,	the	growth	of	northern	Italy’s	cities	drove	the	growth	of	
policing.	Indeed,	cities	like	Padua	and	Florence	practically	doubled	in	size	over	the	course	
of	the	thirteenth	century,	as	seen	in	the	outward	expansion	of	their	walls,	and	commerce	
grew	commensurately	with	the	population.103	This	growth	in	turn	fueled	a	proliferation	of	
public	regulations	and,	ultimately,	of	public	officials	to	enforce	them.	Municipal	regimes	
created	new	rules	and	interventions	to	promote	urban	health	and	the	free	circulation	of	
goods	and	people	while	staving	off	threats	to	their	security,	whether	they	came	in	the	form	
of	political	enemies,	competing	products	from	neighboring	towns,	or	“unproductive”	social	
types	such	as	vagabonds	and	gamblers.	Thus,	government	police	power	grew	as	the	need	to	
regulate	urban	communities	also	grew.	
Two	other	sweeping	trends	enabled	the	growth	of	policing:	the	cultural	shift	“from	
memory	to	written	record”	and	the	revival	of	jurisprudence,	both	of	which	accelerated	in	
the	twelfth	century.	Across	Western	Europe,	elites	came	to	rely	less	on	unwritten	custom	in	
their	exercise	of	power	and	more	on	written	rules	and	records,	as	well	as	the	
administrative	officials	who	produced	them.	Clerics	and	notaries—who	played	a	prominent	
role	in	communal	regimes—drove	a	documentary	revolution	that	saw	an	exponential	
increase	in	official	recordkeeping,	now	in	paper	registers	rather	than	on	more	expensive	
parchment.104	Elites’	newfound	capacity	to	publicize	rules	in	writing,	document	violations	
of	those	rules,	and	keep	public	records	of	proceedings	against	alleged	rule-breakers	was	
fundamental	to	the	growth	of	policing.105	The	revival	of	jurisprudence	also	contributed	
substantially	to	the	toolkit	of	governance.	As	jurists	rediscovered	and	developed	Roman	
																																																								
102	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population,	326–28.	
103	Waley	and	Dean,	The	Italian	City-Republics,	12–30.	For	Bologna’s	thirteenth-century	growth,	see	Giusberti	
and	Roversi	Monaco,	“Economy	and	Demography.”	
104	Clanchy,	From	Memory	to	Written	Record;	Skoda,	“Legal	Performances,”	281–83.	For	communal	Italy,	see	
Maire	Vigueur,	“Révolution	documentaire”;	Albini,	ed.,	Le	Scritture;	Cammarosano,	Italia	medievale.	As	Smail	
notes,	this	was	not	a	simple	shift	so	much	as	one	of	scale,	defined	by	a	massive	increase	in	notarial	activity.	
The	“public	archive”	of	memory	and	gossip	still	played	a	fundamental	role	in	legal	proceedings.	See	Imaginary	
Cartographies,	24–25;	The	Consumption	of	Justice,	210–11.	
105	On	the	importance	of	“publicness”	in	rule	enforcement,	see	Wallis	and	North,	“Coordination	and	Coercion.”	
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and	canon	law,	concepts	and	procedures	from	these	burgeoning	disciplines	quickly	made	
their	way	into	local	statutes	and	legal	practice.	Secular	governments	followed	after	
churchmen	in	using	inquisitio	procedure	to	uncover	hidden	crimes,	for	example,	and	used	
flexible	concepts	such	as	infamy	and	the	deserving	poor	(miserabiles)	to	categorize	
imputed	individuals	and	deal	with	them	accordingly.106	Indeed,	the	jurists,	lawyers,	and	
notaries	who	codified	and	interpreted	civic	statutes	were	active	members	of	the	political	
elite	in	Italy’s	communes	and	used	the	law	to	reinforce	their	hegemony.107	In	this	way,	
written	law	gave	ruling	elites	new	tools	to	make	their	polities	more	“legible”	and	therefore	
more	amenable	to	regulation.108		
Of	course,	these	macro-trends	of	the	central	and	late	Middle	Ages—urbanization,	
the	documentary	revolution,	and	the	revival	of	legal	science—were	hardly	limited	to	
northern	Italy.	It	should	not	be	surprising,	then,	that	the	growth	of	police	power	is	evident	
across	Western	Europe	in	the	later	Middle	Ages.	Royal	officials	increasingly	carried	out	
police	functions	throughout	the	kingdoms	of	France	and	England,	and	towns	across	the	
continent	experimented	with	using	various	sergeants,	guards,	and	militias	to	maintain	
order	in	their	streets.109	In	this	sense,	the	growth	of	policing	in	Italy	and	elsewhere	was	
emblematic	of	the	general	trend	toward	what	Thomas	Bisson	and	John	Sabapathy	have	
termed	accountability	in	governance.110	Written	laws,	written	records,	and	professional	
administrators	allowed	governments	to	surveil	and	discipline	their	communities	to	an	
unprecedented	extent,	and	became	the	default	means	of	domination	for	elites	in	a	range	of	
political	contexts.	If	the	Italian	communes	were	especially	innovative	in	devising	new	
mechanisms	of	policing—including	the	third-party	model,	which	appears	to	have	been	
unique—it	may	be	owing	to	the	intractability	and	violence	of	their	political	conflicts,	as	
well	as	their	status	as	the	intellectual	epicenter	of	the	new	legal	science,	above	all	at	
Bologna’s	studium.	As	the	communes’	internecine	warfare	and	repeated	political	crises	
created	new	exigencies,	politically	active	jurists,	lawyers,	and	notaries	provided	the	
capacity	to	ground	expedient	measures	in	an	acceptable	legal	framework.	
Yet	the	important	point	is	not	to	highlight	what	was	supposedly	unique	about	the	
Italian	communes,	but	to	recognize	that	its	institutional	innovations	were	born	of	the	
exclusionary	logic	of	its	social	order.	Impersonal	rules	and	officials	could	be	valuable	tools	
for	elites	in	popolo	and	signorial	governments	alike,	allowing	them	to	avoid	costly	direct	
conflicts	while	still	maintaining	their	dominance.	For	all	their	stated	concern	for	the	
common	good,	the	communes’	elites	tended	to	do	what	was	expedient	to	secure	and	
maximize	their	interests,	even	if	that	meant	discarding	or	politicizing	institutions	that	were	
designed	to	be	impersonal.	To	take	one	illustrative	example,	in	the	aftermath	of	a	1306	
coup	plot	that	left	the	city	without	a	podestà	or	capitano	del	popolo,	Bologna’s	Council	of	
the	Popolo	gave	their	own	anziani,	consuls,	and	guild	officials	full	regimen	of	the	city	and	
																																																								
106	On	the	use	of	fama	and	treatment	of	miserabiles	in	court,	see	Vallerani,	Medieval	Public	Justice,	108–12,	
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contado,	and	placed	judges,	notaries,	berrovarii,	and	criers	at	their	disposal.111	The	Council	
likewise	gave	them	full	authority	to	investigate,	prosecute,	and	punish	all	robberies,	
assaults,	arsons,	and	homicides	past	and	future,	lest	their	republic	suffer	any	more	harm	
from	the	“men	of	ill	condition	and	repute	who	hate	the	stability	and	liberty	of	the	people	of	
Bologna,	and	who	disparage	the	honor,	state,	and	laudable	reputation	of	the	people	of	
Bologna.”112	In	the	exercise	of	police	power,	the	podestà	and	his	retinue	were	ultimately	
stand-ins	for	local	elites,	who	occasionally	conducted	patrols	themselves.	For	example,	on	5	
October	1297,	when	Bologna	was	temporarily	without	a	podestà,	an	anzianus	led	some	
berrovarii	on	a	curfew	patrol	and	rounded	up	eight	suspects,	who	subsequently	stood	trial	
before	the	anziani	and	consuls.113	Thus,	if	police	power	grew	in	service	to	the	“good	state	of	
the	commune,”	it	also	grew	in	service	to	the	elites	who	defined	that	status	according	to	
their	interests,	rather	than	any	republican	concern	for	institutions	that	treated	people	
more	equitably.	
Conclusion:	A	Preventive	Police	
This	chapter	has	highlighted	how	the	investment	of	police	power	in	the	podestà’s	
familia	reflected	a	newly	preventive	mentality	in	criminal	justice.	Communal	regimes	
designated	full-time	police	forces	not	only	to	bring	more	outlaws	into	custody,	but	also	to	
discipline	statutory	offenses	aggressively.	Their	proactive	patrols	helped	to	detect	and	
investigate	threats	in	a	very	direct	way,	functioning	in	effect	as	a	roving	inquisition.	As	
foreigners,	these	forces	could	circumvent	local	relationships	of	amity	and	enmity	in	their	
work,	allowing	the	authorities	to	administer	justice	according	to	statute.	This	combination	
of	enhanced	coercion,	proactivity,	and	impersonality	made	public	justice	in	the	communes	
not	only	more	punitive	but	also	preventive	in	nature.	
In	his	classic	essay	“The	City,”	Max	Weber	characterizes	the	new	political	
associations	in	late	twelfth-	and	thirteenth-century	Italian	cities	as	self-conscious	of	their	
illegitimacy.	The	corporations	of	merchants	and	artisans	who	made	up	popular	
governments	were	aware	of	their	revolutionary	status,	having	laid	claim	to	political	powers	
previously	reserved	only	for	nobles	and	churchmen.114	Ultimately,	this	basic	insecurity	may	
be	the	best	explanation	for	the	growth	of	policing	in	medieval	Italy.	As	Markus	Dubber	
points	out,	police	power’s	most	basic	aim	is	“the	maintenance	of	national	existence,”	which	
was	frequently	under	threat	in	Italy’s	communes.115	Amidst	such	instability,	urban	elites	
could	not	afford	to	maintain	a	reactive	stance.	It	was	far	safer	to	prevent	threats	from	
manifesting,	whether	in	the	form	of	a	direct	challenge	to	their	political	authority	(e.g.,	a	
rebellion)	or	a	more	oblique	challenge	to	their	precarious	claim	to	legitimate	governance	
(e.g.,	the	proliferation	of	gambling	houses	outside	the	baratarie).		
Indeed,	municipal	statutes	betray	the	preventive	mentality	of	the	governing	elite	
more	fundamentally	than	their	methods	of	enforcement.	Lawmakers	used	the	imperative	of	
preserving	the	bonus	status	communis	to	justify	police	measures	aimed	at	a	wide	range	of	
threats	to	public	order,	health,	and	morals.	Their	statutes	treated	various	acts	of	omission	
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or	commission	(obstructing	public	pathways,	allowing	livestock	to	roam	the	city,	creating	
fire	hazards);	persons	(common	scolds,	ribalds,	gypsies);	or	inanimate	objects	(inns,	
taverns,	gaming	houses)	as	threats	to	be	corrected	or	removed.	Lawmakers	did	not	require	
these	“public	nuisances,”	as	they	would	be	termed	in	English	common	law,	to	have	criminal	
intent	(mens	rea)	or	constitute	a	criminal	act	(actus	reus)	in	the	traditional	sense	of	causing	
harm	to	a	person	or	property.	Rather,	“guilt”	was	a	simple	matter	of	nonconformity	with	
law.116	Lawmakers	also	tried	to	anticipate	“real”	crime	to	an	unprecedented	degree.	The	
arms-bearing	laws	are	a	clear	example	of	this,	as	they	criminalized	the	bearing	of	arms	that	
might	be	used	to	attempt	assault	or	robbery.	In	this	shift	toward	preventive	justice,	the	
communes’	citizen-legislators	anticipated	the	police	science	of	early	modern	Europe.117	The	
next	two	chapters	will	explore	in	greater	depth	this	preventive	mentality,	and	how	
lawmakers	used	third-party	policing	to	discipline	perceived	threats	to	their	power	and	
legitimacy.		 	
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Chapter	4:	External	Threats:	Policing	Out-Groups	and	Criminality	
Early	one	morning	in	July	1286,	not	long	after	the	cathedral	bell	tolled	daybreak,	the	
familia	discovered	three	men	of	Bologna—Bertolino,	Bernabè,	and	a	tailor	named	Giacomo	
the	Mute—each	carrying	a	knife.	Besides	the	weapon,	Giacomo	had	his	clothes	stuffed	full	
of	pears	and	other	fruits.	Two	days	later	the	podestà’s	judge,	named	Ugo,	opened	an	
inquest	against	the	three	men	as	“malefactors	who	are	said	to	be	robbers,	thieves,	
assassins,	and	despoilers	of	the	vineyards	and	orchards	of	the	city	of	Bologna.”	He	
questioned	Bertolino	accordingly:	Do	you	go	to	vineyards	by	night	to	despoil	them	of	
grapes	and	fruits?	Were	you	out	at	night	to	put	ladders	to	the	houses	of	the	good	men	of	the	
city	of	Bologna	in	order	to	steal	from	them?	Were	you	carrying	weapons	in	order	to	
assassinate	anyone?	Are	you	an	assassin?	Bertolino	confessed	to	carrying	the	knife,	but	he	
denied	the	rest	of	these	allegations.	Bernabè	faced	a	similar	battery	of	questions,	but	
likewise	denied	being	a	thief	or	assassin.1	
The	perceived	link	between	thieves	and	the	night	is	ancient,	of	course,	and	partially	
explains	the	judge’s	line	of	questioning.2	These	defendants	had	apparently	been	out	at	night	
armed	and,	in	at	least	one	case,	picking	fruit	in	someone’s	orchard.	However,	the	
interrogation	of	another	resident	of	Bologna	named	Franco—discovered	bearing	
prohibited	arms	on	the	same	day	as	the	three	wayfarers	above,	but	during	the	daytime	and	
without	suspicious	cargo—points	to	other	factors	at	work.	Judge	Ugo	subjected	him,	too,	to	
an	inquest	as	an	alleged	“thief,	harborer	of	thieves,	murderer,	and	assassin.”	Franco’s	
interrogation	followed	a	similar	trajectory:	Have	you	been	outlawed	for	anything	by	the	
commune?	Have	you	ever	committed	theft	or	robbery	or	harbored	thieves?	Have	you	ever	
assassinated	anyone?	Are	you	an	assassin?	One	week	later,	Judge	Ugo	would	ask	a	certain	
Tura	of	Siena,	discovered	by	the	familia	with	a	dagger	in	broad	daylight,	if	he	was	a	thief	or	
assassin.3	Clearly,	then,	the	three	men	above	were	not	interrogated	as	thieves	and	assassins	
merely	because	they	had	been	discovered	at	night	armed	and,	in	one	case,	carrying	fruit.	
	 Judge	Ugo’s	questions	make	more	sense	in	light	of	the	confessions	he	heard	from	so-
called	men	of	ill	repute.	A	case	in	point	is	the	confession	of	Dino	di	Petrizandello,	resident	
of	Bologna,	who	was	tortured	as	a	suspected	thief	in	July	1286,	around	the	time	of	the	
interrogations	above.	Dino	confessed	to	at	least	seven	different	crimes—five	burglaries	
(some	of	them	armed),	one	attempted	burglary,	and	one	agreement	to	execute	a	contract	
killing—all	committed	within	the	previous	few	months	and	described	in	remarkable	detail.	
According	to	his	confession,	four	of	the	crimes,	including	the	murder-for-hire	conspiracy,	
were	facilitated	by	Marino	Carbonesi,	whose	family	belonged	to	the	exiled	Lambertazzi	
party.	Two	of	the	burglaries	targeted	students	who	lodged	in	houses	owned	by	the	magnate	
da	Sala	family,	with	Federico	da	Sala	complicit	in	at	least	one	of	those	cases.	Four	of	the	six	
																																																								
1	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	3r–v:	“Inquisitio	facta	per	dominum	Ugonem	iudicem	domini	potestatis	super	
infrascriptis	malefactoribus,	qui	dicuntur	esse	robatores	et	fures	et	asasinos	et	depopulatores	vinearum	et	
broliorum	civitatis	Bononie.”	The	notary	did	not	record	Giacomo’s	interrogation,	perhaps	because	he	was	
indeed	mute.	
2	For	the	night	as	tempus	malae	praesumptionis,	see	Sbriccoli,	“‘Nox	quia	nocet.’”	For	the	legal	archetype	of	the	
furs	nocturnus,	see	Lacchè,	“Loca	occulta.”	More	broadly,	see	Ekirch,	At	Day’s	Close;	Verdon,	Night	in	the	Middle	
Ages.	
3	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	4v,	5v.	
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burglary	attempts	targeted	university	students;	the	other	two	targeted	women.	At	least	one	
(but	likely	two)	of	the	burglaries	was	inspired	by	the	thieves’	gambling	debts.	And	in	four	of	
the	burglary	attempts	Dino	and	his	accomplices	carried	a	ladder	through	the	streets	at	
night	in	order	to	climb	through	the	windows	of	their	targets’	lodgings.4	After	confessing	to	
these	capital	crimes	under	torture,	Dino	“persevered”	in	his	confession	rather	than	recant	
and	risk	a	second	round	of	torture	(see	below	on	the	procedural	norms).	The	podestà	
sentenced	Dino	to	be	hanged,	“since	it	is	a	shameful	thing	and	a	bad	example	to	do	and	
commit	so	many	thefts	and	robberies.”5	
	 The	records	of	Dino’s	torture	and	sentencing	do	not	reveal	how	he	fell	into	the	
commune’s	custody,	but	it	is	possible	he	was	picked	up	by	a	curfew	patrol.	This	is	explicit	
in	the	case	of	another	convicted	thief	described	later	in	this	chapter.	Moreover,	in	the	one	
failed	attempt	at	burglary	he	described,	Dino	and	his	ladder-toting	accomplices	were	
turned	back	by	an	encounter	with	the	night	watch.	However	he	came	to	be	arrested,	Dino’s	
confession	reveals	the	perceived	links	among	minor	offenses,	such	as	breaking	curfew,	
gambling,	and	bearing	illegal	arms,	and	major	crimes	like	theft,	robbery,	and	murder.	It	also	
suggests	that	the	kind	of	men	who	went	burgling	at	night	were	believed	to	associate	with	
the	commune’s	political	enemies,	such	as	Marino	Carbonesi.	By	extension,	Dino’s	
confession	explains	why	Judge	Ugo	would	regard	men	whom	the	familia	found	at	night	
carrying	weapons	or	fruits	from	an	orchard,	as	capital	suspects.	Indeed,	it	was	hardly	
outlandish	to	ask	curfew	suspects	if	they	put	ladders	to	the	houses	of	the	“good	men”	of	the	
city	at	night	if,	as	Dino’s	confession	suggests,	ladders	were	commonly	used	as	burglars’	
tools	in	medieval	towns.	When	juxtaposed	with	Dino’s	confession,	Judge	Ugo’s	aggressive	
interrogation	of	the	suspects	above	suddenly	appears	more	rational.	
	 This	chapter	explains	how	the	growth	of	police	power	in	the	communes	followed	
logically	from	the	criminology	of	the	day.	The	“good	men”	of	the	city	proscribed	going	out	
under	cover	of	darkness,	carrying	knives,	and	playing	games	of	chance	because	those	were	
the	habitual	behaviors	of	men	of	ill	repute	who	also	committed	burglaries,	assaults,	and	
homicides.	Police	patrols	functioned	as	a	dragnet	to	apprehend	such	men.	Whereas	it	was	
difficult	to	catch	someone	perpetrating	a	capital	offense,	it	was	relatively	easy	to	catch	
someone	prowling	at	night,	carrying	an	illegal	weapon,	or	playing	a	dice	game.	Granted,	
most	of	the	men	caught	committing	these	latter	crimes	were	guilty	of	no	worse,	but	their	
detention	allowed	the	familia—especially	the	judge	of	the	criminal	court—to	determine	if	
they	had	netted	a	so-called	“man	of	ill	repute”	and	prosecute	him	accordingly.6	In	principle,	
this	meant	that	virtually	anyone	whom	the	familia	detained	could	be	interrogated	as	a	
capital	suspect,	as	happened	in	the	cases	above.	For	members	of	the	governing	coalition	or	
anyone	else	with	a	legitimate	place	in	the	social	order,	this	judicial	scrutiny	amounted	to	
little	more	than	a	legal	hassle	or,	at	worst,	a	financial	burden.	But	for	those	who	lacked	
social	standing	or	were	deemed	to	be	members	of	an	out-group,	the	same	judicial	scrutiny	
could	be	a	matter	of	life	and	death.	Thus,	the	familia’s	patrols	not	only	disciplined	
																																																								
4	ASB,	Inquisitiones	8,	reg.	11,	2r–4r.	For	the	Carbonesi	as	Lambertazzi,	see	Milani,	L’esclusione,	194.	For	the	
da	Sala’s	magnate	status,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice.	
5	ASB,	Accusationes	5b,	16,	3v–4v:	“Unde	cum	res	sit	turpis	et	mali	exempli	tot	et	tanta	furta	et	robarias	facere	
et	comitere.”	A	record	of	payment	confirms	that	Dino	was	hanged	by	7	August;	see	ASB,	Sindacato	3,	1286II,	
54r.	
6	On	the	legal	concepts	of	fama	and	ill	repute,	see	Fenster	and	Smail,	eds.,	Fama;	Peters,	“Wounded	Names”;	
Migliorino,	Fama	e	infamia.	
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individuals	who	broke	the	rules	of	public	order	but	also	aimed	to	catch	felons	and	enemies	
of	the	commune	who	threatened	the	established	order.	
	 Arguing	that	policing	grew	in	part	out	of	a	desire	to	punish	may	strike	some	
historians	as	reactionary.	Decades	of	careful	scholarship	has	shown	that	medieval	
magistrates	were	not	the	menacing	inquisitors	and	sadistic	torturers	of	popular	
imagination.7	Although	torture	and	corporal	punishment	played	a	role	in	public	justice,	
judges	followed	through	on	these	threats	only	in	a	small	percentage	of	cases.	By	
highlighting	these,	this	study	might	appear	to	fall	prey	to	what	Trevor	Dean	has	called	the	
“sensationalist	trap”:	cherry-picking	the	juiciest	but	least	representative	cases	in	the	
interest	of	better	storytelling.8	Moreover,	as	discussed	in	earlier	chapters,	the	recent	
historiography	of	medieval	justice	has	emphasized	the	restorative	role	of	public	courts	
over	the	retributive,	and	their	tendency	to	facilitate	negotiation	rather	than	mete	out	
punishment.	
	 Nevertheless,	Bologna’s	court	records	show	that	torture	and	judicial	violence	of	the	
sort	suffered	by	Dino	were	hardly	extraordinary	events.	The	sources	indicate	that	the	
commune	publicly	executed	or	maimed	individuals	every	week	or	two,	and	these	
spectacles	played	an	outsized	role	in	civic	life.9	While	judicial	violence	occurred	in	only	a	
small	percentage	of	the	criminal	court’s	overall	case	load,	this	owed	much	to	the	problem	of	
contumacy,	and	even	then,	it	occurred	too	frequently	to	be	considered	a	rarity.	Exemplary	
punishment	served	not	only	as	a	criminal	deterrent	but	as	propaganda	for	the	communal	
regime	in	its	role	as	guarantor	of	public	safety	and	order.10		
This	chapter	shows	how	government	police	power	grew	out	of	the	same	impulse	to	
deter	and	eliminate	perceived	threats	to	the	social	order.	It	first	establishes	the	relative	
“normalcy”	of	judicial	violence	in	medieval	Bologna,	then	explains	how	this	violence	was	
driven—at	least	on	the	surface—by	elites’	quest	for	deterrence.	Judicial	violence	explicitly	
aimed	to	instill	the	fear	of	punishment	in	would-be	criminals	so	as	to	prevent	socially	or	
politically	unacceptable	behavior.	After	examining	the	stated	justifications	for	judicial	
violence,	the	chapter	explores	the	underlying	sources	of	the	punitive	mentality	displayed	
by	many	judges	and	lawmakers.	At	base,	this	mentality	reflected	the	new	political	elite’s	
anxieties	over	maintaining	their	grip	on	power.	Communal	governments	were	essentially	
one-party	systems,	whose	security	and	legitimacy	depended	on	the	suppression	of	
outsiders.	The	ruling	elite	therefore	used	criminal	law	to	categorize	and	label	various	
threats,	whether	political,	economic,	or	moral.	And	they	treated	a	wide	range	of	them—
from	highway	robbers	and	political	rebels	to	vagabonds	and	sodomites—with	similar	
severity.	Finally,	this	chapter	shows	how	police	patrols	grew	out	of	the	same	urge	to	
																																																								
7	For	low	incidences	of	torture,	see	Gauvard,	De	grace	especial,	1:132–35,	155–62,	178–81;	Vallerani,	“Conflitti	
e	modelli	procedurali,”	279;	Vallerani,	Medieval	Public	Justice,	118–22.	Other	studies	emphasize	the	legal	
limitations	on	the	application	of	torture	in	the	Middle	Ages	to	suggest	that	judges	did	not	resort	to	it	as	
frequently	as	imagined:	Remensnyder,	“Torture	and	Truth,”	157;	Peters,	Torture;	Pennington,	The	Prince	and	
the	Law,	42–44,	159–60;	Fiorelli,	La	tortura	giudiziaria,	1:91–94.	For	popular	misconceptions	about	medieval	
torture	and	corporal	punishment,	see	Tracy,	Torture	and	Brutality,	11–18;	Caviness,	“Giving	‘the	Middle	Ages’	
a	Bad	Name.”	Cf.	Peters,	Torture,	62–71.	
8	Dean,	Crime	and	Justice,	8.	See	also	Cohn,	“Criminality.”	
9	Cohen,	“‘To	Die	a	Criminal.’”	
10	On	capital	punishment	in	the	communes,	see	Ascheri,	“La	pena	di	morte”;	Mazzi,	Gente	a	cui	si	fa	notte;	
Guerra,	Una	eterna	condanna.	On	the	spectacle	of	corporal	punishment	more	generally,	see	Geltner,	Flogging	
Others;	Mills,	Suspended	Animation;	Merback,	The	Thief,	the	Cross,	and	the	Wheel.		
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identify	and	discipline	threats	before	they	caused	real	harm	to	the	social	order.	Under	the	
assumption	that	minor	forms	of	delinquency	could	indicate	more	serious	criminality,	police	
patrols	subjected	a	wide	range	of	persons	to	judicial	scrutiny	in	order	to	ferret	out	
threatening	individuals.	The	defendant	may	have	done	nothing	worse	than	violate	the	
curfew	law,	but	once	he	was	in	court,	the	judge	could	investigate	his	character	and	personal	
history	through	inquisitorial	procedure.	Police	patrols	were	highly	inefficient	as	a	dragnet,	
but	they	did,	from	time	to	time,	allow	the	governing	elite	to	publicly	legitimate	their	role	as	
defenders	of	the	communal	order	against	external	threats.	
Judicial	Violence	
Given	the	historiography’s	recent	emphasis	on	negotiated	justice,	it	should	first	be	
established	that	Dino’s	case	above	was	not	out	of	the	ordinary.	Indeed,	Bologna’s	judicial	
records	indicate	that	corporal	punishment	was	a	central	feature	of	its	criminal	justice	
system.	The	podestà’s	court	recorded	corporal	sentences	separately	from	pecuniary	ones,	
and	these	survive	in	some	quantity	for	this	period	of	study.	Although	the	record	is	far	from	
complete,	Sarah	Blanshei	has	counted	some	369	corporal	sentences	in	these	registers	for	
the	period	1286	to	1325.11	In	the	second	semester	of	1286,	for	example,	20	individuals	
suffered	corporal	punishment,	about	one	person	every	nine	days.12	For	1288,	payment	
records	show	16	corporal	punishments	carried	out	in	the	first	five	months	of	that	year—
again,	a	rate	of	about	one	person	every	nine	days.13	The	commune	also	carried	out	less	
spectacular	punishments	on	a	regular	basis,	such	as	the	routine	but	still	exemplary	flogging	
of	public	gamblers	and	petty	thieves.14	
Besides	their	juridical	function,	corporal	sentences	functioned	as	public	propaganda	
for	the	government.	The	sentences	themselves	tend	to	follow	a	standard	formula,	starting	
with	a	preamble	stating	the	convict’s	name,	that	he	is	in	the	podestà’s	custody,	and	that	his	
crime	has	been	legally	proven.	Then	follow	his	crime(s),	usually	in	the	form	of	a	confession;	
the	ordained	punishment;	and	the	legal	rationale	for	the	punishment.	Each	corporal	
sentence	served	to	underscore	the	efficacy	of	the	commune’s	justice	since,	by	definition,	it	
meant	the	accused	was	in	custody;	otherwise	the	court	would	issue	a	ban.	Furthermore,	the	
presentation	of	the	condemned	was	a	very	public	ritual:	the	palace	bell	would	be	rung	and	
the	trumpets	sounded,	the	convict	presented	to	the	crowd	in	the	piazza	below,	and	his	
sentence	read	aloud.15		
Payment	records	leave	little	doubt	that	these	punishments,	or	“justices”	(justitie)	as	
the	sources	refer	to	them,	were	in	fact	carried	out.	Bologna’s	government	carried	out	
bloody	punishments	in	the	Campo	del	Mercato,	an	open	field	on	the	northern	edge	of	town	
that	also	hosted	markets	(today	Piazza	VIII	Agosto),	and	hangings	from	a	bridge	over	the	
river	Reno.	The	statutes	generally	prohibited	public	executions	in	the	main	piazza.16	
Records	of	payment	to	locals—usually	criers,	jailers,	or	physicians—who	assisted	with	or	
																																																								
11	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	335.	Some	of	the	registers	are	fragmentary	and	a	number	of	semesters	are	
undocumented;	no	registers	survive	from	1296	through	1299,	for	example.	
12	Blanshei,	“Crime	and	Law	Enforcement,”	123.	Payment	records	may	attest	21	corporal	punishments:	ASB,	
Sindacato	3,	1286II.	
13	ASB,	Sindacato	5,	1288I	(96	fols.).	
14	For	the	1292	flogging	of	two	thieves	see	ASB,	Accusationes	10,	reg.	14,	12r.	
15	For	typical	examples,	see	ASB,	Accusationes	22b,	reg.	21,	1v,	8v;	Accusationes	30b,	reg.	29,	10v–11r	
16	Statuti	1288,	1:237.	
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provided	materials	used	in	corporal	punishments	suggest	that	these	events	were	not	
merely	community	spectacles	but	community	efforts.17	For	example,	to	have	Niccolò	
Marchesini	“cooked”	before	he	was	burned	in	1288	(see	below),	the	podestà	paid	12	soldi	
to	borrow	the	cauldron	and	8	soldi	to	several	baraterii	to	carry	it	to	the	Campo	del	
Mercato.18	Lest	anyone	forget	these	spectacular	occasions,	the	commune	might	also	have	
the	condemned’s	portrait	painted	on	the	palace	wall.19	In	June	1295,	for	example,	the	
podestà	found	three	women	guilty—after	having	them	tortured—of	false	testimony	in	a	
murder	trial.	He	sentenced	all	of	them	to	lose	their	right	hands	and	two	of	them	to	lose	
their	tongues,	and	decreed	that	their	portraits	were	to	be	displayed	publicly.20		
	 Ritual	aspects	aside,	the	spectacle	of	these	events	lay	in	their	gruesomeness,	which	
was	clearly	calculated	to	leave	an	impression	on	the	public.	In	the	second	semester	of	1286,	
there	were	nine	decapitations,	seven	hangings,	two	burnings,	and	three	amputations	of	the	
hand	or	foot.	Those	burned	were	an	arsonist	(the	punishment	fit	the	crime)	and	a	woman	
convicted	of	strangling	her	own	daughter	to	death,	perhaps	an	infanticide.21	Some	of	those	
condemned	were	first	dragged	by	a	horse	(traynatus)	to	their	place	of	execution.22	Of	the	
16	punishments	carried	out	between	January	and	May	1288,	three	men	were	decapitated	
and	another	two	lost	a	foot.	Three	other	convicts	lost	an	eye,	a	nose,	and	a	tongue,	
respectively.23	In	the	case	of	a	woman	named	Bonora,	who	lost	her	tongue	for	giving	false	
testimony,	the	podestà	had	“moderated”	her	penalty	on	account	of	her	age,	sex,	and	“the	
lowliness	of	her	person.”24	Likewise	in	the	case	of	Petruccio	da	Monteveglio,	who	was	
caught	in	the	midst	of	a	burglary	after	a	barking	dog	gave	him	away,	the	podestà	
“mitigated”	his	penalty	“since	he	did	not	complete	the	said	theft	and	on	account	of	the	
condition	of	his	person.”25	Instead	of	losing	his	life,	he	simply	lost	his	eye.	Others	were	not	
so	lucky.	The	podestà	had	one	man	pressed	to	death	and	two	others	“planted”	(plantati),	
which	is	to	say	buried	head	first	in	the	ground.26	One	of	these	“plantings”	resulted	from	a	
case	in	which	two	men	from	Ferrara	were	convicted	of	assassinating	a	woman	at	the	behest	
of	her	husband	and	his	mistress.	His	partner	in	crime,	who	confessed	to	numerous	other	
delicts,	was	burned.27	The	podestà	in	this	period	(early	1288)	must	have	thought	
immolations	particularly	effective,	because	he	sentenced	four	other	convicts	to	this	penalty.	
One	of	these	was	a	crier	(nuntius)	named	Martino	who	accepted	a	payment	of	25	lire	to	
																																																								
17	For	examples,	see	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(152	fols.),	12v,	76r,	98r,	113r–v;	Sindacato	3,	1286II,	45r,	57v;	
Sindacato	5,	1288I	(96	fols.),	51v;	ASB,	Tesoreria	1,	2v–3r,	12r.	For	what	such	payments	can	tell	historians	
more	generally,	see	Jordan,	“Expenses.”	
18	ASB,	Sindacato	5,	1288I	(96	fols.),	65v	
19	Behrmann,	ed.,	Images	of	Shame;	Ferrari,	“Avaro,	traditore”;	Milani,	“Avidité	et	trahison”;	Lansing,	Passion	
and	Order,	36–37;	Ortalli,	La	pittura	infamante.	
20	ASB,	Accusationes	16a,	reg.	3,	1r–2r.	Their	confessions	are	on	9v–10v.	
21	ASB,	Accusationes	5b,	reg.	16,	7r,	14v.	Blanshei	mentions	the	case	of	the	woman,	Giacobina,	in	Politics	and	
Justice,	336.	
22	ASB,	Sindacato	3,	1286II,	64r.	
23	ASB,	Sindacato	5,	1288I	(96	fols.),	9v,	10r,	40r.	
24	ASB,	Accusationes	7a,	reg.	4,	1v:	“Condenpnamus	quod	sibi	lingua	tronchetur,	moderata	pena	propter	
etatem	ipsius	Bonore	et	propter	vilitatem	personam	et	sexum	ipsius	Bonore.”		
25	ASB,	Accusationes	7a,	reg.	4,	1v:	“Condepnamus	quod	sibi	dester	oculus	eruatur	de	capite,	mitigata	pena	
quia	non	perfecit	dictum	furtum	et	propter	condictionem	persone.”		
26	ASB,	Sindacato	5,	1288I	(96	fols.),	56r.	
27	ASB,	Accusationes	7a,	reg.	4,	3v–4v.	
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falsely	accuse	five	men	from	Borgo	Panigale	of	assault,	which	had	resulted	in	their	being	
banned.	The	podestà	punished	this	venality	and	abuse	of	communal	office—which	had	
placed	other	men’s	lives	and	limbs	in	jeopardy—by	having	him	skinned	alive	before	
burning.28	Nor	was	Martino	the	first	convict	to	receive	this	excruciating	punishment.29	
Equally	unlucky	were	two	men	from	Ferrara’s	contado	convicted	of	counterfeiting.	One	of	
them	was	“placed	in	a	cauldron	to	cook”	before	having	his	body	burned.30	The	other	saw	
the	counterfeit	coins	melted	and	poured	down	his	throat	before	he	too	was	delivered	to	the	
fire.31		
The	next	podestà,	Corso	Donati	of	Florence,	famous	as	the	leader	of	that	city’s	Black	
Guelfs,	continued	a	similar	policy	of	gruesome	executions.	In	July	he	had	Bertolino	of	Prato,	
convicted	of	slaying	someone	in	the	commune’s	piazza,	dragged	behind	a	cart	to	the	place	
of	execution,	where	his	flesh	was	plucked	away	with	hot	pincers	before	he	was	finally	
decapitated.	Similarly,	he	had	one	Niccolò	of	Piacenza,	who	confessed	to	abducting,	
sodomizing,	and	ransoming	the	son	of	one	Pietro	Uguccio,	dragged	behind	a	cart	and	then	
burned	alive.32	Perhaps	most	cruel	of	all	was	the	1300	execution	of	the	magnate	Ghidino	
Riosti,	convicted	in	August	of	that	year	of	assassinating	a	Florentine	student	for	the	sum	of	
400	lire.	By	sentence	of	the	podestà,	Ghidino’s	executioners	first	cut	away	chunks	of	flesh	
from	his	back	in	the	commune’s	piazza,	then	took	him	to	the	scene	of	the	murder	to	chop	
off	his	hand,	before	bringing	him	to	the	Campo	del	Mercato	to	be	“planted”	in	the	ground.	
They	then	dug	up	his	corpse,	had	him	dragged	by	a	horse	(presumably	to	the	bridge	over	
the	river	Reno),	and	hanged	him	by	the	neck.	Lest	anyone	forget	his	infamy,	his	portrait	was	
also	painted	on	the	palace	wall.33		
Ghidino’s	case	was	exceptional,	but	this	does	not	diminish	the	fact	that	podestà	and	
their	judges	were	capable	of	extraordinary	brutality	in	the	name	of	justice.	As	Blanshei	has	
pointed	out,	gruesome,	nonstatutory	punishments—though	rare—were	a	fixture	of	public	
justice	in	Bologna.34	How	a	podestà	exercised	his	arbitrium	to	punish	surely	had	much	to	
do	with	his	personality	and	the	political	situation	during	his	term	in	office.	Political	unrest,	
for	example,	might	require	the	podestà	to	make	a	more	fearsome	impression	on	his	public	
audience.35	A	prime	example	is	the	case	of	Aghinolfo	da	Ozzano,	an	outlaw	captured	in	
September	1292	and	convicted	of	leading	Lambertazzi	forces	in	an	attack	on	Castello	
Ozzano,	in	the	course	of	which	they	kidnapped,	robbed,	murdered,	and	burned	houses.	
Aghinolfo	was	decapitated	in	the	piazza	by	the	podestà’s	knight	on	what	must	have	been	a	
grand	occasion,	despite	the	statutory	prohibition	against	performing	such	executions	in	the	
city	center.36	In	fact,	this	rule	could	be	suspended	whenever	the	crime	was	deemed	
																																																								
28	ASB,	Accusationes	7a,	reg.	4,	2r.	
29	ASB,	Sindacato	5,	1288I	(96	fols.),	28r,	30r.	
30	ASB,	Sindacato	5,	1288I	(96	fols.),	63v:	“Qui	missus	fuit	in	caldariam	ad	coquinandum	et	postea	fuit	
conbustus.”		
31	ASB,	Accusationes	7a,	reg.	4,	5r.	
32	ASB,	Accusationes	7a,	reg.	5,	1r.	
33	ASB,	Accusationes	22b,	reg.	21,	7v–8v.	
34	Blanshei,	“Gruesome	Penalties.”	
35	For	the	link	between	executions	and	partisan	politics	in	later	centuries,	see	Terpstra,	“Theory	into	
Practice.”	
36	ASB,	Accusationes	10,	reg.	14,	14v–15r.		
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egregious	enough.37	To	be	sure,	podestà	could	also	use	their	arbitrium	to	show	leniency,	as	
seen	in	the	“mitigated”	penalties	above.	But	legal	discretion	also	increased	the	criminal	
court’s	capacity	for	judicial	violence.	
	 To	make	spectacular	examples	of	criminals,	of	course,	podestà	and	judges	first	had	
to	condemn	them.	To	facilitate	this,	magistrates	applied	torture	during	the	course	of	the	
trial	more	than	some	historians	have	allowed.	Trial	records	say	remarkably	little	about	
methods	of	torture,	but	the	strappado	seems	to	have	been	the	most	common	technique	
used	in	communal	Italy.38	Sarah	Blanshei	has	shown	that,	in	late	thirteenth-	and	early	
fourteenth-century	Bologna,	torture	was	rare	only	insofar	as	having	presumed	criminals	in	
custody	was	rare.	Anywhere	from	one	quarter	to	more	than	one	half	of	those	corporally	
punished	were	tortured	in	the	course	of	their	trials.	In	Perugia,	the	rate	was	also	around	25	
percent	in	cases	where	the	imputed	was	actually	in	custody.39	Many	communes’	statutes	
protected	citizens	of	good	repute	from	torture,	allowing	only	“infamous”	criminals	to	be	
tortured	and	for	certain	crimes.40	Bologna’s	statutes,	however,	protected	only	reputable	
members	of	the	guilds	and	popular	militias	(i.e.,	of	the	ruling	party),	leaving	other	citizens,	
such	as	magnates,	open	to	torture.41	It	is	no	surprise,	then,	that	community	outsiders,	such	
as	foreigners	and	marginal	figures	who	had	no	one	to	vouch	for	their	good	fama	accounted	
for	a	significant	majority	of	torturees.42		
Nonetheless,	torture	was	hardly	a	marginal	part	of	public	justice.	Torture	can	be	
found	among	the	earliest	records	of	Bologna’s	criminal	court,	for	example,	in	an	April	1242	
case	of	cattle	rustling	that	may	be	the	earliest	recorded	case	of	judicial	torture	in	Western	
Europe.43	The	notary	Filippo	da	Ponzano—hardly	a	common	thief—was	tortured	twice	in	
February	1292,	and	confessed	during	the	second	round	to	having	forged	a	public	
document.44	And	starting	in	1317,	there	is	a	surge	in	formal	complaints	(protestaciones)	
against	the	podestà	by	popolani	claiming	they	had	been	unjustly	tortured.45	For	a	time,	
Bologna’s	popolo	regime	employed	a	special	“torture	notary”	whose	express	job	was	to	
record	the	confessions	of	torturees.	Most	cases	of	torture	treated	in	this	chapter	come	from	
the	four	registers	to	survive	from	this	office.	Although	the	office	was	discontinued	in	1292	
as	an	inefficient	use	of	public	funds,	its	mere	existence	speaks	volumes	about	the	centrality	
of	torture	to	judicial	practice.46	In	short,	there	is	good	reason	to	believe	the	author(s)	of	the	
																																																								
37	For	another	example,	see	Domenico	di	Pietro	who	was	hanged	in	the	crossroads	of	Porta	Ravegnana	in	
December	1291:	ASB,	Sindacato	8,	1291II	(60	fols.),	5v.	
38	Cohen,	The	Modulated	Scream,	76–77.	In	Bologna’s	1250	statute,	the	rope	and	pulley	system	(tondolum	or	
tirellum)	is	the	only	type	of	torture	referred	to	by	name;	see	Statuti	1245,	1:296–98.	Trial	records	also	speak	
of	suspects	being	“set	down”	(depositus)	from	torture.	See	ASB,	Inquisitiones	1,	reg.	1,	7r;	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	
1,	2r–v,	7v;	Inquisitiones	8,	reg.	11,	2r;	Inquisitiones	10,	reg.	8,	5v.	Blanshei,	however,	has	found	references	to	
torture	involving	water	and	stones;	see	Politics	and	Justice,	324.	
39	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	333–37.	Cf.	Vallerani,	“Conflitti	e	modelli	procedurali,”	279–81.	
40	Pennington,	The	Prince	and	the	Law,	159–60;	Fiorelli,	La	tortura	giudiziaria.	
41	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	320–22.	Popolani	could	only	be	tortured	with	special	permission	from	the	
capitano	del	popolo	and	in	the	presence	of	six	anziani.	
42	Blanshei,	362–63;	Smail,	The	Consumption	of	Justice,	181–82.	
43	ASB,	Inquisitiones	1,	reg.	1,	6v–7r.	The	same	register	contains	two	other	cases	of	judicial	torture	from	1242	
and	1243.	
44	ASB,	Accusationes	10,	reg.	6,	2v–3v.	
45	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	373–77.	
46	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	327.	
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Oculus	pastoralis,	a	handbook	for	podestà	from	the	1220s,	when	they	alleged	that	
indiscriminate	use	of	torture	was	the	“collective	vice”	of	podestà.47	When	they	had	
suspected	criminals	in	custody	and	other	proofs	were	lacking,	podestà	and	judges	were	
likely	to	subject	the	imputed	to	the	strappado	to	induce	a	confession.	
Indeed,	the	archival	record	suggests	that	the	authorities	were	more	interested	in	
using	torture	to	secure	convictions—and	in	turn	making	public	examples	of	suspects—than	
in	finding	the	truth,	the	ostensible	purpose	of	torture.48	Exemplary	in	this	regard	is	the	case	
of	four	alleged	thieves—Martino,	Ventura,	Pietro,	and	Niccolò,	nicknamed	“the	Trumpet”—
whom	the	familia	netted	in	March	1287	on	a	routine	curfew	patrol.	It	is	not	clear	what	
indications	the	court	had	against	them,	but	the	court	seems	to	have	suspected	them	of	
conspiring	with	the	magnate	Caprezino	Lambertini	to	commit	(separately)	kidnapping	and	
burglary.49	Their	confessions	are	recorded	in	a	register	of	the	torture	notary,	and	are	
notable	for	the	lack	of	concord.	Virtually	the	only	thing	these	suspects	agreed	on	in	their	
initial	confessions	was	that	they	had	planted	a	ladder	at	a	church	near	the	house	where	the	
woman	they	planned	to	abduct	resided.	Martino	and	Ventura	disagreed	completely	as	to	
the	name	of	this	woman;	Niccolò	claimed	they	were	never	told	her	name,	and	Pietro	did	not	
seem	to	know	it	either.	Ventura	and	Pietro	did	agree	at	least	that	this	woman	resided	in	a	
house	owned	by	the	Magnani,	an	eminent	family	of	notaries.	Their	stories	also	did	not	
match	with	regards	to	the	burglary	(or	burglaries)	they	were	allegedly	planning.	Initially,	
Pietro	was	the	only	one	to	mention	a	plan	to	rob	both	Ugolino	and	Lanza	Garisendi	in	his	
confession.	Niccolò	and	Ventura	each	acknowledged	it	when	they	were	tortured	a	second	
time,	but	Niccolò	could	not	say	which	Garisendi	they	planned	to	target,	and	Ventura	
disagreed	with	Pietro	about	what	they	planned	to	steal	from	them.		
Their	lack	of	agreement	on	details	strongly	suggests	that	the	contours	of	their	
confessions	were	suggested	to	them	based	on	what	the	magistrates	had	heard	from	their	
alleged	accomplices.50	Importantly,	Niccolò	and	Ventura	were	the	only	two	suspects	who	
were	tortured	twice,	and	they	were	also	the	only	two	who	did	not	confess	to	additional	
crimes	(besides	the	kidnapping	plot)	initially.	Martino,	for	his	part,	had	confessed	to	five	
previous	thefts,	and	Pietro	had	confessed	to	one	count	of	armed	robbery	and	one	of	armed	
assault.	The	judges	seem	to	have	been	hoping	for	similar	admissions	from	the	other	two,	so	
as	to	better	classify	them	as	“common”	thieves	and	criminals.	Ventura	indeed	obliged	them	
during	his	second	torture,	confessing	that	one	year	ago	in	Florence	he	had	killed	the	man	
who	had	killed	his	brother.	Niccolò,	remarkably,	endured	both	rounds	of	torture	without	
admitting	to	anything	more	than	his	involvement	with	Caprezino.51	The	record	does	not	
give	the	respective	fates	of	these	four	suspects,	so	it	is	unclear	whether	this	earned	Niccolò	
a	lighter	punishment.	But	it	is	significant	that	the	second	round	of	torture	seems	to	have	
																																																								
47	Quotation	from	Pennington,	The	Prince	and	the	Law,	42.	
48	For	torture	as	a	means	of	obtaining	a	confession	rather	than	a	means	of	proof,	see	Peters,	Torture,	50.	
49	The	register	gives	the	magnate’s	name	as	Caurecinus	de	Lambertinis,	but	this	is	almost	certainly	the	same	
person	as	Capriçinus	de	Lambertinis,	mentioned	in	a	resolution	from	August	1285,	under	the	rubric	“De	
nobilibus	et	potentibus	comitatus	Bononie	afidandis	et	cançelandis	de	banno	qui	securitatem	prestabunt	infra	
terminum	infra	ordinatum.”	See	Statuti	1288,	1:466.	Other	sources	mention	a	Caprezio	Lambertini.	
50	For	the	possibility	that	the	details	of	confessions	(such	as	the	lists	of	stolen	goods	and	their	values)	were	
compiled	in	advance	as	indictments	and	only	later	presented	as	the	“confession”	of	the	suspected	thief,	see	
Dean,	Crime	and	Justice,	190–92;	Stern,	The	Criminal	Law	System,	216.	
51	ASB,	Inquisitiones	10,	reg.	8,	2v–4r.	
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been	aimed	squarely	at	eliciting	lengthier	confessions,	not	sorting	out	the	contradictions	of	
the	initial	stories.	
	 In	most	cases,	torture	functioned	to	move	the	trial	toward	a	guilty	verdict.	
Importantly,	a	confession	made	under	torture	did	not	in	itself	constitute	legal	proof;	the	
suspect	would	have	to	“persevere”	in	his	confession	afterwards,	repeating	it	a	second	time.	
But	this	opportunity	to	recant	always	occurred	under	the	threat	of	more	torture,	since	any	
confession	made	under	torture,	though	not	probatory,	provided	the	judge	with	new	
evidence	that	justified	a	second	round	of	it.52	Indeed,	some	judges	apparently	did	not	need	
new	evidence	to	continue	torturing	suspects	if	they	did	not	hear	the	confessions	they	
expected	the	first	time.	An	extraordinary	example	of	this	is	the	case	of	Ghisellina,	daughter	
of	Bonaventura	the	shoemaker,	who	was	tortured	five	times	in	1292.	Her	confession	does	
not	make	clear	what	her	alleged	crime	was,	but	she	may	have	been	suspected	of	using	
counterfeit	money.	At	her	first	torturing	on	7	April,	she	claimed	she	had	found	six	gold	
florins	in	a	cubbyhole	in	her	house	one	day	the	previous	month	when	the	commune’s	
knights	were	away	on	an	expedition.	Tortured	again	two	days	later,	she	changed	her	story,	
claiming	she	had	received	the	six	gold	florins	from	one	Fuzio,	“who	committed	adultery	
with	her	in	the	middle	of	the	night.”	She	gave	the	same	terse,	cryptic	confession	when	
tortured	on	14	and	15	April.	She	stuck	to	this	line	when	tortured	for	the	last	time	on	14	
May,	having	apparently	remained	in	custody	for	the	previous	month.	On	this	last	occasion,	
she	was	tortured	in	front	of	four	anziani	and	three	bankers	in	addition	to	the	usual	
audience	of	judges	and	notaries.53	It	was	plainly	illegal	to	subject	her	to	torture	so	many	
times,	but	as	the	presence	of	the	anziani	and	bankers	suggests,	expediency	prevailed	over	
due	process	when	the	political	interest	was	great	enough.	Also	in	1292,	the	podestà	had	
another	individual	tortured	three	times—on	3,	4,	and	6	June—on	suspicion	of	some	
unspecified	crime(s).	This	hardy	soul	made	no	confession	whatsoever	and	was	apparently	
left	alone	thereafter.54	If	torture	encouraged	the	accused	to	condemn	himself	out	of	his	own	
mouth,	as	Mario	Sbriccoli	has	argued,	then	some	judges	took	this	encouragement	to	
extremes.55	
	 Equally	revealing	is	judges’	use	of	torture	against	persons	suspected	of	petty	crimes,	
even	though	Bologna’s	statutes	expressly	forbade	it.	Domenico	di	Giacobino,	resident	of	San	
Giorgio,	was	tortured	in	March	1286	after	being	arrested	by	the	familia	for	playing	dice	in	
front	of	a	church.56	Evidently	the	judge	had	deemed	him	to	be	of	ill	repute,	but	he	confessed	
to	no	other	crime.	In	the	same	month,	a	woman	from	Forlì	named	Brunetta	confessed	
under	torture	that	a	certain	Riccobono	had	caught	her	emptying	and	stealing	a	sack	of	grain	
from	his	home.57	Apparently	she	had	done	nothing	worse,	and	hardly	fit	the	type	of	the	
“common	thief”	seen	elsewhere	in	this	chapter.	Overall,	the	registers	of	the	torture	notary	
suggest	that,	if	torture	were	as	well	documented	for	the	entire	communal	period	as	it	is	for	
these	few	years	in	Bologna,	we	would	have	a	rather	darker	portrait	of	judicial	practice	in	
																																																								
52	Peters,	Torture,	57–58;	Sbriccoli,	“Tormentum.”	
53	ASB,	Accusationes	10,	reg.	6,	4r,	5r–v.	Blanshei	mentions	this	case	in	Politics	and	Justice,	325.	
54	ASB,	Accusationes	10,	reg.	6,	7r–v.	
55	Sbriccoli,	“Tormentum.”	
56	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	1,	7v.	
57	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	1,	6v.	
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late	medieval	Italy.58	Communal	governments	needed	exemplary	punishments	for	public	
consumption,	and	torture	was	a	key	means	of	procuring	them.	
The	Public	Interest	
What	motivated	this	judicial	violence	and,	by	extension,	the	policing	that	fed	into	it?	
The	corporal	sentences	themselves	provide	a	superficial	answer,	since	each	typically	
offered	a	rationale	for	the	prescribed	punishment.	Almost	invariably,	they	expressed	a	
philosophy	of	deterrence,	often	a	formulation	of	the	ne	crimina	maxim	discussed	in	the	last	
chapter.	For	example,	in	1310	the	podestà	sentenced	a	convicted	murderer	to	be	
decapitated	“so	that	crimes	do	not	remain	unpunished	but	[rather]	his	punishment	become	
an	example	to	be	feared	by	others.”59	Examples	could	well	be	multiplied,	and	this	sort	of	
language	was	not	peculiar	to	Bologna.	For	instance,	in	1273	Perugia’s	capitano	condemned	
six	men	to	be	hanged	for	attempting	the	armed	robbery	and	murder	of	an	entire	family	in	
the	village	of	San	Martino.	The	court	declared	it	“a	most	wicked	example	[…]	to	perpetrate	
such	enormous	crimes	against	the	honor	and	peaceful	state	of	so	noble	a	city	as	Perugia,”	
and	called	for	the	convicts’	execution	“so	that	it	might	be	an	example	to	others,”	lest	anyone	
presume	to	commit	such	a	crime	in	the	future.60	
	 Besides	a	theory	of	deterrence,	corporal	sentences	typically	expressed	moral	
outrage	at	the	crime(s)	perpetrated	by	the	condemned.	A	good	example	is	the	sentence	of	
Giacomino	of	Roncastaldo,	convicted	in	January	1290	of	robbing	a	priest	from	Trieste	on	a	
highway	in	Bologna’s	contado.	As	the	story	went,	the	priest	had	become	lost	and	accepted	
Giacomino’s	offer	to	show	him	the	way,	but	Giacomino	then	turned	on	him,	robbing	the	
priest	of	a	lambswool	coat,	two	purses,	a	pair	of	gloves,	and	a	pair	of	knives.	Giacomino	was	
sentenced	to	be	hanged	“since	robbing	men	who	entrust	themselves	to	travel	by	public	
streets	and	roads	under	great	faith	is	a	bad	example,	and	so	that	his	punishment	might	be	
an	example	to	others.”61	Implicit	in	this	choice	of	words	was	the	podestà’s	understanding	
that	it	reflected	poorly	on	his	regimen	when	wayfarers	could	not	travel	the	roads	safely	in	
Bolognese	territory.	The	same	concept	of	public	trust	is	evident	in	the	conviction	of	
Guglielmo	Accarisi,	who	was	decapitated	in	August	1291	as	an	outlaw	for	murder.	After	the	
familia	arrested	him	for	illicit	arms-bearing,	the	court	found	that	he	was	under	ban	for	the	
1288	murder	of	his	roommate	(socius	de	hospitio)	Puzio	of	Tuscany,	who	had	come	to	
Bologna	to	study	canon	law.	The	wording	of	his	sentence	places	this	breach	of	trust	front	
and	center,	characterizing	Guglielmo’s	crime	as	especially	“shameful	and	detestable”	
because	Puzio	had	come	to	Bologna	“believing	himself	to	be	free	from	care	and	to	stay	
																																																								
58	For	further	evidence	of	judges’	repeated	use	of	torture	in	the	investigative	process,	and	how	the	sources	
hide	it,	see	Dean,	“Investigating	Homicide.”	Dean	has	also	argued	that	thieves	were	tortured	as	a	matter	of	
course;	see	Crime	and	Justice,	25.	
59	ASB,	Accusationes	30b,	reg.	29,	11r:	“Ad	hoc	ut	malleficia	non	remaneant	inpunita	set	pena	ipsius	aliis	in	
metu	transeat	in	exemplum.”		
60	ASP,	Capitano	1,	reg.	4,	19v:	“Unde	cum	res	sit	nefandisimi	exempli	tallia	et	tanta	enormia	crimina	
perpetuare	contra	honorem	et	pacificum	statum	tam	nobilis	quam	civitatis	Perusii,	et	ut	ceteris	sit	exemplum	
ne	de	cetero	fieri	presumatur.”		
61	ASB,	Accusationes	9a,	reg.	3,	3r:	“Ideo	cum	derobbare	homines,	qui	ire	per	per	stratas	et	vias	publicas	se	
sub	fiducia	magna	credunt,	sit	res	mali	exempli,	et	ut	ipsius	pena	ceteris	sit	exemplum.”		
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safely	in	the	city.”62	Thus,	punishing	crimes	served	the	public	interest	not	only	by	deterring	
future	criminal	acts,	but	also	by	fostering	moral	solidarity	in	the	community.63	
	 Indeed,	it	is	important	to	remember	that	these	sentences	were	written	for	public	
consumption,	to	be	read	aloud	from	the	steps	of	the	palace	at	the	presentation	of	the	
condemned.	By	casting	himself	as	the	guarantor	of	justice	and	public	morals,	a	podestà	
could	burnish	his	reputation—which	in	turn	would	help	him	secure	his	next	commission—
and	bolster	the	legitimacy	of	the	regime	he	served.	Foreign	rectores	ultimately	served	at	the	
pleasure	of	local	elites,	and	these	elites	expected	their	leading	officials	to	provide	
exemplary	justice	for	the	public.	Indeed,	it	reflected	poorly	on	them	if	their	employees	did	
not.	Thus,	in	October	1300,	Bologna’s	council	granted	the	podestà	special	authority	to	
investigate	and	prosecute	the	attacks	on	pilgrims—likely	on	their	way	to	Rome	for	the	
Jubilee—that	had	taken	place	near	San	Ruffillo	the	night	before.	The	council,	feeling	its	
responsibility	to	protect	religious	wayfarers	in	its	territory,	determined	that	such	crimes	
“could	redound	to	the	serious	damage	and	opprobrium	of	the	commune	and	people	of	
Bologna	if	they	remain	unpunished.”64	An	anonymous	denunciation	from	January	1290	
followed	the	same	line	of	argumentation.	It	notified	Bologna’s	podestà,	capitano,	anziani,	
and	consuls—as	well	as	the	presiding	ministrales	of	the	guilds—that	the	outlaws	Ugolino	di	
Bonifazio	da	Tignano	and	Ugolino	da	Montario	were	assaulting	and	robbing	peasants	
(literally,	pauperes	persone)	in	the	countryside	from	their	stronghold	at	Tignano,	which	was	
“a	great	disgrace	to	the	podestà	and	commune	and	people	of	Bologna.”65	In	a	city-republic,	
the	leading	citizens	ultimately	provided	justice,	and	the	stability	of	their	regime	could	
depend	on	how	well	they	were	perceived	as	doing	so.		
It	should	be	no	surprise,	then,	that	citizens	played	a	pivotal	role	in	shaping	and	
promoting	the	judicial	violence	that	their	foreign	magistrates	carried	out.	When	local	
residents	made	criminal	accusations	or	otherwise	asked	the	podestà	for	justice,	they	often	
invoked	the	same	legal	concepts	and	principles	that	the	podestà	did	when	he	delivered	
sentences	of	corporal	punishment.66	For	example,	in	January	1303,	an	anonymous	citizen	
denounced	the	son	of	a	dyer	for	allegedly	abducting	the	wife	of	a	fisherman	and	forcefully	
keeping	her	in	his	own	home	for	his	sexual	pleasure.	The	denunciation	labeled	the	crime	a	
res	mali	exempli	and	“against	the	rule	and	honor”	of	the	podestà,	and	therefore	asked	him	
to	investigate	and	punish	“so	grave	and	enormous	a	crime,”	as	both	the	statutes	and	his	
honor	required,	“so	that	such	crimes	not	remain	unpunished	and	so	that	from	now	on	such	
things	not	be	attempted.”67		
																																																								
62	ASB,	Accusationes	9b,	reg.	27,	1v:	“Unde	cum	res	sit	turpis	et	mali	exempli	tam	turpe	et	de[te]stabille	
malleficium	comittere	in	personam	sui	socii	de	hospicio.”	Cited	in	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	367.	
63	Erikson,	Wayward	Puritans;	Durkheim,	The	Division	of	Labor,	58.	
64	ASB,	Riformagioni	153,	259r:	“Que	malleficia	si	remanerent	impunita	possent	redundare	et	grave	danpnum	
et	obprobium	comunis	et	populi.”	For	another	complaint	about	outlaws	committing	“enormous”	crimes	in	the	
contado,	see	ASB,	Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	73r.	
65	ASB,	Inquisitiones	18,	reg.	1,	30r:	“Notificatur	magnum	dedecus	potestatis	et	comunis	bononie	et	populi.”		
66	In	the	language	of	a	1256	register,	locals	who	made	accusations	to	the	court	demanded	that	criminals	“be	
punished	according	to	the	form	of	the	statutes	and	of	the	podestà’s	good	rule”;	see	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	
10,	3v.	
67	ASB,	Inquisitiones	58,	reg.	6,	1r–v:	“Quare	cum	talia	facere	et	commitere	sit	res	mali	exempli	et	contra	
regimen	et	honorem	vestri	domini	potestatis	et	vestre	curie,	suplicatur	quatenus	vobis	placeat	de	tam	enormi	
et	gravi	maleficio	inquirere	et	inquisitione	facta	ipsum	punire	et	contra	ipsum	procedere,	prout	requirit	et	
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Other	accusations	and	denunciations	bluntly	requested	acts	of	judicial	violence.	In	
March	1256,	a	ministralis	denounced	several	prostitutes	in	his	neighborhood	and	asked	the	
podestà	to	cut	off	their	noses	if	he	found	them,	so	that	they	would	not	stay	in	the	city	
during	his	term	in	office.68	In	June	1254,	a	shepherd	named	Guarino,	formerly	of	Piacenza,	
asked	for	three	men	to	be	tortured.	He	alleged	that	they	had	testified	falsely	against	him—
saying	“impossible	and	very	false	things”	under	oath—in	a	civil	dispute	over	the	ownership	
of	a	certain	house.	He	therefore	asked	that	each	of	the	alleged	perjurers	“be	punished	for	
the	aforesaid	according	to	law,	the	statutes	and	ordinances	of	the	people,	and	the	good	rule	
of	the	podestà,	and	that	every	single	one	of	the	aforesaid	men	be	subjected	to	torture	since	
there	are	violent	presumptions	of	falsehood	against	them.”69	The	record	does	not	indicate	
whether	the	podestà	obliged	him,	but	the	mere	fact	that	a	lowly	individual	of	foreign	birth	
would	make	such	a	request	highlights	both	the	central	role	of	torture	in	criminal	justice	
and	the	legal	literacy	of	ordinary	people	in	communal	Italy.	Guarino	even	offered	the	court	
the	legal	grounds	for	torture	by	invoking	the	concept	of	“violent	presumptions.”	To	be	sure,	
a	formal	accusation	like	this	would	have	been	drawn	up	with	the	help	of	a	notary,	but	even	
if	an	official	suggested	this	language	to	the	accuser,	the	accuser	still	had	to	approve	it.	In	the	
end,	the	document	reflected	the	accuser’s	wishes.		
Thus,	the	shift	toward	hegemonic	justice	ultimately	rested	on	the	politics	of	the	
communes’	citizens.	As	noted	in	the	previous	chapter,	professional	jurists	like	Alberto	
Gandino	played	a	leading	role	in	developing	communal	statutes	and	criminal	procedure	in	
the	thirteenth	century.	Yet	their	work	necessarily	supported	the	agendas	of	citizen-
legislators	who	viewed	punishment	as	essential	to	the	public	interest	and	good	governance.	
When	foreign	magistrates	carried	out	acts	of	judicial	violence,	they	were	generally	carrying	
out	the	wishes	of	their	employers.	The	underlying	question,	then,	is	why	political	elites	
thought	judicial	violence	served	their	interests.	
Outlaws,	Infames,	and	Men	of	Ill	Repute	
	 Ultimately,	the	“public	interest”	was	synonymous	with	the	continued	political	and	
economic	domination	of	the	ruling	elite.	Though	citizens	invoked	lofty	ideals	like	the	
peaceful	state	of	the	commune	in	drafting	criminal	legislation,	how	they	perceived	and	
labeled	threats	to	those	ideals	depended	on	the	political	and	economic	privileges	they	
enjoyed	as	members	of	the	governing	coalition,	as	well	as	the	moral	order	they	claimed	to	
uphold.	The	frequent	and	severe	political	disruptions	of	the	thirteenth	and	fourteenth	
centuries	may	even	have	impelled	these	communities	to	seek	out	criminals	and	deviants	to	
punish	as	a	way	to	maintain	and	define	moral	boundaries.70	Criminal	justice	in	the	
communes,	of	which	policing	was	a	part,	sought	to	correct	and	remove	threats	to	the	
established	order.	
Communal	statutes	labeled	and	categorized	certain	kinds	of	people	as	threats	to	the	
social	order	and	prescribed	their	correction	or	removal	according	to	the	severity	of	the	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
exigat	honor	vestre	et	forma	juris	statutorum	ordinamentorum	et	reformationum	comunis	et	populi	Bononie	
et	vestri	arbitrii,	et	ne	talia	maleficia	remaneant	inpunita,	et	ut	de	cetero	talia	non	aptentur.”		
68	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	16v.	
69	ASB,	Inquisitiones	1,	reg.	4,	1r:	“Quare	petit	predictos	omnes	et	singulos	puniri	de	predictis	secundum	ius	et	
statuta	et	ordinamenta	populli	et	bonum	regimen	potestatis,	et	predictos	et	singulos	omnes	subici	tormentis	
cum	sint	contra	ipsos	violente	presentiones	falsitatis.”		
70	Building	on	Durkheim’s	theory	of	punishment,	this	is	a	central	contention	in	Erikson,	Wayward	Puritans.	
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threat	they	posed.	At	the	furthest	end	of	the	spectrum	were	outlaws,	infamous	criminals,	
and	social	deviants	whose	very	existence	threatened	the	social	order	and	who,	therefore,	
required	elimination.71	At	the	start	of	every	podestà’s	term,	Bologna’s	heralds	went	out	into	
the	city	to	proclaim	that	all	infamous	persons	should	leave	the	jurisdiction	at	once.	The	list	
of	infames	they	recited	typically	included	thieves,	highway	robbers,	criminal	outlaws,	
counterfeiters,	assassins,	prostitutes,	pimps	and	madams,	Cathars	and	heretics	“of	any	
sect,”	sodomites,	soothsayers,	magicians,	and,	in	case	this	left	anyone	out,	“all	other	
infamous	persons.”72	Pimps	and	prostitutes	stand	out	as	an	anomaly	in	this	laundry	list	of	
out-groups,	because	they	were	not	banned	outright	but	rather	confined	to	specific	
neighborhoods	of	the	city.	Yet	all	the	other	categories	of	person	mentioned	were	by	
definition	capital	criminals,	outlaws	in	the	literal	sense	of	persons	whose	very	identity	
placed	them	outside	the	social	order	and	beyond	the	protection	of	the	law.73	The	heralds’	
proclamations	sent	a	clear	message:	if	the	new	podestà	found	anyone	who	fit	the	
description	of	these	types,	he	would	proceed	against	them	with	the	full	weight	of	the	law.	
Moreover,	these	proclamations	threatened	punishment	for	anyone	who	harbored	any	of	
these	infamous	types.	Every	month	the	podestà’s	familia	followed	up	with	a	general	
inquisition	regarding	infames,	asking	the	ministrales	if	they	knew	of	any	such	individuals	
living	in	their	parishes	or	anyone	harboring	them.74	
The	logic	of	exclusion	in	criminal	law	overlapped	significantly	with	the	logic	of	
exclusion	in	communal	politics,	which	led	the	dominant	coalition	to	banish	their	opponents	
from	the	city,	sometimes	en	masse.	Indeed,	the	judicial	sources	often	lumped	“enemies	and	
exiles	of	the	commune”	(i.e.,	political	enemies)	together	with	criminal	outlaws	and	men	of	
ill	repute.75	Some	general	inquisitions	inquired	about	political	crimes,	such	as	nobles	
retaining	populares	as	bodyguards	or	anyone	contracting	relationships	with	Lambertazzi,	
in	the	same	breath	they	asked	about	thieves,	pimps,	and	assassins.76	An	inquisition	from	
1300	referred	to	members	of	the	exiled	Lambertazzi	party	interchangeably	as	outlaws,	
rebels,	and	“the	disobedient”	(inobedientes).77	In	a	limited	access	order,	there	was	
ultimately	little	difference	among	these	different	types	of	disobedience.	Political	and	moral	
crimes	tend	to	overlap	in	single-party	systems,	and	the	communes	were	no	exception.78	
The	ruling	party	sometimes	took	military	action	against	political	rebels	(see	Chapter	5),	but	
																																																								
71	Vallerani,	“Criminal	Court	Procedure,”	44–45.	
72	ASB,	Sindacato	5,	1288I	(22	fols.),	1r:	“Item	[...]	quod	omnes	et	singuli	latrones,	robatores	stratarum,	banniti	
pro	malleficio,	falsarii	monete,	assasini,	meretrices,	rufiani,	rufiane,	gazari,	sodomite,	indivinatores,	
mathematizi,	et	omnes	alii	gazarii	cuiuscumque	sete,	et	omnes	alie	infamate	persone	que	sunt	in	civitate	
Bononie	vel	districtu	incontinenti	exiant	de	ipsa	civitatis	Bononie	et	districtus	sub	penis	et	bannis	comprensis	
in	statutis	comunis	Bononie.”	For	similar	examples,	see	ASB,	Sindacato	2,	1285II	(28	fols.),	2r;	Corone	7,	
1295I	(44	fols.),	1r;	Corone	17,	1309II,	4r;	Corone	22,	1316I	(50	fols.),	1v.	
73	Dubber,	The	Police	Power,	14–15,	20–21.	For	a	comparative	discussion,	see	Lupoi,	The	Origins,	368–87.	
74	In	July	1315	alone,	the	podestà’s	vicarius	questioned	292	ministrales	about	infames;	see	ASB,	Corone	22,	
1315II	(38	fols.),	1bisv–8r.	For	monthly	inquests	regarding	infames,	see	ASB,	Corone	23,	1316II	(72	fols.),	
12r–23v,	36r–51v;	Corone	17,	1309I,	2r–19v.	
75	See	for	example	the	oath	of	the	massarii	in	ASB,	Sindacato	1,	1285I	(44	fols.),	17r.	On	the	criminalization	of	
political	offenses	in	Bologna,	see	Blanshei	and	Cucini,	“Criminal	Justice	and	Conflict	Resolution,”	343–44.	
76	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(64	fols.),	3r;	Corone	11,	1300	(10	fols.),	10v;	Corone	23,	1316II	(72	fols.),	12r–23v,	
36r–51v.	
77	ASB,	Corone	11,	1300	(10	fols.),	10v.	
78	Bergesen,	“Social	Control.”	
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the	podestà	and	capitano,	acting	on	their	behalf,	also	sought	to	prosecute	such	“criminals”	
in	court.	On	the	rare	occasions	when	the	commune	executed	men	in	the	central	piazza,	such	
as	Aghinolfo	da	Ozzano	above,	it	was	to	make	an	example	of	political	rebels	or	heretics.79		
Municipal	statutes	targeted	threats	to	the	economic	welfare	of	the	commune	
arguably	more	than	any	other	types.	Bologna’s	criminal	court	showed	a	special	
preoccupation	with	common	thieves,	or	in	the	language	of	the	sources,	men	who	lived	by	
thievery	(de	rapto)	rather	than	by	their	own	means	(de	proprio).	The	podestà’s	familia	held	
general	inquisitions	every	two	months	regarding	“men	of	ill	condition	and	repute,	
committers	of	thefts,	and	those	who	are	infamous	for	thefts	and	other	crimes,	or	who	were	
found	or	could	be	found	to	live	more	by	thefts	or	thievery	than	by	their	own	means.”80	By	
definition,	men	who	lived	de	rapto	had	no	place	in	society	and	enjoyed	no	protection	under	
law;	their	social	and	legal	status	made	them	subject	to	summary	justice.	The	April	1290	
sentence	of	Benvenuto	of	Casola	clearly	expressed	the	idea	that	men	who	lived	de	rapto	
were	anathema	to	city	life	and	social	pollutants	to	be	cleansed	from	the	city.	The	podestà	
found	that	Benvenuto	“was	accustomed	to	live	by	thievery	rather	than	by	his	own	means,”	
and	was	a	“public	and	infamous”	assassin	and	robber	as	well.	The	podestà	therefore	had	
him	decapitated	“since	it	is	in	the	interest	of	every	ruler	(rector)	to	purge	the	city	which	he	
rules	of	wicked	men,	and	so	that	those	living	by	their	own	labor	might	be	able	to	remain	
safely	and	securely,	and	so	that	the	punishment	of	this	man	might	be	an	example	to	
others.”81	Similar	is	the	1287	sentence	of	Francesco,	son	of	the	grain	seller	Ottolino,	who	
was	already	under	ban	as	an	assassin	in	Lendinara	and	as	a	thief	in	Padua.	Bologna’s	
podestà	condemned	Francesco	to	be	decapitated	as	an	infamous	assassin,	vagabond,	and	
man	of	ill	repute,	who	had	allegedly	come	to	Bologna	to	commit	more	murders,	“so	that	his	
penalty	might	be	an	example	for	other	malefactors,”	and	“since	it	is	most	vile	for	such	men	
to	be	fostered	in	cities	and	to	abide	in	them.”82	As	men	who	lived	by	ill-gotten	gains,	such	
notorious	criminals	were	the	opposite	of	the	ideal	communal	citizen,	who	earned	his	living	
through	hard	work	in	a	legitimate	trade.		
As	the	labeling	of	Francesco	as	a	“vagabond”	suggests,	judicial	violence	was	also	
motivated	by	the	social	fears	of	a	deeply	conservative	society.83	These	fears	went	beyond	a	
simple,	rational	calculus	of	political	or	economic	self-interest.	Perugia’s	statutes,	for	
example,	enjoined	the	podestà	and	capitano	to	hold	inquisitions	for	sodomites	every	
month.84	In	the	case	of	vagabonds,	beggars,	and	the	disabled,	society	tended	to	assume	the	
																																																								
79	The	1307	decapitation	of	Mostarda	da	Panico	in	the	central	piazza	is	another	example.	
80	ASB,	Corone	17,	1309II,	56r:	“Adversus	et	contra	homines	male	condictionis	et	fame	factores	furtorum,	et	
qui	infamati	essent	de	furtis	et	aliis	mallefitiis,	et	qui	magis	reperirentur	vel	reperiri	possent	vivere	de	furtis	
et	raptu	quam	de	proprio.”	See	also	Corone	12,	1301II,	7v;	Corone	17,	1309I,	2r.	Bologna’s	statutes	required	
the	podestà	to	hold	inquisitions	for	such	men	every	two	months;	see	Statuti	1288,	1:176.	
81	ASB,	Accusationes	9a,	reg.	3,	6v:	“Quod	potius	vivere	consuevit	de	ra[p]to	quam	de	proprio	et	quod	multa	
alia	maleficia	iam	comisit	et	fecit.	[…]	Ideo	cum	intersit	cuiuslibet	rectoris	purgare	civitatem	quam	regit	malis	
hominibus,	et	ut	viventes	de	suo	labore	secure	possint	et	tute	morari,	et	ut	istius	pena	ceteris	sit	exemplum.”		
82	ASB,	Accusationes	6b,	reg.	13,	1r:	“Idcirco	cum	nequissimum	sit	tales	homines	confoveri	etiam	in	civitatibus	
conversari	et	cum	[...]	predicta	et	singula	sint	res	mali	exempli,	et	ut	pena	ipsius	sit	aliis	malefactoribus	ad	
exemplum.”	It	is	unclear	how	the	court	discovered	that	Francesco	was	under	ban	in	other	jurisdictions.	For	
issues	of	territorial	jurisdiction	in	prosecuting	thieves,	see	Dean,	Crime	and	Justice,	192–94.	
83	For	the	use	of	a	similar	label	in	a	1295	sentence	from	Orvieto,	see	ASO,	Podestà	2,	reg.	9,	7v.	Lansing	also	
mentions	the	case	in	Passion	and	Order,	40.		
84	Statuto	1279,	1:12,	15.	
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worst	about	them,	namely	that	they	were	capable	of	productive	labor	but	chose	instead	to	
live	on	handouts,	and	often	won	them	through	deceit.85	Bologna’s	statutes	prohibited	those	
“who	beg	falsely”	from	residing	within	50	rods	(perticas)	of	the	city	wall	and	prescribed	
penalties	for	anyone	who	hosted	them.	The	list	of	false	beggars	included	individuals	who	
“stained”	themselves	with	herbs	(i.e.,	who	used	poisonous	plants	to	create	sores	on	their	
skin);	those	who	pretended	to	be	penitents	by	wearing	iron	rings	around	their	arms;	
women	who	led	young	girls	around	begging	alms	for	their	dowries,	alleging	that	they	were	
to	be	married;	and	soothsayers	and	magicians.	The	same	statute	banned	the	blind	and	
those	who	pretended	to	be	blind	alike,	as	if	they	were	morally	equivalent.86	The	heralds	
frequently	blazoned	reminders	of	these	statutes,	and	the	dirt	notary	included	false	beggars	
among	the	illicit	persons	and	things	he	looked	for	on	patrol	and	investigated	through	
general	inquests	of	parish	officials.87		
If	the	commune	generally	treated	these	types	as	“matter	out	of	place,”	it	was	also	
capable	of	extraordinary	repression	against	them.	Eye-opening	in	this	respect	are	the	
separate	confessions	of	three	alleged	soothsayers,	whom	Bologna	had	burned	at	the	stake	
in	1290,	1300,	and	1310,	respectively.	There	is	no	space	to	detail	their	fascinating	
confessions	here,	but	they	strongly	suggest	that	the	commune’s	concern	was	not	that	they	
actually	knew	magic,	but	that	they	were	wandering	charlatans	who	deceived	vulnerable	
people.88	Together	their	cases	suggest	that	communal	authorities	were	preoccupied	with	
the	threat	posed	by	vagabonds,	charlatans,	and	soothsayers	well	before	the	famines	and	
plagues	of	the	fourteenth	century	supposedly	ballooned	the	ranks	of	such	marginal	
groups.89	It	may	seem	counterintuitive	that	men	who	did	nothing	worse	than	con	people	
would	suffer	such	cruel	punishment	in	a	society	where	murderers	could	avoid	public	
prosecution	by	making	peace	with	the	victim’s	family.	But	it	was	precisely	their	lack	of	
social	connections,	their	not	belonging	to	any	household	or	community,	that	made	
vagabonds,	soothsayers,	and	the	like	incorrigible	in	the	eyes	of	the	law.90		
As	with	judicial	violence	itself,	prejudicial	treatment	under	the	law	originated	in	the	
popular	prejudices	of	citizens	who	viewed	out-groups	of	all	sorts—whether	political,	
economic,	or	religious—with	deep	suspicion.	Indeed,	it	was	not	foreign	magistrates	who	
made	laws	to	exclude	beggars	and	disabled	persons	from	the	city,	but	residents	who	
																																																								
85	In	general,	see	Dean,	Crime	in	Medieval	Europe,	50–52;	Guglielmi,	Il	Medioevo,	77–78,	84–85;	Farmer,	
Surviving	Poverty,	64–69;	Rexroth,	Deviance	and	Power,	68–125;	Geremek,	The	Margins	of	Society,	29–43,	
192–210.	On	attitudes	toward	the	disabled	and	able-bodied	poor,	see	Rawcliffe,	Urban	Bodies,	97–104;	
Metzler,	A	Social	History	of	Disability,	162–97.	On	the	link	between	moral	and	physical	health,	see	Henderson,	
The	Renaissance	Hospital;	Carmichael,	Plague	and	the	Poor.	
86	Statuti	1245,	2:285.	The	list	seems	to	draw	on	Azo	of	Bologna’s	Summa	(1208–10)	on	the	Corpus	juris	civilis;	
see	Farmer,	Surviving	Poverty,	66.	For	a	catalog	of	different	types	of	vagabonds	from	early	modern	Italy,	see	
Camporesi,	ed.,	Il	libro	dei	vagabondi.	For	a	more	recent	discussion	of	these	stereotypes,	see	Jütte,	Poverty	and	
Deviance,	145–46,	164–67,	185–87.	More	broadly,	see	Gambaccini,	Mountebanks	and	Medicasters.	
87	For	proclamations	see	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(44	fols.),	2r;	Sindacato	5,	1288II,	17v–18r;	Sindacato	6,	1289I	
(19	fols.),	2r–v;	Sindacato	7,	1290II	(38	fols.),	5v–6r.	For	the	dirt	notary’s	concern	with	false	beggars,	see	ASB,	
Fango	5,	1293I,	79r–v;	1293II	(80	fols.),	1r.	
88	ASB,	Accusationes	9a,	reg.	3,	3v–4r;	22b,	reg.	21,	2r–v;	30b,	reg.	29,	9v–11r.	The	inquisition	that	led	to	the	
latter	sentence,	from	1310,	survives	in	Inquisitiones	77,	reg.	1,	28r–31v.	
89	Cf.	Pinto,	“Un	vagabondo,	ladro	e	truffatore	nella	Toscana	della	seconda	metà	del	‘300:	Sandro	di	Vanni	
detto	Pescione,”	335–36.	
90	Dubber,	The	Police	Power,	51.	
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potentially	had	to	live	with	them	as	neighbors.	Poverty	and	physical	disability	were	taken	
as	signs	of	ill	repute,	especially	when	found	in	combination.	Hence	in	a	1294	arms-bearing	
case,	a	defense	witness	had	to	qualify	his	statement	that	the	defendant	was	indeed	a	
peaceful	man	of	good	repute	“even	though”	(quamvis)	he	had	two	blind	sons	and	very	little	
in	goods.91	In	court,	local	residents	drew	on	moral	and	medical	conceptions	of	beggars	and	
disabled	persons	as	public	nuisances	to	testify	against	unwanted	neighbors	(or	perhaps	
just	personal	enemies).	In	January	1295,	for	example,	the	dirt	notary	opened	an	inquest	
against	a	taverner	named	Giovanni	based	on	the	public	fama	that	he	was	a	“host	and	
harborer”	of	the	blind,	the	lame,	amputees,	and	“those	who	beg	falsely,”	and	that	he	gave	
“men	and	women	of	this	condition”	food	and	drink	in	his	house	daily	against	the	form	of	the	
statutes.92	Three	of	the	witnesses	therefore	implored	the	court	to	expel	the	beggars	from	
their	neighborhood.	As	one	blacksmith	put	it:	“You,	notary	and	lord	podestà,	would	do	well	
if	you	expelled	such	company	from	the	contrada.”93	Although	Giovanni	produced	four	
defense	witnesses	who	claimed	that	these	witnesses	all	testified	out	of	hatred	for	him,	the	
dirt	notary	convicted	Giovanni	as	a	harborer	of	beggars	and	other	prohibited	types.94	
Similarly,	in	1293	the	dirt	notary	investigated	two	men	who	supposedly	harbored	lepers,	
and	three	blind	men	who	reportedly	lived	with	their	families	in	the	parish	of	San	Giuliano	
on	the	edge	of	town.95	Perugia’s	lawmakers	were	so	concerned	with	lepers	that	they	
appointed	five	custodes	super	leprosis	expellendis—one	for	each	district	of	the	city—and	
charged	them	with	preventing	lepers	from	breaching	what	might	be	characterized	as	a	
sanitary	cordon,	marked	by	five	of	the	city’s	churches.	A	separate	statute	dictated	that	any	
woman	who	lay	with	a	leper	who	was	not	her	husband	was	to	be	flogged	and	have	her	nose	
amputated.96	The	popular	impetus	to	purge	the	city	of	moral	impurities	is	also	evident	in	
Bologna’s	treatment	of	prostitution,	which	lawmakers	progressively	excluded	from	all	but	a	
few	parishes	on	the	periphery	of	the	city—red-light	districts,	in	effect—because	of	the	
disturbances	brothels	allegedly	caused	in	neighborhoods.97	Once	again,	the	drive	to	purify	
the	city	through	repressive	legal	measures	came	not	from	zealous	magistrates	or	jurists,	
but	from	ordinary	residents	with	conservative	social	mores.	
																																																								
91	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	20r.	
92	ASB,	Fango	6,	1295I	(46	fols.),	18r–20r:	“Quod	dicitur	et	publica	vos	et	fama	est	quod	ille	Johanes	est	
hospitator	et	receptator	orborum	et	cechorum	et	avocholorum	et	aviritatorum	et	manchorum	et	membris	
debilitatorum	aliorum	similium	et	qui	falso	mendicant,	et	quod	cotidie	in	domo	predicta	in	qua	habitat	ille	
Johanes	posita	ut	supra	hospitatur	et	receptat	homines	et	mulieres	dicte	conditionis,	et	eis	dat	et	dedit	cibum	
et	potum	in	dicta	domo	contra	formam	statutorum	comunis	Bononie.”		
93	ASB,	Fango	6,	1295I	(46	fols.),	19v:	“Sed	vos	notarius	et	dominus	potestas	bene	faceretis	si	expleretis	de	illa	
contrata	tallem	bregatam.”		
94	For	Giovanni’s	defense	see	ASB,	Fango	6,	1295I	(64	fols.),	5r–8v.	
95	ASB,	Fango	5,	1293II	(80	fols.),	71v–72v;	1293I,	72r–73v.	
96	Statuto	1279,	1:266–67,	319–20.	The	sanitary	cordon	was	marked	by	the	churches	of	Santa	Giuliana,	San	
Galgano,	Santa	Caterina,	Sant’Angelo	di	Libiano,	and	Santa	Trinità.	
97	For	the	growing	list	of	parishes	from	which	prostitutes	were	banned,	see	Statuti	1245,	1:309–15;	Statuti	
1288,	1:197–201.	For	petitions	from	residents	to	add	their	parishes	to	the	list,	see	ASB,	Provvigioni	2,	reg.	
211,	194v;	Riformagioni	153,	292r.	On	prostitutes	as	social	pollutants,	see	Goldberg,	“Pigs	and	Prostitutes”;	
Rexroth,	Deviance	and	Power,	2,	5–6.	
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Police	Patrols	as	Dragnet	
What,	then,	did	communal	society’s	deep	concern	with	political	and	moral	purity	
have	to	do	with	policing?	After	all,	the	evidence	in	previous	chapters	suggests	that	the	
familia	spent	most	of	its	time	pursuing	curfew	breakers,	gamblers,	and	illegally	armed	men.	
It	is	worth	recalling	that	the	familia’s	primary	mission	was	to	capture	outlaws	and	
denounce	criminals	of	all	stripes,	including	“prohibited	persons.”	Furthermore,	in	the	
minds	of	judges	and	lawmakers,	outlaws	and	men	of	ill	repute	were	often	the	same	men	
who	broke	curfew,	gambled,	and	bore	arms	illegally.		
Dino’s	confession	at	the	start	of	this	chapter	illustrates	the	perceived	links	between	
breaking	curfew,	gambling,	and	arms-bearing	on	the	one	hand,	and	theft,	robbery,	and	even	
political	disloyalty	on	the	other.	The	link	to	police	patrols	is	more	explicit	in	the	January	
1286	confession	of	Bologna	resident	Giacomo	di	Guido,	nicknamed	Fideguida.	Under	
torture,	Giacomo	revealed	the	circumstances	of	his	arrest:	the	night	watch	had	discovered	
him	in	the	street	without	a	light	and	carrying	a	piece	of	wood.	He	had	stolen	the	wood	from	
a	carpenter	and	was	bringing	it	to	a	tavern	frequented	by	pimps,	prostitutes,	and	wicked	
men,	where	he	was	planning	to	use	it	as	firewood	while	he	lay	with	a	prostitute	named	
Ravignana—or	so	he	asserted	under	duress.	Giacomo	went	on	to	confess	to	a	litany	of	
crimes	including	multiple	counts	of	burglary,	theft,	armed	assault,	and	conspiracy	to	
commit	murder—in	one	case	with	Marino	Carbonesi,	the	same	Lambertazzi	who	would	
appear	in	Dino’s	confession	six	months	later.	Lastly,	Giacomo	confessed	to	practicing	“the	
art	of	the	sodomites.”	He	named	two	alleged	partners	in	“buggery”	(buziria)	and	claimed	to	
have	“raped	many	boys,	especially	while	he	was	a	prison	guard	for	the	commune	of	
Bologna.”98	Whatever	the	veracity	of	these	details,	Giacomo	was	precisely	the	kind	of	man	
of	ill	repute	whom	the	night	watch	and	familia	hoped	to	catch	on	curfew	patrols.	His	
confession	confirmed	the	prevailing	belief	among	judges	and	lawmakers	that	minor	forms	
of	disobedience	could	be	indicators	of	more	serious	criminal	activity.	Furthermore,	when	
Giacomo	was	presented	to	the	public	and	his	sentence	read	aloud	in	the	piazza,	he	would	
have	provided	an	exemplary	reminder	of	why	police	patrols	were	necessary	to	protect	the	
public	interest.		
Such	examples	suggest	that	the	familia’s	patrols	functioned	according	to	the	same	
logic	as	today’s	“broken	windows”	policing.	According	to	this	theory—or	rather,	the	
popular	simplification	of	it—strict	enforcement	against	minor	offenders	prevents	more	
serious	types	of	crime.	In	effect,	the	police	can	use	misdemeanor	charges	to	create	a	
dragnet	that	picks	up	real	felons	and	prevents	would-be	offenders	from	committing	worse	
crimes.99	Men	who	went	out	at	night	without	a	light	or	who	gambled	and	bore	arms	outside	
the	boundaries	set	by	the	government	were	not	merely	disobedient;	their	behavior	
threatened	specific	kinds	of	harm	in	the	future,	such	as	burglary	or	assault.	Furthermore,	
those	behaviors	could	indicate	the	kind	of	criminal	history	and	ill	repute	that	the	
authorities	sought	to	uncover	and	punish.	By	forcing	men	into	court	on	relatively	minor	
																																																								
98	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	1,	1r–2r:	“Item	confessus	fuit	quod	ipse	Fideguida	est	sodomita	et	pluries	et	
pluries	artem	sodomictorum	faciebat	et	fecit	et	exercuit,	et	plures	gargiones	strupavit,	maxime	dum	esset	
custos	carceris	comunis	Bononie.”	See	also	reg.	2,	10v–12v.	
99	Wilson	and	Kelling,	“Broken	Windows”;	Kelling	and	Coles,	Fixing	Broken	Windows.	For	critiques,	see	
Sampson	and	Raudenbush,	“Seeing	Disorder”;	Thacher,	“Order	Maintenance	Reconsidered”;	Harcourt,	Illusion	
of	Order.	For	a	rebuttal	of	popular	misconceptions	about	the	original	theory,	see	Kelling,	“Don’t	Blame	My	
‘Broken	Windows’	Theory.”		
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charges,	police	patrols	provided	judges	with	hundreds	of	additional	opportunities	to	
investigate	citizens	per	year.	And	those	men	were	far	more	likely	to	pose	real	threats	to	the	
social	order	than	if	the	courts	were	to	simply	investigate	citizens	at	random,	as	they	did,	in	
effect,	through	general	inquests.	Thus,	when	the	podestà’s	familia	went	on	curfew	patrol,	
inspected	arms	permits,	and	raided	gambling	houses	and	taverns,	they	were	legitimating	
their	claim	to	search	for	outlaws	and	felons.	
Curfew	restrictions	were	meant	to	thwart	burglars	and	other	miscreants	who	
operated	under	cover	of	darkness,	not	keep	city	residents	pent	up	at	night.	Indeed,	
Bologna’s	statutes	displayed	a	special	concern	for	burglars,	or	“those	breaking	[into]	or	
maliciously	opening	shops,	bodegas,	chests,	boxes,	or	houses	at	night.”100	As	seen	in	Judge	
Ugo’s	interrogation	at	the	outset	of	the	chapter,	judges	tended	to	view	anyone	discovered	
out	at	night,	especially	without	a	light,	as	suspicious.	A	proclamation	from	May	1315	made	
this	explicit,	declaring	that	any	individuals	discovered	outside	at	night—with	or	without	a	
light—would	be	regarded	as	“suspicious	persons”	(suspecte	persone).101	Conversely,	in	
March	1306,	when	Bologna	was	in	the	midst	of	a	political	crisis	and,	it	seems,	under	a	strict	
curfew,	the	capitano	del	popolo	acquitted	three	alleged	curfew	breakers,	all	found	with	
lights	in	front	of	their	homes,	on	the	grounds	that	they	“were	not	suspicious	persons.”102	
Moreover,	judges	seem	to	have	encountered	suspicious	persons	with	some	regularity	in	the	
course	of	their	work.	Much	like	Giacomo	di	Guido’s	case	above,	Fuzzolino	da	Pedona	
confessed	to	multiple	crimes	including	cattle	rustling	and	murder	after	the	night	watch	
arrested	him	for	burglary	in	November	1292.103		
The	next	chapter	will	discuss	the	preventive	logic	of	the	arms-bearing	laws	in	
greater	detail,	but	it	is	worth	noting	here	that	judges	and	jurists	treated	illicit	arms-bearing	
as	a	sign	of	malicious	intent.104	In	a	May	1293	case,	for	example,	the	familia	reported	that	a	
certain	Bonaventura	was	carrying	a	“malicious”	knife	“maliciously”	at	his	side	and	threw	it	
away	as	soon	as	he	saw	them	searching	people	for	weapons.105	Magistrates	seem	to	have	
viewed	concealed	weapons	with	an	extra	degree	of	suspicion.	As	if	to	suggest	the	suspect’s	
intent,	the	berrovarii	sometimes	reported	whether	he	had	been	carrying	his	knife	publicly	
or	openly	(publice	or	palam)—that	is,	in	the	customary	manner	of	travelers—or	privately,	
concealed,	or	underneath	clothing	(privatim,	absconsus,	occultatus,	or	subtus).106	In	Orvieto,	
carrying	a	concealed	weapon	earned	a	double	fine,	the	same	as	carrying	a	weapon	at	
night.107	Similarly,	the	court	looked	with	greater	suspicion	upon	weapons	that	were	easily	
concealed.	In	a	1308	case,	for	example,	the	familia	described	a	blade	as	“very	small,	very	
sharp,	slender	and	malicious,”	as	if	to	imply	that	the	weapon	had	no	honorable	uses,	like	a	
																																																								
100	ASB,	Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	2r:	“Item	contra	frangentes	de	nocte	stationes	vel	apotechas,	archas	vel	
scrineos,	vel	domos	vel	malitiose	aperientes.”		
101	ASB,	Corone	21,	1315I	(21	fols.),	11v.	
102	ASB,	Corone	15,	1306I,	8r:	“Absoluti	quia	non	fuerunt	suspecte	persone.”	For	other	acquittals	on	this	
ground,	see	4r,	7v,	8v.	The	capitano	had	temporarily	taken	over	police	responsibility	in	the	absence	of	the	
podestà.	
103	ASB,	Accusationes	10,	reg.	14,	1r.	
104	Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms,”	102–4.	
105	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	34v.	
106	ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(46	fols.),	31r:	“Publice	et	palam.”	ASO,	Podestà	2,	reg.	3,	3r	and	8v:	“Privatim.”	
ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(48	fols.),	18v:	“Absconsus.”	ASB,	Corone	16,	1308I	(64	fols.),	4r:	“Occultatus.”	ASB,	
Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	25r:	“Subtus.”		
107	For	examples,	see	ASO,	Podestà	1,	reg.	6,	1v,	36v.	
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combat	knife	(cultellus	de	ferire)	or	broad	sword.108	Of	course,	some	individuals	did	use	
prohibited	weapons	maliciously	to	commit	violent	crimes,	but	there	are	also	cases,	like	
Guglielmo	Accarisi’s	above,	where	routine	stops	for	illegal	arms	uncovered	wanted	men.	By	
targeting	all	men	who	bore	arms	without	a	license,	lawmakers	and	judges	could	discipline	
those	who	bore	them	with	malicious	intent.	
Lawmakers’	attitudes	toward	gambling	were	more	complex.	Games	of	chance	were	
both	a	tolerable	vice,	to	be	regulated	rather	than	banned	outright,	and	a	serious	threat	to	
the	economic	and	moral	life	of	the	city.	The	perceived	links	between	gambling	and	
blasphemy	are	well	known,	and	made	games	of	chance	a	favorite	subject	of	popular	
preachers	like	Giovanni	da	Vicenza,	who	instituted	Bologna’s	first	gaming	laws.109	But	
blasphemy	was	only	one	of	the	concerns	that	led	Lucca’s	lawmakers	to	label	gambling	the	
“source	and	origin”	(fons	et	origo)	of	all	evil	in	their	civic	statutes.110	To	start,	dice	games	
could	lead	men	to	violence.	Judges	frequently	saw	cases	where	dice	games	inspired	not	
only	fisticuffs	and	general	rowdiness,	but	also	premeditated	acts	of	violence.	For	instance,	
in	his	1292	confession	to	multiple	counts	of	theft	and	murder,	Giovanni	Buttrigari	
recounted	how	he	had	once	lost	his	money	gambling	to	a	stranger	in	Padua.	When	he	asked	
for	some	of	the	money	back	so	that	he	could	go	to	the	public	baths,	the	stranger	answered,	
“My	lady,	I	do	not	wish	to	lend	to	you.”	Giovanni	responded	to	this	insult	by	stabbing	him	to	
death.111	In	a	1300	homicide	case,	two	contadini	plotted	overnight	to	recoup	their	money	
after	losing	it	all	gambling	to	a	resident	of	Bologna.	The	next	day	they	led	him	to	the	Ponte	
Maggiore	outside	of	town	under	the	pretense	that	they	were	going	to	pick	grapes,	then	
brutally	struck	him	down	with	a	pole	arm	and	sword.	They	collected	4	lire	and	2	soldi	off	
his	body.112	And	in	1286,	Pietro	di	Pizzolo	confessed	that	he	had	stabbed	his	associate	with	
a	lance	after	the	latter	refused	to	hand	over	his	share	of	the	loot	they	had	just	won	using	
false	dice.113		
A	gambling	habit	could	also	lead	a	family	to	financial	ruin,	and	some	citizens	
petitioned	the	city	council	for	help	controlling	prodigal	gamblers	in	their	households.114	In	
more	extreme	cases,	a	gambling	habit	seems	to	have	led	some	individuals	to	adopt	a	life	of	
crime.	Dino’s	confession	at	the	start	of	this	chapter	offered	a	few	examples	of	thefts	
inspired	by	gambling	losses,	which	was	a	common	motif	in	criminal	confessions.115	The	
case	of	Marco	di	ser	Pietro,	formerly	of	Padua	but	a	resident	of	Iesi	at	the	time	of	his	
conviction,	is	exemplary.	One	night	in	May	1300,	Marco	was	caught	burglarizing	a	
guesthouse	in	Bologna.	His	subsequent	confession	reads	like	a	morality	tale	about	the	
dangers	of	gambling,	depicting	a	criminal	career	fueled	entirely	by	his	gambling	habit.	
Marco	professed	that	he	had	lived	as	a	“public	and	famous	thief”	since	leaving	his	home	city	
																																																								
108	ASB,	Corone	16,	1308I	(64	fols.),	33v:	“Unum	stocchettum	parvunculum,	acutissimum,	et	exilem	et	
malitiosum.”		
109	Connell	and	Constable,	Sacrilege	and	Redemption.	
110	Quoted	in	Dean,	Crime	and	Justice,	88.	For	learned	attitudes	toward	games	of	chance,	see	Ceccarelli,	Il	gioco	
e	il	peccato.	
111	ASB,	Accusationes	10,	reg.	14,	1v:	“Madonna,	ego	nolo	vobis	mutuare.”		
112	ASB,	Accusationes	22b,	reg.	21,	11v.	
113	ASB,	Accusationes	5b,	reg.	16,	6r.	
114	For	examples,	see	ASB,	Riformagioni	153,	240r;	Ungarelli	and	Giorgi,	“Documenti,”	389–91;	Blanshei,	
Politics	and	Justice,	419.	
115	For	another	example,	see	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	1,	2r–v.	
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of	Padua	some	eighteen	years	ago.	He	had	gambled	away	all	his	possessions	and	so	“he	was	
ashamed	to	stay	there	[in	Padua]	and	went	through	the	world	through	many	lands	
gambling	and	stealing	as	the	opportunity	presented	itself	to	him.”	During	that	time,	he	
seems	to	have	apprenticed	himself	to	a	tailor	in	Lucca	and	another	in	Naples,	but	in	both	
cases	stole	from	his	master	after	losing	all	his	clothes	and	money	since	“he	was	in	the	habit	
of	gambling.”	The	judge	sentenced	Marco	to	be	hanged	as	a	common	thief.116	With	Marco’s	
condemnation,	the	criminal	court	effectively	presented	to	the	Bolognese	public	an	
exemplar	of	how	gambling	could	lead	to	the	downfall	of	productive	members	of	society.	
Marco	had	been	born	into	a	respectable	family,	if	his	father’s	honorific	title	of	“ser”	is	any	
indication,	and	trained	to	practice	an	honorable	trade.	Yet	his	gambling	habit	had	reduced	
him	to	thievery	and,	ultimately,	led	to	his	death	on	the	gallows.	The	warning	for	Bologna’s	
citizens	about	the	dangers	of	gambling	could	not	have	been	clearer.	
If	habitual	gamblers	were	a	short	step	removed	from	common	thieves,	they	were	
also	the	close	cousins	of	swindlers	and	cheats.	False	dice	feature	prominently	in	a	number	
of	confessions,	including	Marco’s	above.	The	podestà’s	familia	discovered	ten	dice	on	Marco	
when	he	was	in	custody,	four	of	which	were	trick	dice,	either	mismarked	or	weighted.	
Marco	even	described	in	his	confession	how	he	had	been	inspired	to	acquire	trick	dice	after	
falling	victim	to	them,	which	dice	helped	him	win	11	lire	back	from	the	men	who	had	
initially	duped	him.	In	August	1300,	a	cobbler	and	resident	of	Bologna	named	Polo	di	
Martino	confessed	to	being	“a	common	and	infamous	falsifier,	swindler,	deceiver,	and	
changer	of	dice.”	Polo	admitted	to	practicing	“the	art	of	using	false	and	mismarked	dice”	in	
Bologna	and	other	cities,	and	recounted	a	litany	of	times	when	he	had	used	them	to	win	
money	and	goods	fraudulently.	Polo	estimated	that	he	earned	at	least	a	quarter	of	his	living	
for	himself	and	his	wife	by	practicing	this	art.	The	podestà	condemned	him	to	lose	his	right	
hand.117	And	in	August	1286,	Zollo	da	Montegacio	confessed	to	using	false	dice	and	a	fake	
gold	florin	to	cheat	a	“most	simple	rustic”	from	Saliceto	out	of	6	lire.	Zollo	and	his	associate	
had	seen	this	“rustic”	make	those	6	lire	selling	woolen	textiles	near	the	Porta	Ravegnana,	
and	subsequently	led	him	out	of	the	city	to	gamble	away	his	earnings.	Like	Polo,	Zollo	paid	
for	his	crime	with	the	loss	of	his	right	hand.118		
Besides	outright	theft	and	deceit,	gambling	was	closely	associated	with	usury.	The	
sources	typically	call	men	who	lent	money	to	gamblers	mutuatores,	but	in	a	1286	inquest	
the	notary	labeled	them	feneratores,	a	word	that	more	typically	meant	“usurer,”	suggesting	
these	lenders	charged	high	interest	rates.119	Indeed,	it	is	not	hard	to	imagine	opportunistic	
and	unscrupulous	lenders	frequenting	taverns	and	other	popular	gambling	spots	in	
																																																								
116	ASB,	Accusationes	22b,	reg.	21,	1r–v:	“Et	dixit	quod	a	dicto	tempore	citra	consuevit	ludere	et	ludebat	et	
ideo	faciebat	predicta	furta.	[...]	Item	dixit	et	confessus	fuit	quod	iam	sunt	decem	et	otto	anni	vel	circa	quod	
ipse	se	separavit	de	Padua	occasione	ludi,	quia	luxerat	pannos	denarios	et	arma	que	habebat,	quoniam	
verecundabatur	stare	ibi,	et	ivit	per	mundum	per	plures	terras	ludendo	et	furando	prout	sibi	occurrebat.	Et	
dixit	quod	ipse	est	publicus	et	famosus	latro	et	fuit	a	dicto	tempore	citra,	et	quod	plura	alia	fecit	de	quibus	ad	
presens	non	recordatur.”		
117	ASB,	Accusationes	22b,	reg.	21,	6v–7r:	“Inprimis	dixit	et	confessus	fuit	quod	ipse	est	publicus	et	famosus	
coniator,	ingiuncator,	deceptor,	et	cambiator	taxillorum	et	fuit	a	carniprivio	proxime	preterito	fuit	annus	
citra,	et	quod	quasi	continue	dicto	tempore	operatus	fuit	dictam	artem	mittendi	taxillos	falsos	et	mispuntos	
falso,	scienter,	et	dolose	hominibus	ludentibus	secum.”		
118	ASB,	Accusationes	5b,	reg.	16,	7v:	“rusticho	simplizisimo.”	For	another	robber	charged	with	making	and	
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medieval	cities,	and	the	statutes	prohibited	lending	to	gamblers	accordingly.	Judges	
seemed	to	have	been	more	interested	in	prosecuting	gaming	hosts	and	moneylenders	than	
ordinary	gamblers,	much	the	way	modern	prosecutors	prefer	to	target	drug	dealers	and	
traffickers	rather	than	users.	For	example,	in	September	1286,	when	the	familia	brought	in	
five	men	who	were	allegedly	gambling	in	the	piazza,	the	judge	asked	them	for	the	names	of	
moneylenders	and	other	gamblers.	When	they	offered	no	useful	information,	he	had	all	five	
suspects	released	from	prison	since	they	were	“paupers	and	most	wretched	persons.”120		
Especially	revealing	is	the	case	of	Enrighetto	Aldovrandini,	arrested	in	October	1286	
for	gambling	in	the	piazza.	The	berrovarii	had	seen	Enrighetto	gambling	in	the	piazza	four	
days	before	they	managed	to	arrest	him,	and	heard	then	from	other	gamblers	that	he	had	
been	using	loaded	dice.	Thus,	once	he	was	in	custody,	the	judge	ordered	Enrighetto	under	
pain	of	10	lire	to	hand	over	all	the	dice	he	had	in	his	possession.	He	promptly	handed	over	
three	proper	dice,	but	the	judge,	apparently	unconvinced,	had	Enrighetto	brought	into	the	
palace	chapel	and	searched.	There	the	familia	found	seven	“false	and	despicable”	dice	on	
him—whose	markings	the	notary	described	in	detail—along	with	several	other	proper	
dice.121	Enrighetto	still	refused	to	cooperate	with	the	judge’s	investigation,	however.	Under	
further	questioning,	he	denied	that	he	was	gambling	in	the	piazza,	claiming	instead	that	he	
was	merely	standing	by	the	game	because	he	wanted	to	change	a	bolognino	grosso	to	buy	a	
bundle	of	straw.	He	could	not	deny	that	the	familia	had	just	found	several	false	dice	on	him,	
but	claimed	to	have	found	them	in	a	handkerchief	in	the	piazza.	He	even	claimed	that	he	
only	knew	how	play	the	licit	games	ad	gnassum	and	ad	tabulas,	not	the	forbidden	game	ad	
zardum.	With	all	evidence	to	the	contrary,	the	judge	consigned	him	to	prison.	While	in	
prison,	Enrighetto	decided	to	turn	state’s	witness,	so	to	speak.	When	he	appeared	in	court	
again	six	days	later,	the	judge	asked	him	who	lent	money	to	gamblers	in	the	piazza.	
Enrighetto	offered	the	names	of	11	individuals,	including	four	with	ties	to	the	Lambertini	
family,	who	two	months	earlier	had	been	implicated	in	the	gambling	house	raid	described	
at	the	start	of	this	book.	The	court	proceeded	against	all	11,	but	only	two	answered	the	
summons;	it	is	unclear	if	any	were	found	guilty.	Remarkably,	Enrighetto	received	a	full	
acquittal,	even	though	the	possession	of	false	dice	constituted	a	serious	offense,	as	
illustrated	in	the	cases	above.122	It	is	likely	Enrighetto	struck	a	bargain	while	in	jail,	offering	
the	court	information	in	exchange	for	clemency.	This	podestà	was	apparently	more	
interested	in	prosecuting	private	gaming	operations—especially	those	with	potential	links	
to	a	magnate	family—than	one	lowly	swindler.	Thus,	as	with	arms-bearing	and	curfew,	the	
regulation	of	gambling	helped	the	familia	to	discover	and	prosecute	more	threatening	
criminals	and	infamous	types.	
Finally,	it	did	not	help	the	general	opinion	of	gamblers	that	the	majority	of	players	in	
the	public	gaming	spots	(baratarie)	were	foreigners	and	vagrants.123	Consider	the	defense	
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of	four	gamblers—two	Germans,	one	Modenese,	and	one	Tuscan—arrested	under	the	
Asinelli	tower	in	Bologna.	The	sole	article	of	their	intentio	was	that	they	were	all	marochi	
and	gamblers	accustomed	to	playing	for	clothing,	and	“for	this	reason	they	go	wandering	
through	the	world	and	begging.”124	One	of	their	witnesses	testified	that	he	had	seen	them	
lying	in	the	commune’s	piazza	at	night	because	they	had	no	home	to	return	to	at	the	end	of	
the	day.	He	also	had	seen	them	doing	menial	labor—namely	delivering	wood,	hay,	and	
straw	to	city	residents—“in	order	to	earn	the	bread	from	which	they	might	draw	life.”125	
Indeed,	“wandering”	was	a	common	theme	in	marochi’s	defenses.126	On	the	one	hand,	these	
defenses	were	meant	to	inspire	pity	from	the	court	and	earn	a	lower	financial	penalty.	Yet,	
as	this	chapter	has	shown,	vagabondage	was	not	merely	a	pitiable	state	but	a	threatening	
one	associated	with	heinous	crimes.	As	a	further	case	in	point,	Marco’s	confession	above	
described	how	he	“went	through	the	world	through	many	lands	stealing	and	gambling.”127	
Indeed,	confessions	like	his—to	say	nothing	of	confessions	from	“vagabond”	assassins	and	
soothsayers—go	a	long	way	toward	explaining	why	the	authorities	thought	public	
gamblers	required	constant	surveillance	and	discipline.		
Given	gambling’s	links	to	usury,	blasphemy,	prodigality,	thievery,	deceit,	vagrancy,	
and	violence,	it	is	no	wonder	that	lawmakers	and	judges	considered	men	who	hosted	
private	gaming	to	be	of	ill	repute,	or	even	infamous.	But	it	is	worth	emphasizing	briefly,	
once	again,	that	judicial	acts	against	gamblers	reflected	popular	prejudices.	Local	residents	
tended	to	lump	dice	players	and	their	hosts	together	with	other	infamous	types	when	
testifying	against	reputed	gambling	houses.	For	example,	following	a	raid	on	an	infamous	
(infamata)	gambling	house	in	May	1300,	several	neighbors	testified	that	the	house	was	
frequented	by	prostitutes,	pimps,	and	men	of	ill	repute.128	In	October	1320,	a	ministralis	of	
Santa	Cristina	denounced	a	tavern	as	a	gambling	house	by	alleging	that	foreigners	and	
rustics	(terrones)	lent	money	there.129	And	in	1324,	ministrales	denounced	the	taverner	
Bonaccursio	di	Bonaventura	on	two	different	occasions,	in	January	and	August,	for	hosting	
dice	players,	scoundrels	(gaiuffi),	idlers	(putroni	or	poltrones),	magicians	(afaturatores),	
cripples	(sinancati),	and	the	catchall	“people	of	bad	condition”	as	his	guests.130	
Denunciations	like	these	make	clear,	once	again,	that	jurists	and	laymen	shared	a	common	
vocabulary	of	infamous	and	marginal	types.	They	divided	communal	society	roughly	into	
two	categories,	producers	(e.g.,	guildsmen)	and	free	riders	(e.g.,	thieves	and	beggars),	and	
habitual	gamblers	and	their	facilitators	clearly	fell	into	the	latter	category.	
The	Role	of	Fama	
In	inquisitorial	procedure,	the	course	of	the	trial	hinged	on	the	fama,	or	reputation,	
of	the	accused.	Reputable	individuals—and	in	Bologna,	especially	those	belonging	to	the	
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guilds	and	popular	militias—could	expect	certain	protections	under	law.	In	contrast,	men	
of	ill	repute	could	be	subjected	to	torture.131	Whether	the	court	deemed	a	person	reputable	
or	not	depended	largely	on	what	other	people	said	about	him.	A	reputable	person	could	call	
on	any	number	of	friends	and	neighbors	to	vouch	for	his	or	her	good	name,	including	to	
counter	defamatory	testimony	from	mortal	enemies.	In	contrast,	a	person	of	ill	repute	had	
no	one	to	call	on	to	defend	his	name,	because	his	neighbors	shunned	him	or	he	had	no	links	
to	the	community	at	all.	Either	way,	he	was	considered	a	dangerous	individual	who,	by	
definition,	required	discipline	or	removal,	and	the	statutes	gave	judges	wide	latitude	to	do	
just	that.	Thus,	criminal	investigations	proceeded	along	two	very	different	paths,	
depending	on	the	fama	of	the	suspect.	There	were	effectively	two	justice	systems	in	place:	
one	for	in-groups	and	one	for	out-groups.	
Even	before	the	authorities	heard	any	testimony	about	a	suspect	or	questioned	him	
personally,	they	might	assess	his	fama	simply	by	looking	at	him.132	Physical	appearance	
said	much	about	one’s	fama	and	was	accepted	as	evidence	in	court.	In	a	1296	curfew	case,	
for	example,	a	witness	who	did	not	seem	to	know	the	defendants	well	attested	their	good	
fama	“from	the	sight	of	[their]	body.”133	The	podestà’s	familia	made	similar	judgments	on	
sight.	In	a	1286	arms-bearing	case,	the	judge	was	skeptical	of	the	defendant’s	claim	to	
clerical	status	because	he	appeared	in	court	“without	a	tonsure	and	with	a	helmet	and	
cuirass	on	his	back	and	without	any	clerical	habit.”134	Likewise,	the	notary	carefully	
recorded	the	attire	of	another	alleged	gambler	in	a	1291	case—a	robe,	gray	cloak,	gray	
hood,	and	two	pairs	of	socks	and	shoes—as	if	to	preclude	any	argument	that	he	was	a	
marochus.135	And	in	a	1312	arms	case,	the	judge	acquitted	the	defendant	in	part	because	
“he	did	not	seem	ill-intentioned.”136	Conversely,	when	a	suspect	appeared	before	the	judge	
with	a	physical	disability,	this	did	not	speak	well	of	his	fama.	For	example,	Pino	of	Ferrara,	
tortured	as	a	common	thief	in	1286,	would	have	appeared	immediately	suspicious	for	
having	only	one	eye—the	result	of	a	punishment	for	theft,	he	confessed,	under	a	previous	
podestà.137	The	assumption	that	criminals	often	looked	like	criminals	also	explains	why,	in	
an	otherwise	routine	gambling	case	from	1291,	the	familia	reported	that	one	of	the	two	
suspects	had	only	one	eye.138	
As	a	matter	of	standard	procedure,	the	court	cross-checked	the	names	of	curfew,	
arms-bearing,	and	gambling	offenders	with	the	list	of	criminals	outlawed	by	the	commune.	
This	practice	is	evident	from	a	few	cases	where	wanted	men	gave	false	names	to	the	court.	
In	one	such	case	from	1321,	a	foreigner	named	Antonio,	arrested	for	carrying	a	knife,	
confessed	that	he	had	intentionally	given	the	podestà’s	notary	another	name,	“since	he	was	
outlawed	for	a	crime	and	knew	it,	and	so	that	it	would	not	become	known,	through	his	
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being	discovered	with	arms,	that	his	own	true	name	had	been	written	in	the	book	of	
outlaws.”139	Similar	is	the	case	of	Tura	of	Casola	Canina,	hanged	as	a	common	thief	in	1286.	
As	the	notary	recorded	his	confession,	Tura	had	told	the	judge	he	was	the	son	of	Albertino,	
although	truthfully	he	was	the	son	of	Paolo	Raneri,	and	he	had	changed	his	name	thus	“so	
that	he	could	escape	from	our	hands.”140	How	the	court	saw	through	such	lies	is	an	
interesting	question,	but	one	the	sources	do	not	allow	us	to	answer.	Other	outlaws	were	
more	forthcoming,	it	seems.	In	February	1318,	two	berrovarii	reported	that	Mengo	da	
Bagnarola	had	fled	from	them	into	a	nearby	house	after	they	discovered	him	carrying	a	
knife.	The	officers	never	found	the	knife,	but	they	did	find	Mengo	and	brought	him	before	
the	podestà’s	knight.	Asked	why	he	had	hidden	from	them,	Mengo	answered	that	he	was	
under	ban	for	robbery,	a	fact	he	also	confessed	before	the	judge	in	court.141	And	in	a	1283	
case	from	Perugia,	the	judge	asked	Simonello	Talone,	apparently	arrested	for	violating	
curfew,	if	he	was	an	outlaw.	Simonello	admitted	that	he	was,	having	been	placed	under	ban	
for	the	murder	of	a	certain	Prodo	one	year	earlier.	The	next	day	in	court	Simonello	
confessed	to	the	homicide,	committed	with	a	knife	in	the	neighborhood	of	San	Fortunato.	
The	judge	ordered	him	to	pay	a	hefty	fine	within	three	days	or	face	the	loss	of	his	right	
hand	and	head	in	accordance	with	statute.142	Thus,	just	as	“the	technology	of	
documentation”	was	a	powerful	tool	for	Dominican	inquisitors	in	Languedoc,	it	allowed	the	
secular	courts	in	the	communes	to	track	and	prosecute	wanted	men.143	
The	Crowns	and	Arms	records	indicate	that	this	cross-checking	with	the	book	of	
outlaws	produced	results	on	other	occasions	as	well.	A	prime	example	is	the	case	of	Santo	
of	Faenza,	one	of	two	men	arrested	by	the	familia	in	February	1287	for	playing	dice	next	to	
the	church	of	Madonna	del	Monte.	When	Santo	failed	to	make	a	valid	legal	excuse	or	
produce	guarantors,	the	court	placed	him	in	jail	and	condemned	him	to	a	25-lire	fine.	Six	
days	later,	however,	the	court	brought	him	back	for	questioning.	Under	closer	examination,	
Santo	admitted	he	was	an	outlaw	of	the	commune.	The	previous	podestà,	Tebaldo	Brusati	
of	Brescia,	had	banned	him	for	striking	a	certain	Gallo,	who	then	lived	with	him	in	the	
house	of	Dottino	Dotti,	with	a	dagger	and	drawing	blood.	The	notary	changed	his	sentence	
to	read:	“absolved	of	the	penalty	for	gambling	since	his	foot	must	be	amputated.”144	In	
1302,	a	certain	Dinolo	of	Romagna,	arrested	for	carrying	a	knife,	was	released	from	prison	
after	having	his	foot	cut	off.	Savorino	of	Pistoia,	found	with	a	lance	and	shield	in	August	
1314,	was	hanged	as	a	thief	two	days	later.	And	in	1326,	one	Leonardo,	arrested	for	playing	
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dice,	was	“absolved”	of	gambling	since	he	was	(by	then)	hanged	at	the	podestà’s	order.145	
The	number	of	petty	offenders	who	turned	out	to	be	wanted	men	was	surely	greater	than	
the	Crowns	and	Arms	records	indicate.	To	take	the	case	of	Guglielmo	Accarisi	once	again,	
there	is	no	record	of	his	arrest	for	carrying	a	dagger	at	night	in	the	Crowns	and	Arms	
register	for	the	second	semester	of	1291,	even	though	that	register	has	the	appearance	of	
completeness.	We	know	of	the	familia’s	role	in	his	apprehension	only	through	the	death	
sentence	against	him	as	an	outlaw	for	homicide.		
Besides	cross-checking	names	with	the	books	of	outlaws,	judges	investigated	the	
fama	of	everyone	who	came	into	police	custody.	A	judge	had	several	ways	to	accomplish	
this.	He	might	interrogate	the	defendants	themselves,	as	seen	at	the	start	of	this	chapter	
when	Judge	Ugo	asked	the	curfew	breakers	whether	they	were	thieves	or	assassins.	
Alternatively,	a	judge	might	question	neighbors	about	the	suspect’s	fama.	In	a	1295	case,	
two	men	found	with	knives	at	night	were	placed	in	jail	while	the	judge	questioned	two	
representatives	from	their	parish	about	their	character.	The	suspicion	may	have	been	well-
grounded:	one	of	these	witnesses	stated	they	were	bad	men	and	that	he	had	heard	one	of	
them	had	stolen	an	anvil.146	In	a	1287	case,	the	judge	questioned	some	six	individuals,	
including	the	judge	Rebaconte	Panzoni	and	two	members	of	the	da	Sala	family,	about	an	
individual	suspected	of	spectating	at	a	dice	game.147	Furthermore,	podestà	sometimes	sent	
their	officials	to	the	scene	of	a	discovery	in	order	to	interrogate	the	local	residents.148	After	
gambling	raids	in	particular,	the	podestà	often	dispatched	a	knight	and	notary	to	question	
the	neighbors	of	the	alleged	gambling	house	or	tavern.	A	September	1310	inquisition	
against	an	alleged	gambling	host	and	criminal	associate	spells	out	that	the	knight	and	
notary	held	the	inquisition	“across	the	street	from	the	house	of	the	committed	delict”	and	
made	each	witness	(13	in	total)	swear	to	tell	the	truth	with	his	or	her	hand	on	the	gospel.149	
In	a	1289	case	where	the	familia	found	two	gaming	tables	in	a	tavern,	the	podestà’s	officials	
interrogated	locals	that	very	evening,	right	next	to	the	tavern	in	question.	With	the	
taverners	in	custody,	they	questioned	23	neighborhood	residents	that	evening	and	seven	
more	over	the	next	two	days,	asking	them	what	they	knew	about	the	veracity	of	the	
allegations.150	Multiple	other	instances	of	this	practice	survive	in	the	records.151	
Alternatively,	the	podestà	might	send	out	the	commune’s	heralds	to	invite	testimony	
against	a	suspect.	In	September	1310,	for	example,	the	heralds	blazoned	around	town	that	
anyone	who	had	anything	to	say	against	Giovanni	di	Giacomino,	arrested	for	breaking	
curfew	the	previous	night	and	“appearing	to	be	a	man	of	bad	condition	and	reputation,”	
should	come	before	the	judge	before	terce	the	next	day,	or	else	Giovanni	would	be	restored	
to	his	previous	liberty	the	following	morning.152	After	an	evening	patrol	in	March	1315	
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netted	nine	suspects—five	on	curfew	charges,	one	for	arms-bearing,	and	three	for	music-
making—the	podestà	sent	out	the	heralds	to	invite	everyone	in	the	city	who	might	have	
something	to	say	against	them	to	come	testify,	either	publicly	or	in	secret,	that	day	or	the	
next.153	Again	in	February	1324,	the	heralds	invited	any	citizen	to	bring	charges	against	an	
individual	found	by	the	miles	in	violation	of	curfew	the	night	before.154		
However	the	judge	collected	fama	about	the	suspect,	it	could	play	a	deciding	role	in	
the	ensuing	trial.	The	following	pair	of	curfew	cases	from	1290,	both	involving	suspects	
found	under	suspicious	circumstances,	demonstrates	this	clearly.	In	the	first	case,	the	
familia	found	a	certain	Ugolino	out	in	his	home	neighborhood	of	San	Leonardo	one	night	in	
early	January,	without	a	light	and	carrying	a	load	of	linens.	Textiles	were	popular	loot	for	
thieves,	so	the	podestà’s	court	opened	an	inquisition	against	Ugolino	the	next	day.	The	
court	questioned	four	of	his	neighbors—one	himself	a	judge	and	the	other	three	members	
of	prominent	families—about	Ugolino’s	reputation.	His	neighbors	all	vouched	for	his	good	
name,	albeit	in	rather	generic	terms.	In	the	words	of	one	witness:	“Ugolino	is	and	has	been	
for	as	long	as	can	be	remembered	a	man	of	good	repute	and	of	good	condition,	and	[I]	
never	heard	anything	about	him	except	good,	and	he	is	regarded	as	a	good	man	in	the	
neighborhood	of	San	Leonardo.”155	Ugolino	himself	also	gave	a	statement.	He	admitted	that	
he	was	found	without	a	light	by	the	familia,	but	explained	that,	when	he	was	caught,	he	was	
coming	from	the	house	of	a	certain	Giovanni,	where	he	had	gone	to	help	chop	wood	and	
then	stayed	for	dinner.	The	linens	he	was	carrying	were	in	fact	his	own;	he	was	bringing	
them	back	home	after	Giovanni’s	servant	girl	had	washed	them	for	him.	In	other	words,	
when	Ugolino	had	his	run-in	with	the	familia,	he	was	only	bringing	his	laundry	home	from	
his	friend’s	house,	and	his	hands	were	too	full	to	carry	the	requisite	lantern.	The	court	
acquitted	him	entirely,	despite	his	confessed	infraction	of	the	statutes.156	
In	the	second	case,	three	watchmen	found	Bertramino	of	Como	and	another	man	in	
the	crossroads	of	Porta	Ravegnana	one	night	in	August.	They	managed	to	seize	Bertramino	
and	deliver	him	into	custody,	but	his	associate	eluded	capture.	The	watchmen	also	found	a	
knife	and	a	hand	drill	at	the	scene	of	their	arrest.	The	next	day	the	podestà’s	court	launched	
an	inquisition	against	Bertramino	“as	if	[he	were]	a	thief	and	a	robber,”	on	the	grounds	that	
the	implements	found	(which	of	course	were	assumed	to	be	his)	were	burglar	tools,	
intended	for	breaking	into	shops	and	locked	chests.157	The	three	watchmen	were	all	
questioned	in	turn	about	the	suspect.	They	reported	that	Bertramino	had	given	them	a	
false	name	at	first,	denied	having	any	companion	or	tools	with	him,	and	then	later	
contradicted	himself.	Though	they	did	not	know	Bertramino,	they	all	believed	him	to	be	of	
ill	repute	and	“to	practice	wicked	arts,”	considering	how	they	found	him.158	That	same	day,	
the	judge	had	Bertramino	tortured,	which	produced	the	desired	confession.	As	Bertramino	
told	it,	on	the	day	of	his	arrest	he	had	agreed	to	go	thieving	at	the	suggestion	of	Pagano,	the	
suspect	who	had	escaped.	That	evening	they	had	eaten	dinner	together	at	an	inn	and	then	
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went	to	work	near	the	Porta	Ravegnana,	Pagano	equipped	with	the	knife	and	hand	drill.	
Thus,	Bertramino	confessed	only	to	conspiracy	to	commit	burglary,	and	put	most	of	the	
blame	on	his	escaped	accomplice.	This	apparently	satisfied	the	judge,	who,	in	a	relative	act	
of	mercy,	sentenced	Bertramino	to	be	flogged	through	the	city.159	
	 Together	these	cases	illustrate	how	policing	in	the	communes	worked	as	a	dragnet.	
It	made	citizens	answer	for	minor	offenses,	but	it	also	made	them	vulnerable	to	serious	
legal	scrutiny	from	judges.	Once	in	custody,	a	reputable	man	like	Ugolino	had	little	to	fear,	
even	if	he	had	to	endure	the	hassle	of	being	arrested,	giving	surety,	and	getting	his	friends	
and	neighbors	to	vouch	for	his	good	name.	Indeed,	it	was	self-governing	citizens	like	
Ugolino	who	chose	to	put	up	with	this	legal	harassment	in	the	first	place.	Even	if	he	were	
imprisoned	for	a	spell,	a	citizen	of	any	means	could	pay	for	favors	from	prison	guards	or,	in	
some	cities,	to	upgrade	his	living	quarters	(agevolatura).160	But	for	men	of	ill	repute	like	
Bertramino,	a	simple	curfew	violation	could	result	in	an	expansive	inquisition,	torture,	and	
the	loss	of	life	or	limb.	The	perceived	need	to	discipline	or	remove	men	like	Bertramino	
was	one	of	the	key	motivating	factors	in	the	growth	of	police	power	in	the	thirteenth	
century.	Police	patrols	embodied	the	practical	application	of	the	philosophy	of	deterrence	
that	pervades	the	judicial	sources	from	this	period.		
Conclusion:	A	Persecuting	Society?	
The	examples	of	judicial	violence	presented	in	this	chapter	should	give	pause	to	
scholars	who	downplay	the	prevalence	of	judicial	violence	in	medieval	Europe.	While	these	
represented	just	a	small	percentage	of	the	overall	case	load,	discipline	and	punishment	
were	every	bit	as	central	to	the	system	as	restitution	and	negotiation.	At	the	same	time,	
Bologna’s	use	of	inquisition	and	judicial	violence	to	deter	and	remove	threats	to	the	public	
interest	would	seem	to	support	R.I.	Moore’s	thesis	about	the	emergence	of	a	“persecuting	
society”	in	medieval	Europe.	According	to	this	narrative,	medieval	bureaucracies	grew	
during	the	thirteenth	century	as	a	new	clerical	elite	sought	to	consolidate	its	power	and	
suppress	marginal	groups,	such	as	lepers,	heretics,	and	Jews,	whom	they	perceived	as	
threats.	Theoretical	categories	of	dangerous	persons,	the	use	of	inquisition	to	sort	
individuals	into	those	categories,	and	the	use	of	judicial	violence	to	discipline	or	destroy	
identified	threats	were	all	important	elements	of	the	persecuting	society.161	
Certainly,	the	persecuting	mentality	described	by	Moore	was	part	and	parcel	of	the	
growth	of	police	power	in	the	thirteenth-century	communes.	The	threats	posed	by	all	sorts	
of	out-groups	justified	preventive	intervention	by	authorities,	and	facilitated	a	paradigm	
shift	in	criminal	law	from	personal	guilt	to	social	danger.	However,	the	explanation	for	this	
new	mentality	is	not	as	simple	as	top-down	repression	by	a	new,	insecure	class	of	clerical	
elites,	as	in	Moore’s	narrative.	While	notaries	and	jurists	played	an	integral	role	in	
expanding	the	communes’	statutes	and	public	courts,	they	did	so	in	concert	with	a	broad	
coalition	of	political	elites,	and	these	citizens	were	interested	in	disciplining	and	excluding	
more	groups	than	lepers,	heretics,	and	Jews.	Indeed,	political,	economic,	and	moral	
exclusion	of	all	sorts	was	fundamental	to	the	logic	of	this	limited	access	order,	whose	
																																																								
159	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	14r–16r.	
160	Geltner,	The	Medieval	Prison,	20,	65.	
161	The	foundational	work	is	Moore,	The	Formation	of	a	Persecuting	Society.	Other	important	studies	include:	
Given,	Inquisition;	Pegg,	The	Corruption	of	Angels;	Pegg,	A	Most	Holy	War;	Moore,	The	War	on	Heresy.	
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politics	amounted	to	a	single-party	system.	In	this	context,	“marginal”	types	might	include	
noblemen	who	fought	on	the	losing	side	of	a	civil	war	and	even	guildsmen	who	maintained	
relations	with	them.	These	types	of	exclusion	were	driven	not	purely	by	social	taboos	or	
imagined	threats,	but	by	the	hard	logic	of	a	social	order	that	could	not	tolerate	political	
opposition.	Thus,	to	explain	the	growth	of	police	power	in	the	thirteenth-century	
communes,	historians	must	also	account	for	intra-elite	competition	and	the	collective	
interests	of	their	coalition	governments.		 	
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Chapter	5:	Internal	Threats:	Policing	Violence	and	Enmity1	
	 In	April	1290,	Bettino	di	Megliodeglialtri	Ricci	confessed	in	court	that	he	had	tried	to	
frame	his	enemies	from	the	Boattieri	clan	for	assault.	As	described	in	his	sentence,	Bettino	
first	bloodied	his	hand	with	a	knife	and	then	went	into	the	Boattieri’s	neighborhood	to	pick	
a	fight.	He	surprised	Baldo	and	Giacomo	Boattieri	from	behind,	provoking	one	of	them	to	
shove	him	and	say,	“What	are	you	doing	in	this	neighborhood?”2	This	was	precisely	the	
reaction	Bettino	was	hoping	for.	Now	that	they	had	“come	to	words”	and	made	physical	
contact,	Bettino	held	up	his	bleeding	hand	and	cried	out	that	he	had	been	wounded.	From	
there	it	is	unclear	how	Bettino	landed	in	court,	but	evidently	his	ruse	was	not	very	
convincing.	He	confessed	that	he	had	contrived	this	plot	with	one	of	Tommaso	Ricci’s	sons	
after	the	notary	Giacomo	Biasmaltorti—later	identified	as	a	partisan	(ex	parte)	of	the	
Boattieri	clan—had	Bettino	accused	by	Giacomo	Boattieri	and	Corso	Guglielmi	of	some	
unspecified	crime.	These	details	suggest	that	Bettino	was	pursuing	a	vendetta	through	
criminal	accusations	instead	of	direct	violence—a	vendetta	that	involved	family	friends,	not	
just	blood	relatives.	In	light	of	this	confession,	the	podestà	found	Bettino	guilty	of	
attempting	to	frame	his	enemies	“falsely,	maliciously,	and	against	the	truth”	and	“against	
the	good	and	peaceful	state”	of	the	commune.	He	condemned	Bettino	according	to	statute	
to	lose	his	right	hand—the	same	hand	he	had	bloodied	to	entrap	his	enemies.3	
The	Boattieri	and	Ricci	families	both	featured	prominently	among	Bologna’s	
political	elite.4	While	the	origins	of	their	enmity	remain	unclear,	the	commune’s	mutilation	
of	Bettino	failed	to	lay	the	feud	to	rest.	When	Rosso	della	Tosa	took	office	as	podestà	in	
January	1292,	one	of	his	first	orders	of	business	was	to	place	the	two	families	on	house	
arrest.	The	statutes	allowed	the	podestà	to	confine	warring	parties	to	specific	locations	in	
the	city	or	contado	whenever	this	seemed	politically	expedient.5	He	therefore	sent	eight	
partisans	of	the	Ricci—including	Bettino’s	father,	Megliodeglialtri—to	the	house	of	
Francesco	Preti,	a	leading	popolano.	He	also	sent	nine	of	the	Boattieri—including	Giacomo	
Biasmaltorti,	the	instigator	of	the	legal	charge	that	Bettino	claimed	to	have	been	
avenging—to	the	house	of	Delfino	del	Priore,	a	belted	knight.6	The	podestà	ordered	the	
																																																								
1	Parts	of	this	chapter	appear	in	Roberts,	“Vendetta.”	
2	ASB,	Accusationes	9a,	reg.	3,	1r:	“Quid	vadis	tu	faciendo	per	contratam?”	The	trial	record	does	not	explicitly	
identify	Bettino	as	a	Ricci,	but	his	father’s	unusual	name	and	the	context	(including	the	case	below)	leave	little	
doubt	about	his	family	name.	
3	ASB,	Accusationes	9a,	reg.	3,	1r:	“Et	etiam	probatum	est	legictime	per	testes	receptos	contra	eum	ipsum	de	
dicto	mense	aprilis	falso	et	contra	veritatem	et	malitiose	fecisse	predicta.	[...]	Ideo,	cum	tales	falsitates	et	
malitias	et	tam	turpia	crimina	conmictere	sint	res	pessime	et	mali	exempli	et	contra	bonum	et	tranquillum	
statum	comunis	et	populi	Bononie.”	The	sentence	accorded	with	the	statutory	punishment	for	false	testimony	
in	a	case	of	armed	assault;	see	Statuti	1288,	1:213.	For	Giacomo	Biasmaltorti’s	occupation	as	a	notary,	see	
Statuti	1288,	1:392.	
4	The	Boattieri	and	Ricci	families	included	several	important	political	figures	among	their	ranks.	Graziolo	
Boatteri	held	the	office	of	anzianus	nine	times	between	1283	and	1303,	and	Tommaso	Ricci	did	so	eight	times	
between	1287	and	1309.	The	Boattieri	were	a	family	of	mixed	political	status,	however,	with	several	
magnates	and	belted	knights	among	them,	including	Cervo	in	the	note	below.	See	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	
173,	285,	560–61.	
5	Statuti	1288,	1:186.	See	discussion	below.	
6	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	33r–v,	35r–v.	The	Boattieri	party	comprised:	Cervo	and	his	sons	Ubaldo	and	
Niccoluccio;	Graziolo	and	his	brother	Guido;	Bonincontro;	Giacomo;	and	two	allies	of	the	family,	Giacomo	
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confinees	not	to	stray	more	than	25	brachia	from	their	respective	houses	under	penalty	of	
1,000	lire;	each	party	had	to	provide	ten	guarantors	for	this	sizable	sum.	Furthermore,	
although	the	podestà	allowed	them	to	come	to	the	palace	on	official	business,	he	gave	
orders	to	ensure	their	paths	would	never	cross.	He	ordained	specific	routes	for	each	party	
to	follow	through	the	city	streets,	and	only	allowed	them	to	come	on	alternating	days:	the	
Ricci	on	Monday,	Wednesday,	and	Friday;	the	Boattieri	on	Tuesday,	Thursday,	and	
Saturday.	He	also	allowed	them	to	attend	Mass	at	their	parish	churches	every	day,	if	they	so	
desired.	That	same	month,	the	podestà	ordered	the	jailers	of	the	upper	prison	not	to	
release	Benvenuto	Ricci	from	their	custody	without	his	express	permission	and	to	guard	
him	carefully,	under	penalty	of	2,000	lire.	The	record	does	not	state	what	Benvenuto	had	
done	to	deserve	prison	rather	than	house	arrest.7	
Over	the	next	few	months,	the	podestà	modified	their	terms	of	confinement	multiple	
times,	suggesting	a	sustained	attempt	to	hold	the	feud	in	check.	He	had	the	Boattieri	
relocated	to	the	house	of	Balduino	Balduini,	a	prominent	judge,	less	than	three	weeks	after	
the	initial	order.	He	placed	two	more	Ricci	under	house	arrest,	and	released	two	
individuals	from	each	party	in	May.	The	record	does	not	indicate	how	long	these	house	
arrest	orders	lasted,	but	the	Ricci	and	Boattieri	were	confined	to	their	respective	locations	
for	at	least	five	months.8		
While	they	were	in	confinement,	the	podestà	also	had	his	familia	keep	a	close	eye	on	
these	houses,	as	a	pair	of	arms-bearing	trials	show.	That	January,	the	familia	charged	
Bonincontro	Boattieri,	who	was	among	those	confined,	with	refusing	to	be	searched	for	
illegal	weapons,	and	a	certain	Bencivenni	di	Giliolo,	who	was	with	him,	for	carrying	one.	
The	berrovarius	Ghino	told	the	following	story	in	court:	when	he	arrived	at	the	house	of	
Delfino	del	Priore	“where	the	Boattieri	are	residing	in	confinement,”	he	saw	Bonincontro	
moving	toward	the	house.	He	ordered	him	to	stop	“in	such	a	way	that	he	could	hear	him	
well,”	but	Bonincontro	paid	him	no	heed	and	entered	the	house.	Before	long	he	came	back	
outside	wearing	armor	and	carrying	a	new	license	for	it.	Ghino’s	comrade	Faldo	added	the	
following:	when	“he	was	searching	carefully	for	weapons	among	the	men	who	were	at	the	
house	of	Delfino	del	Priore	where	the	Boattieri	are	residing	in	confinement,”	he	found	a	
small	sword	on	the	ground	behind	Bencivenni.9	He	testified	that	Bencivenni	was	nearest	
the	sword,	which	would	have	made	him	guilty	for	it,	but	Bencivenni	denied	in	court	that	it	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Biasmaltorti	and	Filippo	Lisignuoli.	The	Ricci	party	comprised:	Bartolomeo;	Megliodeglialtri;	Tommasino	and	
his	son	Paolo;	and	their	allies	Giacomino	and	Giovanni	Spavaldi,	Gilio	Azzi,	and	Gerardo	da	Cocca.	For	Delfino	
del	Priore,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	139.	The	Preti	were	also	a	powerful	popolano	family;	Blanshei,	
Politics	and	Justice,	451,	557.	
7	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	1v,	3r,	33v–34r.	
8	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	7v,	11r,	13v,	33v–34r.	On	Balduino	Balduini,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	
245.	
9	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	20v:	“Qui	Ghinus	retulit	et	dixit	quod,	cum	iret	ante	aliam	familiam	apud	
domum	domini	Dalfini	del	Priore	ubi	Bovatterii	morantur	ad	confinia,	vidit	dictum	Bonincontrum	[de	
Bovatteriis]	ire	versus	quandam	domum.	Et	cum	ipse	berrovarius	dixisset	eidem	[illegible	word],	‘Vade	
plane,’	ita	quod	potuit	eum	bene	audire,	ipse	Bonincontrus	tamen	passim	passim	[sic]	intravit	dictam	domum.	
Et	postea	cum	exivit	de	dicta	domo	habebat	arma	defensibilia,	tamen	sed	habebat	bulletam	novam.	[…]	Qui	
Faldus	retulit	acque	dixit	quod	[cum]	ipse	scrutaretur	pro	armis	inter	homines	qui	erant	apud	domum	domini	
Dalfini	del	Priore,	ubi	morantur	Bovatterii	ad	confinia,	invenit	quendam	gradiolum	parvum	de	ferire	in	terra	
post	dictum	Bencivenni.	Et	ipse	Bencivenni	erat	propior	dicto	gradio	aliquo	qui	esset	ibi	et	habebat	arma	
defensibilia	cum	bulla	nova.”		
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was	his.	Fortunately	for	him,	Bonincontro	came	forward	and	confessed	that	he	was	the	
weapon’s	owner.	After	spotting	the	familia,	he	had	laid	down	the	sword	and	gone	inside	in	
order	to	avoid	an	arms-bearing	charge.	In	the	end	Bonincontro	was	convicted	and	the	
charge	against	Bencivenni	dropped.	Yet	the	familia	evidently	continued	their	surveillance	
after	this	case.	Just	three	weeks	later	in	February,	berrovarii	reported	finding	Bonincontro	
again,	this	time	standing	“under	the	portico	of	the	house	in	which	he	is	staying	in	
confinement”	with	a	knife.10	Again	he	was	convicted	and	fined	10	lire.	
Thus,	over	a	two-year	period,	Bologna’s	podestà	attempted	to	suppress	a	feud	
between	two	elite	families	through	corporal	punishment,	house	arrest,	and	police	
surveillance.11	Any	one	of	these	incidents	alone	might	be	dismissed	as	an	anomaly,	but	
together	they	show	a	sustained	effort	by	government	authorities	to	prevent	the	escalation	
of	the	Boattieri-Ricci	conflict,	which	could	well	have	had	implications	for	political	stability.	
Even	if	their	enmity	was	ultimately	resolved	by	a	peace	agreement	or	extrajudicial	
mediation,	the	evidence	belies	Andrea	Zorzi’s	assertion	that	government	authorities	
“recognized	the	existence	of	conflicts	and	tried	to	resolve	them	without	repression	or	
punishment.”12	 	
This	evidence	of	sustained	government	repression	raises	questions	about	the	recent	
historiography	of	vendetta	in	the	communes	and	medieval	Europe	more	broadly.	Over	the	
past	two	decades,	Zorzi	especially	has	championed	the	view	that	Italy’s	communes	
legitimated	vendetta.13	As	the	argument	goes,	vendetta	enjoyed	both	cultural	legitimacy,	
thanks	to	its	widespread	practice	and	society’s	moral	ambivalence	toward	the	institution,	
and	legal	legitimacy	thanks	to	communal	statutes	that	allowed	the	practice.	Although	
certain	communes’	statutes	(including	Bologna’s)	placed	restrictions	on	vendetta,	Zorzi	
states	that	“not	a	single	text	banned	vendetta”	and	“civic	laws	neither	prohibited	nor	
prosecuted	it.”	He	accounts	for	vendetta’s	legitimacy	primarily	in	terms	of	its	social	
function,	arguing	that	vendetta,	unlike	the	mass	exiles	and	factional	violence	that	plagued	
the	Italian	communes,	was	a	symmetrical	response	to	violence	that	sought	to	restore	social	
equilibrium	rather	than	leave	one	side	victorious	over	the	other.	It	put	in	place	“a	
temporary	balance	in	the	exchange	of	injury”	that	could	allow	parties	in	conflict	to	
negotiate	peace.	Consequently,	the	communes	recognized	vendetta’s	“positive	value”	as	a	
“practice	of	social	self-regulation”	and	“balancing	mechanism”	that	worked	to	limit	violence	
rather	than	spread	it.14	Although	a	few	scholars	have	challenged	this	view,	Zorzi’s	reading	
remains	highly	influential	in	the	field.15	
																																																								
10	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(46	fols.),	2v:	“Berovarii	et	familiares	domini	potestatis	predicti	[…]	invenerunt	et	
viderunt	Bonincontrum	condam	Cambii	de	Boacteriis	capelle	Sancti	Nicholay	Burgi	Sancti	Felicis	sub	porticu	
domus	in	qua	moratur	ad	confinia	habentem	unum	cultellum	ad	ferire	contra	formam	statuti	ad	latus.”	
11	For	the	distinction	between	vendetta	and	feud,	see	note	37	in	the	Introduction.	
12	Zorzi,	“Legitimation,”	34.	
13	“Legitimation”;	“Consigliare	alla	vendetta”;	“‘Fracta	est	civitas	magna’”;	“La	cultura	della	vendetta”;	“Conflits	
et	pratiques	infrajudiciaires”;	“‘Ius	erat	in	armis.’”	See	also	the	volume	edited	by	Zorzi,	Conflitti,	paci	e	
vendette	nell’Italia	comunale.	
14	Zorzi,	“Legitimation.”	Quotations	on	44,	47–48.		
15	Vallerani	echoes	Zorzi	that	vendetta	was	“widely	recognized	in	the	communal	statutes”	in	Medieval	Public	
Justice,	116.	For	alternative	readings,	see	Dean,	Crime	and	Justice,	123–32;	Dean,	“Violence,	Vendetta,	and	
Peacemaking”;	Dean,	“Marriage	and	Mutilation”;	Maire	Vigueur,	“Progetti	di	trasformazione”;	Maire	Vigueur,	
Cavaliers	et	citoyens.	
	 157	
The	rehabilitation	of	vendetta	is	part	of	a	broader,	functionalist	current	in	medieval	
studies,	mentioned	in	the	Introduction,	that	emphasizes	the	social	uses	(and	social	value)	of	
institutions.	Whether	the	subject	is	hatred,	reputation,	violence,	or	the	public	trial,	these	
studies	elucidate	how	institutions	“worked”	within	the	logic	of	the	social	order.16	The	
functionalist	paradigm	has	especially	transformed	the	study	of	medieval	justice	to	include	
extra-	and	infrajudicial	processes	of	conflict	resolution,	such	as	vendetta,	peacemaking,	and	
arbitration.17	The	functionalist	approach	to	vendetta	has	shed	valuable	light	on	the	
structures	of	medieval	social	orders,	and	helped	to	correct	some	long-standing	biases	in	the	
historiography.	In	a	society	where	relationships	of	friendship	and	enmity	determined	the	
order,	the	pursuit	of	vendetta	was	clearly	a	rational	decision	and,	in	certain	situations,	
culturally	sanctioned	or	even	obligatory.18	Indeed,	vendetta	is	common	to	many	cultures	
because	it	addresses	the	universal	need	to	establish	rules	for	the	use	of	violence.19	Having	
recognized	vendetta’s	social	value,	today’s	historians	no	longer	assume	that	it	suffered	a	
gradual	but	inevitable	decline	in	the	face	of	growing	state	power.20	And	they	are	far	less	
likely	than	their	predecessors	to	speak	in	terms	of	the	triumph	of	public	justice	over	
private,	or	the	state’s	progressive	claim	to	a	monopoly	on	the	legitimate	use	of	violence.	
However,	the	notion	that	communal	statutes	sanctioned	vendetta	is	not	entirely	
accurate.	Trevor	Dean	has	emphasized	some	of	the	ways	that	communes	did	in	fact	
prohibit	or	prosecute	vengeance.	Some	communes	penalized	vendetta	outright,	while	
others	prescribed	severe	penalties	for	secondary	vendetta	that	were	double,	triple,	or	even	
quadruple	the	norm	for	assault	or	homicide.	Furthermore,	judges	and	jurists	do	not	seem	
to	have	sanctioned	the	practice.	Jurisprudence	distinguished	between	the	legitimacy	of	
defending	oneself	in	a	single	fight	and	the	illegitimacy	of	starting	a	new	fight	in	order	to	
take	revenge.	In	legal	practice,	judges	did	not	accept	vendetta	as	an	excuse	for	violence,	nor	
did	defendants	and	their	lawyers—who	were	generally	adept	at	finding	loopholes	in	the	
statutes—appeal	to	vendetta	laws	to	exonerate	themselves.21	Thus,	if	most	communes’	
																																																								
16	On	the	social	functions	of	violence	and	hatred,	see	Skoda,	Medieval	Violence;	Smail,	“Violence	and	
Predation”;	Smail,	“Hatred”;	Throop	and	Hyams,	eds.,	Vengeance;	Rosenwein,	ed.,	Anger’s	Past.	On	the	function	
of	public	courts,	see	Vallerani,	Medieval	Public	Justice;	Wickham,	Courts	and	Conflict	in	Twelfth-Century	
Tuscany;	Kuehn,	Law,	Family	&	Women.	Smail	ties	together	all	three	threads	in	The	Consumption	of	Justice.	For	
a	historiographical	review,	see	Netterstrøm,	“The	Study	of	Feud.”	
17	The	broader	literature	on	conflict	resolution	is	discussed	in	the	introduction.	On	extra-	or	infrajudicial	
institutions,	see	Garnot	and	Fry,	eds.,	L’infrajudiciaire;	Geary,	“Extra-Judicial	Means”;	Martone,	Arbiter-
arbitrator;	Padoa	Schioppa,	“Delitto	e	pace	privata.”	On	peacemaking	in	medieval	Italy,	see	Jansen,	Peace	and	
Penance;	Kumhera,	The	Benefits	of	Peace;	Palmer,	“Piety	and	Social	Distinction”;	Jansen,	“‘Pro	Bono	Pacis’”;	
Zorzi,	“Pace	e	conflitti”;	Wray,	“Instruments	of	Concord”;	Sensi,	“Per	una	inchiesta	sulle	‘paci	private’”;	
Bellabarba,	“Pace	pubblica	e	pace	privata”;	Vallerani,	“Pace	e	processo.”	The	seminal	work	of	anthropology	is	
Gluckman,	“The	Peace	in	the	Feud.”	
18	Zorzi,	“Legitimation,”	32,	42,	48.	More	broadly,	see	Freund,	Sociologie	du	conflit.	Cf.	Muir,	Mad	Blood	
Stirring,	229	for	sixteenth-century	Friulians’	ambivalence	toward	their	own	desires	for	revenge.	
19	For	a	comparative	overview	of	vendetta	across	cultures,	see	Boehm,	“The	Natural	History.”	For	vengeance	
in	a	variety	of	medieval	contexts,	see	Barthélemy,	Bougard,	and	Le	Jan,	eds.,	La	vengeance.	
20	Cf.	Rubinstein,	Studies	in	Italian	History;	Heers,	Family	Clans;	Celli,	Studi	sui	sistemi	normativi;	Martines,	ed.,	
Violence	and	Civil	Disorder;	Cecchini,	“L’assassinio”;	Niccolai,	I	consorzi	nobiliari;	Maugain,	Mœurs	italiennes;	
Enriques,	“La	vendetta”;	Dorini,	“La	vendetta	privata”;	Kohler,	Das	Strafrecht	der	italienischen	Statuten;	
Pertile,	Storia	del	diritto	italiano;	Burckhardt,	The	Civilization	of	the	Renaissance	in	Italy.	
21	Dean,	Crime	and	Justice,	126–31;	Dean,	“Violence,	Vendetta,	and	Peacemaking”;	Dean,	“Marriage	and	
Mutilation,”	7–9.	
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laws	did	not	expressly	ban	vendetta,	neither	did	they	grant	exceptions	for	vendetta	in	
prescribing	punishments	for	interpersonal	violence.	To	Dean’s	critiques	can	be	added	a	
question	of	emphasis.	If	vendetta	was	a	deeply	entrenched	custom	in	communal	society,	is	
it	really	remarkable	that	civic	statutes	did	not	ban	it	outright?	Is	it	not	more	significant	that	
the	same	citizen-legislators	who	practiced	vendetta	increasingly	sought	to	regulate	it	over	
the	course	of	the	thirteenth	century?	Indeed,	highlighting	the	“legitimation	of	vendetta”	
would	seem	to	make	an	event	out	of	historical	continuity,	while	obscuring	the	more	
interesting	question	of	historical	change.	
	 This	chapter	shows	that	one	of	the	main	impetuses	behind	third-party	policing	in	
the	communes	was	a	perceived	need	to	regulate	and	even	suppress	interpersonal	violence,	
including	the	violence	of	vendetta.	First,	it	explains	why	citizen-legislators	saw	a	need	to	
contain	the	institution	of	feud.	It	was	not	just	that	disorderly	behavior	was	bad	for	
business,	so	to	speak,	but	that	it	could	spawn	more	serious	conflict	with	political	
implications.	When	important	families	were	involved,	the	line	between	feud	and	civil	war	
was	thin;	factional	struggles	were	essentially	feuds	waged	on	a	larger	scale.	Lawmakers	
therefore	understood	their	own	potential	for	violence,	as	well	as	that	of	political	outsiders,	
to	be	problematic.	Second,	this	chapter	explains	how	the	arms-bearing	laws	were	designed	
to	prevent	men	who	had	mortal	enemies	from	expressing	their	hatred	through	“war”	or	
violence.	They	allowed	the	authorities	to	target	feuding	men,	as	in	the	case	of	the	Boattieri	
above,	and	to	intervene	in	volatile	situations	before	enemies	came	to	blows.	The	arms	
permit	system	also	allowed	the	familia,	through	random	stops,	to	discipline	a	broad	swath	
of	the	male	population	that	was	likely	to	engage	in	feud.	The	chapter	goes	on	to	argue	that	
the	regulation	of	arms-bearing	was	part	of	a	broader	legislative	program	that	aimed	to	
restrict	the	right	to	use	violence—and	to	a	certain	extent,	the	right	to	take	vengeance—to	
legitimate	public	collectives,	namely	the	popular	militias.	The	program	did	not	aim	at	a	
state	monopoly	on	the	legitimate	use	of	violence	per	se,	but,	in	keeping	with	the	logic	of	
factional	politics,	sought	to	maintain	the	dominance	of	the	ruling	coalition.	The	ruling	
coalition	needed	not	only	to	suppress	violence	from	external	enemies,	but	to	prevent	the	
defection	of	its	own	members,	and	they	seized	on	written	law	and	public	organizations	as	
powerful	tools	for	policing	unsanctioned	acts	of	violence.	Finally,	this	chapter	shows	how	
the	commune’s	preventive	policing,	beyond	suppressing	feud-related	violence,	sought	to	
prevent	enmity	itself.	Citizen-legislators	passed	laws	to	regulate	mourning,	music-making	
at	night,	festivities,	and	even	snowball	fights	in	large	part	because	these	behaviors	were	
likely	to	precipitate	new	enmities.	In	a	society	where	an	argument	over	a	dice	game	could	
engender	mortal	hatred,	and	where	political	elites	gambled	much	as	commoners	did,	it	was	
a	matter	of	self-preservation	for	the	ruling	coalition	to	regulate	gambling.	
Enmity	and	Instability	
Before	exploring	how	the	communes	policed	feud-related	violence	and	even	enmity	
itself,	it	is	important	to	understand	why	lawmakers	would	seek	to	regulate	these	
institutions.	While	processual	historians	do	not	deny	the	potential	disruptiveness	of	feud,	
they	emphasize	its	positive	role	in	maintaining	the	social	order.	Zorzi	in	particular	has	cast	
vendetta	as	a	self-regulating	institution.	Certainly,	vendetta	and	hatred	are	important	
institutions	for	maintaining	balance	in	many	social	orders.	But	they	are	an	inherently	
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unstable	solution	to	the	problem	of	violence	because	of	the	potential	for	personal	enmities	
to	shade	into	political	ones.22	
	A	pair	of	cases	from	Bologna,	which	took	place	just	months	apart,	illustrates	the	
thin	line	between	personal	and	political	enmity,	as	well	as	the	relative	ease	with	which	men	
across	social	strata	developed	relationships	of	mortal	hatred.	They	also	provide	exceptional	
insight	into	how	ordinary	citizens	thought	of	mortal	enmity,	because	in	both	cases	the	
judge	asked	the	defense	witnesses	to	define	the	concept.	The	first	case,	from	October	1289,	
never	spells	out	the	accusation	against	the	defendant,	a	certain	Francesco	nicknamed	
“Magnano,”	but	he	was	likely	facing	a	spurious	gambling	charge.	Whatever	the	allegation,	
he	tried	to	render	the	testimony	of	the	witnesses	against	him	legally	inadmissible—a	
procedure	known	as	witness	exception—by	proving	through	his	own	witnesses	that	they	
were	his	enemies.23	In	the	words	of	his	defense,	the	witnesses	against	him	“hate	him	to	the	
death	since	they	had	injurious	words	and	blows	between	them.”24	According	to	his	defense	
witnesses,	Francesco	had	exchanged	“words	and	blows”	with	his	enemies	two	months	prior	
in	August	under	the	Asinelli	tower.	Although	there	was	no	bloodshed,	some	of	the	
witnesses	claimed	that	staves	and	defensive	arms	were	involved,	and	one	witness	let	slip	
that	their	fight	(rixa)	had	broken	out	over	a	dice	game.25	After	they	confirmed	that	
Francesco	and	the	hostile	witnesses	hated	each	other,	the	judge	asked	each	defense	witness	
what	mortal	hatred	meant	and	what	caused	it.	The	Latin	record	of	these	exchanges	is	
tortured	but	worth	quoting.	According	to	one	Bartolomeo,	“Mortal	hatred	is	one	man	taking	
another’s	person	from	him	and	one	man	killing	the	other,	and	this	usually	arises	between	
men	because	of	words	and	deeds.”26	According	to	one	Gemignano,	mortal	hatred	was	
simply	hatred	of	one’s	enemy.	It	was	called	“mortal”	because	it	meant	“one	enemy	wants	to	
kill	his	enemy.”27	A	certain	Antonio	likewise	said	mortal	hatred	was	simply	“when	one	man	
hates	another,”	and	explained	that	it	arose	“for	injurious	words	which	one	man	says	to	the	
other	and	for	blows	which	one	man	gives	to	the	other.”28	Lastly,	a	certain	Zambono	likened	
mortal	hatred	to	“saying	one	man	hates	another.”	In	his	understanding,	“One	man	hates	
another	any	time	when	they	strike	each	other	and	when	they	say	injurious	words	to	each	
other	and	when	one	has	the	other	condemned.”29	
																																																								
22	Dean,	“Marriage	and	Mutilation.”	
23	On	witness	exception	procedure,	see	Schnapper,	“Testes	inhabiles”;	Donahue,	“Proof	by	Witnesses”;	Smail,	
The	Consumption	of	Justice,	95–100.	
24	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	52r:	“Et	eum	hodiunt	ad	mortem	cum	habuerint	inter	se	verba	iniuriosa	et	
verbera.”		
25	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	52r–53v.	
26	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	52r:	“Interrogatus	quod	est	hodium	ad	mortem	et	qua	de	causa	hodit	unus	
homo	alium	ad	mortem,	respondit	quod	est	hodium	ad	mortem	accipere	personam	unus	alteri	et	interficere	
unus	alium.	Et	hoc	dixit	quod	solet	intervenire	inter	homines	pro	verbis	et	factis.”	
27	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	52v:	“Interrogatus	quid	est	hodium	mortale,	respondit	quod	est	sui	inimici.	
Interrogatus	qua	de	causa	dicitur	hodium	mortale,	respondit	quod	est	quando	unus	inimicus	vellet	interficere	
suum	inimicum.”		
28	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	53v:	“Interrogatus	quod	est	hodium	ad	mortem,	respondit	quod	est	
hodium	ad	mortem	quando	unus	hodit	alium.	Interrogatus	qua	de	causa	hodit	unus	homo	alium	et	habet	eum	
hodium	ad	mortem,	respondit	quod	pro	verbis	que	dicit	unus	alteri	iniuriosis	et	pro	percussionibus	quas	unus	
homo	facit	alteri.”		
29	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	53r:	“Interrogatus	quod	est	hodium	mortale,	respondit	quod	est	dicere	
sicut	unus	homo	hodit	alium.	Interrogatus	qualiter	hodit	unus	homo	alium,	respondit	quod	unus	homo	hodit	
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Two	months	later,	another	case	unfolded	along	similar	lines	after	six	men	testified	
against	Paolo	di	Balduccio	on	charges	that	he	hosted	and	financed	illicit	gambling.	In	his	
defense,	Paolo	counterargued	that	these	witnesses	were	his	mortal	enemies	who	“hate	him	
mortally	and	regard	him	with	hatred,	and	he	them.”30	Paolo’s	own	four	witnesses	each	
confirmed	that	his	accusers	were	his	mortal	enemies	and	had	been	for	over	two	years.	The	
most	recent	incident	between	Paolo	and	his	accusers	had	occurred	a	few	months	before,	
when	Paolo’s	accusers	attacked	him	with	knives	and	stones	in	front	of	the	Prendiparte	
family’s	compound	and	chased	him	to	the	Tencarari’s,	where	he	apparently	ran	for	safety.	
Most	of	the	witnesses	would	not	say	what	inspired	Paolo’s	enemies	to	commit	this	
“villainy”	(villania),	but	Pietro	Tencarari	revealed—after	first	claiming	not	to	know	the	
cause—that	the	attack	was	to	avenge	a	brawl	(rixa)	between	Paolo	and	Petrizolo	
Carbonesi.31	As	in	the	first	case,	the	judge	asked	each	of	the	defense	witnesses	to	define	
mortal	enmity,	this	time	phrasing	the	question:	“What	kind	of	enmity	makes	a	capital	
enemy?”	Their	answers,	again,	were	wonderfully	matter-of-fact.	Simone	Calamatoni	said	it	
was	“when	one	man	wants	to	take	another’s	person	from	him.”32	Polo	Calamatoni	
answered	simply	that	it	was	“when	one	man	wants	to	kill	another,”	and	later	stated	that	
these	men	“would	gladly	take	Paolo’s	person	from	him.”33	Pietro	Tencarari	said	it	was	
“when	one	man	would	kill	another	if	he	could.”34	Rodolfo	di	Zaccaria,	who	identified	
himself	as	Paolo’s	cognatus,	defined	it	as	“when	one	man	would	injure	another,	with	or	
without	weapons.”	He	even	went	so	far	as	to	admonish	the	judge,	“Do	not	abide	them	lest	
they	kill	Paolo.”35		
The	agreement	between	these	separate	witness	groups	on	the	definition	of	mortal	
enmity	is	striking.	All	eight	witnesses	understood	mortal	hatred	to	mean	that	the	enemies	
actually	wanted	to	kill	each	other	and,	as	Pietro	stated,	would	do	so	if	given	the	
opportunity.	Multiple	witnesses	simply	equated	mortal	hatred	with	hatred,	suggesting	they	
had	no	concept	of	non-mortal	hatred.	Any	sentiment	worthy	of	being	called	hatred	meant	
to	the	death.	And	as	Zambono	stated	explicitly,	it	arose	whenever	one	man	struck	or	
insulted	another,	or	won	a	case	against	him	in	court.	It	was	a	matter	of	course.	Indeed,	the	
witnesses	may	have	been	confounded	at	being	asked	so	obvious	a	question.	Everyone	
understood	what	hatred	meant;	one	did	not	have	to	define	it.	In	both	cases,	months	had	
gone	by	without	any	peace	being	made.	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
alium	aliquando	quando	percutiunt	se	adinvicem	et	quando	dicunt	se	adinvicem	verba	iniuriosa	et	quando	
facit	condempnare	unus	alium.”	
30	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	56r:	“Et	eum	mortaliter	hodiunt	et	hodio	habent	et	ipse	eos.”		
31	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	57r–58r.	
32	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	57r:	“Interrogatus	que	est	inimicitia	capitalis	que	facit	inimicum	capitalem,	
respondit	quod	est	quando	vult	unus	alteri	accipere	personam.”	
33	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	57v:	“Interrogatus	que	est	inimicitia	que	facit	inimicum	capitalem,	
respondit	quod	est	quando	unus	homo	vult	interficere	alium.	[...]	Interrogatus	que	inimicitia	est	inter	dictum	
Paulum	et	predictos	testes,	respondit	quod	predicti	testes	libenter	acciperent	personam	dicto	Paulo,	et	hoc	
dicitur	a	gentibus.”		
34	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	57v:	“Interrogatus	que	est	inimicitia	que	facit	inimicum	mortalem,	
respondit	quando	unus	homo	interficeret	alium	si	posset.”		
35	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	58r:	“Interrogatus	que	inimicitia	est	inter	predictos	Paulum	et	dictos	
testes,	respondit	quod	voluerunt	predicti	testes	predictum	Paulum	vulnerare	cum	cultellis	et	spontonibus,	et	
per	eos	non	stetis	quin	dictum	Paulum	interficerent.	[...]	Interrogatus	que	est	inimicitia	que	facit	inimicum	
mortalem	et	capitalem,	respondit	quod	quando	unus	homo	iniuraret	alium	cum	armis	et	sine	armis.”		
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	 The	similar	witness	testimony	is	all	the	more	remarkable	given	the	apparent	social	
divide	between	the	men	in	these	two	cases.	In	Paolo’s	case,	every	identifiable	individual	
was	a	popolano,	some	of	them	from	elite	families.	Two	of	his	accusers	were	notaries,	one	a	
saddler,	and	the	other	of	the	da	Guercino	family.36	For	his	defense	witnesses,	Paolo	called	
two	Calamatoni	and	a	Tencarari,	and	one	of	his	own	kinsmen	of	ambiguous	relation.37	
(Paolo’s	own	family	name	is	never	given.)	The	political	importance	of	the	individuals,	the	
years-long	history	of	enmity	between	the	two	sides,	and	the	skirmish	from	one	family	
compound	to	another	would	seem	to	point	to	factional	conflict.	Conversely,	Francesco’s	
enmity	appears	to	have	had	lowly	origins	in	fisticuffs	over	a	dice	game	in	a	public	gambling	
spot.	Most	of	the	men	involved	appear	to	have	been	of	no	great	import.	One	of	his	accusers	
was	a	Malpigli,	but	otherwise	no	family	names	are	given.	And	his	own	witnesses	do	not	
seem	particularly	well-educated	or	used	to	testifying	in	court.	The	judge	had	to	rephrase	
one	question	for	Antonio	in	plainer	language,	for	example.38	This	contrast	suggests	that	the	
same	culture	of	honor	existed	across	the	social	spectrum.	Whether	people	came	to	words	
and	blows	over	a	dice	game	or	control	of	the	government,	the	result	was	the	same:	mortal	
enmity	that	would	endure	until	peace	was	made.	
	 These	depositions	are	as	close	as	the	historian	can	get	to	the	subjective	reality	of	
mortal	enmity.	The	men	who	mortally	hated	their	enemies	did	not	think	of	their	hatreds	
and	vendettas	as	a	social	script	or	public	performance.	They	felt	that	hatred	viscerally	and	
acted	on	it	in	the	pursuit	of	honor	and	interest.	Granted,	in	many	cases	they	calculated	that	
a	compromise,	such	as	a	peace	agreement,	offered	them	the	best	chance	of	saving	face.	But	
compromise	was	not	their	object.	Men	in	feuds	actually	wanted	to	kill	each	other,	and	
actually	tried	to	do	so	when	the	opportunity	presented	itself.	Historians	minimize	the	
significance	of	this	reality	when	they	interpret	feud	and	emotions	narrowly	in	terms	of	
their	social	function.	
Furthermore,	however	“normal”	hatred	was	as	an	institution,	it	had	the	potential	to	
disrupt	city	life.	When	those	hatreds	involved	members	of	the	political	elite,	they	could	
threaten	the	cohesion	of	the	governing	coalition	and	destabilize	the	formal	institutions	of	
government.	As	Timothy	Reuter	has	observed	with	regards	to	Salian	Germany,	“[t]he	
boundaries	were	fluid	between	the	‘private’	sphere	of	peace-breaking	and	feud,	on	the	one	
hand,	and	the	‘public’	sphere	of	resistance	and	rebellion	on	the	other.”39	Rebels	and	rulers	
experienced	wars	against	each	other	as	feuds,	and	the	same	can	be	said	for	the	Italian	
communes	with	regards	to	the	governing	coalition	and	its	opponents.	Thus,	for	the	
lawmakers	who	comprised	the	governing	coalition,	it	was	a	matter	of	self-interest	to	
suppress	feud-related	violence	and	even	to	prevent	enmity	from	arising	in	the	first	place.	
																																																								
36	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	13r,	14r.	Their	names	are:	Domenico	the	saddler,	Venedico	di	Michele,	Zarletto	di	
Giacobino,	Albergetto	di	Tommasino,	Francesco	da	Guercino,	and	Giovanni	da	Palea.	Venedico	and	Giovanni	
are	identified	as	notaries	in	another	gambling	case	where	they	were	defendants	themselves.	That	case	also	
identifies	the	former	as	Venedico	Aimeri.	For	the	da	Guercino	family,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	36,	119,	
122,	541,	553.	
37	For	the	Calamatoni,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	39,	330,	558.	For	the	Tencarari,	see	125,	128,	242,	558.	
38	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	53v:	“Interrogatus	tempore	cuius	potestarie	fuerunt	predicta,	respondit	
quod	nescit	bene.	Interrogatus	quis	dominus	erat	Bononie	pro	potestate,	respondit	quod	erat	potestas	
Bononie	dominus	Jaconus	de	Perusio.”		
39	Reuter,	“Peace-Breaking,”	361;	Althoff,	“Königsherrschaft,”	288–89.	
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They	could	not	afford	to	wait	for	their	fellow	elites	to	resolve	their	feuds	without	posing	a	
risk	to	their	coalition.	
The	blurred	lines	between	personal	and	political	enmities	explain	why	the	
authorities	sometimes	prosecuted	verbal	insults	with	heavy	penalties.	For	example,	in	
1256	the	podestà	levied	hefty	fines	against	Bonifacio	di	Castellano	and	Rodolfo	di	Graidano	
after	their	exchange	of	words	in	a	city	council	meeting	led	to	a	brawl.	He	assessed	them	200	
lire	each	“for	the	good	rule	of	the	city	and	so	that	it	might	be	an	example	to	others,”	since	
“many	evils	might	ensue	for	the	commune	and	men	of	Bologna	if	such	things	remained	
unpunished.”40	The	podestà	went	on	to	fine	Bonifacio	and	ten	other	men	for	loitering	at	the	
palace	that	evening	after	vespers—perhaps	as	they	were	daring	Rodolfo	and	his	own	
retinue	to	meet	them	in	a	street	fight.41	Likewise	in	1290,	the	podestà	prosecuted	Mattiolo	
Galluzzi	and	Delfino	di	Michele	Priore,	both	magnates,	after	they	traded	words	in	the	old	
palace.	Delfino	had	apparently	stepped	on	Mattiolo’s	feet,	which	provoked	Mattiolo	to	
stand	up	and	tell	Delfino	that	“he	ought	to	go	around	with	his	head	bowed	just	like	his	
ancestors	did.”	(The	Galluzzi	apparently	looked	down	on	latecomers	to	the	aristocracy.)	
The	insult	and	ensuing	confrontation	earned	Mattiolo	a	100-lire	fine,	of	which	he	actually	
paid	80.	In	the	words	of	the	sentence,	saying	such	“injurious	and	indecent	words”	in	the	
palace	was	not	only	against	the	honor	of	the	podestà	and	the	commune,	but	“might	have	
redounded	in	no	small	way	to	the	detriment	and	prejudice	of	the	commune	and	people	of	
Bologna.”	Delfino	received	the	lesser	sentence	of	25	lire	(of	which	he	paid	20),	but	the	
public	interest	rationale	was	the	same.42	In	light	of	these	cases,	it	is	no	wonder	the	
podestà’s	berrovarii	patted	down	council	members	on	the	palace	steps	before	they	entered	
for	meetings.43	The	pat-downs	would	have	not	only	made	it	harder	for	political	
conspirators	to	carry	out	plots,	but	also	discouraged	citizens	from	retaliating	violently	
when	they	felt	dishonored	in	the	city	council.	
Policing	Feud	
The	most	obvious	way	communal	governments	sought	to	limit	the	potential	
violence	of	feud	was	by	policing	arms-bearing.	Historians	have	generally	either	paid	little	
attention	to	the	communes’	arms-bearing	laws	or	interpreted	them	as	a	type	of	anti-
magnate	legislation,	which	targeted	the	bearing	of	arms	as	a	defining	feature	of	magnate	
																																																								
40	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	27r:	“Unde	cum	res	sit	mali	exempli	et	inde	multa	mala	posset	sequi	comuni	et	
hominibus	Bononie	si	talia	remanerent	impunita,	ideo	potestas	condenpnat	quemlibet	ipsorum	secundum	
formam	statutorum,	et	ex	arbitrio	sibi	ex	statutis	concesso	et	per	bonum	regimen	civitatis,	et	ut	sit	aliis	
exemplum,	in	libris	ducentis.”		
41	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	28v.	
42	ASB,	Accusationes	9a,	reg.	11,	6v:	“Dicendo	eidem	irato	animo	[…]	quod	debebat	ire	capite	inclinato	sicut	
fecerant	sui	maiores.	[...]	Idcirco	cum	talia	et	similia	dicere	et	facere	in	palatio	comunis	in	nostra	presentia	
possent	et	potuissent	in	non	modicum	comunis	et	populi	Bononie	preiudicium	redundasse	et	redondare.”	For	
Delfino,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	139n10.	For	the	Galluzzi	see	below.	For	another	case	of	words	
exchanged	in	the	palace,	this	time	between	Mattiolo	Buonacatti	and	Pietro	Albrici,	see	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	
(24	fols.),	8r–9v.	
43	It	is	unclear	at	what	point	this	became	standard	practice,	but	there	are	multiple	records	of	it	in	a	register	
from	1324.	ASB,	Corone	29,	1324I,	88r,	111r–v,	123v–124v,	132r–134v.	
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identity.44	However,	communes	began	restricting	the	right	to	bear	arms	at	least	a	half	
century	before	the	popolo-magnate	conflict	emerged.	The	1143	breve	of	the	Genoese	
compagna	prohibited	the	bearing	of	arms	in	the	city	except	for	those	traveling	abroad.45	By	
the	mid-thirteenth	century,	similar	laws	also	existed	in	southern	Italy	and	France,	where	
the	popolo-magnate	conflict	did	not	define	politics.46	In	fact,	prohibitions	against	arms-
bearing	had	been	a	common	feature	of	the	Peace	and	Truce	of	God	movements	of	the	late	
tenth	and	eleventh	centuries.	According	to	the	Truce	of	God	decreed	by	Emperor	Henry	IV	
in	1085,	no	man	was	to	“presume	to	bear	as	weapons	a	shield,	sword,	or	lance—or,	in	fact,	
the	burden	of	any	armour”	on	certain	days	of	the	week	or	feast	days.47	Furthermore,	the	
vast	majority	of	people	prosecuted	on	weapons	charges	were	not	magnates.	For	example,	
of	the	more	than	60	individuals	charged	with	illicit	arms-bearing	in	the	second	semester	of	
1291,	not	a	single	one	was	identified	as	a	noble.48	The	same	trend	is	evident	in	Perugia	in	
the	second	half	of	the	thirteenth	century.49	
	
[Image	2:	Drawings	of	prohibited	weapons	on	the	cover	of	a	Crowns	and	Arms	register.]	
	
Rather	than	targeting	a	specific	social	group,	the	regulation	of	arms-bearing	simply	
aimed	to	prevent	acts	of	violence.	Bologna’s	lawmakers	occasionally	made	this	rationale	
explicit,	as	in	a	1293	provision	that	placed	new	restrictions	on	contadini	and	rustici	bearing	
arms	“to	restrain”	their	“many	crimes	and	homicides.”50	Other	legislators	also	left	little	
doubt	about	their	intent.	For	example,	Emperor	Frederick	II	unambiguously	invoked	a	
preventive	rationale	in	his	Constitutions	of	Melfi	(1231):	“Our	aim	is	not	only	directed	
beneficially	at	the	punishment	of	crimes	already	committed,	but	also	at	preventing	the	
opportunity	and	grounds	for	committing	them.	Therefore,	since	the	bearing	of	forbidden	
weapons	sometimes	is	the	cause	of	violence	and	murder,	we	elect	to	resist	now	rather	than	
to	avenge	later.”51	Similarly,	Henry	IV	issued	his	1085	decree	“chiefly	for	the	security	of	all	
those	who	are	at	feud,”	and	so	that	“those	who	travel	and	those	who	remain	at	home	may	
enjoy	the	greatest	possible	security.”	His	restrictions	on	arms-bearing	expressly	did	not	
exempt	men	in	feuds	(faicosi)	and	went	hand-in-hand	with	prohibitions	against	violent	
																																																								
44	An	important	exception	is	Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms.”	For	arms-bearing	laws	as	anti-magnate	legislation,	
see	Grundman,	The	Popolo	at	Perugia,	114;	Salvemini,	Magnati	e	popolani,	85.	Cf.	Vallerani,	Il	sistema	
giudiziario,	170–71.	
45	Imperiale	di	Sant’Angelo,	ed.,	Codice	diplomatico,	1:150.	By	the	the	1160s	and	1170s,	the	Genoese	
compagna	seem	to	have	relaxed	some	of	these	prohibitions,	allowing	swords	and	knives	but	not	bows,	
crossbows,	or	lances.	For	a	discussion,	see	Epstein,	Genoa,	36,	66–68.	
46	Firnhaber-Baker,	Violence,	49–51,	77–79;	Firnhaber-Baker,	“Seigneurial	War,”	62–63;	Gonthier,	Le	
châtiment	du	crime,	55–59;	Kaeuper,	War,	Justice,	and	Public	Order,	239–40,	243–46;	Toulet,	
“L’incrimination”;	Perrot,	Les	cas	royaux,	152–54.	
47	As	in	Bologna’s	later	statutes,	the	decree	granted	exceptions	to	travelers,	provided	that	they	lay	down	their	
arms	again	upon	returning	home.	Doeberl,	ed.,	Monumenta	Germaniae,	49–51.	The	translation	is	from	
Henderson,	ed.,	Select	Historical	Documents,	208–11.	
48	Indeed,	of	the	more	than	200	total	inventiones	contained	in	the	register,	the	only	noble	was	Francesco	
Ramberti,	convicted	for	breaking	curfew;	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	34v.	
49	Vallerani,	Il	sistema	giudiziario,	171.	
50	Statuti	1288,	1:569.	
51	Piccolo,	ed.,	Liber	Augustalis,	23–27.	The	translation	is	from	Powell,	trans.,	The	Liber	Augustalis,	15.	
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crime,	namely	murder,	arson,	robbery,	assault,	and	injuring	anyone	with	“any	kind	of	
weapon.”52		
Communal	governments	were	especially	keen	to	prevent	armed	violence	of	an	
overtly	political	nature.	The	fundamental	job	of	the	podestà	and	capitano	del	popolo	was	to	
preserve	the	regime	that	employed	them,	and	judicial	records	show	that	these	foreign	
magistrates	prosecuted	rioters	and	partisans	in	factional	conflicts	for	violations	of	statute,	
including	breaching	the	arms-bearing	laws.	For	example,	in	April	1267,	Perugia’s	capitano	
convicted	14	men	for	instigating	a	riot	by	assaulting	two	brothers	and	calling	bystanders	to	
arms.	The	capitano	sentenced	each	of	them	to	150-lire	fines,	labeling	it	a	bad	example	“to	
start	brawls	and	tumults	in	such	a	way	and	to	cry	‘To	arms!	To	arms!’	in	cities,”	since	such	
actions	had	historically	led	to	uprisings	in	the	city	of	Perugia.53	The	fine	comprised	100	lire	
for	rioting	and	making	the	call	to	arms,	25	lire	for	armed	assault,	and	25	more	for	dragging	
the	assault	victims	by	the	hair.	The	capitano	also	prosecuted	each	of	the	rioters	for	the	
weapons	they	carried	in	the	tumult.	One	of	them—who	had	evidently	been	dressed	in	full	
battle	array—received	a	10-lire	fine	for	wearing	a	cuirass,	gorget,	greaves,	and	iron	helmet,	
and	carrying	a	shield	and	knife.54	Furthermore,	the	capitano	sentenced	five	of	the	rioters	to	
50-lire	fines	for	throwing	stones	from	their	houses	during	the	riot,	a	crime	typically	
associated	with	urban	warfare.	In	that	sentence,	the	capitano	reasoned	that	“so	harsh	and	
terrible	a	crime	ought	not	to	remain	unpunished”	and	categorized	the	offense	as	being	
“against	the	honor	and	good	state	of	the	city	of	Perugia.”	Finally,	the	capitano	declared	that	
if	any	of	them	could	not	pay	their	fines	within	the	allotted	time,	his	home	would	be	razed	to	
the	ground.55	The	sentence	does	not	reveal	the	motivation	for	the	attack	and	riot,	but	at	a	
minimum	the	case	shows	how	interpersonal	violence	(the	assault	on	the	brothers)	could	
have	political	repercussions	(the	call	to	arms	leading	to	mob	violence).	The	case	also	
illustrates	the	importance—from	the	perspective	of	the	commune’s	political	elite—of	
having	a	neutral	public	official	prosecute	and	punish	the	rioters.	Violent	reprisals	from	the	
victims	of	the	assault	(or	their	allies)	would	still	be	likely,	but	this	third-party	intervention	
lessened	the	likelihood	that	the	violence	would	spiral	out	of	control.	
A	1275	case	from	Bologna	is	also	revealing	for	the	perceived	links	between	arms-
bearing	and	factional	violence.	Here,	Bologna’s	capitano	del	popolo	investigated	a	riot	
(rumor)	between	the	Lambertazzi	and	Geremei	factions	from	February	of	that	year	to	
determine	who	had	participated.	In	defense	of	a	certain	Bonvicino,	Pietro	Matafeloni	
testified	that	Bonvicino	had	remained	inside	his	home	during	the	riot.	He	claimed	not	to	
know	which	party	Bonvicino	favored,	because	he	had	never	seen	him	participate	in	any	riot	
or	carry	weapons	for	either	side.	Rather,	Pietro	believed	Bonvicino	to	be	“a	peaceful	man	
																																																								
52	Doeberl,	ed.,	Monumenta	Germaniae,	49–51.	The	translation	is	from	Henderson,	ed.,	Select	Historical	
Documents,	208–11.	
53	ASP,	Capitano	2,	reg.	1,	23r:	“Cum	sit	res	mali	exempli	rixam	et	rumorem	tali	modo	facere	et	cridare	‘Ad	
arma,	ad	arma’	in	civitatibus,	et	nobis	videatur	qui	cridant	‘Ad	arma’	in	risis	facere	malum	cridum	et	malo	
modo	[…]	Et	etiam	ea	de	causa	tumultus	consuevit	esse	et	potuit	fieri	in	ista	civitate	Perusii.”		
54	ASP,	Capitano	2,	reg.	1,	23v–25v.	
55	ASP,	Capitano	2,	reg.	1,	26r:	“Cum	sit	res	mali	exempli	quod	de	domibus	proiciantur	lapides	in	talibus	et	
multa	mala	possent	ex	inde	oriri,	et	tale	maleficium	tam	durum	et	pessimum	non	debeat	remanere	inpunitum,	
ideo	dominus	capitaneus	ipsos	et	quemlibet	ipsorum	comuni	Perusii	in	quinquaginta	libris	Perusii	
sententialiter	condepnat,	adsimillando	dictum	maleficium	in	personam	quorumlibet	de	predictis	ei	qui	
aliquid	trataverit	contra	honorem	et	bonum	statum	civitatis	Perusii.”		
	 165	
who	loves	the	commune,”	since	he	never	carried	weapons	or	ran	to	arms	during	tumults.56	
Giovanni	Gozzadini	testified	somewhat	more	plausibly	that	he	had	seen	Bonvicino	run	to	
arms	a	few	times	during	riots.	But	he	emphasized	that	Bonvicino	“loved	the	commune”	
(diligens	comune),	never	took	up	arms	for	the	Lambertazzi,	was	sympathetic	toward	the	
Geremei,	and	for	the	most	part	stayed	in	the	houses	of	the	Gozzadini	and	Baciacomatri	
without	any	weapons.57	Whatever	the	truth	of	the	matter,	these	prominent	defense	
witnesses	were	expressing	their	understanding	of	what	it	meant	to	be	a	good	citizen	of	the	
commune.	In	the	popolo’s	ideology,	the	commune	was	a	tranquil	and	harmonious	
community;	men	who	bore	arms	and	participated	in	partisan	conflicts	disturbed	its	good	
state.	
In	this	political	context,	where	interpersonal	violence	often	shaded	into	the	political,	
it	should	be	no	surprise	that	the	podestà’s	familia	used	the	arms-bearing	laws	to	prevent	
violence	between	warring	parties,	as	seen	in	the	case	of	the	Boattieri	at	the	beginning	of	
this	chapter.	Indeed,	this	sort	of	targeted	policing	against	men	known	to	be	in	the	midst	of	a	
feud	likely	occurred	more	often	than	the	trial	records	reveal.	For	example,	in	August	1298,	
the	familia	charged	Bernabò	Gozzadini	and	a	certain	Cuscino,	who	lived	in	the	house	of	
Brandelisio	Gozzadini,	with	carrying	knives.	One	berrovarius	reportedly	took	the	knife	from	
Bernabò’s	hand	as	he	was	trying	to	toss	the	weapon	on	the	ground;	a	second	claimed	to	
have	seen	Cuscino	throw	his	knife	away	before	confiscating	it.	For	his	part,	Bernabò	
claimed	that	the	familia	had	found	the	knife	not	on	him	but	in	a	shop	belonging	to	the	
Pegolotti	family,	and	that	there	were	at	least	15	men	standing	closer	to	the	knife.	Cuscino	
gave	a	similar	story,	alleging	that	the	familia	had	found	the	knife	under	a	table	that	some	30	
men	were	standing	near.	The	notary	recorded	nothing	else	about	their	trials	except	that	
they	were	convicted.58	From	this	record	alone,	it	looks	like	little	more	than	a	case	of	the	
familia’s	word	against	the	defendants’.		
However,	other	sources	reveal	that	1298	was	a	year	of	violence	between	Brandelisio	
Gozzadini	and	his	sons,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	Pegolotti	and	Lamandini	families	on	the	
other.	Just	three	months	after	this	weapons	case,	their	enmity	would	culminate	in	the	fatal	
beating	of	Guidotto	Lamandini.	Fearing	the	outbreak	of	riots	over	this	murder—an	
especially	grave	threat	in	the	midst	of	Bologna’s	ongoing	war	with	Ferrara—the	city	
council	removed	these	Gozzadini	from	the	popular	societies,	declared	them	magnates,	and	
placed	them	under	house	arrest	in	the	countryside.59	Viewed	in	this	light,	an	otherwise	
unremarkable	arms-bearing	case	takes	on	a	whole	new	meaning.	It	seems	that	the	
Gozzadini	had	been	on	the	premises	of	a	shop	owned	by	their	mortal	enemies,	the	
Pegolotti,	amid	a	sizable	gathering	of	men,	some	of	whom	had	weapons.	In	all	likelihood	the	
familia	deliberately	intervened	in	this	volatile	situation,	using	the	arms-bearing	laws	to	
preempt	violence.		
Although	the	familia’s	intervention	did	not	resolve	the	conflict,	the	episode	shows	
them	using	the	arms-bearing	laws	to	coerce	mortal	enemies	effectively.	How	many	more	of	
the	thousands	of	surviving	arms-bearing	cases	had	similar	backgrounds	that	have	been	
																																																								
56	ASB,	Giudici,	Giudici	1,	3v:	“Credit	ipsum	pacificum	et	diligentem	comune,	quia	non	trahit	ad	rumores	nec	
deffert	arma.”		
57	ASB,	Giudici	1,	3v.	
58	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298	(28	fols.),	19v–20r.	
59	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	170–71.	
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glossed	over	by	the	formulae	of	notarial	recordkeeping	is	impossible	to	say.	But	there	is	
also	evidence	that	the	familia	brought	arms-bearing	and	curfew	charges	against	the	da	
Panico	and	Galluzzi	households	during	periods	of	conflict	between	those	noble	families	and	
the	commune.	To	take	the	da	Panico	first,	the	counts	had	a	checkered	but	mostly	
antagonistic	history	with	the	commune.60	Although	they	briefly	allied	with	the	commune	in	
the	war	against	Ferrara	in	1296,	relations	deteriorated	again	in	1297	after	the	counts	and	
Alberto	Galluzzi	murdered	the	esteemed	knight	Delfino	del	Priore	in	the	city	and	then	
fled.61	In	January	1300,	the	podestà	ordered	one	of	his	knights	to	destroy	the	counts’	
property	at	Panico,	overlooking	the	Reno	in	the	mountains	south	of	town,	after	they	
murdered	a	notary	from	Castel	del	Vescovo.62	In	May	1304,	the	commune	decapitated	the	
bastard	Count	Baldino	of	Panico	and	four	others	for	treason.	In	May	1306,	the	governing	
coalition	declared	three	of	the	da	Panico—Paganino,	Tordino,	and	Dosso—rebels	and	
traitors	of	the	commune	when	they	failed	to	appear	in	court	to	answer	the	charge	that	they	
and	their	allies	were	mustering	forces	to	attack	Bologna.	The	podestà’s	knight	again	led	an	
expedition	to	destroy	their	houses	in	the	countryside.	Finally,	in	January	1307,	after	the	
counts	assaulted	several	of	Bologna’s	castles,	the	commune	retaliated	by	decapitating	
Mostarda,	son	of	Count	Maghinardo,	in	the	central	piazza.63	Against	this	backdrop,	it	hardly	
seems	coincidental	that	the	familia	brought	curfew	and	arms-bearing	charges	against	
members	of	the	da	Panico’s	retinues	in	February	1299,	May	1299,	May	1300,	and	April	
1306.	In	at	least	three	of	these	cases,	the	familia	found	the	men	under	the	portico	of	a	house	
in	the	parish	of	San	Gervasio	that	the	da	Panico	and	Romanzi	families	shared	through	
marriage.64		
The	case	from	April	1306	especially	suggests	the	familia	was	keeping	a	close	eye	on	
the	da	Panico	in	the	weeks	before	Paganino,	Tordino,	and	Dosso	were	designated	rebels	of	
the	commune.	One	evening	that	month,	the	familia	brought	curfew	charges	against	two	
retainers	of	Count	Federico	da	Panico,	whom	they	found	without	a	light	“under	the	portico”	
and	“in	front	of	the	door”	of	the	count’s	house.65	According	to	the	berrovarius	Ugolo,	he	and	
his	comrade	Fantinello	were	in	front	of	the	Count’s	door	when	they	heard	it	open	and	saw	
Bitto,	one	of	the	defendants,	come	outside	and	stand	on	the	doorstep.	Bitto	never	
descended	from	the	doorstep	because	Ugolo	said	to	him,	“Don’t	move.	The	podestà’s	knight	
is	coming.”	Bitto	did	as	he	was	told	and	waited	for	the	knight	to	arrive,	but	in	the	meantime	
the	other	defendant,	Bertuccio	(nicknamed	“Ragazzino”),	heard	the	commotion	and	came	
to	the	door.	He	never	exited	the	house,	but	the	knight	had	both	him	and	Bitto	detained	and	
led	to	jail.66	The	second	berrovarius,	Fantinello,	told	virtually	the	same	story,	and	both	
defendants	pleaded	their	innocence	on	the	grounds	that	they	had	been	discovered	“inside”	
																																																								
60	Foschi,	“I	conti	di	Panico”;	Vicinelli,	“La	familia	dei	Conti”;	Gualandi,	“Le	origini	dei	Conti	di	Panico”;	
Gozzadini,	“Di	alcuni	monumenti.”	
61	Griffoni,	Memoriale,	27.	
62	ASB,	Corone	11,	1301I,	8r.	
63	Griffoni,	Memoriale,	29–31.	
64	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298–1299	(48	fols.),	11v,	38v–42r;	Corone	10,	1299	(34	fols.),	22r;	Corone	11,	1300	(82	
fols.),	9r–10v,	19r–20r;	Corone	15,	1306	(47	fols.),	17v–18r.	The	pattern	of	intervention	may	be	much	older.	
In	a	case	dated	1237,	the	watchmen	found	a	certain	Domenico	at	night	with	a	knife	(but	with	a	light)	under	
the	portico	of	Count	Ugolino	da	Panico;	ASB,	Accusationes	1a,	reg.	6,	loose	folio.	
65	ASB,	Corone	15,	1306	(47	fols.),	17v:	“Sub	porticu	domus	dicti	comitis	Federici	ante	hostium	dicte	domus.”		
66	ASB,	Corone	15,	1306	(47	fols.),	17v:	“Ipse	Ugolus	[dixit],	‘Non	moveas	te	quia	venit	dominus	miles	domini	
potestatis.’”	
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the	house.67	Ultimately,	the	judge	acquitted	both	men.	Regardless	of	the	legality	of	the	
familia’s	actions,	however,	they	still	served	the	purpose	of	reminding	the	Counts	of	
Panico—who	always	posed	a	threat	of	violence—that	the	commune	was	watching	them	
closely.	
There	is	also	circumstantial	evidence	that	in	1324,	the	familia	used	an	arms-bearing	
charge	to	target	the	Galluzzi,	a	magnate	family	whose	urban	compound	survives	partially	
intact	today.	On	19	February,	the	commune	suspended	all	business	because	Albizzo	di	
Bonifacio	and	his	sons	Comacio,	Ferino,	and	Maghinardo—all	of	the	Galluzzi	house—had	
kidnapped	the	popolano	Tommaso	di	Aldovrandino	da	Argelata.	(As	discussed	below,	
Bologna’s	statutes	called	for	the	cessation	of	all	public	and	private	business	whenever	a	
magnate	attacked,	killed,	or	kidnapped	a	popolano	until	revenge	was	taken.)	Six	days	later,	
on	25	February,	the	commune	again	ordered	a	halt	to	business	because	the	sons	of	the	late	
Guglielmo	Galluzzi—Tedisio,	Pietro,	and	Mattiolo—had	committed	an	unspecified	offensio	
against	the	popolano	Michele	di	Pietro	da	Pollicino.	One	month	later,	on	24	March,	city	life	
again	came	to	a	halt	after	the	same	three	brothers	and	a	fourth	named	Luca	targeted	
Michele	again,	this	time	assaulting	and	kidnapping	him.	Against	this	background,	it	can	
hardly	be	coincidental	that	on	20	February—one	day	after	the	first	interruption	to	city	
life—two	berrovarii	found	Guglielmo	di	Azzo	Galluzzi	carrying	a	knife	near	his	home.	The	
podestà	convicted	him	for	the	offense.68	
In	all	of	the	cases	above,	the	familia	seems	to	have	targeted	individuals	they	knew	to	
be	engaged	in	feuds	or	conflict	with	the	commune.	Yet	the	trial	records	also	suggest	that	
the	familia	used	the	arms-bearing	laws	to	intervene	more	spontaneously	in	armed	
confrontations,	either	to	break	up	street	fights	or	prevent	them	from	turning	violent.	For	
example,	in	June	1294,	the	familia	arrested	Don	Filippo,	the	rector	of	San	Geminiano,	after	
they	saw	him	toss	a	knife	on	the	ground.	The	priest	spent	four	days	in	jail	before	he	could	
give	surety.69	Again,	it	seems	the	commune	was	reluctant	to	deliver	this	cleric	to	the	
episcopal	court.	In	his	defense,	Don	Filippo	argued	there	had	been	a	street	fight	in	front	of	
his	church	that	day	and	men	had	drawn	knives.	In	an	attempt	to	play	the	role	of	
peacemaker,	he	had	taken	a	knife	from	one	of	the	combatants	and	tossed	it	away.	Two	
witnesses	confirmed	this.	As	one	testified,	Don	Filippo	had	intervened	in	the	“great	rumor	
and	rixa”	in	front	of	his	church	“lest	an	evil	befall,”	and	the	knife’s	owner	had	only	let	Don	
Filippo	have	the	knife	when	he	noticed	the	familia	arriving	on	the	scene.70	The	court	
acquitted	Don	Filippo	accordingly.	This	was	hardly	the	only	arrest	the	familia	made	for	an	
illegal	weapon	during	an	assault	or	attempted	assault.71	In	such	interventions,	the	
podestà’s	men	do	not	appear	to	have	shown	any	regard	for	whether	that	violence	was	
taking	place	within	the	“legally	sanctioned”	context	of	vendetta.	
																																																								
67	ASB,	Corone	15,	1306	(47	fols.),	18r.	
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	 Indeed,	judges	did	not	accept	mortal	enmity	as	an	excuse	for	ignoring	the	
commune’s	ban	on	assault	weapons.	Trevor	Dean	has	already	made	this	point	more	
generally	about	judicial	practice	in	Bologna,	and	the	Crowns	and	Arms	registers	show	this	
to	have	been	true	in	arms-bearing	cases	as	well.72	Some	defendants	tried	to	excuse	
themselves	on	the	grounds	that	they	had	mortal	enemies,	but	I	have	found	no	cases	where	
this	defense	proved	effective.	For	example,	in	August	1291,	Graydano	di	ser	Fantolino	
explained	to	the	judge	that	he	had	been	carrying	a	knife	in	his	stocking	for	his	personal	
protection	since	his	brother	“had	died”	(i.e.,	been	murdered).	The	judge	convicted	him	
nonetheless.73	In	March	1296,	the	familia	discovered	Giacomino,	a	resident	of	Modena’s	
contado,	in	Bolognese	territory	with	an	iron	helmet	(cervelliere)	and	shield,	but	“had	great	
difficulty	capturing	him”	when	he	attempted	to	flee.	Later	in	court,	Giacomino	explained	he	
had	fled	because	he	mistook	the	familia	for	“bad	men”	and	was	being	especially	vigilant	at	
that	time	because	he	was	in	the	midst	of	“a	great	war”	(magnam	gueram).	As	soon	as	he	
recognized	the	armed	men	as	the	podestà’s	familia,	he	came	to	them	straightaway—or	so	
he	claimed.	Whatever	the	truth	of	the	matter,	the	judge	convicted	him	according	to	
statute.74	Similarly,	in	1295	two	brothers	from	Bologna’s	contado	argued	in	their	defense	
that	they	had	been	carrying	assault	weapons	because	they	had	“many	mortal	enemies.”75	
Their	witnesses	confirmed	that	they	carried	weapons	“out	of	fear	and	for	their	defense	
because	of	the	wars	that	they	have,”	particularly	with	two	members	of	the	Galluzzi	family,	
Lippo	and	Galluzzo,	who	had	been	banned	for	murdering	their	uncle	a	few	years	earlier.76	
Once	again,	the	judge	convicted	them	according	to	statute.	Simply	put,	the	statutes	did	not	
allow	men	in	feuds	to	bear	arms,	and	the	podestà’s	judges	appear	to	have	upheld	those	
laws	faithfully.	
Furthermore,	the	communes’	weapons	regulations	aimed	to	prevent	men—
especially	men	in	feuds—from	taking	up	arms	in	the	first	place.	To	this	end,	communes	like	
Bologna	developed	a	licensing	system	for	the	privilege	of	wearing	armor.77	I	have	detailed	
the	evolution	of	Bologna’s	system,	which	seems	to	have	emerged	in	the	1260s,	elsewhere.78	
Most	salient	here	is	the	stated	rationale	for	licenses	to	wear	armor.	A	1262	law	lamented	
that	men	at	war	(habentes	guerram)	often	fell	victim	to	“assassins	and	bad	men	who	did	not	
fear	the	bans	of	the	podestà	and	commune	of	Bologna,”	because	they	themselves	were	
afraid	of	the	statutory	penalties	for	bearing	arms.	Lawmakers	reasoned	they	would	not	be	
such	easy	victims	if	they	were	protected,	and	therefore	ordained	that	all	men	at	war	and	
“all	others	wishing	to	bear	[arms]”	could—at	the	discretion	(arbitrium)	of	the	podestà—
																																																								
72	Dean,	“Violence,	Vendetta,	and	Peacemaking,”	4–10.	
73	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	29v–30r:	“Interrogatus	ubi	habebat	dictum	cultelum,	respondit	in	calcca	et	
dixit	quod	portabat	occasione	custodie	persone	sue	quia	quidam	suus	frater	fuerat	mortuus.”	
74	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(42	fols.),	15r:	“Qui	Jacominus	ad	eius	defensionem	dixit	quod	est	forensis	et	de	
comitatu	Mutine	et	de	terra	Bazani	et	ibi	habitat	cum	familia.	Quando	vidit	familiam	potestatis	credit	quod	
essent	malli	homines,	quia	ipse	habet	atentum	magnum	et	magnam	gueram	et	ipsa	de	causa	afugit.	Et	quando	
scivit	quod	erat	familia	potestatis	incontinenti	venit	ad	ipsos,	et	bene	habebat	dicta	arma	ut	confesus	fuit.”		
75	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	72r:	“Item	quod	predicti	Ugolinus	et	Berthollus	habent	multos	innimicos	
mortales	in	civitate	Bononie	et	districtu,	et	ideo	portabant	dicta	arma.”	The	familia’s	denunciation	is	in	ASB,	
Corone	7,	1295I	(30	fols.),	14v.	
76	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	73v:	“Audivit	eis	dici	quod	portabant	dicta	arma	eis	inventa	propter	
metum	et	ad	eorum	defensionem	propter	guerras	quas	habent.”	For	their	enmity	with	the	Galluzzi,	see	72r–v.	
77	For	a	comparison	of	licensing	regimes	across	northern	Italy,	see	Cavallar,	“Regulating	Arms,”	110–17.	
78	Roberts,	“Vendetta.”		
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wear	armor	and	carry	a	long	sword	without	suffering	any	penalty.79	Similarly,	a	1265	law	
issued	by	Loderingo	degli	Andalò	and	Catalano	di	Guido—two	members	of	the	military	
order	known	as	the	frati	gaudenti	who	had	been	appointed	governors	of	the	city	in	a	time	
of	crisis—allowed	anyone	embroiled	in	“war	or	hatred”	to	receive	a	license	to	wear	armor	
“for	the	protection	of	his	person,”	so	long	as	he	gave	surety	that	he	would	not	harm	
anyone.80	Bologna’s	1288	statute	prohibited	foreigners	from	receiving	a	license	but	made	
an	exception	for	students	who	were	at	war;	later,	the	exception	was	amended	to	apply	to	all	
foreigners	in	feuds.81		
In	their	oaths,	permit	recipients	swore	not	to	assault	anyone	during	the	podestà’s	
term	in	office—in	other	words,	that	they	would	wear	armor	for	purposes	of	self-defense	
only.82	For	instance,	in	1303	five	Florentines—likely	recently	exiled	White	Guelfs—swore	
before	the	podestà	that	“they	wished	to	bear	defensive	arms	since	they	have	hatred	and	
war,	because	of	which	it	is	appropriate	to	bear	these	arms,	and	they	fear	lest	they	be	struck,	
and	for	this	they	are	prepared	to	give	their	word.”83	During	a	five-week	period	in	1303,	
Bologna	accepted	sureties	for	some	313	arms	licenses,	83	of	which	were	for	foreigners	
claiming	feuds.84	Perugia	had	a	similar	licensing	regime	that	allowed	men	in	feuds	to	give	
surety	for	the	privilege	of	wearing	armor.	In	a	1277	list	of	such	sureties,	four	men	from	
each	parish	stood	before	a	judge	to	name	all	of	their	neighbors	who	had	“just	cause”—such	
as	“mortal	hatred”—to	bear	defensive	arms.85	By	1294,	each	petitioner	had	to	swear	before	
a	notary	of	the	court	that	he	would	not	strike,	wound,	or	kill	anyone	with	arms	anywhere	in	
Perugia’s	jurisdiction,	and	that	if	he	did	so	he	would	personally	answer	to	the	
magistrates.86	Clearly,	such	licensing	regimes	were	established	to	allow	men	in	feuds	to	
defend	themselves,	not	to	sanction	violence	between	mortal	enemies.		
Furthermore,	the	Crowns	and	Arms	records	show	that	the	podestà	and	his	familia	
implemented	this	licensing	regime	systematically.	Lists	of	license	recipients	indicate	that,	
by	the	late	thirteenth	century,	the	issuing	of	armor	permits	was	a	major	duty	of	the	
podestà’s	office.	Between	November	1298	and	April	1299,	for	example,	the	podestà’s	
notaries	issued	nearly	1200	permits.87	In	one	month	in	1294,	Perugia	accepted	sureties	
																																																								
79	Statuti	1245,	1:272–73:	“Cum	homines	habentes	guerram	timeant	arma	portare	propter	banna	potestatis	
sepe	per	assasinos	et	malos	homines,	qui	non	timent	banna	potestatis	nec	comunis	Bononie,	qui	feriunt	ad	
postam	oculte	feriantur,	offendatur	et	occidantur,	quas	offensiones	de	facili	non	recipient	si	muniti	essent,	
statuimus	et	ordinamus	quod	omnes	habentes	guerram	cum	aliquibus	et	omnes	alij	portare	volentes	per	
civitatem	et	extra	abque	banno	et	pena	eis	auferenda	a	potestate	possint	suo	arbitrio	portare	per	civitatem	et	
burgos	civitatis	arma	ad	defensionem	sui,	scilicet	panceriam,	gamberias,	collarium,	cerveleriam	rotellam	sive	
braçarolam	et	spatas	longas	pallam	et	non	subtus.”	
80	Statuti	1245,	3:607.	On	the	frati	gaudenti,	see	Gazzini,	“Disciplinati.”	
81	Statuti	1288,	1:227–28.	See	also	570.	
82	Statuti	1288,	1:570.	
83	ASB,	Corone	13,	1303I	(70	fols.),	56v:	“Et	dixerunt	se	vele	portare	arma	defensibilia,	eo	quia	habent	hodium	
et	gueram	propter	quod	oportet	portare	ipsa	arma,	et	timent	ne	sibi	offendantur	et	de	hoc	parati	sunt	fidem	
facere.”	Another	seven	Florentines	took	the	same	oath	that	February	and	are	explicitly	identified	as	being	“of	
the	party	of	the	Whites	of	Florence”;	see	70v.	
84	ASB,	Corone	13,	1303I	(70	fols.).	The	sureties	were	made	between	3	January	and	12	February.	
85	ASP,	Capitano	4,	reg.	1,	15r–33r.	For	one	who	had	“odium	mortalem,”	see	20r.	
86	ASP,	Capitano	19,	reg.	8,	1r–10v.	
87	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298–1299	(72	fols.).	The	notaries	granted	licenses	to	1117	citizens,	33	foreigners,	and	48	
clerics.	
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from	some	62	individuals	seeking	to	wear	armor	legally.88	Permits	also	had	to	be	renewed	
at	the	start	of	every	podestà’s	term	(typically	every	six	months),	as	the	heralds	reminded	
city	residents	on	a	regular	basis.89	Furthermore,	the	familia	made	sure	that	men	who	wore	
armor	through	the	city	were	carrying	a	valid	license	and	were	not	carrying	assault	
weapons,	which	the	permit	did	not	cover.	Trial	records	show	that	the	familia	frequently	
reported	individuals	for	wearing	armor	without	a	permit	or	while	carrying	an	expired	one.	
For	example,	in	July	1299	the	familia	reported	three	men	for	wearing	armor	with	expired	
permits	(boleta	vetera).	At	least	two	of	them,	Giacomo	Boattieri	and	Andalò	Trentinelli,	
were	from	elite	political	families,	but	all	were	convicted	anyway.90	In	brief,	the	familia	paid	
close	attention	to	men	wearing	armor	and,	in	the	absence	of	a	valid	permit,	made	them	
prove	in	court	their	right	to	wear	it.	
The	permit	system	was	a	remarkable	innovation	for	a	society	in	which	no	single	
entity	enjoyed	a	monopoly	on	the	right	to	use	violence.	As	late	as	the	1250s,	men	were	
allowed	to	wear	armor	in	the	city	as	they	saw	fit.	By	the	1260s,	this	customary	right	had	
become	a	privilege	to	be	awarded	by	the	authorities	and	verified	by	the	familia.	In	practice,	
the	licensing	system	enhanced	the	commune’s	ability	to	monitor	and	police	violence	in	two	
significant	ways.	First,	it	required	individuals	who	felt	threatened	by	mortal	enemies	to	
seek	the	government’s	permission	for	the	right	to	protect	themselves.	Only	men	who	would	
come	before	the	podestà’s	notaries	and	swear	an	oath—thereby	making	it	public	
knowledge	that	they	had	mortal	enemies	or	considered	themselves	likely	to	have	them—
were	allowed	to	wear	armor	in	the	city.	Second,	and	by	extension,	the	permit	system	
allowed	the	familia	to	focus	their	patrols	on	men	who	were	likely	to	practice	vendetta.	By	
wearing	armor	in	public,	an	individual	both	signaled	that	he	had	mortal	enemies	and	
invited	the	familia	to	check	his	permit.	When	they	did	check	his	permit—and	searched	him	
for	other	illegal	weapons—the	familia	was	in	effect	reminding	him	that	it	was	illegal	to	
assault	those	enemies.	Thus,	far	from	legitimating	vendetta,	the	permit	system	actually	
sought	to	limit	individuals’	ability	to	pursue	it.		
Toward	a	Monopoly	on	Violence	
	 To	sum	up	thus	far,	Bologna’s	government	took	on	an	increasingly	coercive	role	in	
the	enforcement	of	arms-bearing	laws	over	the	course	of	the	thirteenth	century.	For	many	
generations,	presumably,	there	had	been	no	restriction	on	individuals’	right	to	carry	a	knife	
or	sword	in	the	city	and	certainly	no	need	for	a	government-issued	license	to	wear	armor.	
By	the	1230s,	lawmakers	had	banned	combat	knives	and	other	assault	weapons;	by	the	
1260s,	they	required	most	residents	to	acquire	a	government	permit	before	they	could	
wear	armor.91	In	the	same	period,	the	podestà’s	familia	began	patrolling	the	city	daily	and	
focused	those	patrols	on	men	carrying	weapons.	
The	increased	regulation	of	arms-bearing	in	the	communes	was	part	of	a	broader	
trend	that	saw	communal	governments	increasingly	try	to	regulate	and	suppress	
interpersonal	violence.	It	would	be	anachronistic	to	characterize	these	efforts	as	the	
suppression	of	“private	warfare,”	a	phrase	that	does	not	appear	in	the	sources	and	that	
																																																								
88	ASP,	Capitano	19,	reg.	8,	1r–10v.	The	sureties	were	made	between	4	November	and	6	December.	
89	New	podestà	typically	sent	out	heralds	to	announce	that	it	was	time	to	renew	permits.	For	examples,	see	
ASB,	Sindacato	5,	1288I	(22	fols.),	1v;	Sindacato	10,	1293II	(50	fols.),	3v;	Corone	7,	1295I	(44	fols.),	1v.	
90	ASB,	Corone	10,	1299	(40	fols.),	2r–v.	See	also	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	10v–12r,	17v–18v.	
91	Statuti	1288,	1:225–28.	
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assumes	the	legitimate	right	to	use	violence	fell	along	a	private-public	divide.92	As	seen	
above,	“wars”	between	feuding	individuals	could	shade	into	factional	conflict	and	have	
public	implications.93	Yet	the	sources	suggest	that	Bologna’s	popolo	regime	increasingly	
sought	to	prevent	the	“illegitimate”	violence	of	individuals	and	private	collectives,	such	as	
guarnimenta	and	consorteria,	while	condoning	the	“legitimate”	violence	of	public	
collectives,	such	as	communal	and	popular	military	organizations.		
The	arms-bearing	laws	were	not	the	only	statutes	designed	to	prevent	violence	
outside	of	communal	organizations.	As	seen	at	the	start	of	this	chapter,	the	statutes	granted	
the	podestà	authority	to	place	feuding	groups	under	house	arrest	or	confine	them	to	
locations	in	the	contado.	According	to	statute,	this	authority	applied	in	cases	where	men	
were	at	war	and	a	truce	(treugua)	was	to	be	imposed,	or	where	disturbances	caused	by	
magnates	or	the	great	houses	of	the	popolo	threatened	the	“good	state”	of	the	commune.	
Besides	the	cases	of	the	Boattieri	and	Gozzadini	above,	the	podestà	exercised	this	authority	
on	multiple	occasions.94	Perugia’s	solution	was	to	empower	the	podestà	and	capitano	to	
distrain	500	lire,	in	cash	or	in	kind,	from	parties	between	whom	“any	discord	or	battle	
arose.”	Perugia’s	rectores	could	also	expel	from	the	city	and	contado	anyone	who	engaged	
in	a	brawl	(rixa).95	Other	statutes	criminalized	the	tools	and	tactics	of	urban	warfare.	For	
example,	one	statute	prescribed	harsh	penalties—up	to	and	including	decapitation—for	
arson,	shooting	arrows	in	the	city,	or	throwing	stones	from	one’s	house	at	night.96	Another	
prescribed	a	range	of	penalties	for	using	catapults	or	similar	machines	of	war	to	hurl	
objects	at	the	communal	palace.97	Another	subset	of	statutes	placed	restrictions	on	armed	
groups,	denying	citizens	the	right	to	organize	for	violence.	One	such	statute	prohibited	
anyone	from	exiting	the	city	armed	in	the	service	of	someone	else	without	the	podestà’s	
express	permission.98	A	1290	reformatio	gave	the	podestà	and	capitano	the	authority	to	
prosecute	anyone	who	participated	in	a	military	expedition	(andata,	guarnimentum,	or	
munitio)	without	their	permission.99	In	August	1293,	Bologna’s	heralds	also	proclaimed	a	
ban	against	any	guarnimentum	outside	of	town,	and	an	ordinance	from	1311	gave	the	
podestà	jurisdiction	over	battles	involving	more	than	ten	persons	on	each	side.100	In	the	
same	vein,	lawmakers	restricted	the	right	of	individuals	to	maintain	a	personal	retinue.	
																																																								
92	Firnhaber-Baker,	“Seigneurial	War,”	37–38;	Kaminsky,	“The	Noble	Feud,”	55–56.	Cf.	Shaw,	“Honour,	Faction	
and	Private	Wars”;	Carbonnières,	“Le	pouvoir	royal”;	Algazi,	“Pruning	Peasants”;	Algazi,	“The	Social	Use	of	
Private	War.”	
93	For	the	phrase	“individual	war”	(guerra	specialis),	see	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	12r.	
94	The	main	statute	mentions	men	in	the	midst	of	war;	Statuti	1288,	1:186.	However,	the	statute	on	
inquisitions	also	grants	the	podestà	this	authority	with	regards	to	the	city’s	great	houses;	Statuti	1288,	1:175–
76.	For	other	examples,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	166,	288,	310,	330.	
95	Statuto	1279,	1:299:	“Si	aliqua	discordia	appareret	vel	batalia	inter	aliquos.”		
96	Statuti	1245,	1:278;	Statuti	1288,	1:207–8.	
97	Statuti	1245,	1:281–82;	Statuti	1288,	1:208–9.	For	an	analogous	law	in	Perugia,	see	Statuto	1279,	1:293.	
98	Statuti	1245,	1:273–74.	In	some	versions	of	this	law,	the	podestà	could	not	grant	such	permission	without	
the	approval	of	the	council,	anziani,	and	consuls.	
99	Statuti	1288,	1:179.	An	earlier	statute	had	prescribed	the	death	penalty	for	anyone	who	led	a	
guarnimentum	into	the	city	in	times	of	unrest;	Statuti	1288,	1:216.	
100	ASB,	Sindacato	10,	1293II	(50	fols.),	22r;	ASB,	Provvigioni	4,	reg.	213,	2r.	The	word	guarnimenta	literally	
meant	“garnishments,”	or	in	a	military	context	“fortifications,”	but	metaphorically	signified	the	ensemble	of	
men	and	materiel	used	in	military	actions.	Antonio	Pertile	defined	the	guarnimentum	as	any	cavalcade	of	20	
or	more	armed	men,	but	Bologna’s	laws	do	not	seem	to	have	specified	a	minimum	number	of	participants;	
Pertile,	Storia	del	diritto	italiano,	vol.	5,	Storia	del	diritto	penale,	487.	
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According	to	a	1293	provision,	any	citizen	or	foreigner	at	war	could	travel	with	a	retinue	of	
armored	(but	unarmed)	servants	for	his	protection,	but	only	if	he	submitted	all	of	their	
names	in	writing	to	the	podestà	and	provided	surety	for	each	of	them	to	have	a	permit.	The	
bishop	of	Bologna	was	allowed	to	keep	up	to	12	fully	armed	familiares	and	the	abbot	of	
Nonantola	up	to	six,	provided	that	the	podestà’s	notaries	had	recorded	their	names	and	
they	wore	an	identifying	marker	(intagla).101		
As	with	the	arms-bearing	laws,	there	is	good	evidence	that	Bologna	and	other	
communes	enforced	these	laws.	In	October	1291,	the	podestà	acquitted	one	of	the	bishop’s	
familiares	of	wearing	armor	illegally	after	he	showed	his	license	as	a	member	of	the	
episcopal	household.102	In	July	1318,	Bologna’s	podestà	launched	an	inquest	against	
Tommasino	Ariosti	and	his	three	brothers	for	leading	a	guarnimentum	to	the	castle	of	
Gorgognano	(in	Bologna’s	distretto),	where	they	brutally	slayed	Francesco	Beccadelli.	
Although	the	commune	failed	to	capture	any	of	the	Ariosti,	they	did	apprehend	four	alleged	
participants	in	the	guarnimentum.	These	alleged	accomplices	all	denied	knowledge	of	the	
brothers’	intent	to	commit	homicide,	but	after	being	subjected	to	torture,	they	all	confessed	
to	aiding	and	abetting	murder,	and	were	decapitated	accordingly.103	In	Perugia	in	1279,	a	
boy	who	claimed	to	be	eight	years	old	was	made	to	answer	in	court	after	the	commune’s	
“secret	guard	elected	[…]	over	arrow-shooters”	denounced	him	and	another	individual	for	
shooting	crossbow	bolts.104	That	same	year,	Perugia’s	capitano	tried	Puzio	di	Bonagrazia	
after	the	familia	found	him	around	curfew	time	carrying	a	large	stone	under	his	cloak.105		
	 At	the	same	time	Bologna’s	lawmakers	worked	to	suppress	practices	associated	
with	warfare,	they	increasingly	reserved	the	right	to	take	vengeance	to	the	popolo’s	militias	
or	arms	societies.106	From	the	1280s	onward,	Bolognese	law	mandated	that	whenever	a	
magnate	attacked,	killed,	or	kidnapped	a	popolano,	the	public	courts	and	all	shops	were	to	
close	until	vengeance	was	taken.	The	podestà	was	to	blazon	this	order	across	the	city	as	
soon	as	he	learned	of	the	crime,	and	fine	any	public	official,	merchant,	or	tradesman	who	
kept	his	business	open	25	lire.	This	law	expanded	an	earlier	measure	from	1259,	which	had	
ordered	the	suspension	of	business	only	when	an	anzianus	or	consul	was	attacked.107	
Records	of	the	heralds’	proclamations	show	that	these	laws	went	into	effect	on	multiple	
occasions,	as	seen	above	with	the	Galluzzi’s	1324	attacks	on	a	popolano.108	By	making	
collective	vendetta	a	legal	obligation,	the	popolo	ensured	not	only	that	vengeance	would	be	
taken,	but	also	that	an	attack	on	one	member	would	be	felt	as	an	attack	on	all—if	only	
because	of	the	profits	they	lost	when	they	had	to	close	their	shops.	
																																																								
101	Statuti	1288,	1:570.	Prior	to	this	law,	the	commune	seemed	to	have	granted	licenses	to	retain	bodyguards	
on	a	case-by-case	basis;	an	example	is	in	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	12r.		
102	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	42r.	
103	ASB,	Inquisitiones	96,	reg.	2,	21r–29r.	Francesco	Beccadelli’s	name	is	also	given	as	Francesco	Artenisi.	
Blanshei	mentions	the	case	in	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	360.		
104	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	16v:	“Custos	secretus	electus	pro	comuni	Perusii	super	sagitantibus.”	Perugia’s	
statutes	ordered	the	podestà	and	capitano	to	secretly	appoint	one	bonus	homo	for	each	of	the	city’s	five	
districts	to	denounce	violations	of	the	law	against	shooting	arrows	in	the	city;	Statuto	1279,	1:305.	
105	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	15v.	
106	Fasoli,	“Le	compagnie	delle	armi.”	On	the	popular	militias	more	broadly,	see	Poloni,	“Disciplinare	la	
società”;	Artifoni,	“Corporazioni.”	
107	Statuti	1288,	1:289,	318,	383.	Statuti	1245,	3:304–5.		
108	For	another	example,	see	ASB,	Sindacato	8,	1291I	(44	fols.),	18v–19r.	
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In	practice,	the	organized	violence	of	collective	vendetta	was	hardly	distinguishable	
from	warfare.	For	example,	when	members	of	the	Baccilieri	and	de’	Berni	families	killed	a	
member	of	one	of	the	popular	militias	in	1286,	the	popolo’s	response	was	devastating.	An	
unspecified	number	of	guildsmen	and	militia	members	“ran	to	burn	down	and	destroy”	the	
properties	of	Ramberto	Baccilieri,	the	judge	Lambertino	de’	Berni,	and	others—from	their	
towers	and	homes	in	the	city	to	their	vineyards	and	woodlands	in	the	countryside.	The	
podestà	later	used	public	funds	to	compensate	several	master	carpenters	and	masons	who	
helped	to	raze	the	homes	of	the	Baccilieri,	suggesting	this	vindicta	was	a	well-organized	
and	publicly	sanctioned	event.109	But	for	good	measure,	the	Council	of	the	Popolo	passed	a	
resolution	in	its	aftermath	granting	legal	immunity	to	everyone	who	had	taken	part	in	the	
arson,	robbery,	and	general	devastation,	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	all	“for	the	honor,	good	
state,	and	preservation	of	Bologna’s	popolo.”110		
Furthermore,	the	sources	suggest	“justice”	of	this	sort	was	neither	rare	nor	unique	
to	Bologna.	In	a	July	1303	public	corruption	trial,	a	longtime	crier	of	the	commune	named	
Alberto	da	Roffeno	(see	Chapter	6)	mentioned	that	he	once	rode	in	a	cavalcade	of	400	men	
“taking	certain	vengeances”	in	the	countryside	on	behalf	of	the	commune.	He	later	sold	the	
loot	he	acquired	on	that	expedition	for	40	soldi.111	In	October	1286,	the	podestà	ordered	15	
magistri	of	unnamed	trades—likely	carpenters	and	masons,	as	above—to	be	paid	30	soldi	
for	six	days	of	work	razing	the	homes	of	criminals	in	Castel	San	Pietro.112	The	practice	of	
collective	vendetta	is	also	evident	in	Parma,	where	in	1294	the	notaries’	guild	avenged	the	
murder	of	one	of	its	members	in	the	village	of	Olmo.	According	to	a	later	chronicle,	an	
anzianus	led	100	guildsmen	to	the	village,	where	they	seized	two	of	the	alleged	malefactors	
and	recovered	the	corpse	of	the	victim.	After	Parma’s	court	had	one	of	the	captives	hanged	
and	the	other	sentenced	to	perpetual	imprisonment—and	after	the	guild	had	given	its	
deceased	member	a	proper	burial—they	returned	to	Olmo	in	force	to	destroy	the	houses	
and	properties	of	others	banned	for	the	murder.	The	chronicler	even	notes	that	the	
communal	palace	remained	closed	until	the	notaries	had	completed	their	vindicta	and	
returned	once	again	to	Parma.113	These	acts	of	“justice”	against	the	governing	coalition’s	
enemies	were	hardly	distinguishable	from	acts	of	personal	vengeance,	except	that	they	
were	carried	out	by	legitimate	public	collectives.	
It	is	significant	that	these	governing	coalitions	permitted	and	indeed	mandated	
collective	vendetta	against	magnates	and	others	who	perpetrated	violence	against	their	
members,	as	opposed	to	allowing	individuals	and	families	to	carry	out	revenge	themselves.	
The	practice	clearly	affirmed	the	role	of	public	organizations,	including	the	organs	of	
government,	in	punishing	and	deterring	interpersonal	violence,	but	offered	no	such	
affirmation	to	individuals	seeking	vengeance.	The	same	logic	is	evident	in	the	way	the	
sources	refer	to	corporal	punishments	carried	out	by	the	podestà	as	vendettas	(vindicte).114	
That	is,	the	government	increasingly	claimed	the	right	to	take	vengeance	on	behalf	of	
aggrieved	citizens.	Indeed,	the	popolo	regime	punished	its	own	members	when	they	used	
																																																								
109	ASB,	Sindacato	3,	1286II,	106v–7v.	
110	ASB,	Riformagioni	126,	17r.	Blanshei	mentions	this	incident	in	Politics	and	Justice,	384n233.	
111	ASB,	Accusationes	25b,	reg.	15,	15v:	“Faciendo	certas	vindictas.”		
112	ASB,	Sindacato	3,	1286II,	92r.	
113	Bonazzi,	ed.,	Chronicon	Parmense,	9:66.	The	episode	is	discussed	in	Guarisco,	“Il	‘popolo.’”	
114	For	instance,	one	statute	mandated	that	no	vindicta	or	pena	personalis	except	flogging	was	to	be	carried	
out	within	the	city	limits	unless	it	was	deemed	necessary;	see	Statuti	1288,	1:237.	
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violence	unilaterally,	outside	of	public	organizations	like	the	militias.	For	example,	in	
October	1300,	the	Council	of	the	Popolo	designated	Zoenne	Beccadelli	as	a	magnate	
because	he	had	mortally	wounded	another	member	of	the	popolo.	The	victim	and	his	
brother	claimed	that	Zoenne	had	attacked	him	“without	any	cause,	but	only	because	of	his	
power	and	arrogance,”	and	therefore	petitioned	the	council	to	take	this	extraordinary	
measure	“so	that	crimes	and	homicides	against	the	men	of	Bologna’s	popolo	might	cease,	
and	so	that	they	might	stay	(and	dwell)	in	their	homes	and	neighborhoods	safely.”115	In	the	
popolo’s	ideology,	such	acts	of	violence	were	the	calling	card	of	their	enemies	and	therefore	
could	not	be	tolerated	within	the	coalition.	It	is	noteworthy,	too,	that	collective	vendetta	
brought	overwhelming,	asymmetrical	force	to	bear	on	its	targets,	which	suggests	that	its	
purpose	was	not	restoring	social	balance	so	much	as	making	future	attacks	impractical.	
The	trend	toward	collectivizing	the	right	to	violence	also	helps	to	explain	Bologna’s	
practice	of	auctioning	confiscated	weapons	back	to	citizens,	as	described	in	Chapter	1.	It	
was	perfectly	legal	for	citizens	to	arm	themselves	to	the	teeth	by	way	of	these	auctions.	For	
example,	in	December	1305,	the	commune	sold	some	14	knives,	seven	daggers,	three	
shields,	and	two	lances—a	total	of	25	arms,	explicitly	noted	to	have	been	confiscated	by	the	
familia—to	one	individual,	Francesco	Papazzoni,	for	just	40	soldi.116	The	Papazzoni	and	
other	members	of	the	governing	coalition	were	expected	to	bear	arms	in	the	service	of	
popular	militias	or	the	commune’s	army—that	is,	as	part	of	legitimate	public	organizations.	
However,	if	the	familia	caught	Francesco	bearing	these	same	arms	for	his	own	ends,	and	he	
did	not	have	license	to	do	so,	they	would	be	confiscated	once	again.		
Thus,	while	thirteenth-century	communes	did	not	claim	a	monopoly	on	the	right	to	
use	violence,	they	increasingly	claimed	that	right	for	public	collectives	and	penalized	acts	of	
violence	that	took	place	outside	them.	It	is	through	this	lens	that	Bologna’s	and	Florence’s	
laws	prohibiting	“secondary	vendetta,”	or	revenge	attacks	by	anyone	other	than	the	
original	offender	and	victim,	should	be	read.117	Zorzi	has	pointed	to	these	laws	as	evidence	
of	the	legitimation	of	vendetta,	since	they	did	not	set	penalties	for	the	principals	of	the	
vendetta.	He	argues	that	the	laws’	“salient	element”	was	their	“recognition	of	the	vendetta	
system	as	a	common	mode	of	conflict	resolution	and	as	a	juridically	legitimate	
institution.”118	Yet	the	evolution	of	the	Bolognese	law	shows	rather	the	commune’s	growing	
intolerance	of	vendetta.	The	original	1252	statute	prohibited	the	victim	of	an	attack	from	
retaliating	against	anyone	except	his	assailant,	effectively	placing	kith	and	kin	off	limits.	It	
threatened	perpetual	banishment	and	the	loss	of	all	private	property	as	punishment,	but	
provided	for	the	ban	to	be	lifted	by	consent	of	the	victim	or	his	heirs,	meaning	when	a	
peace	agreement	had	been	made.	This	already	placed	a	significant	restriction	on	a	practice	
that	customarily	required	family	members	to	avenge	each	other.	But	the	penalties	for	
violating	this	stricture	also	became	progressively	more	severe.	In	1265,	the	frati	gaudenti	
(mentioned	above)	included	a	new	version	of	this	law	in	their	ordinances	to	pacify	the	city.	
																																																								
115	ASB,	Riformagioni	153,	254r:	“Absque	aliqua	causa	sed	solum	propter	potentiam	et	superbiam	suam.	[…]	
Ad	hoc	ut	cessent	malleficia	et	homicidia	in	homines	populi	Bononie,	et	ut	secure	stare	et	morari	possint	in	
domibus	et	contracta	ipsorum.”		
116	ASB,	Corone	14,	1305–1306,	4v.	The	Papazzoni	family	were	longstanding	members	of	the	popolo	and	were	
accused	of	violence	on	several	occasions;	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	101n106,	470,	478.	
117	The	Bolognese	statute	dates	to	1252;	see	Statuti	1245,	1:266.	The	Florentine	law	is	from	the	fourteenth	
century;	see	Caggese	et	al.,	eds.,	Statuti,	2:278.	
118	Zorzi,	La	trasformazione,	168.		
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The	1265	law	declared	that	those	who	killed	someone	other	than	the	perpetrator	in	an	
illicit	act	of	revenge	would	suffer	the	same	penalty	as	any	murderer	(i.e.,	death)	and	all	
their	goods	would	be	bequeathed	to	the	victim’s	heirs	except	for	their	houses	and	towers,	
which	would	be	razed	to	the	ground,	never	to	be	rebuilt.	From	there	the	penalties	
decreased,	but	they	were	still	severe:	4,000	lire	for	inflicting	serious	injury,	3,000	lire	for	
inflicting	minor	injury	with	bloodshed,	and	2,000	lire	for	inflicting	injury	without	
bloodshed.	If	the	offenders	could	not	be	brought	into	custody,	they	were	to	be	banished	
permanently	“as	for	a	most	serious	crime”—regardless	of	whether	the	victim	was	killed	or	
only	wounded	and	regardless	of	any	peace	agreement—and	all	their	properties	
redistributed	or	destroyed.	The	frati	gaudenti	passed	these	extreme	sanctions	“so	that	the	
city	and	district	of	Bologna	might	endure	in	peace	and	tranquility,	and	[so	that]	such	an	
enormous,	most	serious,	and	heinous	crime	be	extirpated	by	the	root.”119	Although	this	law	
was	likely	conceived	as	an	emergency	measure,	it	retained	full	effect—including	the	threat	
of	perpetual	and	irrevocable	ban—when	the	popolo	regime	revised	the	statutes	in	the	
1280s.120	These	laws	trended	toward	the	growing	repression	of	vendetta,	not	its	
legitimation.	
	 Indeed,	to	argue	that	the	“salient	element”	of	these	laws	was	that	they	did	not	
prohibit	vendetta	outright	is	to	assume	that	the	communes	naturally	sought	a	monopoly	on	
the	legitimate	use	of	violence.	In	fact,	communal	governments	not	only	lacked	such	a	
monopoly,	they	had	no	concept	of	it.	If	some	communes	did	not	ban	vendetta	outright,	it	
was	because	that	was	a	radical	idea	for	an	honor-based	society	in	which	vengeance	was	a	
moral	obligation	scarcely	distinguishable	from	self-defense.	Nevertheless,	their	laws	(and	
enforcement	of	them)	show	increasing	intolerance	toward	violence	perpetrated	outside	the	
framework	of	public	institutions,	including	the	violence	of	vendetta.	Considering	that	the	
right	to	violence	was	traditionally	diffuse	in	communal	society,	the	growing	suppression	of	
that	right	is	the	remarkable	development,	not	the	fact	that	the	state	did	not	claim	a	
complete	monopoly	of	it.	
Preventing	Enmity	
	 As	public	justice	took	a	preventive	turn,	virtually	no	detail	of	life	in	the	communes	
was	too	trivial	to	merit	the	attention	of	lawmakers.	Chapter	1,	for	example,	showed	how	
the	crowns	notary	attempted	to	measure	the	trains	of	women’s	dresses	to	the	breadth	of	a	
finger.	The	myriad	rules	and	regulations	enforced	by	the	dirt	notary	could	be	just	as	
niggling.	If	many	of	the	communes’	more	far-reaching	statutes	sought	simply	to	prevent	
disorder	in	burgeoning	towns,	a	subset	of	them	can	be	understood	as	aiming	to	prevent	
enmity	itself.	That	is,	beyond	preventing	feud-related	violence,	communal	regimes	sought	
to	prevent	mortal	hatreds	from	developing	in	the	first	place.	This	section	will	treat	the	
policing	of	mourning,	music-making,	public	festivities,	and	snowball	fights	in	turn	as	cases	
in	point.	
Mourning	laws,	which	prohibited	dramatic	displays	of	grief,	seem	to	have	originated	
with	feuds	in	mind.	Bologna	did	not	enshrine	such	laws	in	statute	until	the	1280s,	but	a	ban	
																																																								
119	Statuti	1245,	3:609–10:	“Et	ut	civitas	bononie	et	eius	districtus	in	pace	et	tranquillitate	persistant.	Et	tam	
enorme	tanque	gravissimum	malefitium	et	nefarium	radicitus	extirpetur,	inviolabiliter	observari.”		
120	Statuti	1288,	1:209–10.	The	statute	made	one	small	modification:	there	is	no	4,000-lire	penalty	for	serious	
wounds,	only	the	3,000-	and	2,000-lire	penalties	for	wounds	that	(respectively)	did	and	did	not	cause	
bloodshed.	For	the	tendency	to	normalize	emergency	measures,	see	Isenmann,	“From	Rule	of	Law.”	
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from	1275	reveals	much	about	the	motivations	behind	them.	On	13	June	of	that	year,	the	
heralds	proclaimed	a	ban	against	anyone	making	a	corrotto	(i.e.,	a	song	or	chant	of	
lamentation)	for	any	deceased	or	wounded	person,	or	allowing	anyone	but	neighbors	to	
gather	around	the	body,	under	a	steep	penalty	of	100	lire.121	13	June	1275	also	happened	to	
be	the	day	that	Bologna’s	exiled	Ghibellines	launched	an	attack	on	the	ruling	Guelfs	and	
defeated	them	in	battle.	According	to	one	chronicle,	2,000	Bolognesi	lost	their	lives.122	The	
mourning	ban	was	just	one	in	a	series	of	extraordinary	proclamations	aimed	at	addressing	
this	political	emergency.	One	such	proclamation	granted	all	Geremei	(Guelfs)	permission	to	
seize,	detain,	ransom,	and	injure	in	person	and	property	any	Lambertazzi	(Ghibelline)	they	
could	find	without	fear	of	penalty.	Another	threatened	exile	and	loss	of	property	to	anyone	
who	started	any	brawl	(rissa)	that	might	result	in	a	riot	(rumor)	or	injury	among	the	men	of	
the	city.123	Again,	Bologna’s	authorities	were	explicitly	concerned	that	street	fights	could	
escalate	into	political	tumults.	By	extension,	the	restrictions	on	mourning	were	meant	to	
prevent	public	displays	of	grief	that	could	incite	kinsmen	or	fellow	partisans	to	violence.	
Bologna’s	first	funeral	law	was	not	concerned	with	regulating	passions	in	their	own	right,	
but	with	preventing	reprisals	for	violent,	premature	deaths.	
The	same	preventive	logic	seems	to	undergird	many	of	the	mourning	and	funeral	
laws	found	in	the	1280s	statutes.	By	1285,	lawmakers	had	enshrined	the	1275	prohibition	
against	making	a	corrotto	and	added	to	it	a	list	of	other	prohibited	mourning	behaviors.	
They	also	affirmed	a	prohibition	against	anyone	but	close	kin	(within	three	degrees	of	
kinship)	gathering	at	the	house	of	the	deceased.124	Related	laws	aimed	at	crowd	control.	
They	limited	the	number	of	individuals	allowed	in	funeral	processions	(excepting	guilds,	
militias,	and	confraternities),	prohibited	mourners	from	lingering	at	the	church	or	the	
deceased’s	house	(excepting	neighbors	and	close	kin),	and	forbade	city	residents	from	
inviting	contadini	to	funerals.	Yet	other	mourning	laws	aimed	to	keep	news	of	a	death	from	
stirring	passions	beyond	the	neighborhood	of	the	deceased.	Such	measures	included	bans	
on	trumpeting	news	of	someone’s	death	around	town	or	ringing	the	bell	of	any	church	
other	than	the	one	at	which	the	deceased	was	to	be	buried.	Lastly,	lawmakers	seem	to	have	
believed	that	the	sight	of	a	deceased	woman	or	of	women	mourning	was	especially	likely	to	
inflame	the	passions	of	male	relatives.	Consequently,	they	banned	female	kin	from	funeral	
processions	and	decreed	that	deceased	women	could	not	be	carried	in	a	procession	with	
their	faces	uncovered.125	Furthermore,	by	requiring	ministrales	to	notify	the	podestà	of	
deaths	in	their	parishes,	lawmakers	ensured	that	the	authorities	would	be	aware	of	any	
premature	or	politically	sensitive	deaths	that	might	spark	reprisals	or	riots	over	the	death	
of	important	individuals.	Perugia’s	statutes	featured	similar	provisions	that	limited	funeral	
processions	to	clergymen	and	those	who	were	carrying	the	deceased,	and	required	corpses	
of	either	sex	to	be	fully	covered	during	funerals	and	processions.126	In	the	context	of	
Bologna’s	1275	proclamations,	these	measures	appear	designed,	at	least	in	part,	to	prevent	
feud-related	violence.	They	evidence	a	shared	understanding	among	lawmakers	that	
																																																								
121	ASB,	Giudici	2,	5v.	For	the	meaning	of	corrotto,	see	Lansing,	Passion	and	Order,	12,	61–65.	
122	Griffoni,	Memoriale,	21.	
123	ASB,	Giudici	2,	3v.	
124	ASB,	Sindacato	2,	1285II	(28	fols.),	3v,	11r,	14v.	
125	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(92	fols.),	65r–66v.	
126	Statuto	1279,	1:353.	
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funerals—especially	those	resulting	from	premature	and	violent	deaths—could	inflame	
enmities	and	inspire	acts	of	revenge.	
The	potential	for	enmity	seems	to	have	motivated	many	communes	to	prohibit	
making	music	at	night	(mattinate).	As	Christiane	Klapisch-Zuber	has	noted,	the	word	
mattinata	had	diverse	meanings	in	medieval	Italy;	it	could	refer	equally	to	an	amorous	
serenade	or	a	form	of	charivari.	Charivari,	or	“rough	music,”	was	a	mock	serenade—
consisting	of	bawdy	songs	and	cacophonous	music	made	with	horns,	bells,	kitchen	pots,	
and	the	like—typically	performed	at	night	at	the	house	of	a	newlywed	couple	whose	union	
was	unorthodox	in	some	way,	such	as	when	a	widow	or	widower	married	for	the	second	
time.	Charivari	might	be	used	to	persuade	a	couple	to	throw	a	party	for	their	
“serenaders”—likely	friends	and	neighbors—and	be	taken	with	good	humor.	But	charivari	
could	also	bring	shame	on	a	house	and	lead	to	violence,	especially	if	the	lyrics	became	too	
insulting.	Charivari	was	the	close	cousin	of	“door-scorning,”	a	form	of	community	censure	
for	sexual	misconduct	such	as	adultery	or	prostitution.	Door-scorners	would	vandalize	the	
deviant	couple’s	door	at	night,	drawing	lewd	symbols;	splattering	it	with	mud,	blood,	and	
excrement;	and	even	breaking	it	down—often	while	making	“rough	music.”	Such	customs	
are	attested	across	Western	Europe	in	the	medieval	and	early	modern	periods.127	
Curiously,	however,	historians	have	tended	to	equate	Italian	mattinate	with	charivari	and	
said	little	about	the	appearance	of	laws	banning	mattinate	in	the	thirteenth	century.128		
	 Court	records	suggest	that	the	communes	did	enforce	their	prohibitions	against	
night	music,	and	that	these	bans	covered	all	sorts	of	serenades,	not	just	rough	music.	In	
Bologna,	evidence	of	enforcement	predates	the	earliest	surviving	statutes.	In	1256,	the	
podestà	convicted	three	men	caught	with	a	drum	at	night	and,	separately,	a	notary	caught	
with	a	lute.129	A	lute	is	an	unlikely	instrument	for	making	rough	music,	and	indeed	the	
earliest	such	law	from	Bologna	(1261)	specifically	banned	lutes	and	viols,	not	percussive	or	
brass	instruments	of	the	sort	that	would	be	used	in	charivari.130	Granted,	later	versions	of	
the	ban	mention	horns,	drums,	and	trumpets,	but	actual	cases	make	clear	that	the	law	
aimed	to	suppress	all	music,	not	just	rough	music.131	For	example,	a	certain	Jacopo,	
reportedly	found	playing	a	lute	and	“making	mattinate”	one	night	in	1287,	confessed	that	
he	and	a	companion	had	been	on	their	way	to	the	house	of	a	certain	Zoanna	to	play	
mattinate	before	the	morning	bell.132	This	seems	a	clear-cut	case	of	courtship,	where	
mattinata	meant	precisely	what	it	means	in	Italian	today:	an	aubade,	or	morning	serenade.	
Yet	other	cases	suggest	that	a	mattinata	could	refer	to	any	sort	of	musical	gathering	after	
dark.	One	evening	in	January	1324,	the	familia	reported	a	group	of	eight	men	under	the	
portico	of	the	fisherman	Masino,	where	two	of	them	were	allegedly	“making	mattinate	and	
singing,”	and	one	was	holding	bellows	for	an	organ	on	the	ground	in	the	middle	of	the	
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gathering.	This	was	despite	the	fact	that	two	of	the	accused	had	lanterns.133	In	Perugia	
(1283)	and	Siena	(1306)	as	well,	men	were	convicted	for	playing	guitars	at	night.134	
	 What	was	the	harm	in	making	music	at	night?	Bologna’s	1261	law	prohibited	
anyone	from	carrying	musical	instruments	in	the	evening	“since	many	and	various	crimes	
might	be	perpetrated	because	of	these	instruments.”135	If	rough	music	could	inspire	
criminality,	including	acts	of	violence,	romantic	serenades	could	as	well.	Consider	the	
testimony	in	a	gambling	case	from	1293,	where	the	defendant	claimed	one	of	his	accusers	
was	his	enemy	and	had	made	death	threats	against	him	many	times	since	they	were	both	in	
love	with	the	same	young	woman	(domicella).136	In	medieval	Italy,	a	romantic	rivalry	could	
indeed	be	a	matter	of	life	and	death.	By	extension,	an	evening	serenade	might	precipitate	a	
confrontation	with	such	a	rival,	or	perhaps	with	the	men	of	the	woman’s	house	who	felt	
dishonored	by	the	serenaders.	This	may	explain	why	the	notary	Vacondio	and	companion,	
convicted	in	1256	for	carrying	a	lute,	were	each	found	carrying	a	knife	as	well.	
Furthermore,	young	men	(iuvenes)—who	were	generally	the	most	likely	source	of	
violence—were	the	primary	participants	in	mattinate.	The	1261	ordinance	seems	to	
reference	this	concern	by	explicitly	noting	that	the	ban	applied	to	students	as	well	as	other	
men.	In	a	March	1315	case,	one	of	three	men	arrested	for	carrying	instruments	admitted	he	
had	intended	to	play	the	trumpet	with	some	foreign	students.137	The	link	among	young	
men,	music-making,	and	violence	is	more	explicit	in	the	deposition	of	Alberghetto	
Calamatoni,	who	was	captured	in	January	1315	while	under	ban	for	armed	assault.	As	
mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	Alberghetto	had	served	as	domicellus	to	a	podestà	in	Siena	while	
under	ban.	At	his	arraignment,	Alberghetto	confessed	to	having	assaulted	a	certain	Guido	
(or	Guiduccio)	with	a	knife	the	previous	year,	striking	him	in	the	face	“since	Guido	had	first	
done	injury”	to	him.	The	judge	then	asked	Alberghetto	“of	what	sort	of	condition	and	life”	
he	was,	whether	he	was	literate,	and	what	people	he	consorted	with	both	before	and	after	
his	ban.	He	replied	that	he	was	illiterate	since	“he	could	never	learn”	letters,	though	he	had	
gone	to	school	as	a	boy.	“For	this	reason	he	has	consorted	with	young	men	and	led	his	life	
in	the	manner	of	young	men	in	making	astrudii	and	mattinate	with	instruments	at	night	as	
young	men	do.”	When	the	judge	asked	him	“why	he	did	not	take	up	a	clerical	order	so	that	
he	might	avoid	the	perils	of	the	secular	courts,”	Alberghetto	answered	first	because	of	his	
illiteracy,	but	second	“because	he	liked	the	life	of	astrudii	and	mattinate	and	enjoying	
himself	with	lay	youths	more	than	living	clerically	or	being	a	cleric.”	This	last	question	from	
the	judge	suggests	a	certain	reluctance	to	punish	a	wayward	youth	from	an	elite	family,	but	
in	the	end	he	had	Alberghetto’s	foot	cut	off	as	the	law	demanded.138	The	connection	
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between	night	music	and	youth	violence	could	hardly	be	clearer	in	Alberghetto’s	
deposition.	As	he	portrayed	it,	making	mattinate	was	typical	male	behavior;	it	was	simply	
what	young	men	did.	But	it	was	also	the	case	that	young	men	like	Alberghetto	were	more	
likely	to	get	into	knife	fights	and	therefore	merited	greater	police	attention.	
Bologna’s	lawmakers	treated	traditional	holiday	festivities	as	potential	threats	as	
well.	For	instance,	the	statutes	banned	the	crowning	of	a	May	queen	(maiuma)	at	the	
customary	celebration	of	calendimaggio.139	The	heralds	routinely	reminded	city	residents	
of	this	prohibition	every	April	and	May,	and	asked	ministrales	to	denounce	anyone	who	
violated	it.140	On	at	least	one	occasion,	in	1289,	two	ministrales	from	the	parish	of	San	
Martino	dell’Aposa	denounced	five	young	women	for	playing	a	game	in	which	one	of	them	
was	crowned	“countess”	(comitissa).141	An	episode	described	by	the	chronicler	Matteo	
Griffoni	hints	at	why	lawmakers	saw	a	need	to	suppress	this	tradition.	In	May	1268,	a	
group	of	neighborhood	youths	were	blamed	for	stealing	a	beautiful	purse	from	the	
“countess”	who	had	been	crowned	that	day.	The	father	of	the	“countess”	assaulted	the	
young	men,	wounding	one	of	them,	and	all	involved	were	arrested,	but	the	truth	of	the	
matter	(i.e.,	who	stole	the	purse)	was	never	discovered.142	Calendimaggio	celebrations,	like	
any	large	gatherings	of	Bologna’s	young	men,	had	a	high	potential	to	spawn	enmity	and	
therefore	attracted	preventive	measures	from	the	authorities.	
In	the	same	vein,	lawmakers	prepared	for	holiday	celebrations	with	harsher	laws	
and	increased	police	monitoring,	much	as	if	they	were	political	emergencies.	Some	
communes	doubled	the	penalties	for	bearing	arms	on	feast	days.	In	1295,	for	example,	
Orvieto’s	podestà	convicted	three	men	for	carrying	weapons	on	the	feast	of	the	Assumption	
and	fined	them	double	the	usual	amount,	because	the	city	council	had	passed	an	ordinance	
to	this	effect.143	A	1306	conviction	from	Siena	seems	to	hint	at	a	similar	prohibition	in	
noting	that	the	offender	was	carrying	weapons	on	the	feast	of	San	Bartolomeo.144	It	is	
obvious	why	the	authorities	would	want	to	keep	weapons	away	from	the	large	crowds	
gathered	for	such	festivities,	but	special	holiday	police	measures	did	not	stop	there.	
Bologna’s	government	instituted	a	strict	curfew	during	Carnival	several	times	in	the	1290s,	
prohibiting	anyone	from	being	outside	after	the	first	curfew	bell	(rather	than	the	usual	
third),	even	with	a	light.145	They	also	prohibited	residents	from	holding	dances,	as	was	
customary,	in	their	homes,	courtyards,	or	under	their	porticoes	after	the	first	bell.	The	
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penalty	for	violating	either	prohibition	was	a	steep	50-lire	fine.	The	heralds	blazoned	this	
through	town,	and	in	1291	even	went	out	to	Castelfranco,	at	Bologna’s	border	with	
Modena,	to	make	this	proclamation.146	Nor	were	these	idle	threats.	On	the	last	night	of	
Carnival	in	1296,	the	familia	arrested	a	certain	Matteo	di	Bolognetto	when	they	found	him	
without	a	light	in	Via	Castiglione,	near	Romeo	Pepoli’s	house,	before	the	third	curfew	bell.	
Matteo	gave	up	the	names	of	three	companions	who	had	fled	the	familia,	and	ultimately	the	
judge	sentenced	each	of	them	to	a	20-lire	fine.147	Even	in	years	when	lawmakers	did	not	
issue	special	bans	like	those	above,	there	is	evidence	that	the	familia	paid	close	attention	to	
Carnival	celebrations.	In	a	February	1294	curfew	case,	the	defendant	argued	that	he	had	
been	found	in	front	of	his	home	in	the	presence	of	lamps	that	he	had	set	up	to	watch	a	
dance—“as	customarily	takes	place	during	Carnival	time”—a	few	houses	away.148	The	
judge	ultimately	acquitted	him,	but	it	is	telling	that	the	familia	was	in	the	vicinity	of	such	a	
dance,	perhaps	waiting	for	the	revelers	to	violate	a	statute.	 	
Finally	and	perhaps	most	surprisingly,	Bologna’s	authorities	prohibited	snowball	
fights	and	even	prosecuted	men	for	partaking	in	them.	On	22	December	1293,	the	heralds	
proclaimed	by	order	of	the	podestà	that	no	one	was	to	play	in	the	snow	or	throw	snow	
under	penalty	of	10	lire.149	The	very	next	day,	the	familia	arrested	two	fumantes,	Giacomo	
and	Domenico,	for	playing	in	the	snow	“against	the	precept	or	proclamation	made	by	the	
heralds	of	the	commune	of	Bologna	by	order	of	the	podestà.”	They	were	even	jailed	for	a	
time	because	they	could	not	give	surety,	and	the	podestà	proceeded	against	them	by	
inquisition.150	Under	questioning	the	next	day,	Giacomo	denied	that	he	was	playing	with	or	
throwing	snow	at	anyone.	When	the	judge	asked	him	why	he	was	arrested	and	what	he	was	
doing	at	the	time,	he	claimed	to	have	no	idea	since	he	was	doing	nothing	more	than	
standing	in	the	street.	Domenico	likewise	expressed	bafflement	at	his	arrest.	By	his	
account,	he	was	in	a	house	or	tavern	(domus)	when	the	familia	ordered	him	to	come	
outside,	alleging	that	he	had	played	in	the	snow.	When	he	obediently	exited,	they	arrested	
him.151	The	trial	record	ends	there,	but	this	was	not	an	isolated	occurrence.	The	heralds	
had	proclaimed	an	identical	ban	five	years	earlier,	on	13	February	1288.152	And	at	the	start	
of	1317,	the	familia	arrested	a	number	of	people	for	playing	in	the	snow	following	a	ban	by	
the	podestà.	On	1	January,	they	detained	eight	men	for	having	a	snowball	fight	and	led	
them	to	the	palace.	They	all	confessed	and	gave	surety	for	their	offense.	At	least	seven	more	
men	were	arrested	the	same	day	for	playing	in	the	snow,	one	in	front	of	his	house	and	six	
near	the	cathedral	of	San	Pietro.	Yet	another	was	arrested	the	next	day	and	two	more	on	4	
January	for	a	total	of	18	arrests	in	four	days.153	It	is	hard	to	know	how	common	such	
proclamations	were	after	heavy	snowfalls,	which	are	relatively	infrequent	in	Bologna.	But	
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the	record	of	these	arrests	more	than	23	years	apart	suggests	this	was	a	consistent	policy	
of	the	commune.	
The	trouble	with	snowball	fights,	it	seems,	was	that	snow	could	be	used	as	a	
projectile	much	like	stones,	and	stone-throwing	was	a	common	tactic	in	urban	warfare.	
Lawmakers	in	Bologna	and	other	communes	prohibited	violent	stone-throwing	games	and	
mock	battles	that	were	popular	among	residents.154	The	heralds	regularly	proclaimed	the	
bans	against	such	violent	games,	which	went	by	many	names	and	were	especially	popular	
among	boys	(pueri).	A	proclamation	from	13	June	1306—a	year	of	major	political	unrest—
makes	clear	the	rationale	for	these	prohibitions:	“no	person	great	or	small”	should	dare	to	
play	at	the	games	of	rombolles	or	besogni	“or	any	other	game	whence	a	rumor	or	scandalum	
might	arise”	under	pain	of	a	25-lire	fine.155	In	other	words,	pretend	battles	were	prone	to	
escalate	into	real	ones.	I	have	not	found	any	such	arrests	in	Bologna,	but	in	Siena	the	
podestà’s	familia	arrested	eight	men	for	playing	a	violent	game	(ad	pugnos	et	boccatas)	in	
the	Campo	Foro	in	June	1305.	And	in	1306,	Siena’s	podestà	sentenced	a	certain	Niccoluccio	
to	a	15-lire	fine	for	throwing	snow	at	and	verbally	abusing	his	female	servant	(famula).156	
So	concerned	were	Bologna’s	lawmakers	by	the	potential	for	snowballs	to	cause	enmity	
that	they	also	prohibited	the	throwing	of	snow	at	weddings.157	In	their	elusive	quest	for	the	
commune’s	“good	and	peaceful	state,”	any	behavior	that	had	the	potential	to	spawn	enmity	
was	a	fair	target	for	police	action.	
Conclusion:	Legislating	in	the	Shadow	of	Violence	
This	chapter	has	shown	the	multiple	ways	Bologna	and	other	communes	policed	
vendetta	and	enmity	itself.	On	daily	patrols,	the	podestà’s	familia	worked	to	confiscate	the	
tools	of	violence	and	ensure	no	one	walked	the	city	streets	armed	for	battle,	at	least	
without	the	government’s	license	to	do	so.	The	permit	system	ensured	that	the	familia	
would	focus	their	attention	on	men	who	had,	or	thought	they	might	have,	mortal	enemies.	
Furthermore,	the	podestà	used	the	arms-bearing	laws,	in	combination	with	other	coercive	
measures	such	as	house	arrest,	to	target	families	and	individuals	who	were	in	conflict.	
Indeed,	the	policing	of	illegal	weapons	seems	to	have	been	part	of	a	broader	trend	whereby	
government	officials	increasingly	tried	to	prevent	violence	from	taking	place	outside	of	
public	collectives	and	suppress	it	when	it	did.	Other	statutes	and	police	actions	tried	to	
preempt	such	violence	altogether	by	disciplining	behaviors	that	had	the	potential	to	
generate	enmity	among	citizens.	In	sum,	communal	governments	did	not	sanction	vendetta	
in	the	sense	of	authorizing	it;	rather,	they	increasingly	sanctioned	vendetta	(and	behaviors	
associated	with	it)	in	the	sense	of	penalizing	it.	
																																																								
154	For	example,	Perugia’s	statutes	threatened	a	100-lire	fine	to	anyone	starting	a	batalia	in	the	city,	except	for	
the	batalia	that	was	generally	accustomed	to	take	place	in	the	Campo	Prelii;	see	Statuto	1279,	1:291.	More	
broadly	see	Settia,	Comuni	in	guerra,	29–52;	Zorzi,	“Battagliole”;	Rizzi,	Ludus/ludere,	39–52,	89–102.	
155	ASB,	Corone	15,	1306	(40	fols.),	20v:	“Item	quod	nulla	persona	parva	vel	magna	audeat	vel	presumat	
ludere	ad	ludum	rombollorum	sive	ad	ludum	besogni	vel	aliud	ludum	unde	nasseretur	rumor	vel	scandallum	
pena	vigintiquinque	librarum	Bononie	pater	tenebitur	pro	filio	vel	in	cuius	potestate	esset.”	For	other	bans	
see	ASB,	Sindacato	3	(32	fols.),	1286II,	30r;	Sindacato	5,	1288II,	32v;	Sindacato	6,	1289I	(19	fols.),	13r.	
156	ASS,	Podestà,	Malefizi	10,	9r–13v;	11,	269r.	
157	Statuti	1288,	1:253.	For	a	general	inquisition	that	explicitly	covered	this	prohibition,	see	ASB,	Corone	11,	
1300	(82	fols.),	75r.	
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Indeed,	the	evidence	above	suggests	the	communes’	elites	increasingly	sought	to	
constrain	vendetta,	feud,	and	warfare	through	hegemonic	justice.	To	be	clear,	this	is	not	to	
argue	for	the	state’s	inevitable	or	progressive	monopolization	of	the	right	to	use	
violence.158	The	communal	“state”	was	not	a	unitary	actor,	and	its	institutions	evolved	
through	a	highly	contingent	and	dynamic	process.	These	institutional	changes	still	beg	for	
further	study	and	explanation—minus	the	teleology	of	earlier	scholarship.	Since	it	is	widely	
accepted	that	the	communes	were	not	modern,	Weberian	states	and	thus	had	no	monopoly	
on	the	legitimate	use	of	violence,	it	should	be	no	surprise	that	many	communes	did	not	
expressly	prohibit	vendetta.	Indeed,	it	is	hardly	worth	noting	the	“legitimation”	of	an	
institution	that	traditionally	enjoyed	legitimacy,	but	it	is	worth	exploring	how	that	
institution	was	gradually	delegitimated.	As	North,	Wallis,	and	Weingast	remind	us,	the	
challenge	is	to	explain	how	a	state	monopoly	on	violence	might	emerge	from	a	premodern	
social	order	without	any	concept	of	such	a	monopoly.		
By	extension,	this	chapter	is	also	meant	to	illustrate	the	shortcomings	of	
functionalist	approaches	to	the	history	of	institutions.	By	explaining	how	well	institutions	
“worked”	to	maintain	social	cohesion,	functionalism	can	overlook	the	drivers	of	change	and	
even	explain	it	away.	Indeed,	because	they	focus	on	the	logic	of	existing	institutions,	
functionalist	approaches	can	have	the	unintended	effect	of	implying	that	thirteenth-century	
Italy	had	little	need	for	new	institutions,	such	as	third-party	policing.	Citizen-legislators	
obviously	felt	otherwise.		
Furthermore,	studies	that	treat	vendetta	as	an	institution	of	dispute	resolution	
misinterpret	its	social	function.	Vendetta	is	better	described	as	a	deterrent	than	a	
“balancing	mechanism.”	Insofar	as	vendetta	has	a	“positive	value”	in	limiting	violence,	it	
does	not	derive	from	a	symmetrical	exchange	that	prevents	escalation.	Rather,	it	derives	
from	the	threat	of	retaliation,	which	aims	to	deter	would-be	offenders	from	acting	violently	
in	the	first	place.	Thus,	when	an	act	of	violence	occurs	between	enemies,	the	institution	has	
already	failed.	Moreover,	this	deterrent	often	does	fail,	because	people	frequently	
overestimate	the	advantage	they	have	over	their	enemies	and	perceive	the	harms	they	
suffer	as	worse	than	the	harms	they	inflict.	These	cognitive	biases	make	people	prone	to	
risk	violence	and	escalate	conflicts	out	of	proportion	to	the	original	offense.159	Put	another	
way,	if	vendetta	is	a	“political	game,”	the	players	often	have	different	understandings	of	the	
rules	to	the	game	and	are	likely	to	miscalculate.160	Thus,	vendetta	functions	as	a	self-
regulating	mechanism	more	in	theory	than	in	practice.	Reading	vendetta	as	a	process	of	
dispute	resolution	effectively	de-problematizes	its	violence	and	glosses	over	the	instability	
inherent	in	the	institution.	
In	reality,	the	problem	of	violence	is	one	of	the	key	drivers	of	social	organization	and	
institutional	change.161	The	communes’	elites	voluntarily	expanded	their	governments’	
police	power	in	part	because	they	saw	their	own	violence	as	a	problem	in	need	of	a	better	
solution.	Elites	knew	the	destabilizing	effects	of	vendetta	all	too	well,	and	they	did	not	
believe	existing	practices	of	conflict	resolution	were	adequate	for	their	security.	If	
																																																								
158	For	recent	critiques	of	this	narrative,	see	Firnhaber-Baker,	Violence,	5–10;	Zorzi,	“Justice,”	513.	
159	Pinker,	The	Better	Angels,	529–47.	
160	For	similar	arguments,	see	Hyams,	“Neither	Unnatural	Nor	Wholly	Negative,”	220;	Brown,	Violence,	9,	17–
20.	For	vendetta	as	a	“political	game,”	see	Zorzi,	“Legitimation,”	49,	51.	
161	This	is	the	fundamental	premise	of	North,	Wallis,	and	Weingast,	Violence	and	Social	Orders.	See	also	North	
et	al.,	eds.,	In	the	Shadow	of	Violence;	Schlichte,	In	the	Shadow	of	Violence.	
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historians	are	to	explain	the	growth	of	police	power	and	hegemonic	justice	in	the	
communes,	they	should	understand	violence	the	way	the	communes’	elites	did—namely	as	
a	challenge	to	be	addressed,	not	a	solution	to	conflict	itself.	These	institutional	changes	
were	neither	linear	nor	inevitable,	but	they	did	take	place	in	the	context	of	political	and	
social	competition	where	violence	was	an	omnipresent	threat.	
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Chapter	6:	The	Social	Impact	of	Third-Party	Policing	
In	October	1286,	the	familia	found	a	knife	on	a	table	under	the	portico	of	Giovanni	
Mezzovillani’s	house	in	Strada	Maggiore.	The	record	does	not	indicate	why,	but	they	
charged	a	certain	Giovanni	di	magister	Alberto,	perhaps	because	he	was	standing	nearest.	
In	his	defense,	this	Giovanni	argued	that	the	weapon	was	in	fact	a	tailor’s	knife	and	
belonged	to	Giovanni	Lambertini	da	Stifonte,	who	had	placed	it	there	upon	returning	from	
outside	the	city.	Two	witnesses,	who	claimed	to	have	been	traveling	with	Giovanni	da	
Stifonte,	confirmed	the	defendant’s	story.	According	to	one	of	them,	a	notary	named	
Mattiolo	di	Pietro,	the	other	Giovanni	had	placed	the	knife	on	the	table	upon	returning	to	
the	city	so	that	he	would	not	run	afoul	of	the	familia.	However,	three	days	later—and	with	
no	indication	as	to	why—the	judge	launched	an	inquisition	against	a	tailor	named	Guido,	
who	lived	and	perhaps	worked	in	the	house	Giovanni	Mezzovillani,	alleging	that	he	had	
coached	the	witnesses	of	the	defendant	Giovanni	to	testify	falsely	and	“free	him	from	the	
statutory	penalty”	for	the	knife.1	The	inquest	did	not	suggest	Guido’s	motive,	but	it	is	
possible	that	this	tailor’s	knife	actually	belonged	to	him,	and	he	was	loath	to	lose	it	to	the	
commune.	Whatever	the	case,	the	judge	opened	the	inquest	with	a	noncontroversial	
question,	asking	Guido	if	the	familia	had	found	a	knife	on	his	table	on	the	day	in	question.	
Guido	prevaricated,	however,	responding	that	he	was	not	aware	of	any	knife	at	the	time	he	
was	standing	there.	The	judge,	apparently	annoyed,	abandoned	further	questioning	and	
ordered	Guido	to	produce	a	written	list	of	all	his	apprentices	and	everyone	who	worked	in	
his	shop,	“so	that	he	might	know	whose	knife	it	is	and	so	that	the	podestà	and	commune	
might	have	their	honor	concerning	the	said	knife.”2	He	also	had	Guido	jailed	until	he	could	
produce	a	guarantor.	A	few	days	later,	Guido	submitted	the	names	of	four	legal	minors,	
none	more	than	14	years	old,	as	his	apprentices.	The	first	one	to	testify	claimed	that	that	
the	knife	belonged	to	a	certain	(and	unnamed)	“rustic”	from	Stifonte.	However,	the	next	
apprentice,	Cescolo,	said	he	did	not	know	whom	the	knife	belonged	to,	and	that	his	master	
Guido	had	instructed	him	on	the	way	to	court	to	tell	the	judge	that	it	belonged	to	a	“rustic”	
from	Stifonte.	The	notary	made	special	note	of	the	fact	that	Cescolo—at	considerable	risk	to	
his	future	livelihood,	one	imagines—gave	this	testimony	with	Guido	present	in	court,	
“before	his	face.”3	
The	trial	record	abruptly	ends	there.	If	the	marginal	note	is	correct,	the	court	
ultimately	acquitted	Guido	(on	what	grounds	is	anybody’s	guess),	but	no	verdict	is	given	for	
the	original	defendant,	Giovanni.	Regardless	of	the	outcome,	the	case	provides	a	colorful	
glimpse	of	how	the	commune’s	police	power	changed—and	failed	to	change—life	in	a	
medieval	city.	The	familia’s	patrols	gave	teeth	to	laws	that	would	otherwise	have	been	
toothless,	such	that	city	residents	could	not	even	leave	a	knife	on	a	table	in	public	view	
without	risking	criminal	charges.	Because	of	this,	individuals	feared	arrest	by	the	familia	
and	changed	their	behavior	to	avoid	it,	as	Giovanni	da	Stifonte	allegedly	did	when	he	
																																																								
1	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	38v–40r:	“Ad	ipsum	liberandum	a	pena	statutorum	pro	uno	cutello	invento	ipsi	
Johanni	per	familiam	domini	potestatis.”	The	familia’s	relatio	does	not	survive.	
2	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	40r.	“Ad	hoc	ut	scire	possit	cuius	sit	ipse	cutellus	et	potestas	et	comune	habeant	
honorem	suum	de	dicto	cutello.”		
3	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	40r:	“Et	hoc	dixit	presente	dicto	magistro	et	coram	eius	facie,	quod	ei	dixerat	quod	
deberet	dicere	quod	erat	cuiusdam	rustici	de	Stifonti.”		
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deposited	his	knife	upon	reentering	the	city	from	abroad.	By	routinely	forcing	citizens	to	
defend	themselves	in	court,	policing	also	promoted	legal	literacy.	Giovanni’s	intentio	above	
showed	sophistication	in	arguing	that	the	knife	was	not	an	illegal	kind	and	belonged	to	
another	man,	two	points	that	would	have	beaten	the	familia’s	allegation,	if	proven.	Yet,	
however	much	police	power	changed	“the	rules	of	the	game,”	it	remained	a	game	of	cat	and	
mouse	between	the	familia	and	citizens.	The	podestà’s	capacity	to	coerce	did	not	deter	
citizens	from	lying,	cheating,	and	doing	whatever	they	could	to	avoid	legal	penalties.	In	the	
case	above,	one	is	struck	both	by	the	judge’s	determination	to	uncover	the	truth	behind	an	
abandoned	knife	and	the	apparent	lengths	people	would	go	to	beat	even	a	minor	charge.	
This	chapter	explores	how	the	growth	of	third-party	policing	impacted	the	norms	
that	governed	communal	society.	It	starts	first	with	the	formal	rules	enshrined	in	written	
law.	In	the	language	of	contract	law,	the	familia’s	patrols	effectively	made	certain	statutory	
offenses	mandatory	rules.	For	example,	the	statutory	ban	on	knives	was	not	to	be	invoked	
only	when	citizens	disagreed	about	the	legality	of	someone	carrying	a	weapon;	it	was	a	
binding	rule	that	the	commune	would	enforce	at	all	times.4	New	laws	were	proclaimed	and	
enforced	almost	immediately	through	policing,	making	communal	society	more	of	a	rules-
based	order.	Furthermore,	the	growing	primacy	of	rational-legal	authority	forced	town	
residents	to	reckon	carefully	with	written	law	and	judicial	procedure.	It	rewarded	
individuals	for	legal	savvy	(or	for	hiring	a	savvy	lawyer)	and	even	fostered	a	culture	of	
legalism,	in	which	the	letter	of	the	law	could	favor	defendants	as	much	as	their	accusers.	In	
this	respect,	the	growth	of	police	was	both	a	product	and	driver	of	the	broader	cultural	
shift	from	custom	to	written	law	in	medieval	Europe,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	The	
chapter	then	discusses	the	impact	of	this	new	legalism	on	informal	norms	and	the	behavior	
of	local	residents.	Witness	testimony	leaves	little	doubt	that	the	familia’s	regular	patrols	
affected	the	behavioral	calculus	of	locals.	The	credible	threat	of	arrest	and	punishment	
made	residents	“fear”	the	familia	and	think	twice	about	whether	certain	behaviors,	like	
carrying	a	knife,	were	worth	risking.		
This	did	not	necessarily	mean	that	police	patrols	effectively	prevented	violence,	
however,	or	that	third-party	policing	fundamentally	changed	the	logic	of	the	social	order.	
Indeed,	the	familia’s	policing	struggled	to	live	up	to	the	intent	of	the	commune’s	legislators	
in	at	least	three	ways.	First,	whatever	success	the	familia	had	in	disciplining	particular	
feuds	(see	Chapter	5),	it	did	little	to	transform	the	entrenched	culture	of	violent	self-help.	
Armed	conflict	remained	normal	in	the	medieval	communes,	both	on	an	individual	and	
factional	scale,	and	the	podestà’s	familia	did	not	enjoy	a	place	of	trust	as	the	guarantor	of	
public	safety,	despite	its	third-party	status.	Experience	gave	locals	ample	reason	to	be	wary	
of	armed	groups	in	the	city	streets,	and	they	mistrusted	the	familia	accordingly.	Second,	
locals	tended	to	view	the	podestà’s	familiares	with	hostility,	if	not	outright	enmity.	In	
principle,	the	familia	was	supposed	to	provide	the	law	courts	with	an	impersonal	source	of	
accusations,	untainted	by	personal	hatreds.	In	practice,	however,	locals	did	not	take	kindly	
to	being	denounced	to	the	podestà	by	anyone,	and	viewed	the	berrovarii	more	as	personal	
enemies	than	respected	public	officials.	The	berrovarii	did	little	to	help	themselves	in	this	
regard	since,	as	Chapter	2	showed,	they	routinely	pushed	the	boundaries	of	their	legal	
authority	and	earned	the	animosity	of	locals	in	the	process.	Finally,	the	podestà’s	
																																																								
4	On	the	concept	of	default	versus	mandatory	rules,	see	Ayres	and	Gertner,	“Filling	Gaps	in	Incomplete	
Contracts”;	Mnookin	and	Kornhauser,	“Bargaining	in	the	Shadow	of	the	Law.”	
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familiares—despite	their	ostensibly	impartial	role—were	susceptible	to	corruption.	This	
reflected	not	so	much	the	subversion	of	a	well-established	rational-legal	order	as	the	
persistence	of	a	traditional	culture	of	patronage	and	personal	favors.	Nonetheless,	
corruption	did	little	to	help	the	legitimacy	of	foreign	officials	who	were	paid	solely	to	
uphold	the	commune’s	laws	on	an	impartial	basis.	
Given	these	shortcomings,	one	may	well	ask	why	citizen-legislators	continued	to	
employ	foreign	police	forces	to	enforce	their	laws	aggressively.	Here,	it	is	important	to	
remember	the	evidence	of	the	previous	chapters.	Despite	their	shortcomings,	the	familia	
was	reasonably	effective	at	prosecuting	violators	of	certain	statutes.	They	enforced	the	law	
more	impersonally	than	city	residents	ever	could	have	and	enhanced	the	government’s	
ability	to	deal	with	threats	(both	internal	and	external)	to	the	social	order.	At	the	same	
time,	the	governing	elite	increasingly	managed	to	shield	themselves	from	the	hegemonic	
justice	system	they	created.	This	chapter	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	legal	privileges	in	
Bologna,	which	proliferated	during	the	late	thirteenth	and	early	fourteenth	century	as	the	
popular	coalition	that	had	expanded	political	access	mere	decades	earlier	became	more	
exclusive	and	oligarchical.	Political	elites	increasingly	exempted	themselves	from	
prosecution	for	certain	offenses,	to	include	arrest	and	denunciation	by	patrolling	familiares.	
In	doing	so,	lawmakers	transformed	an	institution	that	originally	involved	some	degree	of	
self-repression	into	a	tool	for	repressing	“others,”	mainly	non-elites	and	political	
opponents.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	noteworthy	that	elites	did	this	by	passing	more	
legislation.	Even	when	written	laws	served	to	enshrine	elite	privileges	and	close	political	
access,	they	contributed	to	the	growing	ascendancy	of	rational-legal	authority.	In	the	end,	
the	chief	legacy	of	the	communes’	experiment	with	more	impersonal	law	enforcement	was	
to	normalize	government	coercion,	even	as	those	governments	served	the	interests	of	an	
increasingly	narrow	elite.	
Mandatory	Rules	
The	sum	effect	of	the	familia’s	patrol	activity	was	to	make	communal	statutes	more	
constraining.	In	the	language	of	contract	law,	the	effect	was	to	make	them	mandatory	rules.	
In	traditional	societies,	the	criminal	law	generally	functions	as	a	system	of	default	rules.	
Public	courts	do	not	prosecute	crimes	unless	members	of	the	community	report	them,	and	
community	members	tend	to	report	crimes	only	when	their	relationship	with	the	alleged	
perpetrator	has	broken	down	and	they	are	unable	to	make	peace	outside	of	court.	In	such	a	
system,	it	is	often	up	to	the	community	(or	officials	elected	from	the	community)	to	
apprehend	criminals.	Magistrates	have	relatively	little	stake	in	apprehending	the	offender	
and	holding	him	or	her	to	account.	By	contrast,	under	the	communes’	police	regime,	the	
government	worked	proactively	to	enforce	its	laws,	making	the	statutes	more	like	a	
contract	concluded	(if	frequently	amended)	among	elite	citizens.	
The	thoroughness	with	which	heralds	proclaimed	new	laws	suggests	that	the	
commune’s	lawmakers	intended	their	legislation	to	have	an	immediate,	binding	effect.	For	
example,	in	August	1293	Bologna	enshrined	the	customary	regulations	concerning	armed	
travel	into	written	law.5	The	heralds	first	announced	the	ordinance	on	18	August,	but	so	
important	were	these	rules	to	the	life	of	the	commune	that	the	heralds	blazoned	them	15	
																																																								
5	Statuti	1288,	1:568–69.	
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more	times	over	the	following	weeks,	with	the	last	proclamation	coming	on	22	September.6	
According	to	the	1288	statutes,	the	heralds	had	to	blazon	such	proclamations	from	204	
different	locations	in	the	city—in	effect,	within	earshot	of	every	domicile—so	that	every	
city	resident	would	know	what	rules	they	were	to	follow.7		
The	familia	also	enforced	new	legislation	as	soon	as	it	was	proclaimed.	A	prime	
example	of	this	comes	from	1290,	when	Bologna	issued	a	ban	on	knives	with	points.	The	
law	was	far-reaching	to	the	point	of	absurdity,	as	it	essentially	called	for	every	knife	in	the	
commune	to	have	its	tip	blunted.	Nevertheless,	the	heralds	proclaimed	the	ban	on	4	July,	
and	the	first	denunciation	by	the	familia	came	about	six	weeks	later.8	On	19	August,	a	
berrovarius	denounced	the	gardener	Danisio	di	Omobono	for	carrying	a	small,	pointed	
knife.	Danisio	confessed	this	was	true,	but	argued	in	his	defense	that	the	“little	knife”	
(cultelinus)	found	on	him	was	a	bread	knife	that	he	used	to	cut	grass	as	well	as	bread.	It	was	
therefore	neither	suspicious	nor	malicious.	Furthermore,	Danisio	claimed	he	had	been	out	
of	town	since	mid-June—before	the	podestà	entered	office—and	thus	did	not	know	of	any	
proclamation	made	against	bread	knives.	After	three	witnesses	corroborated	his	defense,	
the	judge	acquitted	Danisio	on	the	strength	of	his	defense	and	“since	the	knife	was	not	
fraudulent.”9	Three	similar	cases	followed	that	semester.	On	28	October,	a	berrovarius	
denounced	a	tailor	named	Ugolino	for	carrying	“a	bread	knife	with	a	point.”	Although	
Ugolino	and	his	defense	witnesses	argued	that	the	knife	had	a	broken	point	and	was	not	
malicious,	the	judge	convicted	Ugolino	and	fined	him	10	lire.10	Just	one	day	after	Ugolino’s	
arrest,	on	29	October,	another	berrovarius	charged	a	carpenter	named	Massinerio	with	
carrying	“a	bread	knife	with	a	point”	through	the	Campo	del	Mercato.	Massinerio	argued	in	
his	defense	that	he	was	carrying	the	knife	for	use	in	his	trade,	as	was	customary	for	
carpenters,	but	the	judge	convicted	him	all	the	same.11	Lastly,	on	5	December	a	berrovarius	
discovered	Bonaparte	di	Giannino	carrying	a	cultellus	de	ferire	with	a	“somewhat”	
(aliquantulum)	broken	point.	Bonaparte	and	his	defense	witnesses	claimed	that	he	had	
been	taking	the	knife	to	a	craftsman	to	have	the	point	remade,	since	he	was	a	member	of	
the	Society	of	the	Cross—a	popular	militia	2,000-strong	that	was	then	preparing	for	a	
campaign	in	Imola—and	needed	to	have	the	point	remade	so	that	he	could	“better	go	in	the	
service	of	the	commune.”12	The	judge	acquitted	Bonaparte.	
	 Given	the	practical	difficulties	of	enforcing	a	ban	on	pointed	knives,	one	might	
assume	this	law	was	not	really	meant	to	be	enforced.	Yet	the	cases	above	clearly	belie	this	
assumption.	Lawmakers’	repeated	issuance	of	the	ban	on	pointed	knives—perhaps	after	
high-profile	knife	attacks—also	attests	their	seriousness	of	purpose.	Indeed,	this	particular	
ban	seems	to	have	passed	into	and	out	of	effect	in	Bologna.	Lawmakers	had	first	issued	the	
																																																								
6	ASB,	Sindacato	10,	1293II	(50	fols.),	20r–20v.	
7	Statuti	1288,	1:47,	84–90.	For	a	map	of	these	locations	see	Bocchi,	ed.,	Bologna,	2:91.	These	locations	
numbered	32	in	1250,	45	in	1252,	60	in	1259,	and	87	in	1267;	Statuti	1245,	3:81–89.	
8	ASB,	Sindacato	7,	1290II	(38	fols.),	4v.	
9	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	20r:	“Absolutus	quia	cutelus	non	erat	fraudulosus	et	fecit	de	predictis	
defensionem.”		
10	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	57r–58v:	“Unum	cutellum	de	pane	cum	punta.”		
11	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	53v–55r.	
12	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	79r–82r:	“Ipse	Bonapartas	est	de	societate	duorum	milium	et	ideo	fieri	
volebat	facere	dictam	pontam	ad	hoc	ut	poset	servicio	comunis	melius	ire.”	On	the	Society	of	the	Cross,	see	
Carniello,	“The	Rise	of	an	Administrative	Elite,”	328–29;	Pini,	“Manovre	di	regime”;	Paolini,	“Le	origini	della	
Societas	Crucis.”	
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ban	in	1286	before	reissuing	it	in	July	1290	in	the	example	above.13	The	ban	resurfaced	
again	in	1316,	when	the	heralds	issued	a	proclamation	against	pointed,	sharp,	or	malicious	
knives	separately	from	their	usual	reminders	not	to	bear	arms	contrary	to	the	statutes.14	
By	1324	the	ban	included	more	precise	guidelines:	any	knife	or	little	knife	(cultilinus)	that	
was	pointed,	sharp,	or	malicious	and	of	a	length	greater	than	one	span	of	the	knight’s	or	
discovering	officer’s	hand—to	include	both	the	blade	and	handle—was	forbidden,	with	the	
penalty	at	the	podestà’s	discretion.15	Evidently,	lawmakers	were	serious	about	prohibiting	
the	use	of	pointed	knives,	even	including	eating	utensils.	Together,	this	legislation	and	the	
cases	cited	above	offer	a	startling	example	of	how	thoroughly	the	commune’s	elites	tried	to	
regulate	city	life	through	third-party	policing.	
Such	impersonal	rule	enforcement	imposed	real	costs	on	elites	and	non-elites	alike,	
albeit	to	different	degrees.	The	drastic	income	inequalities	of	thirteenth-century	Italy	
meant	that	legal	penalties	could	impose	serious	financial	burdens	on	non-elites.16	As	noted	
in	Chapter	1,	fines	for	curfew,	arms-bearing,	and	gambling	offenses	were	relatively	high	in	
Bologna	and	Siena.	Consider	that,	in	a	1291	case,	a	servant	in	an	elite	Bolognese	household	
told	the	court	that	he	received	a	yearly	salary	of	10	lire.17	This	servant	would	have	to	give	
up	a	year’s	wages	if	he	were	convicted	of	carrying	a	knife	in	Bologna,	or	two	and	a	half	
years’	wages	if	he	were	caught	gambling.	Or	consider	that	some	knives	sold	for	as	little	as	2	
soldi	at	auction.	The	cost	of	the	penalty	for	carrying	such	a	knife	was	100	times	the	value	of	
the	object	itself.	The	disparity	was	even	greater	in	Siena,	where	carrying	weapons	incurred	
a	25-lire	fine.	The	fines	for	these	offenses	could	well	have	been	lower,	as	shown	by	the	
example	of	Orvieto,	where	the	fine	was	merely	1	lira.	The	fines	for	violations	of	building	
code,	trade	regulations,	public	sanitation,	and	so	forth	were	likewise	modest	in	Bologna.	
Evidently,	Bologna’s	and	Siena’s	lawmakers	intended	the	penalties	for	arms-bearing	to	
serve	as	deterrents.	
It	will	not	be	surprising,	then,	that	many	defendants	had	trouble	giving	surety	or	
paying	their	penalties.	From	Bologna	there	survives	an	unusually	detailed	list	of	prisoners	
for	the	two-month	period	from	22	July	to	25	September	1310.	The	list	names	70	individuals	
incarcerated	during	this	time	and	gives	the	crime(s)	for	47	of	them.	In	these	two	months,	
some	19	individuals	were	imprisoned	on	arms-bearing	and/or	gambling	charges,	which	is	
to	say	27	percent	of	the	total	number	of	inmates	or	40	percent	of	those	for	whom	the	
charge	is	listed.18	Of	these	19,	seven	were	charged	with	illicit	arms-bearing,	eight	with	
gambling,	and	four	with	multiples	charges	that	included	arms-bearing	and/or	gambling.	
Five	of	the	seven	charged	with	arms-bearing	were	released	within	these	two	months	once	
they	had	given	surety,	been	acquitted,	or	declared	mentally	unfit,	but	only	one	of	the	eight	
gamblers	is	noted	to	have	been	released.	Evidently,	a	25-lire	fine	constituted	a	financial	
hardship	for	many.	From	Perugia,	a	list	of	37	individuals	incarcerated	by	the	capitano	in	
1295	includes	six	charged	with	arms-bearing	and	one	with	failing	to	pay	surety	for	an	
																																																								
13	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	4,	6v.	
14	ASB,	Corone	22,	1316I	(50	fols.),	1v–2r.	
15	ASB,	Corone	29,	1324I,	105r.	
16	The	estimo	of	1296–1297	suggests	that	about	4	percent	of	Bolognese	citizens—more	than	a	third	of	them	
members	of	the	bankers’	guild—possessed	more	than	53	percent	of	the	total	wealth;	see	Giansante,	“Bankers,	
Financial	Institutions,	and	Politics,”	192.	
17	The	household	was	Testa	Rodaldi’s;	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	6r–v.	
18	ASB,	Corone	18,	1310II	(96	fols.),	75r–82v.	
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arms-bearing	suspect.19	Debt	seems	to	have	been	the	most	common	grounds	for	
incarceration	by	a	wide	margin,	but	illicit	arms-bearing	and	gambling	appear	consistently	
in	prison	records.20	Notably,	no	one	seems	to	have	been	incarcerated	for	violating	curfew.	
Anecdotal	evidence	illustrates	perhaps	more	vividly	the	financial	burden	imposed	
by	policing.	In	Siena,	a	woman	named	Guiduccia	appears	to	have	spent	months	in	jail	in	
1305	after	she	was	discovered	in	a	tavern	and	fined	10	lire.	She	managed	to	pay	half	the	
fine	but	was	only	released	when	the	Nine	accepted	her	claim	of	poverty—with	the	
stipulation	that	she	still	had	to	pay	the	remaining	5	lire.21	In	Perugia,	the	capitano	
sentenced	one	city	resident	to	a	fine	of	10	lire	and	10	soldi	for	carrying	a	sword	on	31	
October	1294;	he	was	released	only	on	Christmas	Day,	nearly	two	months	later.22	In	August	
1290,	a	resident	of	Bologna	from	the	village	of	Castenaso	spent	at	least	two	months	in	jail	
after	he	was	sentenced	to	a	10-lire	fine	for	illicit	arms-bearing.23	Jailtime	carried	an	
additional	financial	burden	because	inmates	had	to	pay	their	own	expenses	to	the	prison	
guards.24	For	example,	in	an	April	1294	curfew	case,	the	defendant,	who	had	been	jailed	
earlier	that	day	on	a	separate	charge,	claimed	his	release	had	been	delayed	because	he	had	
no	means	to	pay	the	jailer.	Only	after	two	friends	loaned	him	6.5	soldi	was	he	able	to	secure	
his	release,	by	which	time	it	was	nearly	nightfall.25	Thus,	by	making	the	communes’	laws	
more	constraining,	third-party	policing	also	enhanced	the	government’s	ability	to	collect	
the	statutory	penalties	owed	for	“bad”	behavior.	
Legal	Literacy	
	 As	third-party	policing	increasingly	bound	citizens	to	written	law,	it	also	made	them	
more	dependent	on	and	conversant	in	the	communes’	notarial	and	juridical	cultures.	
Earlier	chapters	showed	how	the	technology	of	documentation	served	as	a	powerful	tool	
for	the	familia	in	coercing	criminal	suspects	and	securing	convictions.	The	arms	permit	
system	also	forced	residents	to	rely	on	official	documents	issued	by	public	notaries	to	
exercise	a	customary	right.	At	the	same	time,	defendants	learned	to	use	the	primacy	of	
written	proof	in	the	law	courts	to	their	own	advantage.	For	example,	in	a	1256	case,	two	
convicted	gamblers	apparently	struggled	to	convince	the	podestà	to	accept	their	plea	of	
insolvency	in	the	face	of	a	hefty	50-lire	fine.	One	of	the	defendants,	Mercadante,	therefore	
had	his	procurator,	the	notary	Martino	Buttrigari,	seek	a	legal	consilium	from	a	jurist	
(doctor	legum)	and	the	notary	Ramberto	Piatesi.	Their	consilium	argued	that,	since	
Mercadante	had	proven	his	poverty	and	had	no	goods	whence	he	could	pay	the	50-lire	fine,	
it	was	consistent	with	statute	for	him	to	be	flogged	through	the	city	instead	of	being	fined.	
The	podestà	and	his	judge	accepted	this	counsel	and	had	Mercadante	flogged	accordingly.26	
																																																								
19	ASP,	Capitano	19,	reg.	4,	44v.	
20	Geltner,	The	Medieval	Prison,	50–51.	
21	ASS,	Malefizi	11,	26r.	
22	ASP,	Capitano	19,	reg.	4,	18v.	
23	ASB,	Accusationes	9a,	reg.	11,	85r.	Unusually,	the	defendant,	Giacomo	Roffredi,	was	convicted	through	
private	accusation	in	the	court	ad	malleficia	nova,	which	handled	crimes	in	the	contado	and	was	presided	over	
by	a	Bolognese	judge	even	though	it	fell	under	the	podestà’s	jurisdiction.	The	exact	date	of	his	sentence	is	not	
given,	but	the	record	references	the	past	month	of	August,	suggesting	it	was	sometime	in	September.	He	was	
not	released	until	17	November.	On	the	malleficia	nova	court,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	512–13.	
24	Geltner,	The	Medieval	Prison,	38–39.	
25	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(118	fols.),	62r;	1294I	(84	fols.),	39v–40v.	
26	ASB,	Accusationes	2,	reg.	8,	25v–26r.	
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Similarly,	in	April	1293,	after	the	familia	found	gamblers	in	a	certain	tavern,	the	tavern’s	
owner	faced	possible	charges	for	hosting	illegal	gaming.	The	tavern	owner	was	able	to	
exonerate	himself	when	he	produced	a	legal	document	(instrumentum)	showing	he	had	
leased	the	property	to	someone	else.27	
	 In	some	cases,	defendants	would	even	appeal	to	the	notaries	themselves	instead	of	
the	documents	they	produced.	If	a	defendant	had	lost	his	arms	permit,	for	example,	he	
might	call	on	the	issuing	official(s)	to	vouch	for	him,	as	happened	with	a	certain	Guidotto	in	
1295.	Rather	than	produce	his	license,	Guidotto	argued	in	an	intentio	that	he	had	given	
surety	for	such	a	license	under	the	present	podestà.	The	notary	Marco	Pasetti	had	acted	as	
his	guarantor;	the	commune’s	approbator,	Domenico	di	Ugolino,	had	approved	his	surety;	
and	the	notary	Guglielmuccio	Marchi	had	issued	him	the	boletta.	One	of	the	podestà’s	
notaries	must	have	made	a	record	of	this	surety,	Guidotto	contended.	Sure	enough,	the	
notary	Marco	and	approbator	Domenico	testified	on	Guidotto’s	behalf	along	with	a	third	
witness,	and	the	court	acquitted	him.28	Thus,	third-party	policing	obliged	people	to	adopt	
the	culture	of	bureaucracy	and	written	records	that	in	many	ways	defined	the	thirteenth-
century	communes.	Of	course,	people	“consumed”	the	services	of	notaries	and	lawyers	for	a	
host	of	other	reasons.29	But	the	growth	of	policing	was	enabled	by	the	broad	cultural	shift	
“from	memory	to	written	record”	that	had	begun	in	the	eleventh	century.	
	 Because	police	patrols	made	certain	statutes	an	inescapable	reality	in	everyday	life,	
they	also	encouraged	residents	to	know	those	statutes	well—especially	their	exceptions	
and	loopholes.	Indeed,	some	defendants	explicitly	appealed	to	statutes	in	their	legal	
defenses.	For	example,	in	1291	the	familia	reportedly	found	Francesco	Torelli	after	curfew	
without	a	light	“on	the	doorstep	of	his	house	with	the	door	open.”30	In	his	defense,	he	
contended	that	the	curfew	law	did	not	prescribe	a	punishment	for	someone	found	standing	
in	front	of	his	open	door	with	a	light,	“as	is	well	known	through	the	words	of	the	statute	
and	the	text	of	his	discovery.”31	In	March	1294,	Nicola	of	Cerro	Maggiore	cited	one	statute	
and	two	sacred	ordinances	to	argue	that	it	was	legal	for	him	to	wear	armor	as	he	was	
leaving	an	inn	in	Bologna	to	return	home.32	Most	revealing,	perhaps,	is	the	testimony	in	the	
1294	case	of	Duzolo	Preti,	discovered	under	his	portico	with	a	knife	at	his	side,	standing	by	
his	horse	and	still	wearing	spurs.	In	his	defense,	Duzolo	argued	that	he	had	just	come	from	
out	of	town	and	set	his	cap	down	inside,	and	that,	according	to	statute,	it	was	licit	to	bear	
arms	when	returning	from	outside	the	city	while	wearing	a	cap.	One	of	his	witnesses	
confirmed	this	by	claiming	he	had	seen	and	read	the	statute,	and	seen	those	words	to	be	
contained	therein.33	Indeed,	citizens	were	probably	more	intimately	familiar	with	their	
statutes	than	their	foreign	magistrates,	who	had	to	learn	them	every	time	they	took	office	
in	a	new	commune.		
																																																								
27	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293I	(66	fols.),	24v–25r.	
28	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	35rv–38r.	For	a	similar	case,	see	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	10v–
12r.	
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30	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	24v:	“Aput	hostium	domus	sue	cum	hostio	aperta.”		
31	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(37	fols.),	3v:	“Ut	patet	per	verba	statuti	et	scriptura	inventionis	ipsius.”	
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the	curfew	law,	see	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	76r;	1294I	(118	fols.),	37r.	
33	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	18r–v:	“Respondit	quia	vidit	et	legit	statutum	in	quo	sic	vidit	contineri	
predicta.”	For	the	relatio,	see	1294I	(118	fols.),	29r.	
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	 Besides	appealing	to	statute,	defendants	showed	their	legal	literacy	by	appealing	to	
due	process.	For	example,	in	a	1294	curfew	case,	Albertuccio	Maranesi	argued	not	only	that	
he	was	privileged,	but	that	the	judge	could	not	proceed	against	him	by	inquisition	since	the	
statutes	did	not	list	curfew	among	the	crimes	that	were	subject	to	inquisitorial	procedure.34	
In	a	case	from	December	1317,	the	defendant	appealed	to	a	law	that	required	ministrales	or	
other	“good	men”	to	be	present	at	any	inquisition	taking	place	in	their	neighborhood,	lest	
witnesses	dupe	foreign	judges	by	claiming	to	be	someone	else.	The	defendant	was	Triago	
Toschi,	jailer	of	the	Malpaga	prison,	who	faced	charges	that	he	ran	an	illicit	gaming	
operation	inside	the	prison.	The	podestà’s	knight	and	notary	held	the	investigation	inside	
the	prison	itself,	as	they	would	at	the	site	of	any	reputed	gambling	house	(see	Chapter	4).	
They	questioned	five	witnesses,	at	least	three	of	whom	were	inmates,	and	claimed	to	have	
done	so	in	the	presence	of	three	“good	men	of	the	city.”	For	his	part,	Triago	denied	the	
charges	in	court,	and	after	a	new	podestà	took	office	in	January	1318,	he	had	a	procurator	
submit	a	petition	on	his	behalf.	The	petition	argued	that	the	trial	could	not	proceed	first	of	
all	because	Triago	(or	Triaghino)	was	privileged,	and	also	because	no	ministrales	or	
neighbors	were	present	at	the	inquest,	rendering	it	“useless	and	lacking	in	force	and	effect.”	
The	next	day	Triago	submitted	a	defense	along	the	same	lines:	the	three	“good	men”	who	
had	witnessed	the	inquest	at	the	prison,	though	they	came	from	the	same	quarter	of	the	
city,	all	lived	in	different	parishes	more	than	a	third	of	a	mile	(miliare)	from	the	prison.35	
Although	the	record	does	not	indicate	if	this	defense	carried	the	day,	it	was	remarkably	
sophisticated	in	the	way	it	highlighted	procedural	defects	to	circumvent	the	question	of	
guilt	or	innocence.	This	sophistication	should	perhaps	not	be	surprising,	given	that	the	
Toschi	family	to	which	Triago	belonged	was	among	the	most	eminent	in	the	city	and	had	
played	a	leading	role	in	the	popular	revolt	of	1228.36	Nonetheless,	it	vividly	illustrates	the	
resourcefulness	of	citizens	in	their	attempts	to	beat	charges	from	their	foreign	magistrates.	
	 In	the	same	vein,	some	defendants	claimed	they	had	been	deprived	of	due	process	if	
a	ranking	official	(one	of	the	podestà’s	knights,	judges,	or	notaries)	was	not	present	for	the	
arrest,	as	statute	required	(see	Chapter	1).	In	August	1310,	for	instance,	the	familia	
reportedly	found	Pacino	Paci	carrying	a	knife	at	his	side	while	playing	a	dice	game	with	
three	other	men.	Pacino	happened	to	be	from	a	prominent	family	of	judges	and	also	a	
magnate,	as	he	confessed	at	his	arraignment.	He	went	on	to	submit	a	defense	worthy	of	his	
family’s	profession.	To	wit,	he	claimed	that	no	ranking	official	had	been	present	at	his	
arrest,	from	the	moment	the	berrovarii	found	him	at	vespers	through	the	time	they	arrived	
at	the	palace.	As	witnesses,	Pacino	called	on	his	kinsman	Giovanni	Paci	and	two	members	
of	the	equally	prominent	Preti	family.	Francesco	Preti,	himself	a	judge,	testified	that	he	had	
witnessed	some	berrovarii—who	were	apparently	out	of	uniform	(absque	pannis)—arrest	
Pacino	that	evening.	He	asked	them	then,	“Where	is	the	lord	knight	or	judge?”	“He	will	be	
coming,”	the	berrovarii	replied.	But	Francesco	stood	there	for	a	long	time	and	no	judge	or	
knight	came.	Apparently	incensed	at	this	breach	of	due	process,	Francesco	testified	that	he	
went	to	the	palace	later	that	evening	after	dinner	in	order	to	admonish	the	familia	for	its	
professional	malfeasance—that	is,	for	patrolling	without	a	judge	or	knight	and	in	disguise	
																																																								
34	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294II	(28	fols.),	loose	slip	7r.	
35	ASB,	Corone	24,	1317II	(80	fols.),	77r–80r:	“Reditur	inquisitio	inutilis	et	aperte	carere	viribus	et	effectu,	
salvis	et	cetera.”		
36	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	289–90.	
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(incogniti).37	Similarly,	in	1320	an	arms-bearing	suspect	argued	before	a	judge	that	he	
“neither	ought	to	nor	could”	proceed	against	him	on	the	basis	of	the	berrovarii’s	report	
since	they	had	not	been	accompanied	by	a	knight	or	notary.38		
Yet	other	defendants	seized	on	the	legal	standard	that	at	least	two	familiares	had	to	
have	witnessed	the	inventio	for	the	relatio	to	carry	weight	in	court.	For	example,	in	March	
1318,	two	berrovarii	reported	finding	Gerardo	di	Giacomo	with	a	sword	and	a	knife,	but	
they	disagreed	as	to	how.	According	to	Cherichino	of	Brescia,	they	found	Gerardo	in	a	
public	street	under	the	portico	of	a	certain	house,	but	according	to	Barberio	of	Parma,	they	
saw	him	in	the	house	and	called	him	outside,	and	only	then	did	they	find	his	weapons.	
Gerardo	took	full	advantage	of	this	discrepancy.	Rather	than	submit	an	intentio,	he	had	the	
notary	Signorello	Signorelli	reproduce	the	statute	concerning	arms-bearing	and	write	up	
an	exceptio	arguing	that,	according	to	the	statute,	Gerardo	could	only	be	tried	if	at	least	two	
berrovarii	reported	the	same	discovery.	Since	the	reporting	officers	did	not	agree	in	their	
stories,	the	charge	“was	not	proven	as	the	statutes	require.”	The	judge	evidently	agreed,	
since	he	explicitly	released	Gerardo	on	account	of	his	defense.39	According	to	a	witness	in	
an	August	1313	case,	the	defendant,	a	certain	Braccino,	had	refused	to	hand	over	his	knife	
to	a	berrovarius	until	the	podestà’s	knight	arrived,	saying	“I	do	not	wish	to	give	it	to	you,	
but	I	will	give	it	to	the	knight.”	When	the	knight	arrived	soon	after,	Braccino	complied	with	
his	orders.40	If	true,	the	suspect	was	in	effect	demanding	due	process	in	the	street,	before	
he	ever	appeared	before	a	judge.	As	a	practical	matter,	Braccino	might	have	been	better	off	
allowing	the	berrovarii	(or	lone	berrovarius)	to	confiscate	his	weapon	without	the	knight	
present,	since	then	he	could	have	the	charge	thrown	out	in	court.	But	Braccino	may	also	
have	been	signaling	his	low	regard	for	the	hired	soldiers	who	patrolled	the	city,	which	we	
will	see	more	evidence	of	below.	
Thus,	as	third-party	policing	forced	more	citizens	to	answer	to	criminal	charges	in	
court,	it	also	gave	them	an	incentive	to	learn	the	ins	and	outs	of	their	statutes	and	
procedural	rights.	To	be	clear,	defendants	also	appealed	to	custom,	social	identity,	and	a	
host	of	extrastatutory	factors	that	they	considered	legally	relevant.	There	is	no	space	to	
discuss	their	litigating	strategies	in	detail	here,	but	it	is	important	to	note	that	appeal	to	
written	law	did	not	supplant	appeals	to	custom.	Nevertheless,	the	trial	records	show	
remarkable	legal	literacy	and	savvy	on	the	part	of	ordinary	citizens,	and	the	growth	of	
police	power	played	an	important	role	in	fostering	this	culture	of	legalism.		
																																																								
37	ASB,	Corone	18,	1310II	(96	fols.),	35r–v,	37r–v:	“Dixit	quod	ipse	testis	prout	supradixit	dicto	tempore	et	
hora	vidit	quosdam	berroarios	domini	potestatis	absque	pannis	capere	predictum	Paxinum	et	alios	in	dicta	
inquisitione	contentos,	et	quod	ipse	testis	petiit	ab	eis	ubi	est	dominus	milex	vel	dominus	iudex	et	ipsi	
dixerunt	veniet.”	No	verdict	is	given,	but	Villanino	Preti	and	Giovanni	Paci	gave	much	the	same	story.	Pace	
Paci	was	one	of	Bologna’s	most	famous	judges	and	politicians	in	the	latter	decades	of	the	thirteenth	century,	
and	Pacino’s	father	Belvillano	Paci	was	also	a	judge;	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	177.	
38	ASB,	Corone	28,	1320II	(100	fols.),	15r:	“Dicit	[…]	non	debere	nec	posse	procedi	contra	eum.”	For	another	
example,	see	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	16v,	21r.	
39	ASB,	Corone	25,	1318I	(64	fols.),	9v–10r:	“Dicit	etiam	probatum	non	esse	ut	requiret	forma	dicti	statuti.”	
For	a	similar	example,	see	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(46	fols.),	21v.	
40	ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(46	fols.),	15r:	“Et	dictus	Braccinus	recusavit	dare	dictum	cultellum	familie	dicendo,	
‘Nolo	dare	vobis,	sed	dabo	militi.’”	For	the	relatio,	see	1313II	(33	fols.),	17r.	
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Fear	of	the	Familia	
	 To	what	extent	did	the	familia’s	patrols	deter	local	residents	from	engaging	in	illegal	
behavior?	This	is	a	difficult	question	to	answer	for	the	obvious	reason	that	individuals	who	
were	deterred	from	carrying	a	knife	or	breaking	curfew	have	generally	left	no	trace	in	the	
archives.	Furthermore,	it	is	virtually	impossible	to	isolate	police	patrols	as	the	determining	
factor	in	the	behavioral	calculus	of	individuals,	especially	at	a	remove	of	some	seven	
centuries.	Nonetheless,	the	trial	records	leave	important	clues	about	the	psychological	
effects	the	familia’s	virtual	omnipresence	had	on	city	residents.	
Defendants	commonly	cited	their	“fear	of	the	familia”	(timor	familie)	as	the	reason	
why	they	fled	or	otherwise	attempted	to	evade	the	podestà’s	men.41	In	most	such	cases,	the	
defendants	apparently	were	not	so	“afraid”	of	the	familia	as	to	be	deterred	from	breaking	
the	law;	rather,	they	feared	getting	caught	and	did	what	they	could	to	avoid	it.	Thus,	in	
1294	one	particularly	honest	curfew	breaker	told	the	court	that	he	had	fled	from	the	
familia	simply	because	“he	did	not	want	to	fall	under	the	penalty	of	the	commune	of	
Bologna.”42	Yet	other	defendants	implied	their	“fear”	in	describing	how	they	had	attempted	
to	abide	by	the	statutes.	In	a	1294	curfew	case	(also	mentioned	in	Chapter	5),	witnesses	
said	the	defendant	had	ordered	lights	to	be	set	up	on	the	wall	of	his	house	in	case	the	
familia	came	by	as	they	watched	a	Carnival	dance	at	a	neighbor’s	house.43	In	a	1292	arms-
bearing	case,	the	defendant	argued	that,	on	his	way	back	from	a	vineyard	outside	of	town—
and	well	before	the	familia	arrested	him	for	carrying	only	a	sheath—he	had	handed	his	
knife	off	to	one	of	his	travel	companions	since	that	individual	was	wearing	a	cap	and	“it	was	
thus	licit	for	him	to	carry	[the	knife].”44	Even	more	revealing	is	a	case	from	1305,	where	
one	defendant	claimed	he	had	been	so	“overcome	by	his	fear”	of	the	familia	that	he	tossed	
his	knife	under	a	table	when	he	saw	them,	even	though	he	was	carrying	it	tied	shut	while	
on	his	way	out	of	town	to	pick	grapes.45	In	other	words,	he	did	not	trust	that	the	familia	
would	recognize	his	status	as	a	traveler.	Such	testimony	was	obviously	self-serving,	but	it	is	
at	least	plausible	that	these	individuals	had	taken	steps	to	avoid	running	afoul	of	the	
familia.	At	a	minimum,	it	attests	the	place	occupied	by	the	familia	in	the	public	imagination.	
Defense	witnesses	also	attested	their	“fear	of	the	familia”	in	incidental	testimony,	
suggesting	this	phrase	was	not	simply	a	euphemism	for	fear	of	getting	caught.	In	a	1294	
curfew	case,	the	law	students	Francesco	of	Messina	and	Santorio	of	Puglia	argued	in	their	
defense	that,	just	before	the	familia	discovered	them,	they	had	sent	their	servant	into	a	
nearby	house	to	relight	their	candelabra,	which	a	strong	wind	had	blown	out.	When	the	
familia	arrived	shortly	thereafter,	their	servant	“did	not	dare	exit	the	house	then	with	the	
																																																								
41	For	typical	examples,	see	ASB,	Corone	1,	1287I	(34	fols.),	21r,	24v;	Corone	4,	1292I	(46	fols.),	5r.	
42	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(40	fols.),	7v:	“Qui	confessus	fuit	quod	affu[g]it	coram	dicte	familie	quia	nolebat	
cadere	in	penam	comunis	Bononie.”	For	a	similar	example,	see	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	9v.	
43	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	12r–13r.	
44	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(54	fols.),	41r:	“Item	quod	ipse	Martinus,	dum	esset	extra	ciriclam	Burgi	Sancti	
Martini,	dedit	quendam	cultellum	dicto	Phylippo	eo	quod	dictus	Phylippus	habebat	cappellum	ita	licitum	erat	
sibi	deferre.”	For	another	armed	traveler	who	described	his	law-abiding	intent,	see	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	
58r.	
45	ASB,	Corone	14,	1305–1306,	3v:	“Qui	timore	preteritus	cum	vidit	familiam	proiecit	ipsum	[cultellum]	ita	
ligatum	subtus	uno	banco	in	capella	sancti	Juliani.”		
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candelabra.”46	The	servant	himself,	Stefano	of	Rome,	affirmed	this	in	his	testimony:	“I	did	
not	dare	exit	the	said	house	with	the	said	candelabra	fearing	lest	the	familia	might	arrest	
me	and	lead	me	to	prison.”	When	the	judge	pressed	him	as	to	why	he	would	not	exit	the	
house	with	the	candelabra	lit—which	was	no	violation	of	statute	at	all—he	simply	repeated	
that	he	did	not	dare	exit,	and	added	that	the	women	in	the	house	would	not	allow	him	to.47	
Two	of	those	women	confirmed	that	they	would	not	let	Stefano	out	of	the	house	to	help	his	
masters.	As	one	Cristina	put	it,	the	familia	came	“making	such	a	noise	with	their	weapons	
that	we	feared	lest	they	were	something	else.”48	A	1293	curfew	case	also	featured	two	
defense	witnesses	who	claimed	they	were	too	afraid	of	the	familia	to	exit	their	homes	and	
give	surety	for	their	neighbor.49	Granted,	pleading	fear	of	the	familia	was	a	litigating	tactic,	
but	it	is	also	entirely	plausible	that	some	residents	would	not	risk	giving	surety	for	their	
neighbors	for	fear	of	being	arrested	themselves.	Indeed,	as	Chapter	2	showed,	such	
incidents	were	hardly	unheard	of	in	the	commune.	If	the	familia	deterred	licit	behaviors	in	
this	fashion,	it	stands	to	reason	they	also	deterred	would-be	lawbreakers.	
Other	cases	describe	friends	and	neighbors	advising	or	helping	each	other	to	follow	
the	statutes,	suggesting	that	the	familia’s	presence	made	citizens	mindful	of	the	law.	
Witnesses	in	curfew	cases	reported	discussing	when	it	was	time	go	inside	or	light	a	lamp,	
and	a	similar	rule	consciousness	is	evident	in	arms-bearing	and	gambling	cases.50	For	
example,	in	1290,	the	notary	Guido	Canisi	relayed	how	he	had	counseled	the	defendant,	a	
certain	Franco,	to	carry	his	knife	openly	in	his	hands	and	tie	it	to	its	sheath	with	cords	
before	they	entered	the	city	gate.	Guido	also	advised	Franco	to	light	some	candles	before	
they	parted	ways.51	In	December	1299,	the	court	investigated	Bartolomeo	of	Lucca	after	
the	familia	found	gambling	paraphernalia	in	a	raid	on	his	home,	which	he	rented	from	
Pietro	Savioli.	Testifying	as	a	witness,	Pietro	told	the	court	that,	two	months	earlier,	he	had	
gone	to	Bartolomeo	and	told	him	not	to	host	gamblers	in	his	house	because	he	was	afraid	of	
the	podestà	and	of	losing	the	property	under	a	bannum.	He	threatened	to	denounce	
Bartolomeo	to	the	podestà	himself	if	he	did	not	stop	hosting	gamblers	there.	In	a	separate	
gambling	inquest	one	month	earlier	(November	1299),	three	witnesses	reported	gossip	in	
the	neighborhood	that	the	taverner	in	question	would	be	“ruined”	(destructus)	one	day	
because	he	hosted	illicit	gaming.52	Indeed,	the	court	went	on	to	sentence	him	to	a	100-lire	
fine,	a	sum	that	may	well	have	been	ruinous.	Whatever	the	veracity	of	these	particular	
testimonies,	they	evidence	a	community	where	rules	and	rule	enforcers	were	never	far	
from	the	minds	of	residents.	
																																																								
46	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	31v:	“Et	famullus	predictus	non	fuit	ausus	tunc	ipsam	domum	exire	cum	
doplerio.”		
47	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	33r–v:	“Ego	non	fui	aussus	exire	dictam	domum	cum	dicto	doplerio	timens	
ne	ipsa	famillia	me	caperent	et	me	ducerent	in	carzeris.”		
48	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	32r–v:	“Ipsa	famillia	faciente	rumorem	cum	armis	ita	quod	timuimus	ne	
fuisset	alliud.”		
49	ASB,	Corone	5,	1293II	(53	fols.),	19v–20r.	
50	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(50	fols.),	41v;	Corone	6,	1294I	(84	fols.),	29v–30r,	49v;	Corone	10,	1299	(10	fols.),	
3r.	
51	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	39r–v.	“Et	cum	fuerunt	ibi	sero	facto	erat	dicendo	idem	testis	tunc	dicto	
Francho,	‘Caveas	qualiter	vadas	pro	cutello.	Acipias	cutellum	in	manu	ligando	ipsum	cum	corigiis	guayne.’	Et	
tunc	idem	Franchus	ita	fecit.”		
52	ASB,	Corone	10,	1299–1300	(41	fols.),	8v–10r,	18v,	21r.	
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A	group	of	sumptuary	violations	from	1286	also	provides	a	window	into	the	
psychological	effects	of	policing	on	city	residents.	Here,	the	podestà’s	notary	denounced	
three	women—the	sisters	Andrucchia	Beccadelli	and	Bellina	Tencarari	and	their	sister-in-
law	Bartolomea—for	wearing	golden	tiaras	near	the	basilica	of	San	Francesco	on	the	Feast	
of	the	Epiphany	(6	January).	The	witness	testimony	suggests	that	the	defendants	were	well	
aware	of	the	laws	and	even	expected	the	notary’s	patrol.	For	example,	Pietro	dalle	Tavole	
testified	he	had	heard	the	ban	against	tiaras	blazoned	by	the	heralds.	Indeed,	records	
confirm	the	heralds	proclaimed	that	ban	on	5	January	1286,	exactly	one	day	before	the	
feast	day	when	these	women	were	discovered.53	Additionally,	Pietro	claimed	to	have	been	
present	when	Salvuccio	Beccadelli,	“on	the	Sunday	when	there	were	supposed	to	be	
searches	for	women	wearing	tiaras,”	sent	word	to	his	wife	Andrucchia	not	to	wear	a	tiara	in	
violation	of	statute.54	Two	other	witnesses,	including	the	servant	who	had	delivered	the	
message,	confirmed	this	story	in	their	own	testimony.	Separately,	a	witness	reported	
hearing	Giacomo	Tencarari	say	he	was	grieved	(dolebat)	that	his	wife	Bellina	had	been	
wearing	a	tiara,	presumably	because	he	was	aware	of	the	ban.	Another	witness	testified	
similarly	about	Bartolomea’s	husband.55	Interestingly,	multiple	witnesses	also	claimed	they	
had	seen	women	wearing	tiaras	for	years	and	never	heard	of	anyone	being	convicted	for	
it.56	This	testimony	and	the	apparent	lack	of	a	verdict	in	all	three	cases	may	indicate	that	
the	podestà	was	generally	not	expected	to	enforce	these	sumptuary	laws,	as	Carol	Lansing	
has	suggested.57	However,	in	January	1286	the	sumptuary	laws	were	still	quite	new.58	The	
witnesses’	complaint	that	no	one	had	ever	been	penalized	for	wearing	tiaras	could	be	read	
as	a	complaint	about	the	laws	themselves	and	how	they	infringed	on	custom,	rather	than	
their	enforcement.	After	all,	at	least	some	of	the	witnesses	knew	that	Bologna’s	statutes	
prohibited	women	from	wearing	tiaras	and	that	the	podestà’s	notary	would	be	looking	for	
violations	of	that	ban	on	Epiphany.	Given	the	predictable	nature	of	the	crowns	notary’s	
inspections	of	major	churches	(see	Chapter	1),	Bologna’s	elites	likely	expected	their	wives	
to	be	fined	if	they	were	foolhardy	enough	to	wear	their	finery	to	Mass.	The	advance	
warning	of	one	husband	and	aggrieved	state	of	two	others	certainly	seem	to	suggest	this.	
Importantly,	however,	residents’	fear	of	the	familia	did	not	mean	they	had	
internalized	the	rules	the	familia	enforced	or	believed	those	rules	were	legitimate,	even	if	
they	or	their	peers	had	legislated	them.	Rule	consciousness,	in	other	words,	could	easily	
translate	into	consciousness	of	how	to	circumvent	the	rules.	Gamblers	especially	employed	
a	range	of	tactics	to	avoid	getting	caught.	They	might	use	lookouts	to	some	effect,	as	in	a	
1287	case	where	a	berrovarius	approached	a	tavern	and	heard	a	small	boy	on	the	doorstep	
																																																								
53	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	3,	5r.	
54	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	11,	4r:	“Dicit	quod	die	dominica	qua	debuit	fieri	cerca	pro	mulieribus	portantibus	
coronas	dictus	Salvuccius,	se	teste	presente	et	audiente,	mandavit	Francische	famule	sue	quod	iret	ad	
dominam	Andreuzam	et	prohiberet	ei	quod	non	portaret	sertum	contra	formam	constitutionum	Bononie.”	
55	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	11,	5r.	
56	ASB,	Inquisitiones	7,	reg.	11,	5r–6r.		
57	Lansing,	Passion	and	Order,	45–46.	
58	With	two	exceptions—a	1233	law	ordering	women	to	veil	themselves	and	a	1250	ordinance	governing	
prostitutes’	dress—Bologna’s	sumptuary	laws	first	emerged	in	the	1280s.	Muzzarelli,	ed.,	La	legislazione	
suntuaria,	8;	Stuard,	Gilding	the	Market,	65;	Thompson,	Revival	Preachers,	187.	In	July	1284,	one	of	the	
podestà’s	notaries	ordered	Bologna’s	ministrales	to	designate	two	good	men	over	the	age	of	40	in	each	
neighborhood	to	read	out	the	law	concerning	mourning	(quod	tractat	de	omnibus	non	flentibus)	every	month,	
suggesting	that	law	(and	related	legislation)	was	new.	See	ASB,	Inquistiones	1,	reg.	16,	1r.	
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call	inside,	“Stop	playing!	The	podestà’s	familia	is	here!”	The	familia	was	unable	to	find	any	
dice	or	money,	and	the	court	ultimately	acquitted	all	eight	suspects,	including	two	
Zovenzoni	and	a	Pepoli.59	Other	gamblers	chose	to	play	near	waterways	so	they	could	
quickly	dispose	of	the	evidence.	Thus,	in	a	1290	case,	two	alleged	gamblers	on	a	bridge	over	
the	Aposa	threw	their	dice	into	the	water	as	soon	as	they	saw	the	familia.	They	later	denied	
gambling	or	even	having	dice	in	court.60	Yet	other	gamblers	sought	safety	in	numbers	and	
sudden	movements.	In	a	1286	case,	for	instance,	three	berrovarii	came	upon	what	they	
believed	to	be	two	dice	games	near	the	basilica	of	San	Francesco.	The	seven	suspects	stood	
up	so	quickly	when	the	familia	came	that	the	officers	could	not	say	who	was	at	which	game	
and	who	was	playing	or	merely	spectating.	The	judge	went	on	to	acquit	them,	despite	the	
discovery	of	money	and	dice	at	the	scene,	“since	it	was	not	fully	evident	that	they	were	
playing.”61	For	their	part,	armed	men	sometimes	tried	hastily	to	pass	their	weapons	to	legal	
minors	or	women	in	order	to	avoid	prosecution.	For	example,	in	1313	Jacopo	Borghesani	
confessed	that	he	had	fled	from	the	familia	and	handed	off	his	knife	to	a	boy	(puer)	so	that	
he	would	not	be	caught	with	it.62	Similarly,	in	1326	the	familia	alleged	that	a	certain	
Bertolino	had	handed	off	the	knife	he	was	carrying	to	his	neighbor,	a	widow	named	Dolce,	
as	soon	as	he	saw	them.63	
	 Lastly,	suspects	sometimes	lied	about	their	identities	when	confronted	with	a	
charge.	Chapter	4	featured	cases	where	outlaws	gave	false	names	to	avoid	corporal	
punishments,	but	the	Crowns	and	Arms	registers	show	residents	attempting	similar	ploys	
to	escape	far	lesser	penalties.	For	example,	in	August	1299	the	familia	reportedly	found	
Tingo	(or	Dingo)	Dati,	a	university	student	from	the	diocese	of	Florence,	wearing	a	gorget	
in	the	city	streets.	Later	in	court,	Tingo	confessed	he	had	told	the	podestà’s	knight	that	his	
name	was	Giovanni	di	Ventura	and	produced	an	arms	permit	with	Giovanni’s	name	on	it.	
He	claimed	to	have	found	the	permit	on	the	ground	about	two	weeks	earlier.	Asked	why	he	
gave	a	false	name,	Tingo	explained	simply	that	he	did	not	want	to	be	convicted	for	wearing	
armor.	How	the	familia	saw	through	his	deception	is	unclear,	but	the	court	convicted	Tingo	
accordingly.64	In	a	1289	case,	the	familia	reported	that	one	Raynerio	Pilizario—discovered	
out	at	night	with	a	certain	Giacomo	Visconti	of	Modena—had	told	the	podestà’s	knight	that	
he	and	Giacomo	were	both	watchmen,	even	though	Giacomo,	a	foreigner,	was	not.	Again	it	
is	unclear	how	the	familia	discerned	this,	but	Raynerio	confessed	before	the	judge	Alberto	
Gandino	that	he	had	lied	for	Giacomo.65	The	presence	of	the	familia	and	their	proactive	
patrols	clearly	changed	the	behavioral	calculus	of	citizens.	But	that	only	meant	citizens	had	
to	learn	new	rules,	not	that	they	were	deterred	from	breaking	them.	
																																																								
59	ASB,	Corone	1,	1287I	(34	fols.),	6v:	“Cum	fuit	ad	domum	Caselle	de	Cerveleriis	invenit	super	hostia	dicte	
domus	quemdam	puerum	parvum	dicentem	contra	infrascriptos,	‘Nolite	ludere	quia	ecce	familia	potestatis.’”	
For	other	examples,	see	Corone	2,	1287II,	6r;	Corone	10,	1299–1300	(41	fols.),	6v.	
60	ASB,	Corone	3,	1290II	(110	fols.),	2r.	
61	ASB,	Corone	1,	1286II,	47v:	“Absoluti	et	relaxati	fuerunt	omnes	infrascripta	quia	non	plene	constabat	ipsos	
ludere	et	cetera.”		
62	ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(48	fols.),	8r.	For	other	cases	where	suspects	appear	to	have	passed	illegal	weapons	
to	minors,	see	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	50r;	Corone	7,	1295II	(10	fols.),	3r–v;	Corone	9,	1298	(28	fols.),	
2r–v.	
63	ASB,	Corone	30,	1326II	(88	fols.),	59r–v.	
64	ASB,	Corone	10,	1299	(34	fols.),	26v–27r.	
65	ASB,	Sindacato	6,	1289I	(19	fols.),	18v.	
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Violent	Self-Help	
As	the	impartial	guarantors	of	law	and	order,	the	podestà	and	his	familia	were	
supposed	to	provide	for	public	safety,	if	not	the	individual	safety	of	the	commune’s	
residents.	Some	of	the	corporal	sentences	presented	in	Chapter	4	expressed	the	podestà’s	
responsibility	to	protect	travelers,	students,	and	others	who	“entrusted”	themselves	to	the	
commune’s	jurisdiction	from	violent	crime.	This	concern	is	even	more	explicit	in	a	1306	
proclamation	issued	by	Bernardino	da	Polenta,	who	came	to	Bologna	to	restore	order	in	
the	wake	of	a	political	conspiracy.	On	18	March,	by	Bernardino’s	decree,	the	heralds	
ordered	merchants	and	tradesmen	to	continue	going	about	their	business,	“since	the	lord	
podestà	wishes	all	of	them	all	to	live	and	maintain	their	commerce	and	trades	safely	under	
his	protection	and	that	of	the	commune	and	people	of	Bologna.”66		
However,	the	familia’s	daily	patrols	did	little	to	change	the	norms	of	violent	self-help	
in	communal	society.	The	right	to	violence	continued	to	be	shared	among	a	range	of	armed	
groups	with	varying	degrees	of	political	legitimacy,	from	popular	militias	at	the	more	
legitimate	end	of	the	spectrum	to	the	consorterie	of	powerful	families	at	the	other.	In	this	
context,	the	potential	for	violent	conflict	among	city	residents	remained	high,	and	the	
familia	was	only	one	armed	group	among	many.	Despite	the	familia’s	routine	efforts	to	
limit	violence	from	local	enmities	and	personal	guerre,	third-party	policing	did	not	effect	a	
sea	change	in	the	social	norms	surrounding	violence.	As	a	case	in	point,	three	weeks	after	
Bernardino	issued	the	above	decree,	he	had	to	order	all	shops	and	public	offices	closed	
until	the	popolo	could	take	vengeance	against	the	magnate(s)	who	had	assaulted	or	killed	
one	of	their	members.	And	the	following	month	(May	1306),	he	ordered	all	outlaws	and	
rebels	of	the	White	party	of	Florence,	Siena,	Lucca,	and	Prato	to	leave	the	city	within	three	
days,	after	which	any	citizen	would	have	the	authority	to	accuse	and	arrest	them.67	
Personal	hatreds	and	factional	conflicts	continued	to	be	the	order	of	the	day	in	communal	
politics,	despite	third-party	efforts	to	limit	their	destabilizing	effects.	
It	did	not	help	that	the	podestà’s	berrovarii	were	not	readily	distinguishable	from	
less	legitimate	armed	groups,	especially	when	residents	encountered	them	at	night	or	at	a	
distance.	As	noted	in	Chapter	1,	if	the	berrovarii	wore	uniforms,	they	were	not	distinct	
enough	to	make	them	easily	identifiable,	and	claims	of	mistaken	identity	are	common	in	the	
trial	records.68	For	example,	incidental	testimony	in	a	1294	curfew	case	suggests	that	the	
defense	witness	did	not	recognize	the	familia	even	as	they	were	escorting	several	curfew	
breakers	back	to	the	palace.	After	passing	this	party	in	the	street,	the	witness	asked	some	
nearby	women:	“What	commotion	is	this?	What	people	are	those?	And	where	are	they	
going	to?”	The	women	replied,	“Those	guys	are	from	the	podestà’s	macinata.	They	arrested	
the	men	whom	they	are	leading	away	since	they	were	out	at	night.”69	In	1295,	an	alleged	
curfew	breaker	told	the	court	that	he	had	been	“found	by	some	armed	men	whom	he	did	
																																																								
66	ASB,	Corone	15,	1306	(40	fols.),	4r:	“Quoniam	dominus	potestas	ipsos	omnes	et	eorum	mercationes	et	artes	
vult	vivere	et	manere	securos	sub	protectione	sua	et	comunis	et	populi	Bononie.”	
67	ASB,	Corone	15,	1306	(40	fols.),	10r–v,	15r.	
68	ASB,	Corone	2,	1289II	(74	fols.),	27r–v;	Corone	19,	1313I	(67	fols.),	14v–15v.	
69	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294II	(28	fols.),	27r:	“Et	dixi	illis	feminabus,	‘Quis	rumor	est	iste?	Et	que	gens	est	illa?	Et	
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ducunt	viam	pro	eo	quod	ibant	de	nocte.’”		
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not	know,”	as	if	to	question	the	legitimacy	of	his	arrest.70	Even	the	podestà’s	familiares	
were	not	always	certain	whom	to	count	among	their	own.	For	example,	in	the	1286	
gambling	raid	described	in	the	Introduction,	the	familia	arrested	a	mercenary	named	
Biancardo.	According	to	Biancardo’s	testimony,	the	berrovarius	who	had	arrested	him	
asked	in	the	middle	of	the	chaos,	“Are	you	one	of	ours?”	“I	am,”	Biancardo	replied,	likely	as	
a	ploy	to	avoid	arrest.	In	court,	however,	Biancardo	claimed	that,	when	he	said	this,	he	
thought	a	conflict	had	broken	out	between	citizens	and	the	podestà’s	familia,	and	he	
wanted	to	align	himself	with	the	correct	side.71		
Quite	reasonably	for	a	city	where	armed	conflict	was	common,	residents	tended	to	
fear	the	worst	when	they	heard	the	sound	of	armed	men	in	the	streets.	The	ruckus	could	
signal	a	factional	clash	breaking	out,	a	mob	descending	on	the	object	of	its	rage,	or	personal	
enemies	coming	to	exact	vengeance	in	the	night.	The	1318	curfew	defense	of	Michele	Baldi	
is	telling	in	this	respect.	Michele	argued	that,	when	he	was	caught,	he	had	stepped	out	onto	
his	doorstep	because	he	heard	“the	sound	of	weapons”	(sonitum	armorum)	and,	not	
realizing	it	was	the	familia,	wanted	to	know	who	was	going	by.72	Even	more	illustrative	is	
the	case	of	Bolognino	(or	Bolognetto)	di	Gandolfino,	charged	with	fleeing	the	familia	one	
night	in	March	1294.	Bolognino	pleaded	at	his	arraignment	that	he	had	fled	because	he	
feared	the	berrovarii—two	of	whom	were	carrying	spears	and	the	third	a	mace—were	his	
enemies.73	In	his	intentio,	Bolognino	turned	his	confession	into	a	hypothetical:	“If	he	made	
any	motion	which	made	it	seem	like	he	tried	to	flee	[...]	he	made	it	fearing	lest	the	said	
familia	were	his	enemies,	and	when	he	heard	that	it	was	the	podestà’s	familia,	he	stood	
firm	without	trying	to	flee	or	fleeing.”	His	defense	also	claimed	that	Bolognino	and	his	
neighbors	had	mortal	enemies	from	whom	they	guarded	themselves,	and	that	he	had	just	
exited	the	house	of	his	neighbor	Compagno	to	investigate	the	rumor	the	familia	was	making	
in	their	alleyway.	Another	neighbor	named	Zenta,	testifying	as	a	witness,	described	his	own	
uncertainty	at	hearing	the	rumor	of	men	in	their	alley	that	night.	He	too	feared	they	were	
Bolognino’s	enemies	until	the	familia	identified	themselves	and	told	him	to	go	inside	and	
shut	his	door.74	Whatever	the	truth	of	this	particular	story,	the	principle	undergirding	it	is	
unassailable:	the	appearance	of	armed	men	in	an	alleyway	at	night	likely	signaled	grave	
personal	danger,	not	the	arrival	of	help	from	public	officials.	In	this	social	context,	the	
approach	of	the	familia	did	little	to	inspire	confidence	or	a	sense	of	security	in	city	
residents.	Indeed,	Bolognino	was	hardly	the	only	defendant	to	claim	he	had	mistaken	the	
familia	for	his	personal	enemies.75	
																																																								
70	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295II	(32	fols.),	10r:	“Predictus	Tomasinus	interrogatus	si	fuit	inventus	per	dictas	
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quodam	baroario	qui	dixit,	‘Es	tu	de	nostris?’	Et	ipse	dixit	‘Sum.’	Et	credebat	quod	aliqua	discordia	esset	inter	
cives	et	dictam	familiam,	et	ideo	dixit,	‘Ego	sum	de	vestris.’”		
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73	ASB,	Corone	6,	1294I	(118	fols.),	44r,	45r.	
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75	ASB,	Corone	1,	1287I	(34	fols.),	17r,	31v;	ASP,	Capitano	5b,	reg.	8,	11r.	
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The	same	conundrum	presented	itself	in	the	contado,	where	armed	men	on	
horseback	were	at	least	as	likely	to	prey	on	locals	as	to	protect	them	on	behalf	of	the	
commune.	In	a	1297	case,	two	men	caught	by	the	familia	in	someone	else’s	vineyard	said	
they	had	fled	because	they	did	not	realize	it	was	the	familia	who	was	pursuing	them.	One	of	
the	defendants,	a	certain	Schiatta,	claimed	he	had	fled	because	he	thought	the	familia	were	
certain	cavalrymen	(stipendiarii)	who	had	come	to	do	them	harm.76	The	other	defendant,	a	
cobbler	named	Franceschino,	explained	further	that	he	had	mistaken	the	armed	men	for	
certain	stipendiarii	with	whom	he	had	“had	words”	one	day,	implying	that	he	and	Schiatta	
were	in	a	relationship	of	enmity	with	some	of	the	commune’s	constabulary	force.77	Even	if	
this	particular	story	was	a	fabrication,	it	shows	again	the	rationality	of	flight	from	the	
familia.	In	the	countryside	of	medieval	Italy,	the	approach	of	rapid	hoofbeats	was	often	a	
signal	to	run.	Their	story	also	hints	at	the	sometimes	poor	relations	between	local	residents	
and	the	foreign	mercenaries	hired	by	their	government,	discussed	further	below.		
Rather	than	flee,	some	locals	chose	to	resist	the	familia	as	they	would	any	armed	foe.	
Certain	cases	of	violent	resistance	against	the	familia	may	indicate	little	more	than	the	
desperation	of	known	outlaws	trying	to	avoid	arrest	at	all	costs.	This	was	likely	the	case	in	
the	1296	incident	where	two	men	assault	a	berrovarius	attempting	to	bring	one	of	them	
into	custody,	mentioned	in	Chapter	3.	A	few	cases	may	even	hint	at	open	warfare	between	
powerful	nobles	and	the	commune’s	forces.	For	example,	the	chronicler	Matteo	Griffoni	
tells	how	in	May	1306	Count	Doffo	da	Panico	and	the	archpriest	of	San	Lorenzo	in	Collina	
attacked	the	podestà’s	knight	as	he	was	returning	from	an	assault	on	the	da	Panico’s	forces	
near	Casalecchio	di	Reno,	freeing	three	captives	from	the	knight’s	custody.78	However,	
there	are	cases	where	the	defendant	appears	to	have	done	nothing	worse	than	violate	the	
arms-bearing	laws,	yet	chose	to	resist	arrest.	Simo	da	Bondanello,	for	instance,	confessed	in	
January	1296	to	drawing	his	sword	on	the	familia,	knowing	full	well	who	they	were,	after	
they	found	him	with	a	sword	and	knife	and	no	helmet	on	the	road	to	San	Giorgio.	Simo	
explained	to	the	judge	that	he	did	this	“in	the	spirit	of	trying	to	defend	[myself]	and	flee	lest	
[I]	be	captured	by	them.”79	His	statement	shows	little	esteem	for	the	familia	as	a	legal	entity	
and	suggests	an	underlying	belief	that	it	was	perfectly	rational	to	resist	arrest,	even	for	
minor	infractions.	Indeed,	Guido	Ruggiero	has	found	that	patrol	officers	were	frequent	
victims	of	assaults	(some	of	them	deadly)	in	fourteenth-century	Venice.	It	would	hardly	
beggar	the	imagination	if	this	were	the	norm	across	the	cities	of	communal	Italy.80		
Urban	elites	continued	to	live	by	the	norms	of	violent	self-help,	as	a	case	from	1303	
colorfully	illustrates.	In	January	of	that	year,	Bologna’s	podestà	opened	an	inquest	against	
Opizzo	Foscherari,	whose	family	belonged	to	Bologna’s	merchant-banking	elite,	for	
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78	Griffoni,	Memoriale,	30.	In	another	episode	in	1302,	a	certain	Guglielmo	attacked	the	podestà’s	knight	and	
police	with	a	polearm	(roncone)	while	they	were	on	patrol	in	Varignana.	Guglielmo	was	attempting	to	free	a	
captive	but	was	struck	down	by	a	member	of	the	cavalcade;	see	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(152	fols.),	72r.	
79	ASB,	Corone	8,	1296I	(80	fols.),	22r:	“Interrogatus	si	ipse	traxit	dictam	spatam	de	fodro	contra	dictos	
beroerios	dicti	domini	potestatis	et	si	tunc	cognovit	eos,	respondit	sic	bene	animo	volendi	se	defendere	et	
fugere	ne	caperetur	ab	eis.”	The	court	fined	Simo	50	lire,	10	more	than	double	the	fine	for	his	two	weapons.	
80	Ruggiero,	Violence,	140–43.	For	examples	from	Florence,	see	Jansen,	Peace	and	Penance,	106–07,	114–15.	
For	convictions	of	assault	against	familiares	of	the	podestà	or	capitano	in	other	communes,	see	ASP,	Capitano	
2,	reg.	1,	20v;	ASS,	Malefizi	11,	67v,	258r.	
	 208	
throwing	“a	large	and	terrible	stone”	at	the	familia	from	his	window,	nearly	striking	them	
as	they	stood	below	his	house	one	night.81	Questioned	in	court,	Opizzo	freely	admitted	that	
he	threw	the	stone	“in	order	to	induce	fear	in	the	armed	men	whom	he	saw	there.”	Opizzo	
claimed	he	did	not	know	who	the	armed	men	were	“but	believed	them	to	be	certain	
enemies	of	his	or	thieves	who	wanted	to	break	into	and	pillage	his	house.”82	Opizzo’s	
witnesses,	including	two	members	of	the	elite	Pascipoveri	family,	recounted	how	a	young	
neighbor	had	alerted	him	to	the	presence	of	armed	men	“of	bad	condition”	below	his	house	
that	night	after	dinner.	Opizzo	called	down	to	the	men	to	identify	themselves,	and	when	
they	did	not,	Opizzo	threw	the	stone	into	the	street,	not	with	the	intention	of	harming	
anyone,	but	rather	to	strike	fear	into	the	men	so	that	they	would	depart.83	The	record	never	
indicates	why	the	familia	was	at	Opizzo’s	house	that	night—with	two	of	the	podestà’s	
knights	present,	no	less—but	the	judge	acquitted	him	in	the	end.	Elites	like	Opizzo	were	
used	to	defending	their	homes—or	more	precisely,	their	towers	and	family	compounds—in	
civil	wars,	coups,	and	riots.	The	presence	of	a	police	force	in	the	city	did	not	change	their	
calculus	when	armed	men	appeared	on	their	doorsteps	at	night.	
The	commune’s	elites	may	well	have	viewed	the	podestà’s	familia,	despite	their	
ostensible	impartiality,	as	a	rival	household	or	armed	group	opposed	to	their	interests.	This	
mentality	comes	through	in	the	testimony	surrounding	one	of	the	familia’s	interventions	at	
the	da	Panico-Romanzi	house,	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	In	February	1299,	the	
familia	denounced	three	of	Count	Ugolino’s	retainers	for	carrying	illegal	weapons	under	
the	portico	of	his	house.	They	were	apparently	well-armed:	each	had	a	sword	and	armor,	
and	two	of	them	had	knives	as	well.	A	procurator	submitted	an	intentio	on	the	defendants’	
behalf,	arguing	that	the	portico	in	question	was	a	“private	place”	(locus	privatus)	that	
belonged	to	the	Count	and	the	Romanzi.	The	defense	argued	further	that	the	defendants	
were	standing	guard	for	the	Count	when	the	familia	came	under	the	portico.	They	did	not	
know	who	the	berrovarii	were	or	what	their	purpose	was,	so	they	descended	the	stairs	to	
intercept	them.84	As	a	defense	witness,	Scannabecco	Romanzi	testified	that	he,	too,	thought	
the	berrovarii	might	have	been	enemies	of	the	Count	when	he	first	saw	them,	but	he	
recognized	them	just	in	time	to	intervene	and	prevent	the	situation	from	escalating.	As	he	
told	the	court:	“I	believe	that	if	I	had	not	gone	toward	them,	something	might	have	been	
said	to	them	that	they	would	not	have	liked,	since	the	familiares	of	the	Count	did	not	
recognize	the	familia	of	the	podestà.”	The	podestà’s	knight	arrived	on	the	scene	shortly	
thereafter,	and	the	defendants	stood	down	and	obeyed	his	orders.85	The	testimony	of	
another	witness,	Tarlatto	di	Novello,	clarified	what	Scannabecco	meant	by	his	statement.	
As	evidence	of	the	portico’s	private	status,	Tarlatto	explained	that	he	had	never	seen	
																																																								
81	ASB,	Inquisitiones	58,	reg.	4,	1r:	“Magnus	et	horribilis	lapis.”	For	the	Foscherari,	see	Blanshei,	Politics	and	
Justice,	123.	
82	ASB,	Inquisitiones	58,	reg.	4,	1v–2r:	“Interrogatus	qua	de	causa	proiecit	dictum	lapidem,	respondit	causa	
inferendi	timorem	quibusdam	armatis	quos	ibi	videbat.	Interrogatus	qui	erant	illi	armati,	respondit	quod	
nesciebat	sed	credebat	eos	esse	quosdam	inimicos	suos	vel	latrones	qui	vellent	frangere	vel	depredare	
domum	suam.”		
83	ASB,	Inquisitiones	58,	reg.	4,	3r–v.	For	the	Pascipoveri,	see	Gozzadini,	Delle	torri	gentilizie,	400–02.	
84	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298–1299	(48	fols.),	38v.	For	the	relatio,	see	11v.	
85	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298–1299	(48	fols.),	39r:	“Et	credo	quod	nisi	ivissem	versus	eos,	quod	forte	dictum	esset	
eis	de	eo	quod	non	placuisset	sibi,	quia	ipsi	familiares	domini	comitis	non	cognoscebant	familiam	domini	
potestatis.”		
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anyone	besides	friends	of	the	Count	and	the	Romanzi	cross	it,	“except	once	I	saw	two	men	
go	there	at	a	time	when	Rolandino	Romanzi	was	in	a	feud,	and	I	saw	then	that	Rolandino	
did	dishonor	to	those	men,	saying	to	them,	‘Why	are	you	going	through	this	portico?	What	
business	do	you	have	here?’”86	The	Count’s	retainers,	in	other	words,	were	there	to	defend	
the	Count	from	his	enemies	and	might	have	insulted	the	berrovarii	as	presumed	enemies	if	
Scannabecco	had	not	intervened.	In	the	end,	the	judge	acquitted	the	Count’s	retainers	
“since	they	were	not	found	blameworthy,”	suggesting	he	accepted	the	argument	that	the	
portico	was	private.87	Despite	the	sophistication	of	the	legal	defense,	the	episode	at	the	
heart	of	the	case	boils	down	to	a	tense	encounter	between	two	armed	groups:	the	
familiares	of	the	Count	of	Panico	and	the	familiares	of	Bologna’s	podestà.	One	household	
had	the	backing	of	public	law,	the	other	of	private	patronage.	Yet	at	a	basic	level,	they	were	
more	alike	than	different,	serving	as	the	“muscle”	for	powerful	men	with	competing	
interests.	For	families	like	the	da	Panico,	third-party	policing	was	merely	another	one	of	the	
commune’s	infringements	on	their	customary	way	of	life,	to	be	resisted	accordingly.	
Police-Community	Relations	
Besides	limiting	the	violence	of	the	culture	of	hatred,	the	familia	was	supposed	to	
diminish	the	role	of	personal	relationships	of	amity	and	enmity	in	the	administration	of	
justice.	In	theory,	their	denunciations	were	more	trustworthy	because	they	came	from	a	
neutral	third-party,	and	the	statutes	lent	them	greater	credence	accordingly.	However,	the	
commune’s	employment	of	impersonal	law	enforcers	did	not	change	the	fundamental	fact	
that,	in	communal	society,	a	legal	accusation	was	often	grounds	for	mortal	enmity.	Insofar	
as	the	podestà’s	familiares	acted	as	captors,	accusers,	and	hostile	witnesses	toward	locals,	
they	adopted	roles	typically	played	by	personal	enemies.	It	should	be	no	surprise,	then,	that	
locals	seem	to	have	regarded	the	familia	more	as	enemies	than	executors	of	justice.		
To	some	extent,	this	adversarial	relationship	was	a	product	of	the	inherently	
antagonistic	nature	of	the	familia’s	interactions	with	locals.	As	one	taverner	put	it	in	his	
legal	defense	in	January	1299,	residents	were	loath	to	be	“bothered,	troubled,	and	
condemned”	by	the	familia’s	denunciations	and	testimony.88	Arrests	were	publicly	
humiliating	for	the	detainee	and	especially	for	elite	citizens.	This	is	explicit	in	an	appeal	
(protestacio)	submitted	to	the	capitano	del	popolo	by	Giacomo	di	Ugolino	Paci	in	October	
1320.	Giacomo	alleged	that	one	of	the	podestà’s	judges	had	ordered	him	to	be	detained	by	
the	berrovarii	and	criers	until	he	drew	up	a	bill	of	sale	for	a	house	that	was	the	subject	of	a	
legal	dispute.	He	estimated	the	damages	he	suffered	at	100	lire,	since,	among	other	harms,	
he	was	arrested	and	led	to	the	palace	“as	if	a	thief	or	criminal	[...]	publicly,	with	everyone	
seeing.”89		
																																																								
86	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298–1299	(48	fols.),	41v–42r:	“Non	video	aliquem	ire	per	dictam	porticum	nisi	fuerit	et	sit	
amicus	dicti	domini	comitis	et	illorum	de	Romanciis,	excepto	quod	semel	vidi	duos	homines	ire	per	dictam	
porticum	tempore	quo	dominus	Rolandinus	de	Romanciis	habebat	guerram.	Et	tunc	vidi	quod	ipse	dominus	
Rolandinus	fecit	dedecus	ipsis	hominibus	dicendo	eis,	‘Quare	vaditis	per	istam	porticum?	Quid	habetis	vos	
facere	hic?’”	
87	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298–1299	(48	fols.),	11v:	“Quoniam	non	sunt	reperti	inculpi.”		
88	ASB,	Corone	9,	1298–1299	(48	fols.),	35r:	“Hanc	defensionem	facit	Bertholomeus	Zilioli	capelle	sancti	
Jacobi	de	Carbonensibus	ad	hoc	ne	molestetur	et	inquietetur	nec	condepnetur	occaxione	quod.”		
89	ASB,	Giudici	682,	18r:	“Et	quod	ipse	intercetera	extimabat	iniuriam	sibi	factam	eo	quia	detenptus	in	palatio	
et	ductus	tamquam	latro	vel	malefactor	captus	et	detentus	publice,	gentibus	et	hominibus	videntibus,	c.	libris	
Bononie.”	See	also	Blanshei,	Politics	and	Justice,	621.	
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A	1318	gambling	case	illustrates	even	more	colorfully	how	encounters	between	the	
familia	and	locals	could	resemble	confrontations	between	enemies.	The	formulaic	relatio	
and	intentio	offer	few	details:	the	familia	reported	arresting	Pietro	Clerico	and	Lippo	di	
Zaccaria	Buvali	for	gambling,	and	the	duo	argued	simply	that	they	were	playing	tabule	and	
not	any	dice	game.90	Their	witnesses,	however,	told	a	more	interesting	story.	According	to	
Pietro	Cazia,	the	two	defendants	had	been	“trying”	to	play	a	dice	game	(ludus	alearum)—
apparently	of	a	legal	sort—under	the	portico	of	Pietro	Clerico’s	house	when	two	berrovarii	
approached	and	accused	them	of	playing	the	game	azardum.	The	defendants	explained	that	
they	were	playing	a	game	of	alee,	not	azardum,	and	so	the	berrovarii,	apparently	taking	
them	at	their	word,	began	to	depart.	But	then	Pietro	Clerico	said	to	one	of	the	berrovarii,	
“You’re	a	boor,	saying	that	we	are	playing	the	game	of	azardum	when	we	are	playing	the	
game	of	tabule.”	(The	text	does	not	name	the	games	consistently.)	This	evidently	did	not	
please	the	berrovarius,	who	promised	in	turn	to	accuse	them	of	playing	azardum	anyway,	
which	he	apparently	did	as	soon	as	the	podestà’s	knight	arrived	on	the	scene.91	Three	more	
witnesses	corroborated	this	story,	albeit	with	minor	variations	in	the	phrasing	of	the	insult.	
Whatever	actually	transpired	during	this	encounter,	the	story	conveys	a	truth	about	the	
relationship	between	familiares	and	locals.	For	city	residents,	the	salient	feature	of	the	
familia	was	not	their	political	neutrality	so	much	as	their	power	to	place	them	in	legal	
jeopardy.	In	practice	there	was	little	to	stop	a	berrovarius	from	leveling	bogus	charges	
against	locals—for	example,	when	he	felt	his	honor	had	been	offended.	This	imbalance	of	
power	did	little	to	endear	them	to	the	communities	they	policed.	
Besides	abusing	their	office	in	the	street,	the	familia	may	have	pressured	defendants	
to	confess	their	guilt	once	in	custody.	The	1313	case	of	Albizzo	da	Dugliolo,	who	came	from	
a	prominent	family	of	merchants	and	bankers	and	was	charged	with	carrying	a	knife	in	July	
of	that	year,	offers	a	tantalizing	glimpse	of	this.	Albizzo’s	intentio	is	not	recorded,	but	he	
seems	to	have	argued:	first,	that	the	familia	had	found	the	knife	in	a	house,	not	in	the	public	
street;	and	second,	that	the	podestà’s	knight	Bonaventura	had	told	him	he	could	not	leave	
the	palace	under	penalty	of	100	lire	until	he	confessed	that	the	knife	was	discovered	on	
him.	Three	witnesses	upheld	Albizzo’s	contention	that	the	miles	had	essentially	tried	to	
force	a	confession	out	of	him.	According	to	one	of	them,	the	knight	ordered	Albizzo	not	to	
leave	the	palace	under	penalty	of	100	lire,	and	then	later,	around	terce,	said	to	him,	“Do	you	
wish	to	confess	that	the	knife	was	found	on	you	by	the	familia?”	Albizzo	replied,	“If	you	
want	me	to	confess	about	every	weapon,	I’ll	do	it.”92	Indeed,	Albizzo	confessed	to	the	crime	
at	this	arraignment,	before	submitting	his	intentio	refuting	it.	Unfortunately	for	Albizzo,	
two	witnesses	contradicted	his	assertion	that	the	familia	had	found	the	knife	in	a	house.	
																																																								
90	ASB,	Corone	26,	1318II	(48	fols.),	15r;	1318II	(78	fols.),	37v.	
91	ASB,	Corone	26,	1318II	(78	fols.),	37v–38r:	“Et	tunc	dicta	familia	et	beroarii	qui	preibant	diserunt,	‘Vos	
luditis	ad	ludum	azardi.’	Et	ipsi	responderunt,	‘Nos	non	ludimus	ad	ludum	azardi,	sed	ludimus	ad	ludum	
alearum.’	Et	tunc	familia	recedebat,	et	tunc	ipse	Petris	Clericus	dixit	cuidam	ex	ipsis	beroariis	cuius	nomen	
ingnorat,	‘Tu	es	rusticus	homo	quando	nos	ludimus	ad	tabulas	et	tu	dicis	quod	nos	ludimus	ad	ludum	azardi.’	
Et	tunc	ipse	respondit,	‘Ego	dicam	quod	vos	luditis	ad	ludum	azardi.’	Et	tunc	pervenit	dominus	miles	domini	
potestatis.”		
92	ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(46	fols.),	9v:	“Et	post	hec	in	hora	tercie	dixit	dictus	dominus	Bonaventura	dicto	
Albizzo,	‘Vis	tu	confiteri	quod	tibi	inventus	fuit	cultellus	per	familiam?’	Et	tunc	dictus	Alpizzus	respondit	et	
dixit,	‘Si	vultis	quod	ego	confitear	de	omnibus	armis,	faciam.’”	For	the	relatio,	see	ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(33	
fols.),	6v.	
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They	each	testified	that	the	familia	had	seen	Albizzo	carrying	the	knife	in	the	street	and	
followed	him	into	a	house.93	To	the	judge,	this	was	the	pivotal	fact:	Albizzo	had	been	
carrying	the	knife	in	a	public	street	and	was	therefore	convicted	and	fined	10	lire.	
Nonetheless,	the	knight’s	apparently	successful	effort	to	force	Albizzo	to	confess	his	guilt	in	
court	may	hint	at	a	common	pressure	tactic	otherwise	concealed	by	the	trial	records.	At	a	
minimum,	it	epitomizes	the	fundamentally	adversarial	relationship	between	familiares	and	
citizens.	
Unsurprisingly,	then,	some	defendants	expressed	indignation	at	what	they	
perceived	as	deliberate	wrongdoing	by	the	familia.	For	example,	in	a	May	1299	curfew	trial,	
two	members	of	the	Piatesi	family	accused	the	familia	of	ignoring	the	fact	that	the	curfew	
bell	had	sounded	earlier	than	usual	that	evening—before	nightfall	while	the	city	gates	were	
still	open—when	they	detained	two	fumantes	from	San	Venanzio.	Bittino	Piatesi	claimed	
not	only	that	he	had	never	heard	the	bell	sound	as	early	as	it	did	that	evening,	but	also	that	
the	podestà’s	knight,	notary,	and	berrovarii	knew	it	to	be	true.94	In	October	1313,	three	
men	rounded	up	in	a	tavern	raid	contended	not	only	that	they	had	not	been	gambling,	but	
also	that	the	familia	had	“arrested	them	since	they	arrested	everyone	they	could	find	in	
that	location”—i.e.,	with	no	apparent	regard	to	who	had	been	gambling.95	More	explicitly,	
in	August	1293	the	taverner	Corradino	Vittori	protested	that	the	podestà’s	notary	had	
taken	away	his	drinking	vessels—allegedly	of	a	nonstandard	measure—“against	God	and	
justice	and	with	malicious	intent.”96		
In	the	same	vein,	defense	witnesses	sometimes	claimed	that	the	familia’s	arrests	had	
caused	bewilderment	or	outrage	in	the	community.	For	example,	in	March	1295	the	familia	
charged	a	student,	Bernard	the	Burgundian,	with	carrying	a	knife	found	on	the	ground	near	
him.	In	his	defense,	Bernard	argued	that	the	familia	had	found	him	far	from	the	knife	in	a	
piazza	near	the	basilica	of	San	Domenico.	His	witnesses	confirmed	this	and	reported	public	
anger	at	his	arrest.	In	the	words	of	one,	“many	men”	who	were	present	asked	why	the	
berrovarii	had	arrested	Bernard	“since	he	was	far	away	from	where	the	knife	was	found,”	
and	said	“an	injury	had	been	done”	to	him.97	Another	witness	said	bystanders	called	the	
arrest	“a	great	shame”	(magnum	pecatum),	since	the	familia	had	not	found	Bernard	actually	
carrying	the	knife.98	Similarly,	in	a	February	1292	case	of	alleged	flight	from	the	familia,	the	
defendant	argued,	in	part,	that	it	was	publicly	said	in	his	neighborhood	that	he	had	been	
charged	“wrongfully	and	against	the	truth.”99	To	be	sure,	it	generally	behooved	defendants	
																																																								
93	ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(46	fols.),	9v–10r.	
94	ASB,	Corone	10,	1299	(34	fols.),	8r–9v.		
95	ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(46	fols.),	27v:	“Sed	ipsos	ceperunt	quia	ceperunt	omnes	quos	potuerunt	inventos	in	
dicto	loco.”		
96	ASB,	Fango	5,	1293II	(115	fols.),	71r:	“Contra	Deum	et	justitiam	et	malo	animo	accepit	dictos	vigeas	dicto	
Coradino.”		
97	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	66r–v:	“Et	ego	intellexi	tunc	a	multis	hominibus	dicentes,	‘Quare	capiunt	
isti	beroarii	istum	Bernardum	quia	erat	ita	lonze	ab	illo	ubi	inventus	fuit	cultellus?’	scilicet	bene	per	tre	
perticas	et	ultra.	Et	dicti	homines	dicebant	inguria	est	facta	isti	Bernardo.”	For	the	relatio,	see	ASB,	Corone	7,	
1295I	(30	fols.),	20r–v.	
98	ASB,	Corone	7,	1295I	(135	fols.),	66v–67r.	Nevertheless,	the	court	convicted	Bernard	and	consigned	his	
knife	for	resale;	see	1295I	(30	fols.),	20v.	
99	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292I	(46	fols.),	16v:	“Item	quod	publicum	est	et	publice	dicitur	et	vulgarizatur	in	contrata	
in	qua	moratur	dictus	Bencivenni	quod	ipse	ad	tortum	et	contra	veritatem	est	culpatus	de	fuga	quam	dicitur	
eum	fugisse.”		
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and	their	witnesses	to	portray	the	familia’s	actions	as	illegitimate,	but	it	is	difficult	to	write	
off	all	such	grievances	as	purely	self-serving.		
Even	harder	to	disregard	is	incidental	testimony	that	describes	bystanders	rebuking	
the	familia	for	their	perceived	misconduct.	A	prime	example	comes	from	a	set	of	curfew	
cases	from	January	1313,	where	the	familia	reported	finding	three	men	near	the	basilica	of	
San	Francesco	before	the	morning	bell	had	sounded.	All	three	defendants	countered,	in	
varying	ways,	that	it	was	clearly	daytime	even	though	the	commune’s	bellringer	had	
temporarily	gone	on	strike	because	he	had	not	been	paid	his	salary.100	In	one	case,	a	certain	
Figlietto	testified	that	he	had	found	the	defendant	Biagio	already	in	custody	near	his	house	
when	he	went	outside	that	morning.	Figlietto	complained	to	the	podestà’s	knight	that	it	
was	daytime	and	the	friars’	bell	had	rung	for	prime.	After	confirming	with	Biagio	that	he	
had	only	just	been	arrested,	Figlietto	again	reproached	the	knight	for	making	a	curfew	
arrest	in	daytime.101	A	second	witness	named	Bittinello	said	he	was	already	on	his	way	
back	from	church	when	he	saw	Biagio	in	the	hands	of	the	familia.	“Why	are	you	leading	this	
man	away?”	he	said	to	them.	“It’s	clear	day.	He	can	rightly	go	about	without	any	
impediment.”102	Once	again,	the	trial	records	convey	a	perception	among	certain	residents	
that	the	familia	had	wronged	their	neighbors.103		
In	sum,	locals	did	not	have	to	know	familiares	by	name	or	have	a	personal	history	
with	them	to	perceive	them	as	a	hostile	force	of	dubious	legitimacy.	At	the	level	of	the	
berrovarii	and	milites,	the	podestà’s	familiares	seem	to	have	been	more	interested	in	
securing	convictions,	creating	the	perception	that	they	were	doing	their	jobs,	than	being	
true	to	the	facts	of	the	case.	Because	of	this,	the	familia’s	patrols	could	represent	a	public	
nuisance	and	legal	hazard	more	than	the	impartial	administration	of	justice	by	the	
commune.	One	may	well	wonder	why	self-governing	citizens	would	continue	to	tolerate	
this	sort	of	policing,	or	why	aggressive	berrovarii	do	not	seem	to	have	sullied	the	
reputations	of	most	podestà.	Yet	the	persistence	of	the	institution	over	decades	suggests	
citizens	calculated	that	police	patrols,	though	a	blunt	instrument,	were	a	necessary	coercive	
tool	to	ensure	the	survival	of	their	government.	
Public	Corruption	
Besides	aggressive	tactics,	public	corruption	likely	undermined	the	legitimacy	of	
familiares	as	well.	As	foreign	officials,	the	podestà	and	his	familia	were	supposed	to	be	less	
susceptible	to	the	personal	influence	of	the	residents	they	policed.	Yet	there	is	little	reason	
to	think	that	foreign	officials	were	less	susceptible	to	bribery,	graft,	political	favors,	and	
other	forms	of	corruption	than	locals	who	held	public	offices.	For	one,	corruption	is	
endemic	to	limited	access	orders;	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	the	Italian	communes	were	
																																																								
100	The	barber	Federighino,	who	said	he	had	been	on	his	way	to	shave	two	clients,	provided	this	detail	about	
the	bellringer’s	apparent	strike.	See	ASB,	Corone	19,	1313I	(67	fols.),	4v.	
101	ASB,	Corone	19,	1313I	(67	fols.),	3v.	
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103	For	an	incident	where	a	local	confronted	the	familia	for	alleged	misconduct	during	a	gambling	raid,	see	
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exceptional	in	this	regard.104	Furthermore,	with	respect	to	the	communes’	foreign	officials	
in	particular,	the	cases	below	hint	at	a	culture	where	bribes	and	deal-cutting	were	a	
“normal”	part	of	the	administration	of	justice.	
For	instance,	in	May	1283	Perugia’s	capitano	and	podestà	found	Senso,	nicknamed	
Fra	Lasca,	guilty	of	“many	procurements,	frauds,	and	deals”	with	the	men	of	Perugia	and	
the	familia	of	the	previous	podestà,	in	particular	his	notary	Leonardo.	Through	witness	
testimony	and	Senso’s	own	confession,	the	court	uncovered	six	different	occasions	where	
he	had	arranged	for	defendants	to	pay	Leonardo	to	have	them	acquitted	or	their	trials	
suspended.	According	to	the	sentence,	Senso	was	guilty	of	“inducing	and	seducing	with	his	
fraudulent	dealings”	the	men	of	Perugia	to	give	many	gold	florins	and	other	money	to	
Leonardo	“in	corruption	of	the	said	household	[of	the	podestà]	and	against	their	proper	
oath,	profaning	God,	ius,	and	justice.”	The	new	podestà	and	capitano	jointly	sentenced	him	
to	pay	four	times	the	total	of	the	bribes	he	had	arranged,	a	ruinous	sum	of	128	gold	florins	
and	16	lire.105	
In	a	case	from	July	1303,	Bologna’s	podestà	had	a	longtime	crier	of	the	commune	
named	Alberto	da	Roffeno	(mentioned	in	Chapter	5)	decapitated	as	a	thief,	homicide,	and	
“contaminator	of	the	familie	of	the	rulers	of	the	commune	and	people	of	Bologna.”	His	
lengthy	confession	enumerated	crimes	dating	back	to	at	least	1287,	including	cattle	theft,	
robbery,	and	multiple	homicides.	Most	pertinent	to	this	discussion,	however,	were	the	
multiple	counts	of	public	corruption,	which	suggest	the	commune’s	“impersonal”	law	
enforcers	were	quite	susceptible	to	personal	influence.	Among	these,	Alberto	described	
four	specific	instances	under	four	different	podestà	where	he	had	procured	acquittals—or	
at	least	promised	to	procure	an	acquittal—for	defendants	facing	charges	from	the	familia.	
To	take	one	example,	in	1303	under	Bernabò	Confalonieri,	Alberto	arranged	for	a	
berrovarius	to	testify	that	a	curfew	breaker	had	been	found	with	a	light,	for	which	Alberto	
and	the	berrovarius	each	made	15	soldi.	Assuming	the	accused	paid	both	sums,	then	the	30-
soldi	cost	of	securing	his	acquittal	was	some	70	soldi	less	than	the	statutory	fine	for	
breaking	curfew.	Alberto	had	also	arranged	for	his	own	acquittal	in	1287,	under	Gerardo	da	
Giosano,	after	he	was	found	carrying	a	knife.	On	that	occasion	he	paid	30	soldi	each	to	the	
podestà’s	knight	and	“the	knight’s	prostitute”—presumably	for	sexual	services	for	the	
knight—and	received	his	“grace”	(gratia)	in	return.106	Here	and	elsewhere	in	Alberto’s	
confession,	the	language	suggests	that	the	podestà’s	knights	and	notaries	kept	prostitutes	
as	mistresses,	which	may	have	been	a	common,	if	unofficial,	benefit	of	employment	while	
serving	abroad	with	podestà.	Overall,	Alberto’s	confession—which	spanned	more	than	15	
years	and	recounted	other	corrupt	practices—suggests	that	official	corruption	was	an	
engrained	feature	of	the	commune’s	justice	system.	Alberto	had	profited	not	from	a	few	
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bad	actors	under	a	specific	podestà	or	two,	but	from	a	political	culture	where	legal	favors	
could	be	purchased	for	a	price.	
As	a	crier	and	man	of	the	court,	Alberto	may	have	used	his	close	relationships	with	
successive	familie	to	avoid	prosecution.	Incidentally,	he	had	been	investigated	in	1291	after	
a	notary	found	him	and	two	other	criers	gambling	in	the	palace	while	they	were	supposed	
to	be	guarding	a	recently	arrested	gambling	suspect.	Testimony	in	that	case	reveals	that	
Alberto	was	also	a	member	of	one	of	the	popular	militias,	the	Society	of	the	Keys.107	In	the	
end,	however,	Alberto’s	downfall	happened	to	be	a	police	raid	in	the	countryside,	an	
expedition	led	by	one	of	the	podestà’s	knights	to	capture	criminals	in	Bologna’s	distretto.	
According	to	Alberto’s	confession,	the	knight	forbade	everyone	in	the	expedition	from	
taking	any	plunder	under	pain	of	losing	his	foot.	Nevertheless,	when	they	were	in	Anzola	at	
a	house	where	the	knight	captured	certain	malefactores,	Alberto	bagged	a	candlestick,	
linens,	and	a	robe	for	himself—“which	things	he	said	he	took	for	his	labor.”108	In	other	
words,	it	was	his	understanding—and	probably	the	customary	one—that	participants	in	
official	expeditions	were	entitled	to	unofficial	compensation	for	their	troubles.	Indeed,	
Alberto	confessed	that	he	had	done	the	same	thing	years	ago	under	Corso	Donati	of	
Florence	(in	either	1283	or	1288).	While	riding	with	a	Bolognese	force	some	400	strong,	
“taking	certain	vengeances”	in	the	countryside	on	behalf	of	the	commune,	“he	robbed	so	
many	things	there”	that	he	made	40	soldi	from	their	resale.109	Another	crier	named	Pietro	
di	Semprebene	was	also	convicted	for	looting	on	the	expedition	to	Anzola.	In	his	own	
confession,	Pietro	said	he	had	taken	a	metal	pot	at	Alberto’s	urging—again,	“for	his	
labor”—even	though	the	podestà’s	knight	had	expressly	forbidden	looting.	This	was	
apparently	Pietro’s	first	offense,	however,	so	the	podestà	only	barred	him	from	going	near	
the	piazza	or	palace	for	the	next	six	months,	under	pain	of	losing	his	foot.110	Looting	on	a	
police	raid	may	not	fit	the	definition	of	corruption	as	neatly	as	the	quid	pro	quos	seen	
above,	but	the	knight’s	strict	prohibition	against	such	plunder	and	the	court’s	thorough	
inquisition	against	Alberto	after	the	fact	show	that	the	authorities	understood	such	actions	
to	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	their	violence	and	justice.	If	the	commune’s	officials	
plundered	while	capturing	purported	outlaws,	then	their	raids	were	hardly	better	than	
those	of	a	rebellious	contado	lord	or	opposing	political	faction.	The	raid	in	Anzola	
illustrates	once	again	how	custom	and	traditional	norms	worked	against	the	new	
institutions	legislated	by	the	communes’	elites.	
Despite	the	commune’s	efforts	to	keep	policing	free	of	corruption,	bribes	and	
extralegal	dealings	probably	happened	more	than	the	sources	make	explicit.	Individual	
defendants	did	not	necessarily	need	a	Senso	or	an	Alberto	to	serve	as	a	go-between	with	
the	familiares	who	had	charged	them.	In	this	respect,	a	1293	curfew	case	provides	a	rare	
glimpse	of	what	may	have	been	a	common	occurrence.	The	trial	record	itself	describes	a	
fairly	ordinary	curfew	case:	two	watchmen	arrested	Lotorengo	di	Bonagiunta	for	violating	
curfew	one	evening	in	September	and	led	him	to	the	palace.	Lotorengo’s	defense	hinged	on	
his	good	reputation	and	the	circumstances	of	his	arrest.	He	argued	that	he	had	been	
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110	ASB,	Accusationes	25b,	reg.	15,	16v.	
	 215	
working	in	the	shop	of	his	employer,	Bonavoglia,	pressing	cloth	that	evening	when	he	
stepped	outside	for	a	moment	to	relieve	himself,	not	wearing	any	shoes	or	trousers.	As	
soon	as	he	began	to	urinate,	the	watchmen	seized	him	and	led	him	off	to	the	palace,	half-
dressed	as	he	was.	According	to	Lotorengo,	it	was	also	well-known	in	his	neighborhood	
that	his	captors	hated	him	and	had	conspired	to	arrest	him	out	of	spite	even	though	he	was	
an	honest,	hard-working	man.	Although	Bonavoglia’s	witnesses	could	not	all	attest	this,	the	
judge	acquitted	Lotorengo	of	the	charge.111	
If	this	were	all	we	knew	of	Lotorengo’s	case,	it	would	be	unremarkable.	But	two	
months	later	in	November	1293,	a	notary	of	the	podestà	named	Guglielmo	Ruscha	and	the	
berrovarius	Alberto	da	Montono	confessed	to	taking	bribes	from	Lotorengo	(also	identified	
as	Loterio	of	Florence).	According	to	Alberto’s	confession,	he	first	accepted	4	soldi	from	
Lotorengo	to	allow	him	to	sleep	in	his	own	chambers,	rather	than	the	commune’s	prison,	
on	the	evening	of	his	arrest.	About	two	weeks	later—after	Lotorengo	had	been	released,	it	
seems—he	approached	Alberto	and	told	him	he	would	gladly	spend	a	gold	florin	to	avoid	a	
conviction	for	breaking	curfew.	Alberto	went	to	the	notary	Guglielmo	and	told	him	about	
Lotorengo’s	proposal,	suggesting	that	he	procure	Lotorengo’s	acquittal.	Guglielmo	initially	
refused	the	offer,	but	later	returned	to	Alberto	and	said	he	would	do	Lotorengo’s	deed	in	
exchange	for	a	pair	of	gloves	and	a	silk	fillet.	Alberto	passed	the	message	back	to	Lotorengo,	
who	then	gave	Alberto	12	soldi—8	soldi	initially	and	the	other	4	later—to	give	to	
Guglielmo.	Alberto	duly	delivered	the	payments	to	the	notary,	but	also	hinted	to	Lotorengo	
that	his	payments	were	below	Guglielmo’s	asking	price,	advising	him	to	reach	an	
agreement	with	Guglielmo	directly.	In	his	own	confession,	Guglielmo	admitted	to	taking	the	
12	soldi	delivered	by	Alberto,	plus	an	additional	gift	of	20	soldi.	As	he	recounted,	Lotorengo	
later	came	to	his	chambers	as	Alberto	had	suggested	and	said	he	wished	to	give	him	more	
money.	Guglielmo	told	Lotorengo	he	did	not	want	to	take	his	money	and	had	already	
procured	his	acquittal,	but	if	he	wished	to	leave	him	something	extra,	he	should	leave	it	on	
his	doorstep—perhaps	because	he	thought	it	unseemly	to	take	money	directly	from	
Lotorengo’s	hand.	So	Lotorengo	left	another	20	soldi	on	his	doorstep,	which	Guglielmo	then	
pocketed,	bringing	his	total	profit	from	this	favor	to	32	soldi.	In	light	of	these	confessions—
which	were	heard	by	two	Bolognese	judges	in	addition	to	the	podestà’s	criminal	judge—the	
court	stripped	both	Guglielmo	and	Alberto	of	their	offices	and	sentenced	them	to	spend	the	
rest	of	the	podestà’s	term	in	prison,	or	longer	as	the	anziani	and	Council	of	the	Popolo	saw	
fit.	The	record	does	not	say	what,	if	anything,	happened	to	Lotorengo.112	It	is	worth	noting	
that	Lotorengo	seems	to	have	attempted	to	bribe	the	notary	only	after	his	legal	defense	
failed	to	produce	convincing	testimony.	It	was	a	rational	economic	decision:	even	after	
paying	36	soldi	to	a	berrovarius	and	notary,	he	had	saved	himself	64	soldi	compared	to	the	
statutory	fine.	Nonetheless,	the	evidence	suggests	once	again	that	foreign	officials	who	
were	paid	to	uphold	the	law	impersonally	could	easily	be	tempted	to	supplement	their	
incomes.		
	 In	light	of	the	cases	above,	dubious	reversals	in	other	trials	may	well	be	read	as	
evidence	of	corruption.	For	example,	in	August	1291	the	familia	reported	finding	three	
gamblers	in	the	neighborhood	of	San	Giorgio,	one	of	them	a	priest	named	Facciolo.	Facciolo	
and	one	of	his	co-defendants	were	placed	in	prison,	apparently	unable	to	give	surety.	A	full	
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month	later,	in	September,	the	podestà’s	knight	Martino	and	some	of	his	familiares	
suddenly	“remembered,	asserted,	and	said”	that	Facciolo	had	not	been	playing.113	Facciolo	
was	the	only	one	of	the	three	defendants	acquitted.	Perhaps	they	had	wrongly	accused	him	
in	the	first	place,	or	the	podestà	did	not	want	to	anger	the	bishop	by	convicting	a	priest	in	a	
secular	court.	But	it	is	equally	plausible	that	Facciolo	had	paid	them	or	otherwise	arranged	
for	them	to	retract	their	denunciation.	A	similar	reversal	took	place	in	September	1313	
after	the	familia	reported	finding	six	men	playing	dice	in	the	crossroads	of	Porta	
Ravegnana.	Ten	days	after	the	initial	relatio,	the	berrovarii	appeared	before	the	judge	“to	
correct	the	error	of	the	inventio,”	stating	that	they	had	found	the	six	men	near	the	tower	of	
the	capitano,	not	in	the	crossroads,	and	had	not	seen	them	gambling	at	the	time.114	Also	
suspect	is	a	series	of	three	cases	from	July-August	1292	that	all	ended	in	acquittals	because	
of	the	same	procedural	deficiency,	namely	that	no	judge	or	knight	had	been	present	on	the	
familia’s	patrol.	In	the	first	case,	three	men	found	playing	dice	confessed	that	they	had	
indeed	been	gambling	and	were	marochi.	Despite	their	confession,	the	court	determined	
that	no	ranking	official	had	been	present	and	acquitted	them	accordingly.	A	few	weeks	
later,	after	a	curfew	violator	confessed	his	guilt,	the	court	again	discovered	that	no	knight	
had	been	present	and	acquitted	him	as	well.	When	the	issue	surfaced	in	another	gambling	
case	shortly	thereafter,	the	presiding	judge	became	suspicious.	He	asked	three	of	the	four	
defendants	if	they	had	given,	promised,	or	had	somebody	else	give	or	promise	something	to	
the	familia	to	help	them	avoid	conviction.	All	three	swore	they	had	done	no	such	thing,	
however,	and	so	the	judge	acquitted	them	as	well.115	In	all	three	cases	it	is	unclear	who	
brought	the	alleged	procedural	error	to	the	attention	of	the	court.	While	it	is	possible	that	
the	particular	crowns	notary	who	led	these	patrols	kept	repeating	the	same	mistake,	it	is	
more	likely	that	the	defendants	had	paid	some	familiares	to	attest	that	their	arrests	had	not	
been	lawful.	
	 Of	course,	money	did	not	necessarily	have	to	change	hands	to	influence	law	
enforcement.	While	many	cases	show	foreign	judges	were	not	afraid	to	prosecute	local	
elites,	some	acquittals	smack	of	personal	or	political	favors	to	those	same	elites.	For	
example,	in	1302	the	familia	reported	that	Pascipovero	di	Vianisio	Pascipoveri,	a	notary	
and	the	son	of	a	law	professor,	had	been	carrying	a	“sharp	and	malicious”	knife	in	Strada	
Maggiore.	The	court	acquitted	him,	however,	because	“it	did	not	seem	to	the	podestà	or	his	
household	that	the	knife	was	malicious	and	suspicious.”116	Such	a	subjective	determination	
by	the	judge—especially	in	contradiction	of	what	other	familiares	had	initially	reported—
would	seem	to	reflect	the	social	status	of	Pascipovero	and	his	family.	Also	telling,	in	January	
1318	the	familia	reportedly	found	two	men	gambling	in	a	tavern	owned	by	Romeo	Pepoli,	
where	his	servant	(famulus)	Guido	was	the	taverner.	The	notary	initially	wrote	that	Guido	
had	been	hosting	the	gamblers	there,	but	later	crossed	this	out.	The	court	went	on	to	acquit	
him,	even	though	there	is	no	indication	that	Guido	produced	witnesses	or	submitted	a	
																																																								
113	ASB,	Corone	3,	1291II	(56	fols.),	23r:	“Die	jovis	xiii	setembris	prefati	inventores,	scilicet	dictus	dominus	
Martinus	et	alii	qui	secum	fuerunt	ad	dictam	inventionem,	bene	recordati	fuerunt	asseruerunt	et	dixerunt	
quod	dictus	Faciolus	non	ludebat.”		
114	ASB,	Corone	20,	1313II	(33	fols.),	28r.	
115	ASB,	Corone	4,	1292II	(54	fols.),	19r,	28v–29r.	
116	ASB,	Corone	13,	1302II	(102	fols.),	35v:	“Restitutus	fuit	dictus	cutellus	eidem	Paxipovero	quia	non	fuit	
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defense.	Moreover,	the	court	determined	that	the	two	alleged	gamblers	were	in	fact	
ribaldi—a	status	hardly	ever	accorded	to	gamblers	found	in	taverns—and	had	them	doused	
with	water	instead	of	fined.117	One	cannot	help	but	wonder	if	this	was	all	a	favor	to	Romeo,	
who	in	1318	was	at	the	height	of	his	influence	as	the	proto-signore	of	Bologna.	
In	weighing	the	evidence	above,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	the	commune’s	
citizen-legislators	did	not	publicly	condone	the	use	of	personal	influence	to	affect	the	
outcomes	of	criminal	trials.	In	fact,	they	instituted	a	range	of	anti-corruption	measures	to	
combat	it.	For	instance,	in	May	1287,	Bologna’s	council	passed	a	resolution	that	the	podestà	
could	only	send	his	notaries	into	the	contado	to	conduct	inquisitions	for	the	crimes	of	
homicide,	robbery,	kidnapping	(or	rape),	and	arson.	They	deemed	this	necessary	because	
the	podestà’s	knights	and	notaries	were	making	“foul	and	iniquitous	exactions”	in	the	
contado	under	the	pretext	of	inquisition.	To	further	limit	this	extortion,	the	council	
required	these	foreign	officials	to	have	two	or	more	men	of	the	locality	present	at	the	
inquisition	to	vouch	for	the	identity	of	the	witnesses.118	More	broadly,	communes	“audited”	
their	podestà	in	a	process	known	as	the	sindacato.	General	inquisitions	investigated	
corruption	among	public	officials,	and	the	heralds	periodically	reminded	citizens	that	they	
were	not	to	bribe	the	podestà’s	familia.119	Furthermore,	when	the	authorities	got	wind	of	
specific	allegations,	they	do	seem	to	have	investigated	suspects	accordingly,	as	in	the	1286	
inquest	against	two	criers	said	to	have	taken	bribes.120	In	the	end,	however,	these	anti-
corruption	measures	merely	demonstrate	the	persistent	and	pervasive	threat	of	corruption	
to	the	commune’s	justice	system,	not	success	in	countering	it.	
Legal	Privilege	
As	discussed	in	earlier	chapters,	third-party	policing	represented	a	new,	more	
impersonal	mode	of	governance	in	the	mid-thirteenth	century.	Citizen-legislators	sought	to	
prevent	everyone—regardless	of	status—from	engaging	in	behaviors	they	deemed	
threatening	to	the	public	interest.	However,	this	trend	always	stood	in	tension	with	the	
fundamental	inequalities	enshrined	in	the	statutes,	which	prescribed	different	penalties,	
privileges,	and	procedures	for	different	kinds	of	people.	In	the	late	thirteenth	and	early	
fourteenth	centuries,	the	pendulum	swung	back	towards	greater	personality	in	criminal	
justice,	as	political	elites	granted	themselves	legal	immunity	from	prosecution	by	the	
podestà	for	a	range	of	offenses.	Over	the	course	of	decades,	this	proliferation	of	legal	
privilege	undermined	the	office	of	the	podestà	and	made	his	police	force	more	a	tool	of	elite	
repression	than	the	guarantor	of	the	common	welfare	it	was	intended	to	be.	
As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	privilege	in	Bologna	did	not	evolve	in	a	linear	fashion,	but	
it	did	become	an	increasingly	powerful	and	contentious	political	tool	over	the	course	of	the	
decades.	Privileges	generally	waxed	when	the	governing	coalition	became	more	closed	and	
waned	when	it	became	more	open.	To	an	extent,	privilege	represented	the	persistence	of	
traditional	and	charismatic	authority—or	of	“personality,”	in	North,	Wallis,	and	Weingast’s	
framework—in	communal	politics.	At	the	same	time,	it	embodied	the	new	ascendancy	of	
																																																								
117	ASB,	Corone	25,	1318I	(82	fols.),	19r,	20r.	
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rational-legal	authority	in	the	social	order.	Instead	of	dominating	through	sheer	force	of	
personality	and	military	might,	as	feudal	lords	might	have,	the	ruling	coalition	enshrined	
their	superiority	in	written	law,	not	least	through	extraordinary	advantages	in	trial	
procedures.	
With	regards	to	policing,	privilege	effectively	created	a	two-tier	system	of	law	
enforcement.	As	a	1310	privilege	stated,	privileged	men	could	licitly,	freely,	and	with	
impunity	go	about	the	city	and	contado	(including	the	piazzas)	by	day	or	night	as	they	
pleased.	They	could	also	freely	and	with	impunity	carry	knives	and	wear	armor	without	
any	license	or	permit,	provided	that	they	carry	a	light	at	night.	Otherwise	they	could	in	no	
way	be	impeded	by	anyone	or	any	officials	of	the	commune.121	The	stark	legal	inequality	
such	privileges	created	is	evident	in	a	1293	gambling	case,	where	the	familia	found	six	men	
gambling	under	the	portico	of	Bonacossa	de’	Porpori’s	house.	Four	of	these	defendants	
produced	notarized	documents	proving	they	were	privileged	and	were	acquitted	
accordingly,	while	at	least	one	of	the	other	two	suffered	the	25-lire	fine.122	Indeed,	at	the	
height	of	privilege	in	Bologna	(after	1306),	thousands	of	citizens	could	parade	through	the	
streets	armed	without	fear	of	the	familia.	Thus,	a	witness	in	a	1308	curfew	case	attested	the	
privileged	status	of	the	defendants	by	stating	he	had	seen	them	bearing	arms	“as	privileged	
men	do.”123	The	most	privileged	citizens	were	even	allowed	to	keep	bodyguards.	For	
example,	in	April	1308	Filippo	Pepoli—himself	a	repeat	offender	against	the	arms-bearing	
laws	(see	Chapter	2)—produced	a	privilegium	for	retaining	armed	servants	(famuli	armati)	
to	excuse	his	servant	Dino	Ugarelli	for	carrying	a	knife.124	Some	citizens	seem	to	have	
abused	their	privileges	outright,	as	in	the	case	of	six	men	found	“going	through	the	city	
playing	a	guitar	and	serenading”	one	evening	in	September	1302.	Although	they	were	all	
placed	in	prison,	the	charges	against	them	were	dropped	after	the	grain	lords	(domini	
bladi)	claimed	the	defendants	as	their	officers.	By	law,	the	officials	of	the	grain	office	were	
free	to	go	about	at	night	to	discharge	their	duties.	If	the	familia’s	report	is	at	all	true,	these	
men	had	used	a	privilege	of	public	office	to	go	carousing	at	night.125	
The	proliferation	of	privilege	severely	hampered	the	podestà’s	ability	to	police	the	
city,	since	privileged	men	had	only	to	prove	who	they	were	in	court	to	win	immunity.	Some	
podestà	protested	accordingly.	For	example,	in	August	1288,	the	podestà	Corso	Donati	of	
Florence	petitioned	the	Council	of	the	Popolo	for	the	authority	to	investigate	and	punish	
crimes	as	he	deemed	just	and	expedient.	He	complained	that	many	crimes	were	committed	
daily	in	the	city,	and	assassins	and	infamous	persons	resided	in	the	city	continually	without	
any	fear	of	his	rule	or	office,	because	of	various	statutes	and	resolutions,	and	the	privileges	
that	these	criminals	claimed.	He	therefore	asked	the	Council	to	absolve	him	of	the	
hindrances	created	by	such	laws	and	privileges,	and	beseeched	them	to	pass	a	provision	
addressing	the	fact	that	people	carried	assault	weapons	openly	in	the	city	every	day.	It	is	
unclear	what	the	Council	did	with	the	petition,	but	it	is	noteworthy	that	this	podestà	felt	his	
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employers	were	making	it	difficult	for	him	to	do	his	job	a	full	20	years	before	such	
privileges	became	truly	widespread.126	Similarly,	in	October	1320,	the	podestà	argued	
against	an	appeal	(protestacio)	from	Buonacatto	Buonacatti	that	his	privilege	had	been	
violated	in	an	arms-bearing	conviction.	The	podestà	claimed	that	the	reformatio	granting	
Buonacatto	his	privilege	was	not	valid	because	it	contravened	the	Sacred	Ordinances	
(reformationes	sacratas),	which	expressly	prohibited	the	bearing	of	arms.	The	podestà	and	
his	judge	had	sworn	to	uphold	the	Sacred	Ordinances	under	the	penalties	contained	
therein,	and	said	they	would	continue	to	do	so	(including	upholding	the	prohibitions	
against	bearing	arms)	unless	the	Council	passed	new	Sacred	Ordinances	to	the	contrary.127		
The	above	examples	are	evidence	not	only	of	how	difficult	it	could	be	for	podestà	to	
enforce	ever-changing	laws,	but	also	of	citizens’	competing	impulses	to	legislate	order	and	
preserve	their	personal	autonomy	at	the	same	time.	The	political	elite’s	overriding	concern	
to	maintain	their	individual	liberties	is	explicit	in	other	protestaciones,	which	express	the	
outrage	privileged	men	felt	at	being	unjustly	(or	so	they	claimed)	investigated,	arrested,	or	
punished	by	the	podestà	and	his	familia.	To	take	one	example	from	January	1318,	a	
protestacio	on	behalf	of	the	privileged	citizen	Pietro	di	Giacomino	alleged	that	the	former	
podestà	had	arrested,	jailed,	and	placed	him	in	leg	shackles	arbitrarily,	“against	God	and	
justice”	and	“without	any	cause.”	The	podestà	had	thereby	deprived	Pietro	of	the	“license	
and	liberty	of	going	and	standing	and	also	returning	through	the	city	of	Bologna,	the	palace,	
and	piazza	of	the	commune	of	Bologna”	as	he	pleased,	“which	license	and	liberty	he	was	
supposed	to	have”	by	virtue	of	his	privilege.128	This	and	other	protestaciones	cast	the	
plaintiff’s	loss	of	liberty	as	the	main	injury	inflicted	by	the	familia	and	betray	an	elite	
sentiment	that	the	podestà’s	justice	should	be	directed	at	other,	lesser	men,	not	the	men	
who	employed	him.	
The	running	tension	between	the	impersonal	policing	of	the	familia	and	the	
fundamentally	personal	politics	of	communal	life	is	epitomized	in	an	episode	from	
February	1294,	when	a	routine	arms-bearing	stop	provoked	a	public	confrontation	
between	the	familia	and	a	privileged	citizen.	It	began	when	two	berrovarii	stopped	
Bertuccio	Biselli	of	Borgo	Colline	in	the	parish	of	Santo	Stefano	for	carrying	a	knife	and	
wearing	armor.	According	to	the	podestà’s	notary	Giovanni,	a	crowd	gathered	as	he	and	the	
knight	Bonafacino	were	standing	under	a	portico	trying	to	book	Bertuccio.	Bonafacino	
ordered	the	crowd	to	back	away	and	not	obstruct	his	office	under	penalty	of	25	lire.	The	
bystanders	complied	except	for	Bartolomeo	Bianco	di	Cossa,	who	stepped	forward	in	an	
attempt	“to	hear	and	understand	the	things	that	were	being	said	and	written.”	Bonafacino	
ordered	Bartolomeo	to	stand	back	under	penalty	of	20	soldi,	but	Bartolomeo	refused,	both	
verbally	and	in	deed.	The	knight	ordered	him	to	back	away	three	more	times—raising	the	
penalty	each	time	to	100	soldi,	10	lire,	and	finally	25	lire—and	to	present	himself	before	
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the	podestà	as	well.	Each	time	Bartolomeo	refused,	“always	scorning”	the	knight’s	orders	
and	standing	under	the	portico	for	as	long	as	the	familia	was	there.129	Bartolomeo	did	
comply,	however,	with	the	order	to	present	himself	to	the	podestà	that	same	day.	He	
denied	in	court	that	he	had	spurned	the	knight’s	orders,	claiming	to	the	contrary	that	he	
had	backed	away	from	the	portico	each	of	the	four	times	Bonafacino	told	him	to	do	so.130	
(He	did	not	explain	why	he	had	to	be	told	three	additional	times.)	Three	of	Bartolomeo’s	
defense	witnesses	went	further	and	placed	blame	on	the	familia.	The	notary	Bianco	di	Pace	
Surici	testified	that	Bartolomeo	did	leave	the	portico	as	ordered,	and	only	returned	when	
the	knight	called	him	forward	to	book	him	as	well.	Asked	why	the	knight	called	him	
forward,	Bianco	speculated	that	it	was	because	Bartolomeo	had	been	saying	to	the	knight	
from	outside	the	portico,	“Please	don’t	hinder	this	good	man	found	with	weapons	since	he	
is	a	soldier.	You	should	accept	surety	from	him.”	According	to	Bianco,	Bartolomeo	complied	
with	the	knight’s	order	to	leave	the	portico	again	after	he	was	booked,	saying,	“I’ll	do	
whatever	you	please.”	The	judge	later	asked	Bianco	if	Bartolomeo	had	ever	said	to	the	
knight,	“I	will	not	back	away	since	this	portico	is	mine	and	I	am	privileged.”	Bianco	
maintained	that	Bartolomeo	never	refused	the	knight’s	order,	but	he	did	say,	“Very	well,	I’ll	
do	what	you	want,	but	you	are	not	allowed	to	order	me	since	I	am	privileged.”	Bianco	also	
confirmed	that	Bartolomeo	had	asked	him,	as	a	notary,	to	make	a	record	of	the	fact	that	the	
knight	had	scorned	his	privileged	status.131	A	second	witness,	Benedetto	Mussoni,	told	
much	the	same	story.	In	his	version,	Bartolomeo	retreated	from	the	portico	as	ordered	but	
continued	to	agitate.	He	told	the	knight	he	should	show	Bertuccio	some	courtesy	(faceret	
urbanitatem)	and	not	impede	him	since	he	was	a	soldier,	and,	perhaps	more	contentiously,	
that	the	knight	could	not	expel	him	from	his	own	portico.	In	response	the	knight	called	
Bartolomeo	forward	to	be	booked.	Bartolomeo,	meanwhile,	ordered	his	eventual	witness	
Bianco	Surici	to	make	a	separate	record	of	the	incident.	The	original	suspect,	Bertuccio	
Biselli,	also	testified	in	Bartolomeo’s	defense,	upholding	the	basic	contention	that	he	had	
complied	with	the	knight’s	orders.	He	added	that	Bartolomeo	was	singled	out	for	booking	
because	he	had	told	the	knight	he	was	acting	wrongfully	(malle	facit)	in	taking	weapons	
from	a	soldier.132	A	fourth	witness	named	Ricardino	di	Caravita	was	less	helpful	in	his	
testimony.	In	his	telling,	Bartolomeo	never	left	the	portico	completely,	taking	only	a	few	
steps	backwards	when	ordered,	and	had	even	threatened	the	knight,	saying,	“Watch	what	
you	do	since	this	is	my	portico	and	I	am	privileged,	and	you	can’t	give	me	orders.”133		
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The	trial	record	does	not	reveal	whether	Bartolomeo	suffered	any	penalty	for	
impeding	the	office	of	the	familia.	Of	course,	it	is	impossible	to	say	what	exactly	transpired	
under	his	portico,	but	the	basic	outline	would	seem	to	tie	together	the	threads	of	this	
chapter.	Local	bystanders	took	exception	to	one	of	the	familia’s	police	actions;	most	of	
those	bystanders	feared	the	familia	enough	to	back	off	when	ordered;	but	one	of	those	
bystanders,	apparently	emboldened	by	his	privileged	status,	confronted	the	familia	about	
its	supposed	misconduct.	Perhaps	the	most	striking	detail	of	this	story	is	the	way	
Bartolomeo	ordered	his	notary	friend,	Bianco	Surici,	to	write	down	what	was	happening	at	
the	same	time	he	was	being	written	up	by	the	podestà’s	officials.	Rather	than	contest	a	
police	action	through	violence,	these	local	elites	created	a	competing	written	narrative	for	
later	use	in	court—a	testament	to	the	litigious	culture	that	had	taken	root	in	the	communes	
by	the	late	thirteenth	century.	From	the	familia’s	perspective,	this	episode	underlines	the	
difficulty	of	policing	a	city	where	a	sizable	minority	of	residents	were	in	many	respects	
above	the	law.	Indeed,	Bartolomeo	was	probably	right	that	the	podestà’s	knight	could	not	
order	him	around,	especially	under	his	own	portico,	but	the	knight	had	no	way	of	knowing	
the	veracity	of	his	claim	to	privilege	until	documents	were	produced	in	court.	In	the	end,	
privileges	like	Bartolomeo’s	undermined	the	familia’s	ability	to	discipline	elites.	The	
commune’s	lawmakers	may	have	hired	third-party	enforcers	to	uphold	their	laws,	but	
many	did	not	want	to	be	subject	to	police	power	themselves.		
Conclusion:	A	Legacy	of	Government	Coercion		
This	chapter	has	shown,	in	effect,	why	it	is	so	difficult	for	limited	access	orders	to	
transition	to	open	access	or	even	to	adopt	impersonal	rules	on	a	societal	scale.	Such	a	
transition	must	take	place	within	the	logic	of	a	limited	access	order	based	on	identity	rules,	
which	means	existing	norms	will	always	work,	to	some	extent,	against	a	social	order	that	
treats	everyone	more	equally.	The	familia’s	more	impersonal	enforcement	did	change	the	
nature	of	certain	rules	in	the	city,	making	them	constraining	for	all	citizens	to	whom	those	
rules	applied.	This	in	turn	affected	the	behavior	of	citizen-subjects.	But	it	did	not	change	
the	logic	of	the	social	order,	which	continued	to	be	based	on	custom,	honor,	and	identity	
rules.	Even	the	podestà’s	familiares	themselves,	who	were	supposed	to	embody	impersonal	
enforcement,	frequently	behaved	in	keeping	with	traditional	norms	during	the	course	of	
their	work.	Thus,	if	this	book	is	a	case	study	of	how	modern	institutions	might	emerge	from	
a	premodern	social	order,	as	suggested	in	the	Introduction,	it	is	also	a	case	study	of	why	
they	are	unlikely	to	effect	transformational	change.	
Of	course,	the	communes’	leading	citizens	did	not	intend	to	change	the	social	order	
by	instituting	new	forms	of	policing.	But	they	did	intend	for	government	police	power	to	
enhance	their	political	security	and	legitimacy,	and	in	this	respect	the	institution	was	a	
resounding	failure.	At	the	macro	level,	Bologna	and	indeed	most	towns	in	northern	Italy	
lurched	from	one	political	crisis	to	the	next	over	the	course	of	the	thirteenth	and	fourteenth	
centuries,	despite	new	and	far-reaching	techniques	for	the	maintenance	of	public	order.	
Even	with	the	coming	of	the	signoria,	few	rulers	or	regimes	seemed	to	enjoy	lasting	
stability	or	legitimacy.	This	can	well	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	direct	relationship	
between	political	legitimacy	and	stability.	According	to	Weber,	legitimacy	is	marked	by	
voluntary	submission	to	authority,	a	pervasive	belief	that	the	rules	and	order	promulgated	
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by	that	authority	are	obligatory	and	binding.134	Building	on	this	definition,	North	and	
Wallis	have	argued	that	social	orders	“work”	only	insofar	as	elites	buy	into	the	rules.	It	is	
not	fear	of	coercion	from	a	Leviathan	government	but	elites’	shared	belief	in	the	legitimacy	
of	rules—that	following	the	rules	will	benefit	them	somehow—that	produces	order	and	
stability.135	This	kind	of	buy-in	was	generally	lacking	in	the	towns	of	communal	Italy,	where	
elite	politics	were	defined	by	what	Andrea	Gamberini	has	termed	a	“clash	of	
legitimacies.”136	Regimes	governed	by	coercing	and	excluding	their	rivals,	and,	after	the	
initial	successes	of	the	popolo,	the	political	elite	fractured	increasingly	into	groups	of	haves	
and	have-nots.	In	Bologna	this	played	out	along	characteristically	juridical	lines,	with	a	
group	of	legally	privileged	citizens	elevated	above	their	peers,	enemies,	and	ordinary	
residents	alike.	But	this	retrenchment	of	the	elite	occurred	throughout	Italy	and	effectively	
rendered	government	policing	a	tool	of	factional	interests	rather	than	the	public	welfare.137	
On	the	whole,	it	seems	the	communes’	citizens	never	really	believed	it	was	a	matter	
of	self-interest	not	to	carry	knives	or	gamble	per	se,	so	much	as	not	to	get	caught	doing	
those	things.	The	culture	of	hatred	and	feud,	for	example,	still	dictated	that	men	in	certain	
situations	needed	to	bear	arms	in	a	personal	capacity.	To	borrow	again	from	Dubber’s	
terminology	(see	Introduction),	this	tension	was	the	product	of	competing	urges	to	
autonomous	and	heteronomous	governance,	a	tension	inherent	in	most	political	systems	
but	especially	in	republics.138	That	is,	the	governing	elite	must	balance	the	imperative	to	
respect	individual	(and	especially	elite)	rights	against	the	need	to	safeguard	the	
commonwealth	to	create	the	space	for	individuals	to	exercise	those	rights.	Judging	from	the	
evidence	above,	individual	popolani	valued	their	personal	libertas	and	not	being	hindered	
by	the	familia	over	the	more	abstract	libertas	of	their	governing	coalition,	which	the	familia	
was	supposed	to	protect.	
And	yet,	because	the	familia	was	tactically	effective	at	coercion,	government	policing	
proved	enduring	as	an	institution.	The	next	two	centuries	saw	the	size	of	police	forces	
increase	in	the	Italian	city-states,	even	through	the	demographic	crisis	caused	by	the	Black	
Death.	Police	forces	also	become	a	standard	feature	of	the	apparatus	of	government	across	
Western	Europe.139	This	normalization	of	police	does	not	seem	to	have	improved	the	
reputation	of	police	forces	among	the	local	populace;	on	the	contrary,	it	may	only	have	
worsened	as	the	number	of	police	per	capita	increased.140	However,	for	rulers	in	an	age	of	
state	formation,	the	popularity	of	police	forces	mattered	less	than	their	capacity	to	
coerce.141	Just	as	signorie	retained	the	trappings	of	republican	institutions	to	legitimate	
																																																								
134	Weber,	Economy	and	Society,	31–33,	946.	
135	Wallis	and	North,	“Coordination	and	Coercion.”	
136	Gamberini,	The	Clash	of	Legitimacies.	Blanshei	has	also	seized	on	how	popular	attitudes	toward	the	
government	relate	to	the	success	(or	lack	thereof)	of	government	policies;	Blanshei,	“Homicide.”	
137	As	Patrick	Lantschner	has	pointed	out,	the	“fragmentation	of	cities”	was	not	a	uniquely	Italian	or	even	
European	phenomenon	in	the	late	medieval	and	early	modern	period.	Lantschner,	The	Logic	of	Political	
Conflict,	202–7.	
138	This	tension	is	also	a	major	theme	in	Carvalho,	The	Preventive	Turn.	
139	On	northern	Italy,	see	Blanshei,	“Bolognese	Criminal	Justice,”	65;	Zorzi,	“Justice,”	501;	Zorzi,	“The	Judicial	
System,”	49;	Stern,	The	Criminal	Law	System,	48–49;	Manikowska,	“Il	controllo	sulle	città”;	Ruggiero,	Violence,	
3–17.	On	Western	Europe,	see	Bayley,	“The	Police.”	
140	For	this	trend	in	Bologna,	see	Hughes,	Crime;	Hughes,	“Fear	and	Loathing.”	On	the	unsavory	reputation	of	
the	Paris	police,	see	Merriman,	Police	Stories,	9–10;	Emsley,	“Policing	the	Streets,”	278–80.	
141	On	state	formation	in	the	fourteenth	and	fifteenth	centuries,	see	Watts,	The	Making	of	Polities.	
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their	autocratic	rule,	they	also	retained	their	police	forces	to	legitimate	their	claims	as	the	
providers	of	justice	and	order.		 	
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Conclusion	
This	study	set	out	to	explore	the	role	of	government	police	power	in	the	life	of	the	
Italian	communes,	and	how	and	why	that	police	power	burgeoned	over	the	course	of	the	
thirteenth	century.	Three	points	should	be	clear	by	now.	First,	by	hiring	foreign	officials	to	
patrol	their	streets,	the	communes’	citizens	greatly	enhanced	their	criminal	courts’	capacity	
to	enforce	impersonal	rules	and,	more	fundamentally,	to	coerce	citizens	as	subjects.	
Second,	the	police	activity	of	the	foreign	rectores	was	part	of	a	preventive	turn	in	public	
justice,	built	on	a	profusion	of	new	legislation	aimed	at	correcting	or	removing	threats	to	
the	public	good.	Third,	in	the	Italian	communes,	this	preventive	turn	came	during—and	
appears	in	part	to	have	been	a	product	of—a	moment	of	growing	political	participation	and	
instability.	This	conclusion	will	discuss	the	implications	of	each	of	these	points	for	future	
studies	of	police,	medieval	justice,	and	state	formation.	
On	the	first	point,	the	evident	scope	of	the	communes’	police	power	will,	I	hope,	
make	it	harder	for	historians	of	police	to	overlook	the	Middle	Ages	as	the	epoch	when	
police	supposedly	did	not	exist.	For	decades,	the	historiography	of	police—especially	
Anglo-American	scholarship—has	been	dominated	by	the	“state	monopolization	thesis,”	
the	idea	that	in	the	nineteenth	century,	the	state	took	control	of	criminal	justice	through	
police	forces,	ending	a	prior	era	in	which	criminal	justice	depended	primarily	on	the	
participation	of	ordinary	people	in	the	community.1	Although	some	scholars	have	
challenged	this	state-centric	model,	the	basic	“newness”	of	the	police	forces	of	the	1800s—
and	the	supposed	ineffectuality	of	the	police	forces	that	predated	them—has	gone	largely	
unchallenged.	Yet	much	of	what	was	supposedly	novel	about	the	professional	police	forces	
of	the	1800s—that	they	were	centrally	directed,	bureaucratically	controlled,	and	publicly	
funded—aptly	describes	what	was	novel	about	the	podestà’s	familia	in	the	1200s.2	This	is	
not	to	imply	that	northern	Italy’s	berrovarii	were	just	like	London’s	bobbies,	or	that	one	can	
draw	a	straight	line	from	the	berrovarii	to	the	carabinieri.	But	it	is	to	argue	that	European	
and	American	police	institutions—narrowly	defined	as	law	enforcement	entities—have	a	
much	deeper	and	more	dynamic	history	than	the	historiography	would	seem	to	allow.3	
Admittedly,	this	study’s	focus	on	the	coercive	capacity	of	the	communes’	criminal	
courts	is	to	some	degree	a	reaction	against	scholars’	recent	emphasis	on	the	negotiated	
aspects	of	medieval	justice.	To	be	sure,	this	recent	scholarship	has	greatly	enhanced	our	
understanding	of	how	medieval	societies	functioned	by	contextualizing	public	justice	
within	the	broader	framework	of	dispute	resolution.	This	study	hardly	denies	that	extra-	
and	infrajudicial	institutions	such	as	peace	agreements	remained	of	vital	importance	into	
the	fourteenth	century	and	beyond.	Yet	medievalists	have	largely	overlooked	the	fact	that	
foreign	police	forces	compelled	hundreds	of	people,	including	elites,	to	answer	charges	in	
court	each	year,	and	made	government	intervention	a	routine	feature	of	urban	life.	The	
historiography	is	curiously	out	of	balance	in	this	regard.	After	all,	in	most	traditional	
																																																								
1	For	a	historiographical	discussion,	see	Churchill,	Crime	Control,	1–8.	
2	For	this	list	of	characteristics,	see	Hay	and	Snyder,	“Using	the	Criminal	Law,”	51.	
3	For	example,	Mark	Neocleous	has	shown	how	the	ideas	of	Britain’s	late	eighteenth-	and	early	nineteenth-
century	police	reformers—usually	treated	as	the	founders	of	a	new	tradition	of	policing—are	rooted	in	
continental	police	science;	see	“Theoretical	Foundations.’”	
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societies,	justice	is	rooted	in	the	customs	of	local	communities	and	oriented	toward	
reparation	and	reconciliation.	It	should	be	no	surprise	to	find	such	institutions	still	at	work	
in	the	later	Middle	Ages,	even	in	urban	communities	with	relatively	complex	systems	of	
government.	Rather,	the	shift	toward	hegemonic	justice,	aimed	at	punishing	guilty	subjects	
according	to	written	laws,	is	the	novel	and	interesting	development.	Attempting	to	analyze	
and	explain	this	transition,	moreover,	does	not	require	complicity	with	any	“master	
narrative”	of	state	or	“Western”	triumphalism.4	If	the	job	of	historians	is	(in	part)	to	explain	
change	over	time,	then	medievalists	must	reckon	anew	with	the	ways	later	medieval	
governments	increased	their	capacity	to	discipline	and	punish,	including	through	new	and	
expanded	police	measures.	
Turning	to	the	second	point,	a	key	element	of	the	rise	of	hegemonic	justice	was	a	
new	preventive	mentality—a	police	mentality—in	public	justice.	Authorities	increasingly	
sought	to	keep	the	peace	and	maintain	order	through	proactive	measures,	rather	than	
reacting	to	harms	committed.	This	study	has	focused	on	a	broad	subset	of	preventive	
measures	aimed	at	human	threats:	political	rebels,	men	bearing	arms,	thieves	in	the	night,	
vagabonds,	and	so	forth.	In	other	words,	it	has	focused	on	what	Dubber	calls	“people	
police”	instead	of	“thing	police,”	keeping	in	mind	that	police	treats	both	people	and	things	
as	objects.5	However,	“thing	police”—which	addresses	threats	to	public	health,	public	
property,	and	the	free	circulation	of	goods—may	well	have	constituted	the	larger	sphere	of	
preventive	justice	in	the	Italian	communes.	Chapter	1	touched	on	the	familia’s	efforts	to	
regulate	these	domains,	but	much	more	can	be	said	on	economic	and	hygienic	forms	of	
police.	Indeed,	Foucault	used	the	regulation	of	grain	markets	and	urban	planning	schemes	
to	illustrate	early	modern	police	efforts	in	his	own	lectures.	Yet	medievalists	are	just	
beginning	to	draw	on	his	work	on	police	and	biopower	in	their	studies	of	public	health,	
commerce,	and	urban	planning,	despite	their	earlier	embrace	of	his	work	on	discipline	and	
deviance.6	This	study	will	have	shown,	I	hope,	the	utility	of	police	as	a	framing	concept	for	
diverse	lines	of	effort	in	medieval	governance,	all	aimed	(ostensibly)	at	the	public	good.	
Although	the	“outsourcing”	of	police	patrols	was	peculiar	to	Italy,	the	proliferation	of	police	
measures	was	a	widespread	phenomenon	in	medieval	Europe,	above	all	in	cities.	The	
origins	of	European	police	science	lie	in	the	Middle	Ages,	and	more	study	is	needed	to	
illuminate	the	medieval	contribution.	
This	study	has	focused	on	government	police	power,	in	particular	the	office	of	the	
podestà,	but	Foucault’s	concept	of	police	also	opens	up	possibilities	for	broader	inquiries	
into	the	history	of	public	services.	After	all,	Foucault’s	work	on	power	(including	police	
power)	in	many	ways	transcends	traditional	politics.	He	treats	power	not	as	a	social	
commodity	wielded	by	discrete	agents,	such	as	sovereigns	or	government	officials,	but	as	a	
pervasive	element	of	society,	rooted	in	the	discourses	and	accepted	bodies	of	knowledge	
that	shape	society	and	its	individual	members.	As	such,	Foucault	is	interested	less	in	acts	of	
government	than	practices	and	techniques	of	governance—what	he	calls	
“governmentality”—which	manifest	themselves	in	any	number	of	organizations	(schools,	
clinics,	prisons,	etc.).	Adopting	this	expansive	view	of	power	risks	transforming	police	(or	
social	control	more	broadly)	into	an	all-encompassing	concept,	and	therefore	one	of	limited	
																																																								
4	On	the	“Master	Narrative,”	see	Moore,	“Medieval	Europe	in	World	History.”	
5	Dubber,	The	Police	Power,	124.	
6	See	for	example	Geltner’s	forthcoming	work,	Roads	to	Health.	
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analytical	value.7	Nevertheless,	government	is	not	the	only	organization	in	society	to	
exercise	police	power,	even	in	the	most	paradigmatic	of	modern	states.8	In	medieval	cities	
especially,	one	could	well	talk	about	the	police	power	of	guilds,	militias,	confraternities,	
religious	communities,	neighborhood	associations,	and	so	forth.	Whether	they	had	
constitutional	roles	in	the	government	or	not,	these	organizations	all	played	important	
roles	in	defining	and	constructing	the	public	good.9	
In	light	of	this,	this	study	may	appear	somewhat	old-fashioned	in	its	focus	on	the	
police	power	of	public	officials.	Indeed,	the	question	posed	at	the	beginning	of	how	
seemingly	“modern”	institutions—namely	third-party	enforcement	and	more	impersonal	
rules—gained	traction	in	premodern	Italy	may	seem	to	some	readers	to	have	a	teleological	
bent.	After	all,	one	of	the	oldest	strands	in	the	historiography	on	the	Italian	communes	
views	them	as	the	precocious	forebears	of	liberal	democracies,	whose	republican	ideals	
laid	the	institutional	groundwork	for	the	modern	state	and	civil	society.	It	cannot	be	
stressed	enough,	then,	that	the	aim	of	this	study	is	not	to	understand	how	the	Italian	
communes	achieved	a	more	modern	(and	implicitly	superior)	form	of	government.	Without	
a	doubt,	institutional	change	is	a	dynamic	and	highly	contingent	process,	not	linear	and	
progressive.	The	communes’	transition	to	signorie	after	a	moment	of	increased	political	
participation	should	be	evidence	enough	of	this.	But	the	stubborn	fact	remains	that	
communal	governments	took	on	a	more	prominent	role	in	rule	enforcement	in	the	
thirteenth	century,	and	historians	have	hardly	exhausted	their	understanding	of	the	factors	
behind	this	important	development.	Moreover,	very	few	societies	in	human	history	have	
succeeded	in	enforcing	impersonal	rules	for	any	sustained	period	of	time,	and	those	that	
have	may	yet	fail	to	do	so	in	the	future.	It	is	therefore	a	matter	of	general	historical	interest	
when	societies	take	steps	toward	more	impersonal	institutions,	whether	they	succeed	or	
fail	to	make	the	transition.10	The	Italian	communes	make	an	especially	intriguing	case	
study	in	light	of	their	political	autonomy	and	relatively	participatory	systems	of	
government.	After	all,	the	state	monopolization	thesis	tends	to	treat	“the	state”	as	a	single	
actor	that	expands	police	power	to	serve	its	own	interests;	it	assumes	the	growth	of	police	
is	a	top-down	process.	The	case	of	the	communes’	makes	clear,	however,	that	the	intra-
state	dynamics	among	governments	and	other	elite	organizations	are	more	complicated	
and	interesting	than	that.	
	 This	brings	us	finally	to	the	third	point,	that	the	growth	of	police	power	in	the	
communes	seems	to	have	been	a	direct	outgrowth	of	a	temporary	expansion	of	access	to	
the	political	elite	and	the	political	shocks	that	created.	That,	of	course,	is	not	meant	to	be	a	
universalizing	explanation	for	the	growth	of	police	power	in	all	social	orders.	Nor	is	it	to	
suggest	that	the	political	elite	consciously	or	deliberately	tried	to	claim	for	the	government	
a	monopoly	on	the	legitimate	use	of	violence,	or	create	some	form	of	“rule	of	law.”	Indeed,	
the	communes’	leading	citizens	had	no	conception	of	these	ideals,	nor	did	they	view	
impersonal	institutions	as	morally	superior.	Rather,	it	was	a	classic	calculation	of	collective	
interest.	The	popolani	newcomers	to	the	political	elite	were	more	numerous	but	
																																																								
7	For	a	critique	of	overly	broad	uses	of	“social	control,”	see	Cohen,	Visions	of	Social	Control,	2–4.	
8	Johnston	and	Shearing,	Governing	Security.	More	broadly,	see	Rhodes,	“The	New	Governance.”	
9	This	is	a	central	theme	in	Van	der	Heijden	et	al.,	eds.,	Serving	the	Urban	Community.	
10	Understanding	this	transition	is	the	central	concern	of	North,	Wallis,	and	Weingast	in	Violence	and	Social	
Orders.	
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individually	weaker	than	the	families	that	had	traditionally	dominated	the	city.	Thus,	in	
order	to	protect	their	economic	interests	and	constrain	the	violence	of	powerful	individuals	
(including	those	within	their	coalition),	they	legislated	new	rules	that	would	apply	to	
virtually	everyone	in	the	commune,	including	elites.	Granted,	they	also	made	use	of	identity	
rules	to	level	the	political	playing	field,	but	their	legislative	program	was	more	impersonal	
and	far-reaching	than	what	came	before	it.	Moreover,	to	ensure	that	enforcement	would	
not	spark	vicious	cycles	of	legal	reprisals	and	counterreprisals,	they	hired	a	foreign	military	
organization—embedded	within	the	government—to	enforce	those	rules.	To	borrow	again	
from	Wallis	and	North,	the	central	insight	here	is	that,	in	a	premodern	social	order,	the	
government	gains	its	capacity	to	coerce	through	its	capacity	to	coordinate—not	the	other	
way	around,	as	most	theories	of	state	have	assumed	since	Hobbes.	The	government’s	
primary	function	is	to	signify	publicly	the	rules	agreed	upon	by	elites	and	their	intent	to	
abide	by	them.11	Public	enforcement	by	government	officials	is	of	secondary	importance.	
The	government	can	only	legitimately	coerce	elites	when	they	have	broken	a	rule	that	all	
agreed,	at	least	in	theory,	was	to	their	collective	benefit.	
	 Again,	this	experiment	with	more	impersonal	institutions	did	not	transform	the	
basic	logic	of	the	social	order.	In	this	respect,	the	experience	of	the	Italian	communes	is	
well	within	the	historical	norm.	As	a	recent	set	of	case	studies	suggests,	elites	have	
difficulty	enforcing	impersonal	rules	and	opening	political	access	because	these	are	
inherently	destabilizing	activities.12	When	the	social	order	itself	is	predicated	on	exclusion	
and	identity	rules,	elites	have	an	obvious	personal	incentive	to	retain	their	privileges	and	
can	legitimately	claim	that	relinquishing	them	would	undermine	stability.	As	a	result,	elites	
in	limited	access	orders	have	tended	to	replace	each	other	periodically	through	history	
rather	than	transition	to	open	access.	This	seems	to	have	been	the	case	in	the	Italian	
communes,	as	popular	coalitions	fell	victim	to	factional	infighting	and	the	reins	of	
government	passed	once	again	to	a	handful	of	powerful	families.	Nonetheless,	the	
innovations	in	policing	spawned	by	this	historical	moment	endured,	leaving	a	powerful	
new	coercive	tool	in	the	hands	of	rulers	of	signorial	and	territorial	states.		 	
																																																								
11	Wallis	and	North,	“Coordination	and	Coercion.”	
12	Lamoreaux	and	Wallis,	eds.,	Organizations.	
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